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Introduction 
Lubumbashi, 7 November 2009. TP Mazembe beats Nigeria’s Heartland FC 1-0 
in the CAF Champions League final. President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo watches the match from the VIP section at the Stade Muni-
cipal, together with tens of thousands of spectators. It is the third time for TP – or 
Tout Puissant, meaning All Powerful – Mazembe to clinch the continent’s most 
prestigious club trophy. The team successfully defends the title the following 
year. 
The team’s star player is a youthful striker by the name of Mputu Mabi, called 
Tresor by his father who saw his son as a treasure, and rightly so. The club’s true 
star, however, is a wealthy man named Moise Katumbi Chapwe, who has been 
its president since the late 1990s. Under his tutelage the club won five league 
titles in the first decade of the new millennium. Katumbi has consistently stated 
that his goal is to make TP Mazembe one of Africa’s biggest club sides. For the 
2010 season he announced a $10 million budget plus an extra $2 million to 
renovate the stadium.  
Moise Katumbi is one of many African businessmen who sponsor and run 
clubs. Although TP Mazembe’s recent budgets have been rather high in com-
parison with most clubs in Africa, a rich and influential man taking over a club 
and turning it into a powerhouse is an example of the situation on the continent. 
Katumbi, who was elected governor of Katanga Province in 2007, made his 
fortune in the fishing, mining and transport sector in both Zambia and DR 
Congo. It was and still is a time of turmoil and unrest. The Big Man has always 
remained close to those in positions of power.  
Why would a wealthy man such as Katumbi invest time and money in a 
football club? For one thing, Katumbi understands the political ramifications of 
the club’s massive following, having stated that ‘TP Mazembe is the hope of the 
Congolese people’.1 He nevertheless denies having any political aspirations. ‘I 
have no interest in politics,’ he says. ‘If I had to choose between politics and my 
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football club I would choose football.’2 Yet one would be wise to take such 
words with a few grains of salt. 
The de-virtualised world of football 
It is claimed that Africa’s national teams have evolved to a point where they can 
rival the world’s best national teams. This idea is caused by the fact that some of 
the most popular players contracted by Europe’s richest clubs are Africans. As a 
result, the national teams of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon boast 
well-known professionals. The 2010 World Cup nevertheless proved once again 
that Africa’s performances leave a lot to be desired. To me, the main cause is to 
be found in the way the African game is organised, financed and managed. As 
journalist Jonathan Wilson remarked, inept and corrupt ‘administration coupled 
with political interference leads to confused governance and (a football) 
infrastructure that never develops’.3 
This is an anthropological study and as such the data have been gathered 
during fieldwork at what one might call the grassroots level. My argument is 
based on what happens within the management of clubs in Africa’s leagues and, 
to a lesser extent, within Africa’s football associations (FAs). Most examples 
therefore deal directly with club affairs. However, the results of this study can 
with relative ease be extrapolated to the level of Africa’s national teams for the 
simple reason that those who run clubs and those who run the FAs (and by 
implication the various national teams) are more often than not the same people. 
In fact, football in Africa is organised and run in a more or less similar fashion no 
matter how high or low the level of the game. 
The topic at hand originated out of a five-month stay in the town of Buea 
(pronunciation Boy-ya) in southwestern Cameroon in 2003. It was here, in the 
foothills of West Africa’s highest mountain, that I joined two teams and im-
mersed myself in the lives of footballers, team managers, coaches, referees, 
witchdoctors and others who were directly involved in the game. I researched the 
spiritual practices and beliefs that are so prevalent in the African game.4 Yet it 
was a meeting with Calvin Foinding, the owner and president of Buea’s top 
league club at the time, that made me aware of the existence of what I perceived 
to be a parallel world – one inhabited not by players, team managers and coaches 
but by presidents, chairmen, directors and patrons. 
Calvin Foinding is a successful businessman who founded his private club 
Mount Cameroon in the late 1990s. He once acted as president of a community-
owned team in his native town Bandjoun, during which time he was voted into 
parliament. As a businessman-politician, Foinding can easily be compared to the 
president of TP Mazembe, Moise Katumbi. Both men decided to spend time and 
money on managing a football club and both of them became well-known 
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personalities in the process. Foinding and Katumbi belong to a group of men 
(and a few women) whom I label as Big Men, a concept to which I will return 
shortly. 
Although the other world of which I speak is actually far from hidden – for 
instance, Katumbi is a prominent figure in public life – these Big Men’s motives 
for investing money in football are rather secretive. That is, they do not talk 
about it openly. Yet their interests are clear to everyone who wishes to see them. 
Theirs is a world where the concept of winning is not limited to the sheer joy and 
excitement of collecting a trophy. Perhaps more to the point, those involved in 
sponsoring and running the game want victory as much as the next person, but 
not always for the sake of victory itself. These Big Men’s aspirations reach 
beyond the confines of the stadium as they tend to transform success in football 
into personal glory: Status and popularity, political influence and business 
opportunities. 
The reasons presidents, chairmen, directors and patrons have for getting 
involved in football will take up one part of this dissertation. The other part deals 
with the consequences of their actions. Calvin Foinding, for example, belongs to 
the Bamileke, an ethnic group known for its entrepreneurial spirit. The Bamileke 
own a number of top league clubs, partially as a means to gain a foothold in the 
political arena.5 Persistent rumours – and in some cases there is evidence – have 
it that these Bamileke club presidents are engaged in bribing referees and 
opponents in order for their clubs to be promoted and win titles. This desire to 
win is, of course, not uncommon in sports, but in their case a victory on the pitch 
yields a victory in the political arena. It can be argued that the Bamileke will do 
anything, including foul play, to achieve their (political) goals. 
Football serves both as a model of and a vehicle for practices and beliefs in 
society. The model of idea refers to the game as constituting a mirror of society. 
As the sociologist Richard Giulianotti asserts, football ‘in any setting provides us 
with a kind of cultural map, a metaphorical representation, which enhances our 
understanding of that society’.6 Silvio Berlusconi, owner of AC Milan, said that 
‘soccer is a metaphor for life’.7 And although discussing American football, the 
anthropologist William Arens could have referred to association football when he 
argued that the game 
… tells us much about who and what we Americans are as a people, and if an anthropologist 
from another planet visited here, he would be struck by the American fixation on this game 
and would report on it with glee and romantic intoxication anthropologists normally reserve 
for the exotic rituals of a newly discovered tribe. This assertion is based on the theory that 
certain significant symbols are the key to understanding a culture; football is such a symbol.8 
In short, football and sports in general tell us something about the world we live 
in.9 The anthropologist Jeremy MacClancy argues that sport ‘is not a “reflection” 
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of some postulated essence of society, but an integral part of society and one, 
moreover, which may be used as a means of reflecting on society’.10  
While the model of idea can be regarded as a mode of representation and 
reflection, the vehicle for idea is mainly a mode of action and transformation. 
The vehicle for idea refers to the game as a means for individuals and groups to 
achieve certain goals. Indeed, football can be regarded as “capital” that is 
convertible into other forms of capital. The Bamileke convert the game’s 
popularity into political capital by using football as a ‘stepping stone’ to a career 
in politics, as one informant called it. At the same time, the Bamileke convert the 
game’s commercial value into economic capital by being active in the global 
player transfer market. In short, individuals and groups use football as a vehicle 
for prestigious, political and business purposes. 
Labelling football as capital brings me to the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu 
(1930-2002) whose generative structuralism acquired a place in sports studies.11 
Bourdieu goes beyond the dichotomy between objectivism versus subjectivism 
by focusing on everyday ‘practice’, which ‘discloses both people’s practical 
understanding of the social world and how social reality is made’.12 On the 
subjective end lies his concept of habitus, defined as a system of dispositions, 
which ‘captures the complexities of human agency as that agency repeatedly 
engages with forms of structure and influence’.13 On the objective end lies his 
concept of field, which is a structured system of social positions occupied by 
individuals or institutions.14 For example, a football club is a field, meaning ‘a 
system characterized by a series of power relations, where positions are viewed 
as more or less dominant, reflecting an individual’s access to capital’.15 
Bourdieu’s concept of capital is a central element of this dissertation. His idea 
of capital goes further than the Marxist notion of capital as a surplus value 
derived from the production process which, in turn, can be used as an investment 
by those who control the means of production. In Bourdieu’s scheme, capital is 
not necessarily of a monetary kind; it can ‘assume monetary and nonmonetary as 
well as tangible and intangible forms’.16 Bourdieu’s main forms of capital are 
economic capital (material wealth), social capital (social positions and networks), 
cultural capital (educational and artistic knowledge) and symbolic capital (hon-
our and prestige). In Distinction, Bourdieu explains how these forms of capital 
are used a means by the dominant classes to retain their positions in society.17 
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Cultural capital is a crucial factor in Bourdieu’s scheme but, for reasons that 
will soon become clear, I in-
stead focus more on the relat-
ed symbolic capital. Figure 1 
thus represents my model of 
the forms of capital in mod-
ern-day football. One aspect 
of this model is the intercon-
nectedness between symbolic, 
social and economic capital in 
the sense that the ‘various 
types of capital can translate 
into one another (…)’.18 For 
example, symbolic capital is 
perceived as a ‘credit’ that is 
easily convertible into econo-
mic or socio-political capi-
tal.19 Also, power holders 
tend to control more than one 
form of capital. This is evi-
dent in the case of the Bami-
leke in Cameroon who focus on all types of capital as mentioned above. 
Cultural capital exists in various guises such as cultural goods and educational 
qualifications. One distinction is that between incorporated cultural capital, 
which refers to education and knowledge, and symbolic cultural capital, which is 
the ‘capacity to define and legitimize cultural, moral, and artistic values, 
standards, and styles’.20 In Africa, the distinction between cultural and symbolic 
capital ‘is less relevant because the various fields are less separated, power 
differences rely less on education, and culture tends to be shared by all the 
players in the political field’.21 This is especially true in the case of football, a 
sport that is widely supported by the lower classes as well as the elite in Africa. I 
will therefore focus on symbolic capital, which has a potent strength throughout 
the continent. 
Symbolic capital refers to honour and prestige (discussed in chapter 4). It is, in 
the words of Bourdieu, a ‘credit of honourability’.22 In sports, a title or trophy 
may not have much economic value, it does have immeasurable prestigious 
value. The anthropologist Wouter van Beek writes about the ‘crowning glories of 
the symbolic capital: The titles, championships and records’:23 
A sports cup is the obvious example. The “Cup” lacks any practical value, is all show and no 
content, and may sometimes be beautiful but often is hideously ugly; yet, it is highly prized, 
not for its intrinsic economic value, but for the efforts needed to win it.24 
Social  
capital  
(networks) 
 
Figure 1 The forms of capital in football 
Economic 
capital 
(wealth) 
Football 
Symbolic 
capital 
(honour) 
6 
 
Indeed, football is symbolic capital or, put differently, a ‘highly valued global 
commodity’.25 João Havelange, president of the Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association (FIFA) between 1974 and 1998, once summed up his en-
counters with world leaders and concluded that ‘They’ve got their power, and 
I’ve got mine: The power of football, which is the greatest power there is’.26 
The game’s symbolic capital is related to the fact that it captures the 
imagination of literally billions of people. In fact, modern sports such as football 
have often, albeit not altogether correctly, been labelled a secular faith or reli-
gion.27 One way to look at it is that players (gods) play on pitches (sacred turfs, 
altars) inside stadiums (temples) in front of supporters (worshippers). Modern 
team sports are sometimes regarded as a form of ‘ritualized warfare’28 or a ritual 
hunt whereby players make the ‘symbolic kill by shooting at the goalmouth’.29 
Seeing football as a form of symbolic warfare is logical considering the game’s 
inherent rivalry.30 A home team beats the visitors, thereby symbolically defend-
ing its territory (city, region, nation). 
Identification with teams is based on class, religion, ethnicity and nationalism, 
among other factors.31 A nation’s ‘imagined community’ becomes real when it is 
pitted against other nations during high-profile tournaments.32 As identification 
with the nation-state tends to be weak in most African countries, the national 
team may well be the glue that brings people together. Support for teams in 
Africa’s leagues is primarily predicated on the basis of ethnicity, defined here in 
political terms as ‘informal interest group(s) whose members are distinct from 
the members of other groups within the same society’ in that they share features 
of kinship, religion and communication.33 In Cameroon, among other countries, 
the prevalence of teams in areas dominated by certain ethnic groups has even 
proven to strengthen ethnic affiliation.34 
It has to be noted that the strong bonds people have with teams often result in 
the game being far from merely symbolic warfare. In fact, spectator violence or 
hooliganism has for long been part and parcel of the game. According to 
Giulianotti, such hooligans are part of groups that can be regarded as a mixture 
between ‘modern subculture and postmodern neo-tribe’.35 Much has been written 
about on- and off-pitch spectator violence which in rare cases even triggered 
war.36 In Africa too, spectator violence is common and as such I will deal with 
this subject later on. It is nevertheless not my intention to explain its causes and 
processes; rather I treat intimidation and violence as part of a repertoire to 
influence the outcome of matches. 
Social capital is comprised of social networks and positions. Bourdieu defines 
social capital as ‘the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’.37 The 
7 
 
level of social capital depends both on the size of the network and on the volume 
of the forms of capital the individual possesses.38 Social capital generally arises 
out of group membership, be it a family, a political party, an ethnic group or a 
football club. Sports organisations tend to be predominantly controlled by the 
rich and powerful, thus constituting an abundance of social capital.39 Football is 
no exception in this respect. 
The game’s social capital is most visible at the VIP section where important 
people from all walks of life meet and greet. In a documentary on the 2010 
World Cup one could watch the rich and famous entering Soccer City Stadium in 
Johannesburg on the day of the final.40 These days companies rent sky boxes in 
order to facilitate social meetings between employees, clients and potential part-
ners. Club directors all of a sudden find themselves travelling to all corners of the 
globe to watch matches and interact with people. As social capital, football 
seems to attract interest from agents in both the formal and informal economy. 
Indeed, one study concluded that sport ‘can be a route for criminals to become 
“celebrities” by associating with famous people and moving upwards to powerful 
circles within established society’.41 
In (African) football, social capital is convertible to political capital (chapter 
5). Clubs tend to maintain connections with ethnic groups, regional authorities 
and political parties. The links between social and political capital are a two-way 
street. On the one hand, research in Ghana and Tanzania, among other countries, 
shows that in order to be voted into the managements of clubs and FAs not 
seldom requires one to be active within a political party.42 On the other hand, 
research in Brazil and Malta, among other places, suggests that patrons use clubs 
in a similar vein as the Bamileke in Cameroon, namely as vehicles to a political 
career.43 In both cases, a club director or football administrator often either is a 
politician or has (in)direct access to those that are.  
Economic capital refers to material wealth. Bourdieu sees economic capital as 
that ‘which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be 
institutionalized in the form of property rights’.44 In Bourdieu’s view, economic 
capital lies at the ‘root’ of the other forms of capital which are actually ‘trans-
formed, disguised forms of economic capital’.45 He also asserts that some forms 
of economic capital can be obtained without secondary costs while other forms 
can be obtained only through social capital. Converting economic capital into 
social, cultural or symbolic capital is closely related to Thorstein Veblen’s theory 
of ‘conspicuous consumption’,46 meaning the display of wealth ‘through exten-
sive leisure activities and through lavish expenditure on consumption and serv-
ices’ in order to increase one’s socio-cultural standing.47 
As with symbolic and social capital, football is well-endowed in terms of 
economic capital. The modern game has been commercialised to the extent that 
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by 1998 football as a global industry was said to be worth $250 billion. For 
instance, the 2010 edition of the World Cup delivered a turnover of around $3 
billion. It was former FIFA president João Havelange who with the help of the 
late Adidas top executive Horst Dassler transformed football from a blue-collar, 
cash-strapped sport into a white-collar, multibillion dollar business.48 This suc-
cess was accomplished in collaboration with multinational corporations, called 
“partners” in FIFA terminology.49 Other sports, under the umbrellas of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the International Association of 
Athletics Federations (IAAF), have also undergone this transition. 
These days players, clubs, leagues and tournaments are increasingly used as 
economic capital (chapter 6). Many Premier League clubs in England, among 
other countries, are now run by foreign businessmen and investors. Such clubs 
are regarded as lucrative investments rather than leisure activities or, put dif-
ferently, as economic capital rather than social organisations. The same can be 
said of broadcasting rights and sponsorship opportunities with regard to leagues 
and tournaments. The journalist David Conn rightfully speaks of the ‘football 
business’ in this respect.50 Although Africa as a whole cannot be compared to 
Europe in terms of economic capital, here too the game’s increased commer-
cialisation allows one to speak of a business. 
The player transfer market has witnessed a surge in profits in recent times. 
Both transfer fees and salary caps have increased exponentially, making players, 
agents and other intermediaries exceedingly rich in the process. Indeed, football 
players are treated as commodities, ready to be bought and sold on the inter-
national market. They are, in other words, economic capital to those who re-
present them, but also to those who control clubs and FAs. A body of literature 
exists in relation to the global transfer of athletes in general and footballers in 
particular. It is theorised that since Africa lies at the periphery of world football, 
its players tend to migrate to the core that is Europe. Holders of capital 
throughout Africa evidently display an interest in this form of economic capital. 
Having discussed the forms of capital in relation to football, it needs to be 
emphasised that Bourdieu’s scheme is essentially a theory of power. For one 
thing, Bourdieu considers each field to be a game. Agents take positions within 
the game according to their habitus and to the types of capital they possess. 
Positions are thus never static and, according to Bourdieu, ‘no one can benefit 
from the game, not even those who dominate it, without taking part in the game 
and being taken in by the game’.51 As with an actual game, players need to get 
acquainted with its rules and devise strategies. Bourdieu ‘pictures capital in terms 
of game tokens with different colours to designate each player’s varied capa-
bilities’. In this game, players ‘adopt different tactics to protect and augment 
their capital’.52 
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This brings us to the second part of this dissertation which, as one would 
recall, relates to the ways power brokers, in their attempts at converting capital, 
tend to change the nature of the game. The world of sports is governed by a set of 
ideals or ethics known to everyone and more or less taken for granted by athletes, 
administrators and spectators alike. Examples include Pierre de Coubertin’s 
Olympic ideal and FIFA’s Fair Play Code. The overall ideal is to approach the 
game as though the competition itself is more important that the ultimate goal 
(winning). It suffices to quote the first of ten rules that make up the Fair Play 
Code: 
Winning is without value if victory has been achieved unfairly or dishonestly. Cheating is 
easy, but brings no pleasure. Playing fair requires courage and character. It is also more 
satisfying. Fair play always has its reward, even when the game is lost. Playing fair earns 
you respect, while cheats are detested. Remember: It is only a game. And games are 
pointless unless played fairly.53 
However, these days this statement will come across as naive to those who 
follow the game. Those with knowledge of football need no convincing of the 
fact that winning is important in so many respects that one is tempted to violate 
the Fair Play Code. 
Ideals or ethics become part of public scrutiny when agents violate its prin-
ciples. The bribery scandal surrounding the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake 
City triggered a public outcry over the violation of the Olympic ideal. Similar 
scandals have plagued FIFA in recent times, from the dubious contacts with a 
company called International Sport and Leisure (ISL) to the voting procedures 
for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups. Several journalists and academics have set 
their teeth into these issues so there is no need to get into detail here.54 The point 
is that while club, FA and FIFA administrators consistently utter the mantra that 
they act “for the good of the game” (thereby denying foul play of any kind), real-
life crises cause its validity to be openly questioned. 
Again, I regard clubs, FAs and football as a whole to be games/fields in which 
power brokers aim to convert (and accumulate) capital. These power brokers 
play a game that is governed by a set of ideals or ethics. My argument is twofold: 
First, that one requirement in the attempt to convert capital is to be “successful”; 
and second, that to achieve success leads power brokers to devise tactics and 
strategies that may not always be congruent with the game’s rules and regula-
tions. I will explain this argument by focusing on three aspects in which holders 
of capital become successful, namely the ability to (1) control the game’s 
bureaucratic organisation, (2) win matches, particularly those played at home, 
and (3) collect league and tournament titles, earn promotion and avoid relegation. 
The first field of inquiry is the game’s bureaucratic organisation (chapter 7). 
Power brokers strive to acquire crucial positions within this bureaucracy in order 
to maximise their chances to convert capital. This applies to clubs, FAs, the 
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Confederation of African Football (CAF) and FIFA. Bourdieu makes this point 
in relation to social capital when he speaks of the ‘internal competition for the 
monopoly of legitimate representation of the group’.55 Put simply, a presid-
ent/chairman is the foremost representative of a club, FA or FIFA and in that 
capacity he is in control of the forms of capital. But, as the above statement from 
Bourdieu already indicates, the president/chairman will have to fend off com-
petitors. One consequence is that a president/chairman resorts to patronage 
politics in order to monopolise power. 
An example of this practice, which includes levels of mismanagement, cor-
ruption and nepotism, can be found within the ranks of FIFA itself. For example, 
journalist David Yallop describes the reign of former FIFA president João 
Havelange as a string of cronyism, wheeling and dealing, secret business deals, 
nepotism, lack of democracy and dictatorial leadership.56 His successor Joseph 
“Sepp” Blatter has, among other things, been accused of creating a group of 
loyalists, called the F-Crew. He is also said to have reshuffled the set-up of FIFA 
committees, ‘giving his supporters key positions, but also making sure that 
potential opponents were kept in the club’.57 Transparency and accountability 
mean little in the world of football.58 During my research in Africa I have 
observed similar practices within the management ranks of clubs and FAs. 
The second field of inquiry is the playing of matches, particularly those from 
the perspective of the home team (chapter 8). Presidents, chairmen, directors and 
patrons know that their attempts at converting capital by and large depend on 
winning matches. For example, converting economic capital into symbolic capi-
tal requires one to earn the admiration of those supporting the team. One of the 
best ways to do that is to win home matches. This is, of course, related to the fact 
that a team represents a geographical location, making victory vital for the pride 
of the population. Many club officials and football administrators tend not to 
leave the outcome of such matches to chance. They instead violate the Fair Play 
Code by engaging in extra-sportive activities, i.e. match-fixing, occult forces, and 
intimidation and violence. 
Match-fixing may well be the most effective way of winning matches. It is 
also a practice that really flies into the face of fair play. Fairly recent 
investigations and arrests in Italy, Germany and Turkey, among other countries, 
indicate that match-fixing is a worldwide phenomenon. Africa is by no means an 
exception. Players, fans and officials also engage in religious acts so as to 
increase the likelihood of victory. In Africa, such beliefs are widespread and are 
said to have both physical and psychological effects. Indeed, spiritual practices 
(known as juju or muti) are used as extra-sportive means to win matches. Finally, 
we have already touched upon the subject of spectator violence or hooliganism. 
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In Africa, intimidation and violence are part of a collective effort to beat op-
ponents, particularly at home grounds. 
The third field of inquiry is the ability to collect league and tournament titles 
as well as earning promotion and avoiding relegation (chapter 9). Although 
winning home matches is a good start to be successful as a club or FA official, 
winning titles evidently is even better. A Champions League or African Cup of 
Nations trophy undoubtedly increases a club’s or national team’s economic, 
social and symbolic capital. Also, the higher the league the larger the capital. 
Indeed, top leagues generate more capital as compared to lower-level leagues. 
The majority (but not all) of club officials therefore strive to gain entry to their 
country’s top league. Vice versa they try to avoid relegation, which inevitably 
leads to loss of capital, at all costs.  
Social capital is a crucial form of capital in this respect. Social networks 
among club officials and football administrators have proven to lead to “deals” 
and “favours” which, in turn, have had an impact on final league tables. This, of 
course, is in disregard of the Fair Play Code as well. More importantly, the rules 
and regulations of leagues and tournaments are overseen by FA boards and 
committees. Here, too, social networks come in handy in the sense that in Africa 
the rules and regulations are not seldom subjectively applied by the authorities. 
Labelling this phenomenon Big Man politics, I will show that powerful 
individuals who occupy top positions within clubs and FAs tend to influence the 
judicial aspects of the game as well as issues regarding promotion and relegation. 
One last aspect of the third field of inquiry is that economic capital also plays 
a role. This is particularly true in relation to the global transfer market. I already 
mentioned how (some of) those who control clubs and FAs in Africa use players 
as commodities in order to make profits. One consequence is that the ages of 
players are lowered so as to increase their commercial value. Also, the owners 
and presidents of some clubs specialise in buying and selling players to the extent 
that these teams no longer vie for titles but simply exist as player terminals. It is 
possible to identify different methods of increasing one’s capital in this manner, 
but let us not go into the details until the appropriate time (again, chapter 9). It 
should, however, be noted that the uncompetitive nature of such teams also goes 
against the Fair Play Code. 
The overall point is that the violation of the Fair Play Code signals a “de-
virtualisation” of or “disenchantment” with the game. To set up this argument 
properly I should start with Dutch historian Johan Huizinga’s premise that by 
entering the world of play and games one steps ‘out of “real” life into a 
temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own’.59 As the French 
sociologist Roger Caillois states, play is ‘essentially a separate occupation, 
carefully isolated from the rest of life, and generally engaged in with precise 
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limits of time and place’.60 The domain of play and games is, again according to 
Caillois, ‘a restricted, closed, protected universe: A pure space’.61 Van Beek 
refers to the world of play as a ‘virtual world’: ‘Each game, each play, creates its 
own reality’.62 
In From Ritual to Record, Guttmann argues that modern sports are charac-
terised by a high degree of secularism, equality, specialisation and professionali-
sation, rationalisation, quantification and a drive towards setting records.63 
FIFA’s 140-page Laws of the Game, which includes official standards for the 
size of the pitch as well as a list of instances that require disciplinary measures, is 
testimony to this tendency towards rationalisation.64 The very essence of such a 
document is to ensure that opponents always start out with an equal chance of 
winning, no matter where in the world they step onto the pitch. However, 
Guttmann maintains that the rationalised world of modern sports, seemingly 
existing in “splendid isolation” from real life, can be pinched through at any 
time.65 
The commercialisation and politicisation of the modern game has rendered the 
idea of a virtual world meaningless. As the anthropologist Kendall Blanchard 
states, professional sports are ‘more often about record salaries than about record 
performance, dollars rather than diversion, and profit rather than play’.66 ‘Sport is 
too much a game to be a business and too much a business to be a game,’ the 
American journalist Roger Kahn once said.67 Indeed, the everyday world of 
money, politics and power is intricately linked to the world of sports. For 
example, clubs in Europe and Africa will do anything to reach the lucrative 
group stages of the Champions League. At least on Dutch television, club of-
ficials, journalists and others never fail to emphasise the financial remunerations. 
“Surviving the winter”, is the euphemism they use. 
The world of sports is falsely presented as a virtual (or neutral) world, a pure 
space that is free of all the hazards of modern life. This statement will unlikely 
come as a surprise to most football fans. Still, doping scandals in cycling or 
match-fixing scandals in football and cricket, among other sports, do appear to 
have shocked many fans. One reflex by the authorities is to pretend nothing 
happens. This is true for FIFA but also for, let us say, Japan where stories about 
corruption in sumo wrestling abound.68 Yet burying one’s head in the sand does 
not make the problem go away. As the economists Ian Preston and Stefan 
Szymanski conclude, ‘most cheating seems to take place when the incentives to 
win are too great. Many people bemoan this aspect of modern sport, but in truth 
it reflects the enormous value placed on winning today.’69 
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A study of Big Men in the African game 
This dissertation is not so much about football, it is about the people who run it. 
The world of modern sports has become highly bureaucratised and institution-
alised, with its ‘primary, technical, managerial and corporate social organizations 
that arrange, facilitate and regulate human action in sport situations’.70 FIFA is 
comprised of a wide array of confederations, associations, departments and 
committees. The same is true for, let us say, Ghana. In 2006 and again in 2011, 
the president of the Ghana Football Association (GFA) appointed more than 150 
administrators to run 25 committees and league boards.71 Also, hundreds of clubs 
are led by patrons, presidents, vice presidents, members of Boards of Directors, 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and management members. These people are 
hired to make sure football is run properly.  
Club officials and football administrators nevertheless appear to suffer from a 
negative image. This is true, for example, for both João Havelange and Sepp 
Blatter.72 Clubs too seem to attract dubious characters of various casts.73 Also, 
club officials and administrators alike are often alleged to know little to nothing 
about the game.74 Another point of criticism is that they tend to feel they 
themselves are more important than the players themselves.75 It is fairly easy to 
lambast those who run the game in Africa in a similar manner and, admittedly, I 
will spend some pages discussing their shortcomings. However, I refuse to see 
them merely as having a negative influence on football. For one thing, club 
presidents in Africa typically spend a lot of their own money on maintaining the 
team. Without their help many clubs would most likely cease to exist. 
Earlier I explained the origins of this study when discussing the so-called 
parallel world in the African game. Now it is time to present the research 
question at hand. This question is stated as follows: 
How do African Big Men convert symbolic, social and economic capital through 
football and in what ways does this influence the nature of the game? 
One notices that the research question actually consists of two interrelated 
questions. The first question, derived from the notion that Big Men do indeed 
convert capital, is mainly aimed at how they convert one form of capital into 
another. The second question is based on the hypothesis that these Big Men tend 
not to leave their attempts at converting capital to chance. They instead resort to 
strategies to ensure “success” in the field of football, even if that means violating 
the Fair Play Code. The second question is therefore aimed at finding out these 
Big Men’s strategies in the game/field. 
I sought for answers primarily among club officials and secondarily among 
FA officials, although, as stated earlier, there is a great deal of overlap between 
the two categories. The bulk of the data was gathered during fieldwork in 
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Cameroon and Ghana. I first visited Ghana in January and February 2008, at a 
time Africa’s most prestigious football tournament, the African Cup of Nations, 
was held there. I returned to Ghana the following year for fieldwork in the 
months of March, April, May, June and July. The next stop was Cameroon, 
where I lived from October 2009 until February 2010. Finally, I returned to 
Ghana in February 2011 for a follow-up. Also included in this dissertation is 
fieldwork performed in Cameroon in 2003. 
Before getting into the details of my research methods and settings, I should 
first explain the research population, namely Africa’s top club and FA officials. 
As said, I refer to them as Big Men. As former and current head of FIFA, both 
Havelange & Blatter are Big Men par excellence. Havelange embodies the 
perfect Big Man, not in the literal sense (the Brazilian is not that tall) but because 
he has a ‘big presence’.76 More importantly, Havelange has excelled in several 
fields, namely sports, business and politics. This involvement in more than one 
field characterises the Big Man. Armstrong and Mitchell also use the label Big 
Men with regard to football in Malta, referring to ‘well-placed, wealthy and 
entrepreneurial characters – often with political ambitions and connections’.77 
Similar Big Men types in football are observed elsewhere.78 
Armstrong’s & Mitchell’s statement brings us to the core of the concept, 
namely the idea that a Big Man strives to own and accumulate economic, social 
and symbolic capital. The most typical Big Man in African football is either a 
self-made businessman or the appointed general director of a company. He uses 
his or the company’s economic capital to gain a position in the game’s bureau-
cracy. As said earlier, converting economic capital into social and/or symbolic 
capital relatively easily leads to political capital. Throughout Africa, political 
capital is by definition convertible in economic capital. Indeed, the other most 
typical Big Man in African football is the businessman-politician. The circle is 
round: Economic capital begets symbolic and social capital which, in turn, leads 
to the accumulation of economic capital. 
The French sociologist Jean-Pascal Daloz argues that leaders in Africa tend to 
act as Big Men who try to control ‘as many fields of activities and networks as 
possible’. Their strategy in the accumulation of wealth and power is to be 
‘surrounded by the greatest possible number of supporters and clients’.79 This 
system is called patronage politics and it appears to have found a fertile ground 
in the world of (African) football. After all, the game is rife with economic, 
social and symbolic capital which, in turn, are excellent means by which Big 
Men enter into patron-client relationships. Daloz states that this theory applies 
not only to businessmen and politicians but also to traditional rulers, religious 
leaders and top military personnel. Indeed, many top club and FA officials in 
Africa belong to one of these categories. 
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Photo 1.1 Flanked by his entourage, Hearts of Oak Board member Alhaji Fawaz Zowk 
observes a practice session at the El-Wak Stadium in Accra, Ghana 
 
 
The emphasis on creating patron-client ties means the African Big Man re-
sembles other leadership types. For instance, he can be likened to the Melanesian 
Big Man who redistributes wealth to attract a following.80 There is, however, a 
difference in the sense that the Melanesian Big Man mainly converts social 
capital into economic capital while the African Big Man mainly converts 
economic capital into other forms of capital. Overall, the Big Man-type leader 
can be observed practically everywhere, whether called ‘entrepreneur’, ‘patron’, 
‘cacique’ or ‘informal leader’.81 In Africa itself, the anthropologist Jean-François 
Bayart identifies the ‘big types’ (in Ivory Coast), the ‘decree men’ (in Came-
roon), the ‘acquirers’ (in Zaïre), the ‘wabenzi’ (in eastern Africa), the ‘nizers’ (in 
Tanzania) and the ‘mafutamingi’ (in Uganda).82 
The Big Man-type leader thrives in Africa precisely because patronage poli-
tics, coined the ‘politics of the belly’ by Bayart,83 is pervasive in the majority of 
countries on the continent. It is the (neo-)patrimonial office that so characterises 
African political life. In Max Weber’s definition, the patrimonial office ‘lacks 
above all the bureaucratic separation of the “private” and “official” sphere. For 
the political administration, too, is treated as a purely personal affair of the ruler, 
and political power is considered part of his personal property.’84 The state in 
Africa, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz argue, is ‘no more than a décor, a 
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pseudo-Western faҫade masking the realities of deeply personalized political 
relations’:85 
… the notion that politicians, bureaucrats or military chiefs should be the servants of the 
state simply does not make sense. Their political obligations are, first and foremost, to their 
kith and kin, their clients, their communities, their regions, or even to their religion. All such 
patrons seek ideally to constitute themselves as ‘Big Men’, controlling as many networks as 
they can. But to succeed as a ‘Big Man’ demands resources; and the more extensive the 
network, the greater the need for the means of distribution. The legitimacy of the African 
political elites, such as it is, derives from their ability to nourish the clientele on which their 
power rests. It is therefore imperative for them to exploit governmental resources for patri-
monial purposes.86 
Africa’s biggest Big Men after independence are undoubtedly its presidents. 
We can deduct at least two characteristics of this “ultimate” Big Man-type.87 
First, his power is absolute. By the end of the 1980s, Africa ‘was renowned for 
its Big Men, dictators who strutted the stage, tolerated neither opposition nor 
dissent, (…) demanding abject servility and making themselves exceedingly 
rich’.88 Despite the introduction of multi-partyism in the 1990s, elections are 
generally free nor fair. Second, his power is based on personal rule. Jackson and 
Rosberg, who identify four types of personal rule,89 argue that it rests on ‘a 
distinctive type of political system in which the rivalries and struggles of 
powerful and wilful men, rather than impersonal institutions, ideologies, public 
policies, or class interests, are fundamental in shaping political life’.90 
Following several studies into the phenomenon of African Big Men, I will 
refer to them broadly as members of today’s elites.91 Presidents, politicians, gov-
ernors, military men, civil servants, self-made businessmen, general managers of 
corporations, traditional rulers, upper-class professionals and former footballers 
have all engaged in football management. As club and FA officials, their power 
too is largely absolute and based on personal rule. Similar to Jackson’s and 
Rosberg’s classification of presidential types, the Big Men in African football too 
can be roughly categorised. On one end of the spectrum lies the flamboyant, 
charismatic and populist Big Man who uses his social skills and popularity to 
gain political support. On the other end lies the entrepreneurial Big Man who 
avoids public attention while building his football empire.  
As said, the actions and motivations of the Big Man as club or FA official 
should not necessarily be viewed in a negative sense. It is true that a president 
commonly runs a club in a personal capacity and as such completely controls the 
organisation. Yet there is a distinct quid pro quo in the relationship between the 
Big Man and the club. Most importantly, the Big Man brings capital along which 
allows a club to sustain itself. This situation resembles that of the ‘padrino’ 
(godfather, patron) in Argentina, described by Duke and Crolley as ‘occupants of 
high positions of power who looked after the interests of a particular club’. ‘It 
enhanced (the padrino’s) profile and status in society. Clubs benefited by having 
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someone in power to represent them so it was in their interests to offer support in 
return.’92 
Moreover, the patron-client ties that exist between Big Men and “lesser men” 
are beneficial to both. This mutual benefit is visible within the bureaucracy of 
clubs and FAs in the sense that the president/chairman more often than not takes 
care of his subordinates’ needs. There is, at least on the face of it, an immense 
respect for Big Men by lesser men which is governed by social etiquette. 
Labelling it the Big-Man Small-Boy Syndrome, Robert Price argues that the Big 
Man behaves arrogantly towards inferiors who, in turn, show deference towards 
the Big Man.93 It also requires the Big Man to show his wealth through con-
spicuous consumption. In Africa, the Big Men in football not only own luxurious 
cars and mansions, they also tend to have corpulent physiques which, in Africa, 
is a metaphor for power and accumulation. 
Last but not least, football itself brings forth Big Men. Africa’s top players are 
global icons who rival presidents in terms of symbolic capital. Keeping in mind 
the Big-Man Small-Boy Syndrome, it cannot be a surprise that they regularly 
clash with football’s “true” Big Men: Top FA and CAF administrators. After all, 
famous footballers turn the traditional hierarchy of administrators (Big Men) 
above the athletes (Small Boys) upside down. When Ivory Coast star Didier 
Drogba gained a majority of votes in the African Player of the Year contest in 
2007, but then announced he would not attend the ceremony, CAF president Issa 
Hayatou named Frédérick Kanouté best player instead. In doing so, Hayatou 
evidently punished Drogba for disrespecting his superiors. In other words, the 
CAF president showed the footballer who the real Big Man was. 
For my data, I have relied upon such typical anthropological methods as parti-
cipant observation as well as conducting interviews and informal conversations. 
Football lends itself perfectly for participant observation. I observed top league 
as well as lower league matches, either from the sideline, the stands or the press 
box. I also visited training grounds, club secretariats, radio stations, bars and 
private residences. Furthermore, I observed African Cup of Nations matches in 
Ghana in 2008. Formal interviews and informal conversations were conducted 
with a few dozen Big Men and other club and FA officials, and with coaches, 
players, supporters, referees, journalists, jujumen and people not officially in-
volved in the game. 
Explaining the topic at hand to the research population was far from an easy 
task. I often sensed a mixture of scepticism and amazement whenever I explained 
I was conducting doctorate research into football. (To be sure, many Dutch 
people expressed a similar disbelief.) Moreover, some people were obviously 
suspicious of my motives. A few club officials and referees seemed to mistake 
me for a spy sent by the FA; and FA officials sometimes wondered whether I was 
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a FIFA investigator. A number of interviewees assumed I was a journalist 
reporting about Africa’s participants at the then upcoming 2010 World Cup. The 
majority of the people I met thought I was a scout or agent, and they were visibly 
confused by my lack of interest in talented players. 
It was not always easy to get in touch with the game’s Big Men. Many times 
they asked me to call back the following day. “Call me again tomorrow, I’m busy 
at the moment,” was a favourite phrase. Some of them used this evasive method 
so consistently that it became ludicrous. Their daily schedules did not appear to 
be written down in agendas, and secretaries seemed to have perfected the art of 
turning down interview requests. Interviewing one wealthy club president in 
Kumasi turned out to be a catch-22. While club officials told me to make an 
appointment with his secretary, the secretary stated that this was possible only 
with her boss’ written consent. Yet nobody was willing to give me his phone 
number. 
Another challenge was to get beyond the rhetoric Big Men use to describe the 
world they live in. They will say that their clubs are organised and run pro-
fessionally for that, of course, is how it is supposed to be. Ghanaians constantly 
referred to the situation in England – the one place they think football is 
organised the way it should be. When Big Men do not describe an ideal world, 
they at least tell stories from a certain point of view. Personal, economic and 
political considerations all play a part in how stories are framed. Big Men tend 
not to make statements that may harm themselves, their colleagues or others – 
yet sometimes that is exactly what they will do for reasons known to them alone. 
A prolonged stay in the community can overcome such obstacles. 
Regarding fieldwork methods, I am inspired by the concept of investigative 
journalism. Such an approach has often been used to gain information from 
within difficult-to-access sub-cultures. The paradox of my research lies in the 
fact that while football is essentially a public affair, the top men (and a few 
women) who run it tend to be secretive about their daily activities. Journalist 
Andrew Jennings became aware of this when he tried to investigate FIFA’s top 
administrators.94 Other journalists, such as David Conn and Tom Bower, have 
come across the secretive and dubious actions of club officials when describing 
the commercialisation of English football.95 Moreover, Declan Hill, who mixes 
journalism with academic research, also had to delve deep into a world where 
football had become enmeshed with Asian gambling syndicates.96 
The approach by John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson is of particular interest, as 
it combines methods employed in sociology, ethnography and investigative jour-
nalism.97 They take a stance with the Chicago School, with its ‘classic, long-
term, depth-immersion studies’ and a short-term approach of ‘ethnographic visit-
ing’. They state that ‘even if classic Chicago-style ethnography is not the main 
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research tool, gaining a sense of space, place, character and culture – which can 
only be achieved through spending some time in the living research environment 
– sharpens a researcher’s critical gaze, helps the formulation of questions and 
enhances interpretation and theorisation’.98 My fieldwork included short-term 
and long-term stays with an emphasis on the latter. 
My interest in investigative journalism notwithstanding, my fieldwork is dis-
tinctly anthropological in nature. As research settings, I chose to be based in 
Kumasi (Ghana) and Bamenda (Cameroon). Kumasi is home to Ghana’s top club 
Asante Kotoko whose exploits I observed in the 2008/2009 Premier League 
season. I also followed other Kumasi-based teams, namely Kessben FC and King 
Faisal. Also under consideration were Accra Hearts of Oak, Sekondi Hasaacas 
and Eleven Wise, and AshantiGold FC. Bamenda is home to two relatively 
prominent clubs, namely PWD Bamenda and Yong Sports Academy. I followed 
the latter’s exploits in the 2009/2010 Elite One league season and the former’s 
struggles in one of Cameroon’s lower-level leagues. Other teams that I watched 
closely include Mount Cameroon FC and Tiko United. 
I have taken into account rumours and gossip. This may seem contradictory to 
academic research but anthropologists tend to find rumours quite helpful in 
making sense of the world they study. Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar ex-
plicitly discuss the role of rumours and gossip (also known as radio trottoir) in 
their study of religion and politics in Africa. Gossip, they argue, ‘represents 
people’s attempts to understand the world, usually by attributing causes to 
events’.99 In this dissertation I have included stories that cannot be regarded as 
facts. An example is the rumour that one Ghanaian club was repeatedly saved 
from relegation by powerful politicians. The rumour is widely believed to be 
true, even though the politicians never confirmed it. The manner in which this 
story circulates tells us that Ghanaians find the story credible. 
Newspapers and radio broadcasts are useful channels through which to pick up 
rumours and gossip. In fact, in Africa radio stations and football form a rather 
perfect tandem. Big Men, coaches, supporters and others seem to find pleasure in 
discussing the affairs of clubs and the national team “over the airwaves”. 
Similarly, numerous sports newspapers are published throughout Africa. In 
Ghana, I bought at least five different football-related newspapers every week. 
One needs to keep in mind, though, that journalists on occasion accept money to 
write subjective reports. Also, several journalists are in one way or the other 
connected to clubs and/or Big Men, leading stories to be biased. 
It has not been easy to obtain documents from Ghana and Cameroon, largely 
because club and FA officials tend not to maintain archives. Some of the sources 
I could get were the constitutions of Hearts of Oak and Asante Kotoko. Also 
useful were the newspapers published by both Hearts and Kotoko. The same 
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applies to books written by African journalists or academics, particularly the his-
tories of football in Nigeria, Ghana, Cameroon and Zambia.100 Books on football 
in Africa by the Nigerian journalist Anver Versi and the Tunisian journalist 
Faouzi Mahjoub were also helpful, as were Armstrong’s and Giulianotti’s Foot-
ball in Africa and David Goldblatt’s The ball is round.101 Furthermore, I used 
collections of articles on sport (and football) in Africa that appeared in edited 
works as well as various academic journals. 
The 2010 World Cup encouraged a range of journalists and academics to 
publish articles, books and documentaries on football in Africa. Examples in-
clude books written by journalists Ian Hawkey and Steve Bloomfield.102 Another 
book worth noting is one written by the historian Peter Alegi, whose study 
encompasses a history of the African game.103 It nevertheless appears that most 
attention has been accorded to two subjects: First, the exodus of African football 
talent to Europe and elsewhere and, second, the legacy and impact of the World 
Cup in respect to the development of South Africa and the continent as a whole. 
Literally dozens of articles have recently been published in this respect.104 The 
majority of these publications, especially those in the second category, are be-
yond the scope of this dissertation. 
Having done research in only two countries while claiming to be writing about 
Africa requires an explanation. I am well aware of the fact that Africa encom-
passes more than 50 countries with distinctive histories, peoples, cultures, land-
scapes and climates. This even applies to the countries I visited for my fieldwork. 
After many years of economic despair and political unrest, Ghana is now 
regarded as a relatively peaceful and prosperous democracy. Ethnic divisions 
appear less markedly strong than elsewhere on the continent. The largest of the 
60 or so ethnic groups are the Ashanti, who are part of the Akan people and who 
speak the Twi language. Colonised by the British, Ghana employs English as its 
official language. Although there are levels of corruption, human rights are 
reasonably upheld and the press enjoys quite a bit of freedom. 
In contrast, Cameroon is governed by an autocratic regime whose inhabitants 
have known only two presidents since independence; the most recent one ruling 
the country for thirty years now. Although multi-party politics were introduced in 
the 1990s, only one party – the CPDM – exerts power. The president is known 
for favouring his own ethnic group at the expense of virtually everyone else. This 
is quite an issue in a country with over 200 ethnically diverse groups. Colonised 
first by the Germans and then by the British and the French, Cameroonians 
officially speak both English and French. There is widespread corruption as well 
as human rights violations, particularly in respect to critical journalists, homo-
sexuals and opponents to the government. 
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There are similarities as well. Both Ghana and Cameroon are situated in the 
Mid-Western part of Africa and there is not much difference in the size of their 
populations (Ghana: 24 million, Cameroon: 19 million). Both countries are poor, 
but relatively wealthy in comparison with many other African countries. 
Ghanaians’ annual per capita income is $1,500 with around 30 percent of the 
population living off less than $1.25 a day; Cameroonians’ annual per capita 
income is around $2,300 with almost 50 percent living below poverty level.105 
With regard to football, Ghana and Cameroon have each won the African Cup of 
Nations four times. Both countries reached the quarter finals of the World Cup at 
one point in time. Their domestic leagues are comparable in the sense that both 
Cameroon’s Elite One and Ghana’s Premier League are semi-professional at 
best. 
It is my intention not to highlight the differences but to focus on the com-
monalities in African football. From Kenya to Senegal and from South Africa to 
Libya, Big Men play an important role in the history and development of the 
game. Moreover, their motivations for getting involved in the game and the 
consequences of their actions are surprisingly similar all over the continent. As 
the historian Martin Meredith states, ‘Although Africa is a continent of great 
diversity, African states have much in common, not only their origins as colonial 
territories, but the similar hazards and difficulties they have faced’.106  
Let us now see how these similarities play out when I present a history of the 
game in Africa. 
 
 2 
A short history of football in Africa 
For one month in 2010, Africa found itself at the centre of attention. Journalists 
roamed the continent in search of stories that were “typical” of Africa. They 
interviewed famous (former) players, visited slums in Johannesburg and Nairobi 
to look at sports development projects, and talked to sangomas who predicted the 
outcome of matches through magical rituals. Fans the world over came to know 
the Bafana Bafana and the sound of vuvuzelas. 
“Waka Waka”, sang the Colombian artist Shakira, and “This Time for Africa” 
was indeed a fine summary of Africans’ expectations at the World Cup. On the 
eve of the tournament, the South Africans increased home advantage by 
slaughtering an ox at Soccer City Stadium. Yet something went wrong as 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Algeria and Nigeria all left the tournament after the 
group phase. So did South Africa, which made it the first time the host failed to 
progress to the second round. 
Luckily, there was a beacon of hope. Ghana’s Black Stars made it through the 
group phase and then beat the United States in the next round. The Ghanaians 
were then renamed the BaGhana BaGhana by South African fans. But the match 
between Ghana and Uruguay on 2 July would go down as the third time an 
African nation failed to take the quarter final hurdle. The Uruguayans ended the 
dream of millions of Africans by beating the Black Stars 4-2 in a penalty shoot-
out. 
As fast as it came, the World Cup caravan left the continent again. The 
Africans had every reason to feel sad. Africa’s six representatives had won only 
four (out of 20) matches. Samuel Eto’o Fils, Didier Drogba and the other stars 
had failed to impress. The question is whether African football had improved 
ever since Pélé predicted an African team would win the World Cup by the turn 
of the century. Cameroon’s reputation as a football powerhouse is based on a 
single success story in 1990. Nigeria performed well in the 1990s but has since 
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gone into decline. Egypt may have won seven African Cup of Nations titles but 
did not even qualify for “Twenty Ten”. 
Africa, football and the early days 
In August 1951 a bunch of footballers from the Gold Coast went on a tour to 
England. ‘We played barefoot,’ remembered one of them. ‘We had no know-
ledge of playing in boots. But we played good football against those teams in 
boots.’107 The Ghanaians were not the first to go to Europe. In 1949 the Nigerians 
visited Britain which made it the first tour ‘by a Black African team purporting to 
represent its national football association’.108 When the Gold Coast players 
returned home, chairman Charles Dickson of Asante Kotoko bought 72 sets of 
boots and ordered the players to wear them. Initially, these changes were not 
appreciated and supporters beat up players who wore boots. When Kotoko beat 
Venomous Vipers in their second “match on boots”, the critics were silenced and 
designer boots were ordered from Dakar, Senegal.109 
The issue whether to play barefoot or in boots turned into a struggle over 
power and authority in colonial Congo-Brazzaville. The trouble began in 1936 
when a player named Makossa died after sustaining an injury. The European-
dominated Native Sports Federation expressed its worry over the increased 
violence on and off the pitch and ordered all teams to play barefooted hence-
forward. Four senior players wrote a letter of protest to the governor-general, 
arguing that they were accustomed to playing in boots. Phyllis Martin argues that 
the boots turned into a symbol of broader issues. For the Europeans ‘the con-
troversy was a test of their authority; it seemed another manifestation of African 
aspirations for independence’. For the Africans ‘the incident was another exam-
ple of overbearing colonial authority and intervention in daily life’.110 
The introduction of football in Africa is closely linked to the colonisation of 
the continent by the European superpowers. The first European to explore the 
coasts of Africa was a Portuguese named Prince Henry the Navigator. The Portu-
guese established forts and settlements in West Africa throughout the fifteen 
century before the British, Dutch, French, Germans, Danes, Belgians and other 
powers joined in. The colonisation intensified between 1880 and 1914 in a period 
known as the Scramble for Africa. By the First World War, the European powers 
had carved up the continent amongst themselves, with the exception of Liberia 
and Ethiopia. Britain and France occupied the largest territories with Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain controlling the rest. 
The first match on African soil reportedly took place on 23 August 1862 in 
Cape Town between soldiers and employees of the colonial administration. At 
the start of the nineteenth century, the British had annexed Cape Town and the 
Cape Colony and in 1909 they created the Union of South Africa. Soldiers, 
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sailors, traders and missionaries brought football to South Africa, precisely 
during Britain’s imperial expansion in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury.111 Football was played in other towns as well, and the game grew in scope 
and popularity when more British soldiers arrived to crush indigenous resistance. 
Football in those days was an all-white affair. The British team Corinthians 
visited South Africa in 1897, beating most of the all-white teams and drawing 
huge crowds to the field of play. 
The game was introduced on the island of Zanzibar in the 1870s by workers of 
the British Eastern Telegraph Company. Laura Fair describes how the game was 
spread by these workers and graduates of St. Andrew’s College to such an extent 
that by the 1920s ‘everyone’ was playing football. Several clubs were founded 
and daily matches were played at a sandpit named Mnazi Moja. The first official 
league was organised in 1926, in which nine teams participated. Matches at 
Mnazi Moja regularly attracted crowds of 3,000 to 4,000 spectators. Positions on 
the administrative side of the game were reserved for the colonisers whose 
policies were aimed at reinforcing European dominance. Zanzibari felt aggrieved 
that only Europeans were selected as referees.112 
On the mainland, in Tanganyika (now Tanzania), colonial administrators and 
the armed forces spread the game in the 1920s. One army major helped organise 
the first Dar es Salaam league in 1921. One year later the first match between an 
all-European team and an indigenous one took place. The Dar es Salaam 
Association Football League was formed in 1929. From the 1930s onwards 
several clubs emerged in Dar es Salaam, some organised along ethnic lines, some 
institutional. In 1945 the Tanganyika Football Association came into being and 
the game expanded to the entire country. 
Football was introduced in Congo-Brazzaville before the 1920s. Europeans 
organised matches through the Union Sportive Brazzavilloise by the year 1913. 
In 1926 Europeans founded the Club Athlètique Brazzavillois (CAB). Martin 
writes that Brazzaville football was a ‘child of the streets’.113 The Native Sports 
Federation was formed in 1929 and two years later a championship was orga-
nised featuring 27 teams. On the other side of the river, in Belgian Congo, 
Europeans founded separate teams while Belgian missionaries and a local busi-
nessman founded African teams. As of March 1936, Kinshasa and Brazzaville set 
up a tournament in which 25 teams took part. Europeans tried to keep control of 
the game but after the shoe incident the Native Sports Federations was disbanded 
and Africans wrestled football away from the colonisers.114 
The diffusion of football in West Africa was not so much instigated by the 
army and colonial administration but rather by mission posts and government 
schools. In Nigeria, for instance, the game was brought to Calabar by a group of 
Jamaican Presbyterians. In 1902 the Reverend James Luke, carrying a football 
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along, arrived in town to take up the position of headmaster of the Hope Waddell 
Training Centre. The first reported match took place in 1904 between pupils and 
teachers of the school and soldiers from the British vessel HMS Thistle. The 
Nigerians won.115 
The Reverend A.G. Fraser, who had first introduced football in Uganda’s 
capital Kampala, took the game to the Gold Coast. There, in Cape Coast, West 
Africa’s first football team Excelsior was formed in 1903. Seven years later a 
second team, Invincibles, was founded in Accra’s James Town district. A group 
of young men from neighbouring Ussher Town then came together to start a rival 
team. On 11 November 1911, their team Hearts of Oak played its first match 
against Invincibles. Today, Hearts is credited as West Africa’s oldest existing 
club. Many clubs were set up in the coastal part of the Gold Coast between 1903 
and 1930. Well-known examples include Accra-based teams Argonauts and 
Standfast, Sekondi-based teams Eleven Wise and Hasaacas, and Cape Coast-
based teams Mysterious Dwarfs and Venomous Vipers. 
Sir Gordon Guggisberg, governor of the Gold Coast, started a competition 
among clubs in Accra in 1922. Hearts of Oak dominated the so-called Guggis-
berg Shield competition, winning six out of twelve editions. Only two clubs 
existed in the Ashanti Region around this time: Evertons and Royals. In 1924 a 
taxi driver from Kumasi founded the Rainbow Football Club. Later called 
Ashanti United and then Titanics, the club took on the name Asante Kotoko in 
1935. The famous Jackson Park Stadium in Kumasi was built in the 1930s. In 
1936 a match between Kotoko and Kumasi Cornerstones marked the opening of 
the venue. Cornerstones won the match 2-0. Muslims refused to enter Jackson 
Park as it was built on a Muslim cemetery.116 
North Africans came into contact with the game in the late nineteenth century. 
French settlers in the Algerian town of Oran created a team in 1897. Several 
other teams were since founded and a competition was played in Oran as early as 
1902. The Algerians benefited from British sailors and tourists who shared their 
experiences. A match between the French national team and a selection of 
Algerian players in 1931 drew 10,000 spectators.117 In 1910 Algeria’s first Arab 
team, L’Étoile Sportive de Dupere, was formed. Muslims used their clubs as 
places ‘for the training of leaders of the national movement and for a wider 
political mobilisation’; their clubs’ names commonly included the word ‘musul-
man’.118 In neighbouring Tunisia a club named Racing was formed in 1906.119 A 
league was set up around the time of the First World War, featuring French, 
Italian, Jewish and Maltese teams. In 1919 Tunisian Arabs founded the club 
Espérance de Tunis, initially with French management members. Clubs domina-
ted by Tunisians entered the national league from the 1920s onwards. 
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The British conquered the countries along the Nile in 1882 in order to secure 
dominance over the Suez Canal. One year later an Egyptian team played against 
a team consisting of British soldiers. Egypt’s first club, the Al-Sekka Al-Hadid 
Railways Club, was formed in 1903. The country’s biggest clubs Al-Ahly and 
Zamalek were founded in Cairo in 1907 and 1911, respectively. Egyptian and 
foreign teams played each other in a competition called the Sultani Cup. Sudan’s 
biggest clubs were both founded in Omdurman: Al-Masalam in 1908 (renamed 
Al-Merreikh in 1927) and Al-Hilal in 1957. Morocco’s Wydad Casablanca was 
founded in 1937. The country’s first Arab club, Wydad, was set up for wealthy 
Moroccans under the patronage of King Hassan. His political rival Abderrahman 
Youssoufi assisted in founding Raja Casablanca in 1949. 
Football generally found its way into Africa through the coastal areas before 
spreading inland following railway and road networks. The game’s organisation 
and control depended on different approaches by Africa’s two foremost colo-
nisers. Known for their policy of indirect rule, the British used existing power 
structures to govern the colonies. Sports could be used to promote values such as 
discipline, teamwork and a spirit of fair play, or so the British thought. They kept 
a firm control over the game as they were afraid that the Africans might use it to 
undermine British authority. In Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) the British allowed 
for the creation of a native-controlled African Welfare Society (AWS), which 
promoted football in Bulawayo in the 1930s. When the British became concerned 
about the high levels of self-organisation in the colony, they tried to take control 
of the AWS, which resulted in boycotts and massive strikes.120 
The policy of the French relied on assimilation or Frenchification which 
meant that peoples of the colonies effectively became citizens of the French 
empire. The French feared the organisational and political potential of sports 
clubs and tried to exert maximum control. As a result, football diffused at a 
slower pace in the French colonies in comparison to their British counterparts. 
This occurred, for instance, in Ivory Coast where the game was introduced in the 
1920s – not by the colonisers but by Ghanaian migrants. Ivorians set up the 
country’s top clubs in the then-capital Abidjan in the late 1940s: Club Sportif 
Bété (later known as Africa Sports) in 1947 and ASEC Mimomas (also known as 
ASEC Abidjan) in 1948. 
The differences between French and British rule were especially visible in 
Cameroon, a country divided into a British and a French colony. A photographer 
from Sierra Leone is said to have introduced football in Douala in the 1920s.121 
The French colonisers did not have the resources and manpower to create clubs 
and initially relied on migrants from other African countries. The exact dates of 
the first founded clubs are shady. André Ntonfo states that Oryx, for long 
Douala’s foremost club, was set up in 1928.122 In its early years football was the 
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terrain of Europeans in the metropolitan areas. When on 11 November 1930 a 
French submarine entered the Douala harbour, two white teams played each 
other as part of the celebrations. Only afterwards were Cameroonians allowed to 
play. The French also forbade the adoption of French club names. Olympic 
(named after Olympique Marseille) was renamed Oryx and Diables Noirs 
(named after Sporting Club de Five) became known as Léopard.123 
Football first spread in Cameroon’s economically developed areas, namely 
Douala and the South. Yaoundé’s foremost club Canon was founded in Novem-
ber 1930, followed by Tonnerre in 1934. But, as Clignet and Stark argue, the 
French did not encourage companies to invest in football, and several clubs that 
either belonged to the railways or the police disappeared, and others that re-
cruited players from civil servants experienced internal transformations.124 Entre-
preneurs who were willing to get involved in clubs often did not have enough 
financial resources. In (Anglophone) West Cameroon clubs could not rely on 
wealthy benefactors; here clubs were dependant on state-owned corporations and 
regional governmental departments. In neighbouring (Anglophone) Nigeria, 
clubs were sponsored by government departments as well,125 and the same goes 
for other English territories such as Sudan.126 
Europeans did not introduce the game in Liberia. The first club was formed in 
1934 by an ethnic group called the Kru, some of whose members had taken the 
game home from a trip to Britain. One of the country’s biggest clubs, Invincible 
Eleven (IE), was set up in 1943 by wealthy inhabitants from Monrovia. IE was 
the country’s best team in the 1940s and early 50s. Its main rival, Mighty 
Barrolle (MB), had a more pronounced ethnic background. The club was founded 
in 1956 by members of the Basa ethnic group and was most successful from the 
1960s onwards.127 In Ethiopia, another country that escaped colonisation, many 
sports clubs were linked to churches, factories and youth clubs. An example is 
the mighty Saint George Sports Club in Addis Abeba, founded in 1928, which is 
associated with St. George’s Church.128 
Urbanisation hit the continent in the years before independence, influencing 
football in no small way. Nigeria’s largest city Lagos doubled in terms of the 
number of residents in slightly over twenty years; from 126,000 in 1931 to 
267,000 in 1953.129 The population of Brazzaville grew from 6,000 in 1914 to 
75,000 in 1951.130 Football was the most important activity in the capital of the 
Congo. Rivalries between clubs from the larger cities in Africa intensified, for 
instance Canon vs Tonnerre (Yaoundé, Cameroon) and Simba vs Yanga (Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania). Yanga was formed in the 1920s under the name of the 
Jangwani Sports Club.131 Simba was set up by players of Yanga under the name 
of Queens, followed by Sunderland. In terms of rivalry, Egypt is host to Africa’s 
most violent derby: Al-Ahly vs Zamalek. 
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Photo 2.1 Football infrastructures throughout Africa are largely inadequate. Players of Tiko 
United (Cameroon) practice on a barren ground inside the town stadium 
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The terms creolisation and Africanisation have been used in relation to the 
spread, growth and popularity of football in Africa. Two noticeable features were 
the role of magic (juju or muti) and indigenous playing styles. First, spiritual 
practices were commonplace from the game’s earliest moments on the continent. 
South African clubs employed healers, diviners and sorcerers to decide matches 
in their favour.132 Martin notes with regard to Congo-Brazzaville that teams 
needed to ‘tame’ the occult forces and for that purpose marabouts from as far as 
West Africa were hired to win matches.133 Second, in terms of playing styles, 
Africans first adopted the English “kick and rush” and other European tactics in 
the 1920s and 30s. Yet supporters truly appreciated individual skills such as 
strength, improvisation and dribbling.134 
Indigenous resistance to colonial rule through football was visible all over the 
continent. New clubs, organised along racial and ethnic lines, emerged in 
Zanzibar during the 1930s and 40s. This competition led the players of three 
clubs – New Kings, New Generation and Caddies – to form a new, stronger 
team: African Sports. The aim of the founding members was ‘not only to rebuild 
a team that was capable of taking the league championship but to form and 
strengthen a sense of African ethnic identity and ultimately to struggle for the 
recognition of the interest of the island’s majority populations in colonial govern-
ance’.135 Indeed, the success of African Sports contributed to the development of 
African nationalism in Zanzibar. 
The situation in Algeria in the 1950s is arguably Africa’s most prominent case 
of the interplay between football and the fight for independence. The Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) set up a team that represented the Algerian resistance 
against the French. Professional players oversees were asked to join the FLN’s 
team. Several players, among whom Rachid Mekhloufi and Mustapha Zitouni, 
responded and escaped France. ‘We were the true ambassadors of Algerian 
independence,’ said Mohammed Maouche, who was captured and imprisoned 
when he tried to flee France.136 Journalist Ian Hawkey argues that the FLN team 
may be Algeria’s best-ever national team.137  
Football after independence: The good old days 
‘Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else will follow.’ President Kwame 
Nkrumah’s words echoed on 6 March 1957 when the former Gold Coast, now 
Republic of Ghana, became the first Sub-Saharan nation to gain independence. 
North African nations – respectively Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco 
– had by then already shown their colonisers the door. After years of intense 
violence, Algeria jumped the bandwagon in 1962. Three dozen other countries 
gained independence in the 1960s. The mood was one of optimism and joy. An 
abundance of natural resources, an economic boom and leaders who advocated to 
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strive for development and nation-building caused a wave of euphoria amidst the 
people of the newly independent nations. 
National associations and leagues were set up around the time the French, 
British and other colonial powers were packing their bags. Cameroon’s Fédé-
ration Camerounaise de Football (FECAFOOT) was created in 1959. Oryx 
Douala won the maiden edition of the national league that took off the following 
year. The Kenya Football Federation (KFF) came into being in 1960 and a 
national league was started three years later. The Fédération Sénégalaise de 
Football (FSF) was founded in 1960 as well, but a national league did not 
commence until 1966. 
Some countries had already laid down their football structures decades earlier. 
The Egyptian Football Association was created in 1921 and became affiliated to 
FIFA in 1923. The Egyptians were the first to start a football league on the 
continent. The league’s maiden edition in 1948/49 was won by Al-Ahly.138 The 
Liberia Football Association (LFA) was formed in 1936. Ethiopia followed in 
1943 with the creation of the Ethiopian Football Federation (EFF). Mozambique 
and Angola, on the other hand, were late. When they finally gained independence 
from Portugal, they set up associations in 1976 and 1979, respectively. 
Kwame Nkrumah was one of the first African leaders who understood the 
power of football. He invested heavily in the Gold Coast XI, which he renamed 
the Black Stars, after Marcus Garvey’s famed Black Star Line. He appointed the 
player C.K. Gyamfi as national team coach. Nkrumah, nicknamed Osagyefo 
(Redeemer), reckoned that a black man could do what white men could – and 
better. His confidence in Gyamfi paid off: The Black Stars won the African Cup 
of Nations twice, in 1963 and 1965. The Ghanaians were invited by other newly 
instated African leaders, among whom Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. Kenyatta would 
come to regret it. Ghana defeated Kenya 13-2. 
Nkrumah’s interests went further. He appointed Ohene Djan as head of the 
National Sports Council (NSC) and together they came up with the idea of 
creating a national club. Not all clubs liked the so-called Real Republikans and to 
sooth matters it was decided that Nkrumah’s team would enter the competition 
on a non-scoring basis. Yet these limitations were lifted and Republikans won the 
1962/63 National League season. When Nkrumah was overthrown in 1965, his 
club was swiftly disbanded and the national team’s performances deteriorated. 
Ghana plunged into an economic crisis and witnessed a series of military coups, 
until a Flight Lieutenant by the name of Jerry Rawlings came to power in 1981. 
Egypt and Ethiopia were among the four nations that initiated the founding of 
the Confederation of African Football (CAF), the others being Sudan and South 
Africa. The birth took place on 8 February 1957 at the Grand Hotel in Khartoum, 
Sudan. Its headquarters were set in Cairo, despite the objections made by Ethio-
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pia’s Ydnekatchew Tessema, CAF’s longstanding president in the 1970s and 
1980s, who thought Addis Abeba a more suitable place. The organisation would 
grow to become the largest of FIFA’s six confederations, and Africa’s power in 
the world of global football has increased significantly ever since. By 1965 CAF 
had welcomed 26 members, by 1970 this number had risen to 34, and by 2010 to 
55. 
One of the first steps CAF’s founders took was to create a new tournament. 
Named the African Cup of Nations, it was to become Africa’s biggest sporting 
event. Only three nations took part in the contest of the first edition in 1957, after 
South Africa had been disqualified for wanting to field white players only. Egypt 
beat Sudan in the semi-final and Ethiopia in the final. Two years later Egypt, 
briefly called the United Arab Republic, secured the hosting of the second 
edition. The Pharaohs again won the tournament by beating Sudan in the final. 
The third edition (in 1962) was won by Ethiopia. 
South Africa’s apartheid regime made the independent African nations aware 
of their growing influence on a global stage. South Africa was boycotted by 
excluding it from taking part in international sports contests from the early 1960s 
onwards. In 1968, however, an IOC committee decided that South Africa was 
eligible to participate in the Olympics in Mexico City. The Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) immediately staged a boycott. Dozens of countries in 
Africa announced their withdrawal, forcing the IOC to reverse its decision. In 
May 1970, South Africa was expelled from the Olympic movement.139 The 
white-controlled football association FASA was suspended in 1962 and expelled 
in 1976. South African football would find itself isolated for almost three dec-
ades. 
Football in South Africa was defined by racial segregation. There were 
different associations for whites (FASA), blacks (SANFA), the coloured (SAFA) 
and Indians (SASA). The killings in the Sharpeville and Langa townships in 
1960 led African, Indian and coloured administrators to found the non-racial 
South African Soccer League (SASL). The SASL league took off in 1961 and 
instantly became a success. After some time the South African government and 
FASA ordered the proprietors of playing grounds to cancel SASL matches. 
SASL had to abandon the league in 1966 due to a lack of playing grounds. Peter 
Alegi argues that SASL was ‘the most important force in the history of South 
African football before the 1990s’.140  
Football was seen as a means to instil a sense of nationalism and national pride 
after independence. Ghana and Nkrumah had led the way. In Cameroon too, the 
game was used to forge unity among the more than 200 ethnic groups. The then 
president Ahmadou Ahidjo ordered that the national team be made up of players 
from all over the country. Cameroon hosted the African Cup of Nations in 1972. 
32 
 
The country’s biggest stadiums in Yaoundé and Douala are a reminder of the 
tournament of which it was rumoured that most of the money disappeared into 
the organisers’ pockets.141 When the host nation stumbled in the semi-finals, 
Ahidjo was so upset that he demanded a fearsome nickname for the team – hence 
the Indomitable Lions. 
The organisation of, and support for, Cameroonian clubs was (and still is) 
predominantly ethnic in nature. The biggest Douala-based clubs, for instance, 
were founded in specific quartiers by members of distinctive ethnic groups. The 
founding fathers of Caiman Douala came from the Akwa district and those of 
Oryx from Bali. Léopard derived its support from the Deido and Union origin-
ated from the Bamileke-dominated New Bell area.142 In a move to detribalise 
football in 1970, the Minister of Sports ordered the Douala clubs to change 
names to Douala I, II and III. It had been done elsewhere, most notably in 
Guinea. It did not work out in Cameroon and president Ahidjo subsequently 
sacked his minister.143 
A Presidential Decree in Kenya in 1980 demanded all organisations to adopt 
national or ethnic-neutral name. The country’s most popular clubs, Abaluhya 
Football Club and Gor Mahia, were run by respectively the Luhya and Luo and 
were ordered to change names. Abaluhya Football Club was renamed AFC 
Leopards, Gor Mahia temporarily switched to Gulf Olympic Rangers. The coun-
try’s powerful Kikuyu played a subordinate role in the national league. W.W.S. 
Njororai relates this to the Mau Mau war for national independence after which 
numerous Kikuyu were held in camps. This gave the Luhya and Luo the oppor-
tunity to engage in recreational activities. For them, football became a vehicle for 
ethnic identity and resistance.144 
Ethnic divisions have had an impact on football throughout the continent, in-
cluding Africa’s most populous nation, Nigeria. The struggle for political power 
by the country’s foremost ethnic groups – the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Igbo 
in the east, and the Yoruba in the west – adversely affected the game. In fact, due 
to political instability and the Biafran War between 1967 and 1970, a national 
league did not kick off until 8 January 1972.145 The Nigerian national team only 
became a force to be reckoned with from 1976 onwards. A notable club in the 
early days was Enugu Rangers, a team founded in 1970 in an Igbo-dominated 
region. The Rangers came in second in the 1975 African Cup of Champions 
Clubs. 
Football was not only used by those in power but also by those who felt 
oppressed or neglected in the political domain. In Algeria, where the Berbers 
were suppressed by Arab rulers, the club JS Kabylie (JSK) came to represent 
Berber identity. The club’s immense successes, culminating in the 1981 and 1990 
African Cup of Champions Clubs and the 1995 African Cup Winners’ Cup titles, 
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led fans to refer to JSK as “Je suis Kabylie”. The FLN-dominated government 
opposed the club’s ethnic base and ordered the name to be changed to Jeunesse 
Électronique Tizi Ouzou for most of the 1980s,146 although elsewhere it is stated 
that clubs like JSK had to be named after the companies that sponsored them.147 
The Cameroonian club PWD Bamenda represented the English-speaking 
(Anglophone) population and as such the team drew large numbers of fans to the 
field of play. Supporters in Bamenda claim that the powerful men in Yaoundé 
loathed the club’s Anglophone identity and therefore obstructed PWD’s matches 
any which way they could. ‘There were always truckloads of soldiers coming 
from Yaoundé to our stadium,’ one supporter remembered, ‘and they would 
seriously beat up anyone who rooted for PWD.’ One famous story (told in 
chapter 6) deals with the Francophone Sports Minister poisoning the PWD 
players before the 1979 Cup of Cameroon final. 
Football was also subject to foreign powers and ideologies. The Soviet Union 
developed sporting relations with more than 30 African countries in the 1960s 
and 70s. This interest increased in the 1980s as the USSR sent specialists and 
various materials to the continent. Ethiopian sports clubs were officially taken 
over by the Marxist government in 1976. Sports, football included, came under 
strict government control, and military influences in sports activities were sig-
nificant. These influences diminished after the overthrow of the Marxists in 
1991.148 
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania resorted to a policy of socialism and self-
reliance called ujamaa. Between 1967 and 1971 measures were taken, in line 
with the Arusha Declaration, to give the government maximum control over 
sports. The National Sports Council (NSC) would come to oversee all sports in 
the country. The administrators at the Football Association of Tanzania (FAT) 
were accused of incompetence and replaced by members of the ruling TANU 
political party. Nyerere’s main goals – national integration and promotion of 
African unity – were hardly achieved through football as matches occasionally 
descended into violence.149 
CAF set up continental club competitions from the 1960s onwards. The Afri-
can Cup of Champions Clubs was proposed by the Ghanaian delegation at CAF’s 
General Assembly in January 1962.150 The prestigious competition was aptly 
called the Nkrumah Cup in the first years of its existence. Cameroon’s Oryx 
Douala beat Mali’s Stade Malien 2-1 in the competition’s maiden final in 1964. 
The African Cup Winners’ Cup, a competition for clubs that had won the 
domestic cup final, was introduced in 1975. Cameroon’s Tonnerre Yaoundé be-
came Africa’s first cup champion by beating Ivory Coast’s Stella Club d’Adjamé 
4-1. The CAF Cup came into being in 1992. It was a competition for the runners-
up in Africa’s domestic leagues. 
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Clubs from West and Southern Africa dominated the continental competitions 
in the first two decades. Canon Yaoundé was ‘arguably the best African team in 
the late 1970s’151 (although it is fair to mention Hafia Conakry’s three Cup of 
Champions Cup titles). The club from Cameroon’s capital lifted 14 trophies 
between 1970 and 1980: Five championships, five Cups of Cameroon, three 
Cups of Champions Clubs and one Cup Winners’ Cup. Rival Tonnerre Yaoundé 
collected the first Cup Winners’ Cup with the help of Liberian star George Weah. 
Asante Kotoko won the Cup of Champions Clubs in 1970 and 1983 with the 
assistance of Ibrahim Sunday, first as player, then as coach. ‘Those were the 
good old days,’ former Kotoko player Ernest Appau recalled. ‘There was no 
money but we were so popular back then. We just liked to play.’ 
Stadiums all over Africa were filled to capacity. Several stadiums were built in 
the years after independence, many bearing names of presidents or signifying a 
country’s unification. The Nigerian prime minister Alhaji Sir Tafawa Balewa 
inaugurated the National Stadium in Lagos in the year of independence.152 
Zambia’s national stadium in Lusaka was opened in 1964 to host the country’s 
independence festivities. Safety was (and still is) an issue. Overcrowded stands 
have led to numerous deaths. Many stadiums have over the years been deemed 
unsuitable to host international matches. 
Top matches in Ghana attracted between 40,000 and 45,000 fans in the early 
years of the National League. When Asante Kotoko and Real Republikans met at 
the Wembley-Accra Stadium on the last days of the league season in 1961, the 
venue was ‘as usual packed with all classes of men and women and chiefs, the 
fashionably dressed ladies, including the expensive cloth type, taking the upper 
row’.153 People flocked to the field to watch the likes of forward Wilberforce 
Mfum and Robert Mensah, one of Ghana’s best goalkeepers, who was stabbed to 
death in a bar in 1971.154  
Part of the game’s popularity was the fact that Africa’s best players could be 
watched on the continent’s lousy pitches. To be sure, African footballers played 
in European leagues from as early as the 1920s, most notably those from the 
French colonies.155 Britain started importing black South African players around 
that period, among whom Steve Mokone, known as the Black Meteor. Players 
from Mozambique and Angola found their way to Portugal. Yet the number of 
African footballers abroad initially remained small. One reason was that Africa’s 
performances at the World Cup – Morocco participating in the 1970 edition, 
Zaire in 1974 and Tunisia in 1978 – were unimpressive. Another reason was that 
stereotypes about Africans were much alive. 
Roger Milla played for Cameroonian clubs for 12 years between 1965 and 
1977 before moving to Europe. Similarly, Théophile Abega, another Cameroon-
ian star, was Canon Yaoundé’s best player between 1974 and 1984. Fantastic 
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nicknames were accorded to players. The former Ghanaian international Osei 
Kofi was known as ‘The Wizard Dribbler’. People also called him ‘One Man 
Symphony Orchestra’ for his ability to steer the team to victory.156 Fans in 
Congo-Brazzaville nicknamed players ‘Elastic’ (a goalkeeper), ‘Dancer’, ‘Tech-
nician’, ‘Phantom’ and ‘Steamboat’.157 Zaire’s top striker Mulamba Ndaye was 
so fast they called him ‘Volvo’ and ‘Mustang’, after newly imported auto-
mobiles.158 One Nigerian goalkeeper named I.S. Adewale was nicknamed ‘The 
Boy is Good’,159 requiring no further explanation. 
Some African governments passed laws to prevent players from leaving the 
country. Zaire installed a ban on the movement of footballers in the 1960s. For 
several years players were effectively nationalised in the same manner as copper 
and diamonds.160 Star players such as Mulamba Ndaye failed to cash in and 
players from this era struggled to sustain themselves after ending their careers.161 
All-time greats like Ghana’s Baba Yara and Cameroon’s Mbappé Lépé died 
relatively young – and poor. The former Ghanaian player Prince Polley re-
membered a talented footballer who sustained an injury from which he never 
recovered. ‘Sometimes I see him limping at a roundabout begging for money,’ 
Polley said. Former players have been spotted cleaning the VIP stands in the 
same stadiums where spectators once applauded their moves.162 
The lost decade: Economic crisis and structural adjustments 
The oil crisis and the drop of global cash crop prices were some of the causes of 
the economic crisis that hit the continent in the 1980s. One by one African 
nations called out for help. Billions of dollars in foreign aid were sent to Africa, 
especially during the heydays of the Cold War. African leaders started borrowing 
money to make up for deficits. The continent’s debts rose from six billion dollars 
in 1970 to nearly 200 billion dollars by the mid-1990s.163 Much of the money 
from the loans was spent on the luxurious lifestyles of the elite. Africa’s 
economic decline in the 1980s was so great that Martin Meredith calls it the ‘lost 
decade’.164 Western donors developed a new strategy to rid the continent of 
economic despair – the ideology of the free market. 
Senegal became Africa’s first country to accept a so-called structural adjust-
ment loan from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Kenya followed in 1980, Ghana in 1983. African governments complied with the 
wishes of donor institutions. They trimmed down their bureaucratic apparatuses, 
they privatised state-owned corporations and they opened up their borders to 
welcome foreign capital. These measures were thought to wipe out corruption 
and patronage. Multinational corporations would start to invest with the money 
trickling down to the poorest people. The consequences, however, were disas-
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trous. Around 55 percent of all Africans lived in abject poverty in the 1960s. By 
2002 the number had risen to 65 percent.165 
The impact of the so-called Washington Consensus on football proved harsh. 
As Armstrong and Giulianotti state, ‘State-owned enterprises had helped to run 
football clubs that were important community resources. Following their take-
over by TNCs (transnational corporations), the newly privatised institutions have 
tended to reduce expenditure in all social programmes, including sports-related 
associations.’166 Club football in Cameroon declined in the 1980s. Union Douala 
has the dubious honour of being the country’s last club to win a continental 
trophy – the Cup Winners’ Cup in 1981. CDC Tiko, a club from Anglophone 
Cameroon, lost its sponsorship from the Cameroon Development Corporation in 
the 1980s. The club was renamed Tiko United. In Limbe, CDC Victoria became 
Victoria United. ‘We grow and sell bananas and palm oil,’ one CDC manager 
told me. ‘Football is not part of our core business.’ 
A few African countries managed to overcome the economic crisis. Ghana, for 
instance, was on the brink of bankruptcy by the time Jerry Rawlings came to 
power. Rawlings accepted economic reform, resulting in a sharp rise of cocoa 
prizes in the 1980s. Inflation was reduced, and so was the high number of 
government employees. But as the economy grew, so did the country’s external 
debt. By 1998 Ghana’s GDP was lower than it had been almost thirty years 
earlier.167 
Company clubs flooded the Ghanaian league in the 1970s. The 1979 league 
consisted of six company-owned clubs. The power of the company clubs waned 
in the 1980s, most likely due to the economic crisis. ‘The workers who found 
their wages cut were increasingly angered by the fact that the company kept on 
putting money in a football team,’ said the former CEO of a club named State 
Traders. The performances of so-called community-based clubs deteriorated in 
the 1980s and 90s. Ebusua Mysterious Dwarfs, once one of Ghana’s top clubs, 
relegated on several occasions. Sekondi Eleven Wise found itself in the second 
tier for many years. Asante Kotoko never won another continental trophy after 
1983. Only Hearts of Oak managed to win a continental prize – the 2000 CAF 
Champions League. 
Africa’s mining industry had been responsible for the successes of many 
clubs. When the privatisation of state-owned corporations set in, sports-related 
sponsorships were slashed. Zambia’s Nkana Red Devils won several league titles 
and reached the final of the 1990 Cup of Champions Clubs but later fell into 
decline.168 In fact, football in Zambia experienced dramatic moments during the 
credit crisis in the new millennium. Clubs ran into financial difficulties when 
companies from the Copper Belt withdrew their sponsorships.169 Komkola Cop-
per Mines announced to cut in half its annual contribution of $232,000 for the 
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national team. Power Dynamos, on the other hand, won the Cup Winners’ Cup in 
1991 and claimed four league titles since. In 2011 the club still enjoyed the 
sponsorship of the Copperbelt Energy Corporation. 
Only well-organised and financially stable clubs prospered in continental club 
competitions during and after the economic crisis. North African clubs pushed 
West and Southern African clubs to the background. Between 1965 and 1983, 15 
out of 19 Cup of Champions Clubs titles were won by Sub-Saharan clubs. Asante 
Kotoko’s 1-0 victory over Al-Ahly in 1983 marked the ending of black Africa’s 
hegemony. The following eleven finals were won by North African clubs and the 
Maghreb’s dominance has never waned since. Top clubs were Tunisia’s Club 
Africain, Espérance de Tunis and, later, Etoile du Sahel; Morocco’s Wydad and 
Raja Casablanca as well as FAR Rabat; Egypt’s Zamalek and Al-Ahly; and 
Algeria’s JS Kabylie. 
The economic climate in North African countries has been more favourable in 
comparison to Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco 
and Algeria were (and in some cases still are) governed by autocratic regimes, 
there was – at least until 2011 – a political stability which was largely absent 
elsewhere. North African clubs paid their star players significantly higher salaries 
than clubs in, for example, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria. David Goldblatt 
argues that North African clubs established facilities that ‘were the envy of 
Africa’.170 Huge crowds occupied the stands on match days and top clubs could 
afford scouting systems and youth programmes. Perhaps only Ivory Coast’s 
ASEC Mimomas and South Africa’s top clubs are able to match the North 
Africans in terms of facilities and youth programmes. 
North Africa’s infrastructural superiority was especially visible between 1980 
and 1990 when four out of six African Cup of Nations were hosted in the 
Maghreb (Libya 1982, Egypt 1986, Morocco 1988 and Algeria 1990). West 
African nations nonetheless dominated most of the tournament’s history. Indeed, 
the usual suspects for a place in the final were Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon. No 
less than 14 out of 18 African Cup of Nations finals between 1957 and 2000 
featured at least one of these nations. With respect to North African nations, the 
statistics were 10 out of 18 finals. From Southern Africa came, albeit on a much 
less prominent scale, Zaire/DR Congo, Congo, South Africa and, perhaps, 
Zambia. 
There have been few East African successes both with regard to clubs and 
national teams. Ethiopia won the African Cup of Nations in 1962, Uganda was 
runner-up in 1978 and that was about it. The impact of clubs from East Africa in 
continental competitions was minimal. Uganda’s Simba FC was runner-up in the 
1972 Cup of Champions Clubs. Villa SC, also from Uganda, reached the final of 
Africa’s top club competition in 1991 yet failed to beat Tunisia’s Club Africain. 
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Gor Mahia, one of Kenya’s most popular clubs, is the East Africa’s only club to 
have won a continental trophy (the Cup Winners’ Cup in 1987). Burundi’s 
Vital’O and Kenya Breweries also reached the final of the Cup Winners’ Cup. 
South Africa was admitted back to international football after the formation of 
the non-racial South African Football Association (SAFA) in 1991. When Kenya 
withdrew as host of the 1996 African Cup of Nations, South Africa stepped in 
and began preparations. The Bafana Bafana went on to win the tournament, 
beating Tunisia 2-0 in the final. The multi-ethnic team received the trophy from 
Nelson Mandela, F.W. de Klerk and the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini. South 
Africa made it again to the final of the next edition in Burkina Faso but lost out 
to Egypt. By that time, Orlando Pirates (founded in 1937), Moroka Swallows 
(1947) and Mamelodi Sundowns (early 1960s) had to tolerate the company of 
Kaizer Chiefs (1970), Jomo Cosmos (1983) and SuperSport United (1994). The 
Soweto derby between Kaizer Chiefs and Orlando Pirates still stands as one of 
the toughest matches on the continent. 
The euphoria around the time of independence vanished in the political 
domain as well. Ivory Coast’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Malawi’s Hastings 
Banda, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Senegal’s Léopold Senghor and Cameroon’s 
Ahmadou Ahidjo were some of the presidents who had ruled their countries for 
decades. Most of them installed one-party systems, funded brutal intelligence 
services and clung on to power through patronage and corruption. Most if not all 
African leaders used the state’s coffers for personal use. For example, Mobutu 
Sese Seko reportedly side-tracked around $5 billion to off-shore accounts. The 
privatisation of state-owned corporations led to what some have called crony 
capitalism, whereby relatives, friends and allies were given top positions within 
these companies. 
War and famine were (and still are) common in Africa. The genocides in 
Rwanda and Sudan’s Darfur region, the breaking up of Somalia’s state and civil 
wars in Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola were some of the con-
tinent’s ghastliest conflicts. Droughts and politics in the redistribution of food led 
to the famine in Ethiopia in 1984/85. Football was severely hindered in parts of 
Africa and several leagues were abandoned, sometimes for years on end. This 
happened in Liberia where the civil war killed 150,000 Liberians after the over-
throw of Samuel K. Doe in 1990.171  
The longstanding war between Eritrea and neighbouring Ethiopia all but 
destroyed football in the small East African nation. Ethiopia had annexed its 
neighbour in 1962. The Ethiopians went on to win the 1963 African Cup of 
Nations with the help of nine Eritrean-born players. Eritrean liberation move-
ments took up arms. Supported by the Soviet Union, Ethiopia’s Marxist dic- 
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Photo 2.2 Clubs in Africa have suffered from low patronage in recent times. A Hearts of Oak 
supporter watches his team play at the Len Clay Stadium in Obuasi, Ghana 
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tator Mengistu reclaimed control over Eritrea in the late 1970s. Eritrean clubs 
were founded on communist principles; they were attached to factories and 
carried names such as Shoe Factory and Food Preparation. Matches were played 
in between fighting. Eritrean forces finally liberated the country in 1991, the 
country’s FA was founded the following year. No match has taken place between 
the two countries since the July 2000 ceasefire. Thousands and thousands of 
people on both sides of the border died in a war lasting thirty years.172 
African football reached an all-time low in 1993 when 18 members of 
Zambia’s national team perished in a plane crash off the coast of Gabon. They 
had been en route to Dakar to play a World Cup qualifier against Senegal. 
Captain Kalusha Bwalya escaped his teammates’ fate due to club engagements in 
Europe. After the crash, questions were asked why the squad flew in an old 
military cargo plane. For years the widows of the deceased players tried to sue 
the government for money, but to no avail.173 Zambia reached the final of the 
1994 African Cup of Nations but lost to Nigeria. 
The end of the Cold War triggered a wave of political reform in Africa. A new 
set of leaders entered the political arena. Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over from 
Nyerere in Tanzania, Yoweri Museveni came to power in Uganda and Robert 
Mugabe became president of Zimbabwe. Many of them received praise and were 
supported by western donors but their political reforms were mostly done on 
paper. In reality, power structures by and large remained the same. In Cameroon, 
Paul Biya took over the presidency in 1982. He was forced to allow rivals to 
form parties in the early 1990s. Biya consistently rigged elections to stay in 
power. He also capitalised on the successes of the national team by attaching the 
logo of a lion to his party.174 
Cameroon was Africa’s first nation to make an impact on a world stage. To be 
sure, Egypt was the continent’s first representative at the 1934 World Cup (the 
Pharaohs lost their match and went home). The closest Africa came to reaching 
the second phase was Algeria in 1982. The North Africans, however, were 
eliminated due to what has been widely considered an “agreement” between 
Germany and Austria. Also in 1982, Cameroon recorded three draws in the group 
stage and was sent home. The Indomitable Lions’ biggest success was accom-
plished at the 1990 World Cup. Cameroon beat the defending world champions 
Argentina in the opening match and were unluckily defeated by England in the 
quarter finals. 
Africa’s national teams defied the economic crisis and went on to perform 
reasonably well in international tournaments. More slots had been allocated to 
the continent in the 1970s, courtesy of FIFA president João Havelange who 
promised to increase the number of participants at the World Cup. Africa bene-
fited from the Brazilian’s power politics as it went from one representative at the 
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16-team 1978 World Cup to three at the 1994 World Cup. By 1998, when the 
World Cup had expanded to its present 32 participants, Africa was allowed to 
send five representatives. 
Nigeria made it to the second round in the 1994 and 1998 World Cups. The 
country’s Golden Generation, among whom Jay-Jay Okocha and Nwankwo 
Kanu, played under the dictatorial leadership of Sani Abacha. The general acted 
as patron of the Super Eagles. Former national team coach Clemens Westerhof 
remembered Abacha asking him at the start of the 1994 African Cup of Nations: 
‘Do you bring me the cup, yes or no?’ Westerhof answered: ‘The name Nigeria is 
already in the cup.’175 The Ogoni Nine were executed only months after Nigeria 
had become African champions. When Nelson Mandela questioned Abacha’s 
human rights record, the dictator withdrew the national team from the 1996 
African Cup of Nations. 
Another of Havelange’s promises was to create international youth tourna-
ments. From its inception in 1985, African teams performed well at the U17 
World Cup – the tournament for players under 17 years of age. Nigeria reached 
the finals six times, winning three. Ghana played four finals, winning two. The 
Ghanaians won the U20 World Cup in 2009. Africa has also performed rea-
sonably well at the Olympics. The Nigerians won the Gold medal at the 1996 
edition in Atlanta. Cameroon followed in 2000 with a Gold medal at the Sydney 
Olympics. 
The new millennium: Exodus, commercialisation and Europe 
Abedi “Pele” Ayew was born on 5 November 1964. He was voted best player in 
the 1978 Accra Juvenile League and earned himself a transfer to a club named 
Real Tamale United. He went on to take part in Ghana’s qualifying series for the 
1982 African Cup of Nations. The Black Stars won the tournament and Abedi 
Pele turned into one of Africa’s most talented players. Later that year, at age 18, 
he signed a contract worth $50,000 at a club in Qatar. The Ghana star was most 
successful in the early 1990s when he played for Olympique Marseille. Abedi 
Pele won the African Player of the Year award in 1991, 1992 and 1993. 
Abedi Pele’s fame did not go unnoticed. Young African players wanted to 
follow in the Maestro’s footsteps. Ghana had become one of Africa’s biggest 
actors on the transfer market at the turn of the century, exporting more than 10 
percent of Africa’s entire ‘output’.176 To be sure, Nigeria topped the charts with 
nearly 16 percent of all African players, Cameroon came in second with 10.9 
percent.177 The exodus accelerated in the new millennium, one reason being 
Africa’s ‘new image’ since 1982.178 Another reason is the freedom of players to 
move around Europe due to the Bosman ruling. Yet another reason is related to 
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the ‘fragile political economy of African football’,179 although this does not apply 
to all the countries on the continent.180 
The exodus is most visible during the African Cup of Nations. Every other 
year a large number of European-based Africans fly to Africa for a few weeks. 
When the tournament was held in Mali in 2002, 62 percent of the 311 parti-
cipating players enjoyed club contracts in Europe. The squads of Cameroon, 
Senegal and Nigeria consisted entirely of European-based players.181 The per-
centage rose to 69 percent for the 2008 African Cup of Nations. Twenty players 
of the 23-member Ghanaian national team at that tournament took their salaries 
from clubs outside their home country. Five countries – Cameroon, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Guinea and Mali – had their entire national team selections playing 
abroad.182 
The temporary migration of some of Europe’s best African players causes 
resentment among clubs in England, France, Belgium, Spain and elsewhere. 
European-based African players go into training camp by late December, thereby 
missing the busiest period in the English Premier League. European clubs are 
obliged to keep on paying these players’ salaries, and not seldom are they found 
to suffer from injuries upon their return. CAF took a cosmetic measure by 
starting the 2010 edition ten days later (on 20 January instead of 10 January). 
CAF then decided to switch the African Cup of Nations to odd years with South 
Africa hosting the tournament in 2013.183 
The exodus of Africa’s best players is matched by a ‘reverse migration of 
skilled technicians’, as Lanfranchi and Taylor put it.184 Four out of six coaches 
who led African national teams at the 2010 World Cup were non-Africans. A 
mere five out of 16 coaches at the 2010 African Cup of Nations were Africans. 
Most of Africa’s successes have nevertheless been achieved with local coaches at 
the helm. Ghana won its four African Cup of Nations titles with a local coach on 
the bench. Hassan Shehata collected three African Cup of Nations titles in a row 
in the new millennium (2006, 2008 and 2010) with his native country, Egypt. 
A plethora of football academies have been founded in recent years.185 Early 
academies were the Salif Keita Football Centre (founded in 1993 by a former 
Malian football star) and the academy belonging to the Ivorian club ASEC 
Mimomas. Ghana’s Feyenoord Fetteh Academy is known to combine football 
practice with school classes. Hundreds of small, illegal academies flooded Africa 
and it is estimated that Ghana’s capital Accra alone boasts 500 academies,186 
although this number may be exaggerated. African club officials too increasingly 
occupy themselves with selling players, preferably to clubs abroad.187 
Most attention is accorded to the players who made it. Didier Drogba, Samuel 
Eto’o, Michael Essien and Emmanuel Adebayor are household names. Drogba is 
credited for contributing to peace in Ivory Coast. He dropped on his knees on 
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national television in 2005 and asked his countrymen to stop fighting. The 
country nevertheless temporarily plunged into chaos again later on. Africa’s top 
players now earn salaries their predecessors could only dream of. In 2010, for 
example, Chelsea-midfielder Michael Essien earned a weekly salary of £120,000. 
It is said that Africa’s national teams benefit from the experience of their Euro-
pean-based players. 
Africa’s football administrators have tried to keep pace with worldwide 
developments. When Rupert Murdoch’s Sky paid £305 million for England’s 
Premier League broadcasting rights in 1992, it set off what Conn has called the 
‘football business’.188 Murdoch’s company paid £1.1 billion in 2001 in exchange 
for the exclusive rights to cover five seasons of Premier League football.189 
When Issa Hayatou took office as CAF president, he adopted a ‘far more 
sympathetic approach to commercialism’ than his predecessor Tessema which 
resulted in a number of changes with the aim of ‘privatizing’ the game.190 Cor-
porate sponsorship came in and broadcasting rights increased the game’s com-
mercial prospects. Africa’s continental competitions and tournaments were about 
to turn into marketable products. 
CAF and the French-based company MediaFoot signed a contract in the early 
1990s to manage the sales of TV rights for the African Cup of Nations. The fact 
that the majority of African households did not own a television in the decades 
after independence rapidly changed in the 1980s and 90s. More and more Afri-
cans gained access to television and the commercialisation of the game grew 
along with it. A renewed deal between CAF and MediaFoot in 2000 was worth 
$50 million. The downside is evident as several state broadcasters have been 
unable to pay the fees to show African Cup of Nations matches.191 
CAF took notice of the introduction of the lucrative UEFA Champions League 
in 1992 and set up the CAF Champions League five years later, replacing the 
Cup of Champions Clubs. Although the initial total prize money of $2.1 million, 
provided by CAF’s partner MediaFoot, was not comparable to that of Europe, it 
is argued that for the first time serious money was poured into African foot-
ball.192 The competition’s first winner Raja Casablanca earned $675,000 in prize 
money with runner-up Ashanti Goldfields receiving $225,000. The competition’s 
set-up resembles the one in Europe. Clubs play preliminary rounds in order to 
qualify for the group phase, thereby collecting $150,000 each. The CAF Cham-
pions League expanded to 64 clubs in 2001. 
The CAF Champions League has increasingly become a playground for the 
wealthiest clubs. The prize money was raised to $1.5 million for the winner and 
one million for the runner-up in 2009. Even the fourth placed club in the group 
phase received $400,000. North African clubs have dominated the competition, 
having won nine finals between 1997 and 2011. Africa’s all-time most successful 
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club is Al-Ahly, the Egyptian giant that won four CAF Champions League titles 
in the new millennium alone (2001, 2005, 2006 and 2008). Tunisia’s Etoile du 
Sahel played three finals (2004, 2005 and 2007), winning the last one. Nigeria’s 
Enyimba, meaning People’s Elephant in the Igbo language, won the competition 
in 2003 and 2004. 
Getting to the profitable group phase of the competition has become quite 
difficult for most clubs. For instance, financial limitations forced Ghanaian clubs 
such as Hearts of Oak, Asante Kotoko, Heart of Lions and Nania FC to pull out 
of the competition’s preliminary stages in recent years. CAF fines teams that fail 
to show up. 
In 2004, the Cup Winners’ Cup and the CAF Cup merged to form the CAF 
Confederation Cup. Hearts of Oak beat Asante Kotoko 8-7 in a penalty shoot-out 
in the competition’s maiden final. North Africans clubs have so far dominated 
the Confederation Cup with FAR Rabat (Morocco, 2005), Etoile du Sahel 
(Tunisia, 2006), SC Sfaxien (Tunisia, 2007, 2008), FUS Rabat (Morocco, 2010) 
and MAS Fez (Morocco, 2011) all collecting trophies. Here too, prize money 
went up. The champion took $625,000 in 2009, the runner-up had to make do 
with $432,000.193 A third competition was introduced in 1993. The CAF Super 
Cup is a match between the winner of the CAF Champions League and the CAF 
Confederation Cup. 
South Africa set the standard in the commercialisation of football. In the 
2007/08 season the Premier League signed a multiyear TV and marketing deal 
worth 1.6 billion rand ($200 million).194 The country’s top clubs now boast some 
of the continent’s highest turnovers. However, aside from Orlando Pirates win-
ning the 1995 CAF Champions League and Mamelodi Sundowns reaching the 
final of the 2001 edition, this increased financial prowess has so far not resulted 
in continental successes. This is in contrast to Egypt, another country where top 
clubs enjoy huge budgets but where supporters are spoiled with significantly 
more continental trophies. 
Africa’s football administrators have tried to professionalise and commer-
cialise the game in the 1990s. Ghana’s top officials set up the Premier League 
after a series of stakeholder meetings in the coastal town of Winneba in 1993. 
They ordered all clubs to register as limited liability companies, demanded them 
to set up physical offices with full-time secretaries and urged them to float shares 
on the Ghana Stock Exchange. These demands have only minimally been met by 
the clubs. Hearts of Oak, however, did float shares in 2011, raising 2.5 million 
cedi (approximately €1.2 million). The biggest shareholder, a businessman who 
was already a director of Hearts, was elected chairman of the Board of 
Directors.195 
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These days the Ghana Premier League attracts corporate sponsorship. For 
example, the GFA signed a five-year deal worth $15 million with the Nigerian 
company Globacom in 2008. The English Premier League model was adopted in 
many African countries. Although clubs receive money at the start of the season, 
officials have complained that it is not enough and they staged boycotts on 
several occasions. Similar problems have been cited in relation to broadcasting 
rights. In fact, seeing quality league matches on Cameroonian television is a rare 
phenomenon. The sponsorships notwithstanding, the professionalisation of the 
game never fully materialised. For instance, the Algerian government instigated 
the formation of a professional league in 1999. Years later the clubs’ financial 
state were described as fragile and a number of problems have plagued the league 
since.196 
 
 
Photo 2.3 Playing abroad has made some African players rich. One of Ghana’s national team 
players leaves Accra’s military airport in his expensive SUV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Football in Africa suffers from mismanagement and corruption. One scandal 
was uncovered by South African Supreme Court Judge Benjamin Pickard who 
investigated the practices of SAFA officials in 1997. SAFA chairman Solomon 
Morewa was found guilty of pocketing 500,000 Rand (€50,000) from a grateful 
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sponsor. Similarly, members of SAFA’s Executive Committee awarded them-
selves handsome bonuses for staging the 1996 African Cup of Nations. Accu-
sations of corruption have been made against many administrators over the years. 
Africa’s domestic leagues have been plagued by match-fixing accusations. 
Visiting teams and referees also suffer from intimidation and violence by the 
home crowd. Unfortunately, deaths are common in and around stadiums. Two of 
Africa’s worst football disasters occurred in 2001 – first in South Africa, then in 
Ghana – and were caused by organisational flaws, contempt for safety measures 
and inadequate security personnel. Things have hardly improved since, despite 
Chinese firms building ultramodern stadiums all over the continent. Early in 
2012, 74 people died in Port Said (Egypt) after Al-Masry fans attacked Al-Ahly 
supporters. 
At one point, African fans were presented with an alternative. The launch of 
satellite TV opened up the European football market. The South African com-
pany DSTV grew from 44,000 subscribers in 1998 to 1.7 million in 2008.197 
Nowadays, bars with satellite television are packed while Africa’s stadiums are 
virtually empty. The popularity of European leagues has led to a devaluation of 
domestic leagues. The admiration goes so far that matches involving Manchester 
United, Chelsea, Liverpool and Arsenal lead to violence in Africa. Akindes, 
borrowing a theory from Thomas McPhail, labelled the broadcasting of European 
football in Africa as ‘electronic colonization’.198 
Algeria has witnessed a process of “Italianization” from the early 1990s on-
wards. The Italian Serie A grew so popular that the country’s oldest club 
Mouloudia Football Club was nicknamed Juventus while its rival Algiers Union 
Football Club became known as AC Milan.199 A similar process took place in 
Ghana. Indeed, clubs such as Berekum Arsenals, Bechem Chelsea, Westham 
United and Kade Hotspurs still bear the names of their counterparts in the 
English Premier League. At some point, the administrators were so annoyed that 
they forbade clubs to take on foreign names. One victim was Accra-based club 
Manchester United, which was renamed Man U.200 
The popularity of European football has led clubs in Africa to suffer budget 
deficits. ‘Why would I pay money to see rubbish in the stadium when I can 
watch Essien on television?’ one supporter remarked. Most Premier League 
matches in Ghana are watched by only a handful of spectators. Iya Mohamed, 
president of FECAFOOT, once stated that the exodus ‘is bad for football’.201 
CAF has tried to reverse the trend by introducing a new tournament, called the 
African Nations Championship (CHAN). CAF president Issa Hayatou has argued 
that CHAN increases the value of domestic leagues by offering a platform for 
locally-based players. Several players who featured in the first final in 2009, 
however, went on to play for clubs abroad. 
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Recent African Cup of Nations editions were held in countries with autocratic 
regimes. Staging matches in the contested Angolan enclave of Cabinda backfired 
when Togo’s national team bus was ambushed by rebels. North Africa’s spring 
revolutions in 2011 gave rise to a new Libyan national team, featuring players 
who had fought against Colonel Gaddafi’s regime. The 2012 African Cup of 
Nations was extraordinary in the sense that Egypt, Cameroon and Nigeria were 
notably absent. Zambia beat favourite Ivory Coast in the final in Libreville. The 
Zambians dedicated the trophy to the 18 players who died in the 1993 plane 
crash. 
 
 
 
 3 
Looking for a wealthy Big Man 
Kumasi, 22 April 2009. A black limousine arrives at the main entrance of the 
Baba Yara Stadium. Out steps Otumfuo Osei Tutu II who, accompanied by his 
entourage, is immediately led onto the pitch. The King wears a pair of black 
trousers, a white polo shirt and a baseball cap. He greets Asante Kotoko’s 
management members, coaches and players, followed by those of the opposing 
team, King Faisal. Naturally, the Asantehene is guest of honour during today’s 
Otumfuo Challenge Cup final. 
Otumfuo Osei Tutu II ascended the Golden Stool on 26 April 1999 following 
the death of Opoku Ware II. Otumfuo is said to be an ardent sports lover. His 
favourite place is the Royal Golf Course in Kumasi. Otumfuo also inherited the 
foremost club of the Ashanti people, Asante Kotoko. Rumour has it that he 
prefers golf over football and, more worryingly, favours arch rival Hearts of Oak 
over Kotoko.202 In any case, Kotoko’s constitution states that the Asantehene is 
the ‘father, Spiritual Head and Custodian and Chief Patron of the Club’.203 
Otumfuo’s job is to hire and fire directors and managers. He also takes care of 
the club’s finances, which prompted some informants to state that Kotoko is 
financially sound. One journalist disagreed: ‘How can you say that Kotoko is rich 
when you see their sandy training pitch?’ He has a point, although the club now 
owns a new training centre. Otumfuo does not run the club all by himself. Two 
traditional rulers in the Kumasi area – the Hiahene and the Akyempimhene – take 
care of Kotoko’s affairs. Yet Otumfuo has the right to Kasapreko, literally 
meaning “he who speaks once and for all”. 
This week the Asantehene celebrates his ten year anniversary on the throne. It 
is rumoured that King Faisal was ordered to throw the match. Several teams 
other than Kotoko have won this Cup but this time around losing the final would 
have been quite embarrassing for the King. In the end, Kotoko rather predictably 
49 
 
beats Faisal 1-0. Otumfuo Osei Tutu II steps onto the pitch again, this time to 
hand out the trophy. 
From community-based clubs to one-man shows 
In one way, Asante Kotoko is an exceptional club. It is owned and run by the 
person who inherited the sacred Golden Stool. Indeed, the Asantehene is a highly 
respected and influential figure in Ghanaian society. As owner and patron of one 
of Ghana’s biggest clubs, Otumfuo Osei Tutu II is a true Big Man in football. 
With “exceptional” I mean that Kotoko can always rely on the funds and 
leadership of an individual who obviously is in possession of a significant 
amount of symbolic, social and economic capital. 
In another way, Kotoko is a rather common club. It is one of the most typical 
community-based clubs one can find in Africa. On the face of it, Kotoko is a 
public club, meaning that the team is owned by the community at large. The 
opposite of the public club is the private club. In a sense, all clubs in Africa are 
public entities for the simple reason that they fulfil a communal role. In terms of 
ownership, however, there is a difference between the two categories. Broadly 
speaking, decisions within the ranks of private clubs are made by its owners/ 
presidents with supporters lacking power. In contrast, supporters are considered 
to be the backbone of public clubs. 
I have discerned four types of clubs in Africa, which by and large correspond 
to a categorisation made by Tado Oumarou and Pierre Chazaud.204 The commu-
nity-based club is the true public club; the company club and the government 
departmental club lie somewhere in between public and private clubs; and the 
one-man show is the true private club. The distinction is nevertheless fluid and 
clubs occasionally switch from one type to the other. The overall point is that 
these club types own different forms of capital in different quantities. 
 
Community-based clubs 
Africa’s oldest and most successful clubs typically are community-based clubs. 
A few exceptions aside, these clubs enjoy large fan bases and richly filled trophy 
cabinets. Ghana’s top clubs Accra Hearts of Oak and Kumasi Asante Kotoko 
neatly fit into this category. The same goes for Cameroon’s Canon and Tonnerre 
Yaoundé, Tanzania’s Simba and Yanga, Kenya’s Gor Mahia and AFC Leopards, 
Uganda’s Express FC and Egypt’s Al-Ahly. As most community-based clubs 
were once founded by members of certain ethnic groups, identification is mostly 
predicated on ethnicity and home turf, often mixed with politics. 
From the four club types, community-based clubs generally enjoy the greatest 
support. Ghana’s top clubs in terms of support – which arguably are Asante 
Kotoko, Hearts of Oak, Ebusua Mysterious Dwarfs and Eleven Wise – are firmly 
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rooted in Kumasi, Accra, Cape Coast and Sekondi, respectively. Some commu-
nity-based clubs, for example Express FC and Al-Ahly, are even nicknamed Club 
of the People. Their grounding in communities is the reason why community-
based clubs are sometimes referred to as traditional clubs, meaning that the club 
is run by (members of) the ethnic group that owns the club’s home ground. 
Overall, community-based clubs serve as social clubs whose membership trans-
cends the mere love for the game.  
The advantages of this club type are evident. First, footballers are drawn to 
these popular clubs. ‘It’s difficult to keep players here as opposed to the 
traditional clubs,’ explained Kojo Fianoo, CEO of company club AshantiGold 
FC. ‘A player may be employed by Asante Kotoko for five years without ever 
playing for the team. But he’s satisfied just because he’s with Kotoko. Someone 
can play for a company club for two or three years but then he’s in a rush to go 
and play for one of the traditional clubs. These clubs don’t have the facilities but 
still the player prefers to play for Kotoko.’ Coaches will also abandon their clubs 
when given the chance to coach a community-based club. The movement of 
personnel thus goes in the direction of this club type, which is why it is said that 
other club types mostly act as “satellites”. 
For players and coaches alike, community-based clubs are regarded as a 
stepping stone to a potentially prosperous career. These clubs commonly win lots 
of titles and trophies. They also regularly take part in continental competitions, 
thereby enhancing a player’s and coach’s visibility. Hearts and Kotoko are 
historically seen as Ghana’s foremost “player terminals” because players tend to 
leave the country through either of these two clubs. In short, community-based 
clubs enhance a player’s market value. These clubs also boast of strong repre-
sentation in the game’s wider bureaucracy and are, as a result, regarded as 
powerful entities in the world of football. 
It is evident that Big Men will want to be connected to these clubs as well. 
More than any other club type, a position within the management of a commu-
nity-based club brings forth symbolic capital. One explanation is that commu-
nity-based clubs generate much more media attention than other club types. 
(Hearts and Kotoko even create their own news by publishing Hearts News and 
Kotoko Express several times a week.) Big Men find community-based clubs 
appealing because of their large fan bases, meaning that a management position 
significantly increases their own following. As these clubs draw upon wide 
networks in society, Big Men are able to acquire social (and political) capital. 
Guardianship of this type of club normally rests with the (descendants of) the 
founding fathers and community leaders, especially traditional rulers and elders. 
An advantage of this loose ownership is that the club should theoretically be able 
to draw upon the financial resources of the population at large. Also advanta-
51 
 
geous is the fact that a large fan base should theoretically result in high gate 
proceeds – at least higher than is the case with other club types. Also, sponsors 
should find it worthwhile to invest in these clubs. This means that community-
based clubs generate economic capital, making this club type in my view the 
only one that possesses all three forms of capital from the outset. 
The strength of public ownership is nevertheless also its weakness. It can be 
argued that community-based clubs are owned by everybody and nobody at the 
same time. Put differently, when the team performs well, everybody will want to 
be associated with it and financially support it. When the team does not perform 
well, it is common to see it being abandoned. A relegated, community-based club 
may find a return to the top league to be quite difficult since nobody claims 
responsibility and nobody is willing to invest in an ailing team. After all, what 
benefit does a Big Man enjoy for sponsoring a club that has lost its appeal and 
popularity among the wider population? 
This brings us to a paradoxical situation that is so characteristic of community-
based clubs in Africa. They may enjoy the (financial) backing of more Big Men 
than any other type, but at the same time they suffer from almost permanent 
power struggles within the management ranks. For instance, Cameroon’s top 
clubs Canon and Tonnerre Yaoundé have underperformed for years due to in-
fighting. Similarly, disgruntled players, management members and/or supporters 
have occasionally formed rival factions in order to challenge their club’s offi-
cials. Some of these rival factions even left and formed clubs elsewhere. A 
related – but probably rare – situation is that the availability of several extremely 
wealthy Big Men in one area can be financially disadvantageous for the welfare 
of a public club. This happened, for example, with Stade Bandjoun in Came-
roon.205 
Yet another disadvantage is that the fanatical support of hundreds of thousands 
or even millions of fans puts too much stress on players, coaches and Big Men 
alike. ‘The pressure is higher than with other clubs,’ said Bashir Hayford, who 
coached several clubs in Ghana, one of which was Asante Kotoko. ‘Everybody 
thinks that they are a shareholder and that they have a role to play. If you win 
you are comfortable but if you lose they will harass you.’ Harassing occasionally 
means physical violence and destruction of property which not seldom extends to 
the family of the unfortunate player, coach or Big Man. The result is that those 
attached to a community-based club fear for their jobs almost on a daily basis – 
and with good reason. 
Community-based clubs have been hit hard by the supporters’ declining inte-
rests in Africa’s domestic leagues. Attendance rates have dropped dramatically 
and so has a vital source of income for community-based clubs, namely gate 
proceeds. From all indications it is safe to conclude that this type of club is 
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experiencing dark times in terms of both finances and successes while other club 
types have instead flourished. Indeed, the nature and structure of the community-
based club could lead to its demise in this day of professionalism and commer-
cialism. This was aptly voiced by Valentine Molulu, owner of the Cameroonian 
one-man show Botafogo FC: 
We are a football club with private ownership. We try to implement a working formula and a 
model borrowed from the successful leagues in Europe. There should be a clear divide 
between ownership of a club which is an enterprise and supporting the club as a fan. The old 
model [of community-owned clubs] is no longer viable as shown by the problems in Canon 
and Tonnerre, and also as demonstrated by the demise of clubs which were run by govern-
ment parastatals, the last surviving of which is Coton Sport [Garoua]. But the day the cotton 
trading goes out of fashion then Sodecoton will not have the resources to support Coton 
Sport any more. It happened to PWD Bamenda, Kumba, etc. The new and emerging models 
are clubs like Mount Cameroon, KSA [Kadji Sports Academy] and Botafogo, where individ-
uals are investing their own money and attempting to run an enterprise.206 
Molulu rightfully remarked that one-man shows now outdo some of the most 
popular community-based clubs. For many years Molulu’s own Buea-based club 
Botafogo FC has had more successes than the town’s community-based club, 
Prisons Buea. Similarly, the company club Coton Sport Garoua has beaten Cam-
eroon’s community-based clubs time and again over the last fifteen years or so.  
The economic crisis that engulfed Africa from the 1980s onwards and the 
increased popularity of European football have indeed put the future of many 
community-based clubs in jeopardy. Officials of several Cameroonian clubs, 
particularly those in the West Region, have tried to reverse the trend by 
ingeniously expanding their potential fan base. By changing their clubs’ names 
they stopped appealing only to supporters in the club’s immediate environment – 
the village, town or city – and instead addressed the inhabitants of the wider ad-
ministrative division or region.207 Whether these measures will prove successful 
is difficult to say at this point. 
 
Company clubs 
It is common to see clubs in Africa being owned and sponsored by private or 
state-owned companies, operating in different fields of businesses: Agriculture, 
petroleum, minerals, gas and electricity, construction, media, soda and alcoholic 
beverages, banking. The mining industry’s dominance over Zambian football is a 
good example. Some of Algeria’s biggest clubs are sponsored by oil, petro-
chemical and electronics companies.208 Kenya Breweries, owned by the East 
African Breweries company, changed its name to one of the company’s beer 
brands, Tusker FC. Angola’s top clubs Atlético Sport Aviação and Petro-Atlético 
are financed by the national airway operator and the national oil company, 
respectively. Egypt’s PetroJet, Asyyut Petroleum and Arab Contractors are, as 
the names suggest, company clubs as well. 
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As mentioned in chapter 2, Ghana’s National League featured several com-
pany clubs in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Akotex, one of the most successful 
company clubs, was owned by Akosombo Textile Limited. Another successful 
club, Dumas, belonged to Ghana Textile Printing in the harbour city of Tema. 
The STC, Ghana’s official bus company, had a Tamale-based team named 
Roadmasters. One company club, State Traders, promoted to the top league but 
relegated at the end of its first season. It was common to see companies pulling 
their hands off football as soon as their teams went on relegation. An exception is 
Power FC which is still owned by the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) after 
being relegated in 2007. 
It is said that the company clubs were Ghana’s most professionally run clubs. 
‘We take care of the players’ salaries and their medical expenses and we pay 
their utility bills because we are an electricity company,’ said CEO Emmanuel 
Adotey of Power FC. ‘The company clubs are better run than the community 
clubs,’ added Kojo Fianoo. ‘In the community clubs it’s the passion that moves 
people.’ What he meant to say was that passion alone is not a guarantee for a 
well-organised and financially stable club. What distinguishes the company clubs 
from other club types is finance and a business-minded approach. First, the clubs 
are commonly owned by companies for the full 100 percent and thus (should) 
have a sound financial base. Second, the general directors of the companies 
tended to run the teams as regular businesses.  
Ghana’s most prominent company club is Ashanti Goldfields. Based in the 
mining town of Obuasi, the club’s proliferation in the early 1990s coincided with 
the professionalisation of the game in Ghana. Ashanti Goldfields won the newly 
initiated Premier League three times in a row and established itself as the main 
contender to break the hegemony of Hearts and Kotoko. The club’s profession-
alism and successes could for a large part be attributed to the former general 
director of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC), Dr. Sam Jonah.209 The 
economist A.A. Taylor argues that Jonah convinced the Board of Directors to 
increase its investments into the club in order to provide entertainment and re-
creation in Obuasi.210 According to Kojo Fianoo, Jonah also knew how to make 
international oil companies contribute to the club.211 
Ashanti Goldfields’ origins are typical of company clubs all over Africa. The 
club’s founding in 1978 came in response to a call from the Ghanaian govern-
ment to corporations to start sponsoring clubs. Initially, the directors and man-
agers saw the game as a leisure activity for the workers, who made up the bulk of 
the team. In respect to Ashanti Goldfields, Taylor states that there ‘tended to be a 
positive correlation between the football club’s fortunes and morale and pro-
duction on the mine. True to this, production managers reported that output 
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increased considerably in the days following that victory (the 1994 National 
League title).’212 
A similar story can be told of Coton Sport Garoua. Founded in 1986 by em-
ployees of the Societé de Développement du Coton du Cameroun (SODECO-
TON), the club’s intention was to fill the void left by the relegated community-
based club L’Etoile Filante. When Coton Sport gained entrance to the top league 
in 1993, it established itself as Cameroon’s best team since, winning the league 
title eleven times between 1997 and 2011. Despite being a company club, 
Cameroonians supported the team when it played the final of the 2008 CAF 
Champions League. It was, after all, more than twenty-five years since a domes-
tic club had achieved that feat. Coton Sport, the country’s sole professional club, 
operated on a €750,000 budget in 2007.213 
The company clubs nevertheless faced a set of problems. First of all, the 
regular workers were commonly hostile to those who played for the team. ‘The 
workers used to become angry,’ said Bashir Hayford, who coached two company 
clubs. ‘Sometimes they wouldn’t get paid for a week while the players would 
receive winning bonuses. The workers would say: “We’re all part of the same 
company. Why are the players being treated differently?” They would stage 
strikes. When I was in Power FC, the workers wanted the team to go away.’ Kojo 
Fianoo experienced similar problems. ‘Footballers have to be comfortable,’ he 
said. ‘They use the best buses, they eat the best food. Some of them don’t even 
go to work. So there would be serious agitation.’ 
Another disadvantage is that the company clubs are too dependent on a 
football-loving general director. ‘A company normally doesn’t want to invest in 
football. They say that football eats their budget, which is true,’ said Hayford. In 
2005, two years after AGC had merged with AngloGold to form AngloGold 
Ashanti Limited, Jonah stepped down as general director. Now named 
AshantiGold Sporting Club Limited, the club did not receive help from the new 
directors. ‘The club signed a deal with Ajax Amsterdam in 1999 but this contract 
was abrogated in 2002,’ said Fianoo. ‘When Ajax left, they gave AshantiGold 
$2.5 million. The club used the money and never went to AngloGold for support. 
The new directors didn’t even know they owned the club. When they found out, 
they tried to make the club a communal affair but it’s difficult.’ 
If we were to compare company clubs to community-based clubs in terms of 
capital, then the former certainly appear to own more economic capital than the 
latter. Yet the difference should mostly be viewed in terms of stability, meaning 
that a company’s funds are more “reliable” than a community-based club’s 
external sponsor. A company club nevertheless cannot compete with a com-
munity-based club in terms of social capital. This is due to this club type’s 
relatively low patronage. In Ghana, Ashanti Goldfields may be the exception in 
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the sense that the team is reasonably supported in Obuasi, although this support 
is mostly of a temporary nature as former employees who leave town stop taking 
an interest in the club. 
Finally, this club type does not have much symbolic capital. Indeed, in the 
eyes of players, coaches and supporters alike, the company clubs lack appeal. 
Remember the earlier statement that players and coaches tend to run to com-
munity-based clubs. If a company club and a community-based club were locked 
in a virtual battle for symbolic capital, the company club would not even dream 
of winning this match. This is what Kojo Fianoo said in relation to his time as 
CEO of State Traders: 
You may have had an employee who supported State Traders for 40 percent but you knew 
that he supported Hearts or Kotoko for a full 100 percent. When we played Hearts he might 
be brought into the stadium as a supporter of State Trader but as soon as he was inside he 
would support Hearts. When we played against regular clubs and we supplied buses for the 
staff to go and watch the match, most of the times these buses would be empty. But when we 
traveled to Kumasi to play Kotoko we needed five buses that were all filled to capacity. 
Many employees were Kotoko supporters and they grabbed the opportunity to watch Kotoko 
play. When Kotoko beat State Traders everybody would be celebrating on the way back to 
Accra. When we beat Kotoko the whole bus would be quiet and only a few people would be 
celebrating. The same thing applies to AshantiGold. A lot of people working in the mines are 
Hearts or Kotoko supporters. 
There is also a disadvantage of location in the sense that most company clubs 
are randomly based in a town. The directors of State Traders, a company 
operating nationwide, bought the company club Akotex and took over its home 
ground, Akosomba. Another company club, Power FC, decided to be based in 
Koforidua. These clubs are strangers and do not attract much support, if at all. In 
fact, most inhabitants dislike these clubs for competing with the town’s commu-
nity-based club. AshantiGold, for instance, is Obuasi’s outsider team while 
Adansiman FC is the true indigenous team. Moreover, clubs belonging to state-
owned companies generally experience hostility when playing away. This is how 
Kojo Fianoo explained it: 
Ghanaians think that the mines in Obuasi are meant for everybody. They see that the money 
is spent on a particular club and they are not benefiting. So they will be hostile: “We are 
suffering while you are using state money for your own comfort.” They will say that you are 
feeding yourself from their sweat. When you get out of the bus they start insulting you. “You 
are chopping good money!” That’s the general attitude. 
The number of company clubs in Ghana’s top league dropped dramatically in 
the 1980s and 90s.214 The privatisation of parastatals due to the World Bank’s 
and IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) is the most probable ex-
planation for their decline.215 Cameroon only had a handful of public enterprises 
around the time of independence but registered 219 of such enterprises by the 
mid-1980s, employing approximately 100,000 people.216 These figures then 
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sharply dropped and, parallel to these developments, most company clubs have 
since disappeared.217 A similar process occurred in the Anglophone zone.218 
 
Government departmental clubs 
Whereas the company clubs belonged to economic organisations, the government 
departmental clubs were (and in some cases still are) owned by public service 
institutions. In Africa, it is common to see police, army and prisons owning their 
own teams. Decades ago, Ghana had a competition in which five teams parti-
cipated: First Brigade, Second Brigade, Support Services, Navy, and Air Force. 
One army team travelled abroad to compete against an Ugandan army team in the 
days of Idi Amin. In Gabon, the Ligue Militaire Omnisports organised sports 
competitions, football included, between the army, air force, gendarmerie, fire-
men and (other) public service teams. The same thing occurred in Cameroon with 
the formation of the Association Sportive des Forces Armées et Police (ASFAP) 
in 1978.219 
There is indeed a strong tradition in terms of military and police clubs on the 
continent. Rwanda’s APR and Morocco’s FAR Rabat are two prominent exam-
ples. Togo’s Dynamic Togolais Lomé, a club belonging to the army, is effect-
ively controlled by the powerful Gnassingbé family. Gabon is home to the well-
known army club FC 105 Libreville. Senegal’s AS Forces Armées and ASF 
Police, both Dakar-based clubs, were once powerful forces. The army, security 
services and the police all maintain a club in the Nigerien Premier League. In 
Zambia, the army club is called Green Buffaloes; in Congo, the police club is 
simply called AS Police. Angola has an army club called Primeiro and a police 
club called Interclube. 
In Uganda, Simba is the army team, Police FC that of, indeed, the police and 
Prisons that of the prison institution. Known as The Forces, these three clubs 
were quite powerful in the days of Idi Amin. ‘There was no war, the soldiers had 
very little to do,’ former national team player Tom Lwanga explained. ‘Many of 
them were released to play full-time. That’s what Amin wanted. So the players in 
those teams played very well together.’220 Another example of a government-
owned club is Kampala City Council (KCC). The club was founded by Samuel 
Wamala, the head of the Sewage Works section of the city council’s Engineering 
Department. KCC won several titles since its promotion to the top league in 
1974. 
The connection between football and government departments can be traced 
back to the colonial days. The Public Works Department, the Medical Depart-
ment and the Police formed teams in Zanzibar in the 1930s. ‘If a man took a job 
with either of these departments, he was required to play for the department 
team, if they wanted him,’ Fair states.221 As was the case with company clubs, 
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players were lured with perks and privileges. Some people within the Public 
Works Department offered players jobs and driving licenses. Although PWD was 
Zanzibar’s most formidable force for two decades, the employees-turned-players 
were not too enthusiastic about the departmental clubs: 
Working for the PWD was a way for these men to earn a living, but their larger social 
identities were constructed in relation to their friends and communities, not their jobs. What 
this meant was that men would often miss practice or show up late for PWD and Police 
matches so that they could attend the games of their own teams which were simply more 
important to them.222 
In other words, they did not identify with the departmental clubs as much as they 
did with their own community-based clubs. 
Sudan had its share of government departmental teams in the 1920s, among 
which Public Works Department, Stores and Ordnance, Railways and Steam-
ers.223 The league in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) in 1942 consisted of teams with 
names as Government School, Post Office, Railways, Kings’ African Rifles, 
Police and Medical Department.224 It is alleged that Nigeria’s oldest club bore the 
name Public Works Department. The club was formed in 1929 in Lagos.225 
Lindsay argues that the Nigerian government stimulated departments to pro-
mote European-style sports and games among their employees. By 1941 the 
railways maintained football fields at its headquarters in Lagos and it ran a 
league with four competing teams. Somewhere along the line, things went astray 
as the game became enmeshed with workplace factions. First, teams were split 
up in blue- and white-collar employees. Second, the regular workers were jealous 
of the player-employees who were often hired solely based on their football skills 
and who only performed nominal work in between competitions. This sort of 
favouritism caused friction and resembles what happened at the company 
clubs.226 
Anglophone Cameroon boasted a plethora of clubs consisting the prefix PWD. 
The Public Works Department, as the name suggests, took care of community 
services such as roads and the like. When the region was still called West 
Cameroon, this department was very active in promoting football. Bamenda, 
Victoria, Mamfe and Kumba, among other towns, all had their own PWD teams. 
Similarly, the Cameroon Produce Marketing Board (CAMMARK) set up clubs in 
Mamfe, Victoria and Bamenda. Other departmental teams included Police 
Mutengene and Kumba Federation of Cocoa Farmers. For one reason or the 
other, and in contrast to their Zanzibari counterparts, the PWD teams became 
some of the most popular teams in the region. 
Two Bamenda-based clubs stand out: CAMMARK in terms of profession-
alism, PWD in terms in support. CAMMARK Bamenda was regarded as a 
professional club whose team entertained the crowd with its Brazilian style of 
play. The club was led by a traditional ruler by the name of Fon Doh and was 
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sponsored by a board responsible for selling farmers’ produce. Once a mighty 
force, the club suffered from mismanagement as well as and from Francophones 
taking over the Marketing Board. CAMMARK Bamenda relegated in the early 
1990s. PWD Bamenda was (and still is) the town’s most popular club. The team 
thrived in the 1970s and early 80s but things went sour after the Public Works 
Department handed the team over to the community (see chapter 5). 
Prisons Buea in Cameroon’s Southwest Region is another prominent example 
of a government departmental club. The club was formed in 1967 under the 
patronage of the director of the Central Prison who ‘used his office’ to sponsor 
the club.227 The founding of the club reportedly came as an Anglophone response 
to the successes of Francophone-based club Oryx Douala. Barely one year after 
its creation, Prisons reached the 1968 Cup of Cameroon final. After some years 
in the top league, the team lost its link to the prison, turned into something of a 
community-based club and subsequently relegated. Various Big Men have un-
successfully tried to revive the fortunes of the team. Prisons dropped to the Third 
Division in 1990. 
The situation in Cameroon is not typical of Africa as a whole, as the following 
case from Nigeria testifies. When the economic crisis diminished the number of 
Nigerian company clubs in the 1980s and 90s, the government stepped in. 
Almost half of all the Premier League clubs in the 2000 season were state-
owned.228 Ten years later almost all the top clubs belonged to the respective 
State.229 Having the financial backing of the state is no guarantee for success. 
Bayelsa United, league champion in 2009, ran into difficulties in the 2009/10 
season and ended up in the relegation zone. 
In sum, this club type appears to have undergone changes to such an extent 
that many government departmental clubs either ceased to exist or witnessed a 
transition towards community-based clubs. In some countries, government 
departmental clubs are rather unpopular in comparison to the community-based 
clubs. In other countries, notably Cameroon, former government-sponsored clubs 
occasionally rival the community-based clubs in terms of popularity (see Prisons 
Buea and PWD Bamenda). Generally speaking, government departmental clubs 
are modestly well-off in terms of social and symbolic capital, but come up short 
when it comes to economic capital. 
 
One-man shows 
Private clubs have become quite popular in Africa in recent years. There are two 
ways in which a Big Man is able to start a club. First, he registers a new club at 
the FA and enrols his team in the Third Division. A second way is to buy an 
existing club from somebody else. To be sure, this has been done by individuals 
and companies alike (remember the company club State Traders). Such a 
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scenario is mostly profitable when that club is active in the top league. Both 
options commit the Big Man to find a suitable home ground for his new team. He 
may opt for his place of birth but this is not a given. In case of a take-over, the 
Big Man may decide to stick to the original location. 
One-man shows are named this way because they are intimately connected to 
and associated with the founder/owner. King Faisal, the team that played the 
Otumfuo Challenge Cup final in 2009, was founded by a Muslim businessman 
named Alhaji Karim Grunsah. (He once visited Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud, 
King of Saudi Arabia from 1964 to 1975, to ask for his permission to use his 
name.) Ghanaians do not distinguish the club from its owner, which can be 
illustrated by a cartoon published in the Kotoko Express in July 2009. Prior to the 
derby between Asante Kotoko and King Faisal, the cartoonist pictured Grunsah 
standing in front of a goalpost wearing gloves, thereby implying that his team 
(Kotoko) would take on Faisal’s Big Man himself.230 
Ghanaian one-man shows may not be wealthier than community-based clubs 
but they are more professionally run, at least on paper. Bashir Hayford, who 
coached Asante Kotoko before moving on to one-man show Kessben FC, had the 
following story to tell: 
When I was with Kotoko I didn’t have an office. Kotoko has an office but that’s the 
management office. Did you see the car outside the Kotoko office? The one with the broken 
windows and the flat tyres? That’s the coach’s car. But here with Kessben FC I have a car of 
my own. And it works. Kessben FC also has a secretariat at Aseda House [in Kumasi’s city 
centre]. There is an office for the CEO, for the kit man, for the directors. I also have an 
office. I can watch the clips from the previous matches. You see, it’s not about money, it’s 
about management and foresight. When I coached Kotoko, I would not go to the office after 
training. I would be sitting under a tree.  
From my own observations it can be argued that one-man shows indeed own 
better offices than community-based clubs. The office of one-man show Heart of 
Lions, located in a suburb of Accra, certainly has all the facilities one needs. 
Like the company clubs, one-man shows too cannot rely on much support. The 
Cameroonian one-man show Yong Sports Academy (YOSA) has a supporters 
union but with few members. I once travelled along with the team to Bafang. The 
original 56-seater bus was replaced by a smaller one due to low patronage. 
Mount Cameroon FC, as we known owned by businessman-politician Calvin 
Foinding, on average drew a few hundred supporters at home. It was only when 
the team played against big guns like Canon Yaoundé, Coton Sport Garoua, 
Union Douala or fellow Anglophone teams that Buea’s Molyko Stadium was 
filled to capacity. But here another problem popped up: Mount Cameroon sup-
porters would be outnumbered by those of the visiting team. The traditional 
home advantage rule does not seem to apply to one-man shows. 
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Photo 3.1 A supporter of one-man show Yong Sports Academy shows his self-made flag at 
the stadium in Bamenda 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One consequence is that one-man shows collect few money from gate takings. 
This is no small matter, for whereas company clubs can rely on company funds, 
the one-man shows rely on the finances of one man only. In 2009, when YOSA 
promoted to the Elite One league, the team travelled to faraway places. Its first 
match generated 2.2 million CFA francs (€3,400) but only because it was the first 
top league match in Bamenda in five years. President Yong Francis collected 50 
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percent of that amount but was forced to spend it on fixed club expenses. The 
Big Man had to fund the following away match, a two-day journey to Garoua, 
out of his own pocket. Kessben FC earned 200 cedi (€100) for playing Wa All 
Stars at home in 2009. ‘That’s normal for many of our home matches,’ said club 
accountant Samuel Ellis-Obir. ‘That money won’t last a week.’ 
Kessben FC is, in fact, a good example of a one-man show lacking support. 
The club was founded in April 2002 by the Kumasi-based businessman Kwabena 
Kesse. Although Kesse owns several businesses and buildings in the Ashanti 
capital and thus ensures employment on a modest scale, his club is hugely 
unpopular among the population. Kwame Owusu Donkor, the club’s deputy 
CEO, explained the matter: 
Kesse is a rich man and he has to take care of his family. Here people say: “Why should I 
support an individual like Kesse? He has more than enough money. Do I really need to pay 
for a ticket so that he can provide for his family?” You see, people in Ghana don’t go to 
watch football just to watch football. They go to the stadium to support their own team. 
There is plenty of support for the traditional teams in this country but people don’t want to 
support an individual. It’s the same thing with Liberty Professionals. Normally you would 
expect that team to have a lot of support because they are playing the best football in the 
country. But Liberty doesn’t have many supporters because nobody wants to sponsor the 
owner, Sly Tetteh. They don’t take such a team as their own. 
There are others reasons for Kessben FC not having many supporters. First, 
Kwabena Kesse used to be a director of Asante Kotoko before resigning his post 
in 2006. It upsets Kotoko supporters to see an Ashanti businessman spending his 
money on a team other than Kotoko. Second, Kessben FC’s stadium is located in 
Abrankese, which is a 30 minutes’ drive from Kumasi. ‘It’s an area with a lot of 
small villages and lots of poverty,’ said Owusu Donkor. Most people are 
unwilling or unable to make the trip. 
This lack of popularity and support does not apply to all one-man shows. 
Heart of Lions and Berekum Arsenals are two Ghanaian Premier League clubs 
that have managed to become quite popular in Kpandu and Berekum, 
respectively. Founded in 1978, Berekum Arsenals is owned by a businessman 
named Alhaji Yakubu Moro. ‘This club is different,’ said one sports journalist. 
‘The team is owned by a man who was born and raised in Berekum. So the 
population feels that the team belongs to the town and they want to support it.’ 
Similarly, Heart of Lions was set up by a local businessman by the name of 
Victor Akpene Ahiakpor. Although the team practices in Accra, the Kpandu 
community still more or less regards it as a public team.  
One thing that company clubs and one-man shows generally have in common 
is that they tend to rival the community-based clubs. Mount Cameroon FC and 
Kessben FC were both disliked by supporters of Prisons Buea and Asante 
Kotoko, respectively, for this very reason. YOSA too is looked upon with 
contempt by inhabitants of Bamenda. As was the case with Kwabena Kesse, 
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Yong Francis was involved in the (now) community-based club PWD Bamenda 
before founding his private club. When YOSA underperformed early in the 
2009/10 Elite One league, it was rumoured that angry PWD supporters had 
spiritually blocked the team. 
In terms of capital, one-man shows fall short when it comes to social and 
symbolic capital, especially in comparison to community-based clubs. A more 
nuanced view is that the image of one-man shows by and large depends on the 
popularity of its founders/owners. In other words, if a Big Man is popular and 
respected, it will undoubtedly reflect positively on his private club. This is true of 
the late Sly Tetteh, founder of the Accra-based club Liberty Professionals. As 
with company clubs, the advantage of one-man shows is their economic capital. 
A wealthy Big Man should be able to sustain his private club. 
This club type’s economic capital is nevertheless far from stable. The main 
disadvantage of one-man shows is that they tend to fall into disarray when the 
owner’s businesses go bad, when he loses interest or, ultimately, when he dies. 
This is the moment when many one-man shows disappear altogether. It was said 
that Calvin Foinding ran into financial difficulties, after which he attempted to 
sell Mount Cameroon FC. Another example is that of the Nigerian club 
Alyufsalam Rocks, founded by the Muslim businessman Alhaji Yussuf Salami, 
which turned out to be a ‘one year wonder’. As S.E. Akpabot states, after 
reaching Nigeria’s cup final in the club’s maiden season, the ‘fortunes of the 
team slumped gradually until his (Salami’s) dream went up in smoke and the 
team fell into the limbo of forgotten club sides’.231 
Some academy clubs fit into this category. Whereas YOSA started out as a 
club and not an academy, Kadji Sports Academy (KSA) is a good example of an 
academy whose first team promoted to the Elite One league. Owned by the 
famed Cameroonian businessman Gilbert Kadji, KSA played in the highest 
division for three years before being relegated. One problem of this particular 
academy is that it is based on the outskirts of Douala, which makes it difficult to 
attract supporters. A similar story can be told of the Feyenoord Academy in 
Gomoa-Fetteh which at one point in time also maintained a team in the Ghanaian 
Premier League. 
Who is the boss? 
It may seem as if community-based clubs are the place to be for a Big Man 
aspiring to convert capital. After all, the community-based club is the one club 
type that in theory is blessed with an abundance of all forms of capital: Social, 
symbolic and economic. Seen this way, it can be argued that the one-man show 
lies at the opposite end of the spectrum. Indeed, a typical one-man show pos-
sesses economic capital (provided for by its owner) but falls short when it comes 
63 
 
to both social and symbolic capital. Choosing the ideal vehicle through which to 
convert capital thus seems like a no-brainer. Such a decision, however, would not 
take into consideration issues related to power. 
To explore this issue we need to map out positions of power. I will focus on 
community-based clubs and one-man shows since these club types represent the 
true public and private club, respectively. I will limit myself to clubs in Ghana 
and, to a lesser extent, Cameroon. The question is: Who ultimately exerts power 
within a club? I briefly touched on this issue at the outset of this chapter. This is 
where we noticed a disadvantage of community-based clubs, namely the fact that 
Big Men share power with other Big Men and with the club’s supporters. In 
contrast, one Big Man alone owns, sponsors and runs a one-man show. The 
owner thus fully controls the club, which could be a reason why a businessman 
would be so crazy as to fund a club all by himself.  
Traditionally, football clubs are organised as voluntary associations, meaning 
that clubs are hierarchically structured with a president/chairman at the helm, 
followed by one or more vice presidents, a technical director, a communications 
officer, a secretary-general and a treasurer. Those who occupy these positions 
tend to do so on a voluntary basis. In practice, many club officials receive some 
sort of salary. This was the way most if not all clubs were organised prior to the 
professionalisation of the game. Most clubs in Cameroon are still organised in 
this manner. In 2010, for example, Dynamo Douala was run by a president-
exécutif and no less than four vice presidents. Clubs in Ghana’s lower divisions 
are generally also organised as voluntary associations. 
As said, the professionalisation of football in Africa changed club structures in 
such a way that many clubs now operate as limited liability companies. As of 
1993, a Ghanaian Premier League club is comprised of a Board of Directors and 
a CEO who heads a management team. The foremost reason for these changes 
was that a full-time CEO was expected to bring a business-minded attitude to the 
game. It can nevertheless be observed that these changes have been implemented 
poorly. Put differently, clubs are organised analogous to companies on paper but 
run through a system of patronage in reality. This topic is explored in chapter 7. 
In the meantime, I do think it is important to explain the official structures of 
clubs in Africa today. 
The best way to do this is by analysing the constitutions of clubs. I will limit 
myself to the constitutions of Ghana’s top clubs Hearts of Oak and Asante 
Kotoko, which are exemplary of the power structures at Ghanaian Premier 
League clubs.232 At certain times I will compare these structures to the situation 
in Cameroon. It should be noted that the constitution of any given club is a 
historical document in the sense that it is the result of several decades worth of 
expertise in club management. We could easily go on a lengthy tour down 
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memory lane (in the case of Hearts back to 1911) but this would distract us from 
the topic at hand.233 
The first thing to notice from the constitutions of Hearts and Kotoko is that the 
Council of Patrons serves as the club’s highest advisory body. The Hearts 
constitution describes patrons as ‘persons of high respectability and honour and 
proven to have shown interest in the affairs of the club’. The president of Hearts’ 
Council of Patrons acts as the ‘father’ of the club ‘with no executive powers but 
(he) shall serve as the custodian of the spirit, noble ideas and visions, which 
motivated the Founders who, by their significant contributions and widely 
recognised efforts, founded and established the Club’. The Kotoko constitution 
mentions two types of patrons. The first type is the ‘Chief Patron’ or ‘occupant of 
the Golden Stool’ who is, as we know, none other than the Ashanti King himself. 
The second type of patron, personally selected by the Asantehene, is more or less 
comparable to a Hearts patron. 
Patrons officially lack power. However, they do exert power in the sense that 
they act as advisers and are involved in electing directors (see below). Patrons 
also exert power because they typically are Big Men, meaning that they are 
powerful in their own right. A person normally gets accepted into the Council of 
Patrons after having served the club for a long time. This is why patrons are 
called fathers, custodians and/or elders. They are literally elderly people who 
know firsthand the history and traditions of the club. Some patrons are, in fact, 
their clubs’ founding members. Most clubs in Africa are familiar with patrons. 
Many of them fulfil a ceremonial role. For instance, the foremost role of PWD 
Bamenda’s honorary patrons is to add a respected name to the club. 
The Hearts constitution also mentions a Board of Trustees whose members 
‘have the power, subject to the approval of the Annual General Meeting to 
acquire, invest and hold any immoveable property for and on behalf of the Club’. 
Its members, drawn from the ranks of the Council of Patrons and the Board of 
Directors, maintain a so-called Reserve Fund whose contents are used only to 
replace ‘fixed assets and equipment’. Also, the Board of Trustees is closely 
linked to the club’s limited liability status in the sense that its members act as 
‘guarantors’ who are ‘jointly and severally liable’. This idea of guarantors, in 
turn, is related to the notion that clubs need to float shares on the stock exchange. 
Few clubs, however, actually float shares. 
The most powerful body of both Hearts and Kotoko is the Board of Directors. 
Kotoko’s Board of Directors, whose members are elected by the Asantehene, 
serves as the club’s ‘policy-making body’. Their task is not only to elect the 
members of the management committee but also to meet with them every three 
months and review their work. Hearts’ Board of Directors also serves as a policy-
making organ. According to the constitution, the Council of Patrons nominates a 
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maximum of five persons as members of the Board; the other members are 
nominated by registered supporters and are drawn from the ranks of National and 
Chapter Members (see below). As with the Council of Patrons, one is eligible to 
become a Board member if he/she ‘made significant contributions towards the 
achievement and progress of the Club’. 
It could be argued that the chairman of the Board of Directors is the club’s 
most powerful individual. At Hearts and Kotoko, he presides over a body that has 
the final responsibility over the club’s financial aspects, including budgets and 
end-of-year audited accounts. At Hearts, the Board of Directors may, in con-
sultation with the Board of Trustees, borrow money and mortgage the assets of 
the club. Moreover, the Board is ‘charged with the general direction of the affairs 
of the Club, including the employment, control and dismissal of all employees of 
the Club’. Finally, Hearts’ and Kotoko’s Boards of Directors have, in collabo-
ration with the Council of Patrons, the power to appoint an Interim Management 
Committee (IMC) to temporarily run the club. 
The next body in line is the management team whose members run the club on 
a daily basis. Kotoko’s management committee consists of a CEO, a Director of 
Finance and Administration, a Director of Operations, an administrative secretary 
and a team manager. Also part of the management committee are representatives 
of the national supporters union, the old players’ association, the ladies’ group, 
and the squad (termed the ‘playing body’).234 The Asantehene (not the Board of 
Directors) elects the CEO based on the recommendation of a ‘special commit-
tee’. The Kotoko constitution states that a CEO should be ‘reasonably educated, 
credit worthy, physically fit and (with) qualities to lead a Sporting Club’. Hearts’ 
management committee is elected by the Board of Directors; the committee is 
normally run by a CEO. 
I said earlier that the chairman of the Board of Directors is the club’s most 
powerful person. This could also be said of the CEO. After all, it is the CEO and 
his management team who run the club on a day-to-day basis and, by impli-
cation, control the club’s most vital asset: The team. They spend club money to 
fund home and away matches and to pay salaries and bonuses to players and 
coaches. With regard to several Premier League clubs in Ghana, the CEO and the 
other management members are powerful individuals indeed. However, this is 
not true in the case of one-man shows where, as we know, it is the owner/ 
president himself who exerts full power. In countries such as Cameroon, where 
the majority of clubs lack business-like structures, the position of president/ 
chairman more or less equals that of CEO. 
We need to pause for a moment to discuss the difference between community-
based clubs and one-man shows in terms of organisation. In Ghana, it looks as 
though there is no difference at all. King Faisal, for example, also employs a 
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CEO who runs the club on a day-to-day basis. At Kessben FC, people act as 
CEO, deputy CEO and directors with specific tasks. The same thing applies to 
Heart of Lions, Wa All Stars and other one-man shows. On closer inspection, 
these clubs normally do not have a properly functioning Board of Directors. 
Moreover, the founders/owners of these one-man shows still act as the de facto 
president, thereby rendering the business-like positions meaningless. Again, I 
will discuss these issues more fully in chapter 7. 
The main difference between community-based clubs and one-man shows in 
terms of power is their support base. Community-based clubs generally have 
extensive supporter networks. At Hearts, a registered supporter group is called a 
Chapter; at Kotoko, such a group is called a Circle. There are approximately a 
few hundred Chapters, each made up of least 100 members (same for Kotoko 
Circles). It is widely acknowledged that supporters are the true owners of com-
munity-based clubs. ‘The people who run the club are within our control because 
we have the power to make or break them,’ said Edmund Palmer, the secretary of 
the National Chapters Committee. Circle groups, however, are less powerful. 
‘It’s tradition that you cannot defy the King but we do make our voices heard,’ 
said Kwaku Anor, Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Ashanti Regional 
Circles Council. ‘We can always advice the great King.’ 
The first requirement for anyone desiring a formal position is to become a 
member of the club. At Hearts, membership is open to ‘all persons of sound mind 
and good behaviors (sic), irrespective of nationality, sex, tribe or creed’ (the 
same applies to Kotoko). An aspiring Hearts member needs the backing of at 
least two members of the club. A member is entitled to a Membership Card only 
if he or she pays a monthly fee. Hearts’ members can be divided in two 
categories. A National Member is a general member of the club who pays a 
monthly fee of 10 cedi (€5). The National Members are less in numbers but 
compensate it by being important individuals (for instance, president John Evans 
Atta Mills was a National Member). A Chapter Member pays one cedi per 
month. Kotoko’s members are divided in similar categories. 
The supporters of community-based clubs exert power in the sense that they 
are able to elect their club officials and hold them accountable for their actions. 
At one-man shows, nobody elects or checks the officials but the founder/owner 
himself. At company clubs, the top club officials are generally also the general 
managers of the company. This used to be true for AshantiGold, only now the 
company appointed an non-company man (Kojo Fianoo) as CEO. Officials of 
company clubs are accountable to the company’s Board of Directors. ‘The 
managers are interested only in the judicial use of our finances,’ said Fianoo. 
‘Since the club is spending company money we should follow the patterns about 
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how purchases are made.’ At government departmental clubs, the officials are 
accountable to the relevant local or regional authorities. 
As said, those who run community-based clubs are obliged to report to the 
Council of Patrons, the Board of Directors and registered club members. The 
time and place to discuss all matters related to the running of the club is at the so-
called Congress (sometimes known as the General Assembly). According to the 
Kotoko constitution, the club should hold a Congress in Kumasi at the end of the 
season. The Asantehene chooses the chairman of the Congress and opens the 
meeting. All stakeholders – patrons, directors, CEO, management members, old 
players, ladies, playing body, supporters – are cordially invited. Each registered 
member is entitled to submit a resolution. A resolution is adopted by majority 
vote through a secret ballot. 
The Hearts constitution allows for a Congress to be held every four years. As 
the ‘highest decision-making body of the Club’, the Congress has ‘the power to 
take binding decisions on all matters affecting the Club’. At the Congress, 
amendments to the constitution can be made and officials can be (re-)elected. 
The Hearts constitution also gives the Board of Directors the power to hold a 
General Meeting at the end of each season. Moreover, the Board of Directors is, 
in consultation with the Council of Patrons, entitled to call for an Extraordinary 
Congress ‘to consider such matters as the Board may deem necessary’. As was 
the case at Kotoko, ‘questions’ submitted to the Congress are decided by a 
majority vote. In case of an amendment of the constitution, two-thirds of the 
votes are required. 
Clubs elsewhere in Africa also organise Congresses. Those in charge of 
organising the gathering will rent a hall at a suitable location, for instance a 
church or a town hall, and fill the room with plastic chairs. Club officials and 
prominent people such as chiefs, elders, mayors, prefects and governors take a 
seat behind a long table from where they conduct the proceedings. Also present 
are representatives of the (regional) FA. It is custom for everyone to speak 
his/her mind. All decisions and donations are written down. It is worth adding 
that a Congress does not always commence peacefully. One coach remembered 
an incident during a Congress in Limbe (Cameroon) where one supporter group 
attacked a rival group with machetes. 
A Congress fulfils two important functions. First, it is here where club offi-
cials are elected and where their actions come under scrutiny. A Membership 
Card allows a Hearts supporter to vote for or against officials. The situation at 
Kotoko is different in the sense that officials are summoned to the palace and 
questioned by the King (see chapter 7). Second, it is at the Congress where 
money is raised for the club’s budget. Everybody – taxi drivers, market salesmen, 
petty traders, businessmen, and so on – is urged to donate in order to ensure the 
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future welfare of the club. Ni John Fru Ndi, former president of PWD Bamenda, 
explained it as follows:  
The purpose of the Congress is to present a budget for the next period. This is to raise money 
and see if we can recruit players, buy equipment, see how we can maintain the players, the 
team and the buses and all those things. You also give a stewardship account for a specific 
period. We spent this, we borrowed this. This player is ill so we spent so much on him. 
A Congress normally fulfils both functions simultaneously, as happened in 2009 
when the Cameroonian musician Petit Pays became president of Caiman 
Douala.235 In terms of raising funds, a Congress is sometimes organised to collect 
money for the upcoming league236 or as preparation for a crucial match or 
tournament.237 
I have on occasion been told that the funds raised at a Congress are not 
sufficient to sustain the club for the whole season.238 Indeed, Big Men often 
complain about supporters contributing little to nothing. ‘Sometimes you come 
up with a budget (at the Congress) and the money is not forthcoming,’ said Fru 
Ndi. Also, registered Hearts and Kotoko supporters are, as said earlier, required 
to make monthly donations. However, it is claimed that many of them fail to pay 
their dues, which was confirmed by both Kwaku Anor and Edmund Palmer. 
Frank Nelson Nwokolo, a former management member of Hearts of Oak, 
expressed his frustrations thus: 
Most supporters don’t really contribute to the club. Sometimes we ask them: “How can you 
say you are a supporter of Hearts of Oak when you don’t contribute financially?” The 
constitution recognises the people who contribute financially and then you can say you are a 
member. Some of those people are always making noise but they don’t have what it takes. 
When we go to Congress we look at who qualifies to be a member. Are you a Chapter 
Member, a National Member? If you’re not a member, you’re not entitled to be in the 
Congress. But at the end of the day they are sympathisers too. 
It is evident that such problems arise due to poverty but poor management is also 
to blame. This became apparent when MTN, sponsor of Hearts of Oak, asked the 
club to provide a list of 100,000 supporters for promotional purposes. It is 
claimed that Hearts has a support base of four to five million fans. Yet an 
editorial piece in Hearts News indicated that the club found it difficult to fulfil 
MTN’s request.239 
The fact that supporters tend not to make financial contributions on a regular 
basis does not mean that they do not contribute at all. On the contrary, there are 
numerous stories of supporters offering money to players after a match or of 
supporters making donations to the club in general. Also, one characteristic of 
community-based clubs is that their support base extends far beyond the home 
town. For instance, Chapter and Circle groups are found all over Ghana. The 
same applies to community-based clubs in Cameroon. Tiko United can count on 
supporter groups elsewhere, notably Douala and Yaoundé, for the simple reason 
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that many inhabitants of Tiko migrated to these cities. ‘Whenever we play a 
match in Yaoundé,’ club president Eteki Charles explained, ‘the supporters there 
take care of lodging, feeding and the like.’ 
This is a good moment to make a few observations in relation to club finances. 
We have seen the (non-)availability of economic capital at each club type. 
Generally speaking, clubs in Africa receive income from the following sources: 
League sponsorships, television and marketing rights, private company sponsor-
ships (including jersey sponsoring), gate proceeds, membership fees, the Con-
gress, selling club paraphernalia, selling players, prize money and in some cases 
also government sponsorships. From all indications it seems that this is not 
enough to sustain clubs (discussed in chapter 6). In fact, both Hearts and Kotoko 
reportedly amassed huge debts.240 One Nigerian journalist noted that the clubs in 
his country’s Premier League were also heavily indebted.241 
A few exceptions aside, clubs throughout Africa now find themselves in al-
most permanent financial crises, partly because they seem unable to generate 
economic capital by themselves. The situation seems to have gotten worse in 
recent years. As said earlier, interest in Africa’s leagues is waning which results 
in less gate proceeds. Another explanation is that clubs are having a hard time 
coping with increased expenditures. This was voiced by Herbert Mensah a few 
months after he became CEO of Asante Kotoko in 1999: 
People should not forget that it takes money to rebuild and manage a great institution like 
Kotoko. Times have changed where players played for free and management only needed to 
manage the matches. Planning did not include the development of training facilities, medical 
support, gymnasiums, offices, internet development, newspaper, radio station, PR and 
Publicity management, fund raising, youth development programme, reorganisation of the 
basis for supporters and membership drive and the corporate image of the Club. Last year 
Kotoko owned nothing. (…) We must be looking forward to the point where the Kotoko 
family generates its own funds through internal inertia.242 
This void, however, is commonly filled by Big Men. 
Wanted: A Big Man 
It would be far from inconceivable to read the following advertisement in a 
newspaper in Ghana, Cameroon or, for that matter, anywhere else in Africa: 
Looking for a club president. Requirements: (1) a huge bank account and a willingness to 
part with it, (2) a vast experience in terms of leadership and management skills, (3) a spirited 
attitude and in possession of an elephant’s skin (to ward off verbal and physical abuse), (4) 
an undying love for our club, (5) a significant network and connections in high society, and 
(6) a relentless determination in bringing fame and fortune to our beloved club. 
From this hypothetical ad we can deduct that clubs are looking for Big Men who 
“love” the club. First of all, a Big Man has to have the club “in his heart” or, 
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Photo 3.2 Through a public signpost in a Kumasi suburb, members of Asante Kotoko’s Circle 
group 98 are reminded of a six o’clock meeting on a Thursday 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
more precisely, he needs to convince the supporters that this is the case. One 
might argue that the community will only hand over the proverbial key to the 
club’s executive room if there is sufficient trust or faith in a Big Man’s drive to 
steer the club towards success. In this respect, Big Men who were born in the 
club’s home area are more likely to get elected than those who were born 
elsewhere (see chapter 4). 
One could get the impression that Big Men only get involved in football to 
convert capital. However, I have come to learn that in many cases a Big Man’s 
love for the game is real. It appears that most Big Men, at least the ones who run 
clubs, genuinely want to be part of football for football’s sake. Big Men such as 
Harry Zakkour, Jamil Maraby, Ni John Fru Ndi, Eteki Charles Dikonge and 
Yong Francis all stated that football was ‘in their blood’. Indeed, it is difficult to 
fake this love if one realises that the Big Men mentioned above have all shown 
an interest in football from a very early age. It would in any case be unwise for 
anyone to admit that he got involved only to get something out of it. This is equal 
to saying that he does not love the game which, in turn, would seriously 
undermine his credibility among the supporters. 
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We can also deduct from our hypothetical ad that Big Men should preferably 
have experience in football management. Indeed, one characteristic of a typical 
Big Man is that he occupies various positions throughout his football career. 
Harry Zakkour, for example, already gained experience as director of Accra 
Great Olympics before making the switch to Hearts of Oak. Jamil Maraby 
already owned a lower league club by the time he reached the age of twenty. 
Eteki Charles had years of experience as management member of PWD Bamenda 
before he took up the presidency of Tiko United. In fact, it seems to be difficult 
to convert capital through football in a short period of time. It may take many 
years before a Big Man is able to reap the benefits of his involvement in the 
game.  
A third deduction is that a Big Man needs to own capital to begin with. 
Recalling that clubs in Africa are generally unable to financially sustain them-
selves, it can be stated that the most important form of capital in this respect is 
economic capital. Indeed, a position within a club’s management depends on a 
Big Man’s ability to redistribute his wealth. ‘You have to spend your money to 
become a management member of the club,’ said Hearts of Oak’s former 
management member, Frank Nelson Nwokolo. ‘It’s my money!’ said Ben Nab 
Eyison, CEO of Hasaacas. ‘The club doesn’t have any money so I have to spend 
my own.’ ‘Most of the money I spent was out of my own pocket,’ remembered 
Ni John Fru Ndi with regard to his time as president of PWD Bamenda. One of 
Fru Ndi’s successors, Augstine Iche Ozoemena, said: 
The money comes from my own pocket, yes! It goes so far that my wife and I sometimes do 
not greet each other in the morning. She doesn’t want me to be part of the club. You pay for 
the team while you cannot afford your children’s school fees. I remember the previous 
president whose wife publicly stated that nobody should come near her husband. She asked 
whom he married: PWD or his wife? So he abandoned the club. 
The businessman is the football Big Man par excellence. Indeed, no less than 
12 out of 16 clubs in Ghana’s 2008/09 Premier League season were run by 
businessmen.243 There are broadly speaking two types of businessmen active in 
club management. A common type is the self-made businessman. Former Hearts 
CEO Harry Zakkour owns a restaurant and a bar/night club in Accra; former 
Kotoko CEO Herbert Mensah made his money in the mobile phone business, 
among other sectors; and Yong Francis, founder of Yong Sports Academy, owns 
four public schools in the Bamenda area. The list is endless. The self-made 
businessman commonly founds a private club or becomes a management mem-
ber of a community-based club. This is true as well of famous footballers, many 
of whom became businessmen after retiring from playing football. 
Another type of businessman is the general manager of a private or state-
owned corporation. He does not necessarily own economic capital of his own 
(although in most cases he does) but uses company funds to finance a club. Such 
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businessmen commonly run company clubs. One example is the aforementioned 
Dr. Sam Jonah who used the funds of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation to 
finance the company club. A well-known example from Cameroon is Iya 
Mohamed who founded Coton Sport Garoua during his tenure as general 
manager of SODECOTON. Yet another example is Jean-Baptiste Nguini-Effa 
who founded his private club Renaissance Ngoumou when he was still general 
director of the Societé Camerounaise des Dépôts Pétroliers (SCDP). Here too, 
the list is quite extensive. 
In terms of economic capital, there is a difference between those who offer 
products/services and those who earn money by siphoning percentages off other 
people’s work. The latter are, in the words of Daloz, not real owners of capital.244 
An example in this respect is the politician or top bureaucrat who tends to use his 
position to acquire land, percentages of business contracts and/or other perks 
through which to increase his wealth. This is where we find other types of Big 
Men in football, namely the politician, the military leader, the traditional ruler, 
the regional civil servant, and so forth. For all types of Big Men, it can be stated 
that the origins of their wealth are not always exactly clear. This certainly applies 
to another type of Big Man, namely the one who is involved in the trade of illegal 
substances.245 
At this point, we can finally answer the question who the real boss of a club is. 
The one who exerts most power within a club typically is the one who redis-
tributes most economic capital. Many informants in Ghana uttered the phrase “he 
who pays the piper plays the tunes”, meaning that the one who provides the 
money makes the decisions. There are nevertheless management members who 
do not contribute financially. One example is Vincent Sowah Odotei, a former 
CEO of Hearts of Oak and King Faisal. Another example is the aforementioned 
Kojo Fianoo, who receives a salary for being the CEO of AshantiGold FC. In 
fact, Fianoo is generally credited as Ghana’s only CEO who is employed on a 
full-time basis. However, we will see that those who do not spend their own 
money are looked upon with scepticism (chapter 7). 
Economic capital may be the defining quality of a Big Man aspiring a position 
in club management, it certainly is not the only form of capital that may open 
doors. After all, wealth is not always of a material kind. Social and symbolic 
capital sometimes do the trick. From Cameroon comes the notable example of 
the aforementioned (former) president of Caiman Douala. A larger than life 
personality in his country, the musician Petit Pays evidently is in possession of 
social and symbolic capital. It is said that he used his social network to persuade 
members of the Douala elite to invest in the club. Of course, famous former 
footballers also possess social and symbolic capital. On their part, politicians 
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maintain social connections in the political arena. As we will see in chapter 5, 
clubs generally welcome such capital with open arms.  
I have argued that Big Men get crucial positions in club management only if 
they bring in capital to the benefit of the club. This applies to all club types: 
Those running community-based, company and government departmental clubs 
as well as one-man shows all finance their respective clubs, albeit from different 
sources. It is now time to present a few cases from my fieldwork. The question 
is: How does a Big Man become club president, chairman, CEO or director? 
Based on these cases it can be stated that Big Men (1) announce their candidacy 
for a position after which they succeed or fail to be elected at a Congress or (2) 
receive an invitation to fill a position after which the voting procedure at the 
Congress is ceremonial in kind. In the latter instance, a Big Man is practically 
begged to take up a position. 
Ben Nab Eyison is a wealthy businessman who acted as CEO of community-
based club Sekondi Hasaacas for more than two decades. ‘I became a part of the 
club because of E.A. Nartey, who was in the timber business,’ Eyison said. ‘He 
had one of the best factories in West Africa. Nartey was first involved in Hearts 
of Oak before moving to Sekondi-Takoradi. He ran Hasaacas for ten years 
between 1974 and 1984. Mr. Nartey’s son was a mate of mine.’ In those days 
Eyison was still a young man. ‘From Monday to Friday I was womanising,’ he 
explained. ‘So one day Mr. Nartey called us and said: “Young men, you are 
wasting your time and energy. I want you to be management cadets.” Everybody 
thought that he wanted to give the club to his son but that wasn’t it. We were 
sitting in on meetings and learning about managing the club.’ 
A problem between chairman Nartey and his vice led both of them to leave the 
club in 1984. ‘Myself and six others were approached by the Sekondihene (the 
paramount chief of the Sekondi area),’ Eyison said. ‘He wanted us to take over 
the club. So that’s when I came in. We steered the club out of the relegation zone 
and we even won the FA Cup in 1985. That was around the time my first child 
was born. I also had some financial difficulties. I needed to take some time off so 
I left the club.’ In the 1988/89 season, Hasaacas was involved in a huge bribery 
scandal (see chapter 8), resulting in the club’s demotion to a lower division. 
Eyison told me that in 1993 
the club was still in the Second Division. Some people came to my house and called me to 
the palace. The Sekondihene told me: “The supporters have confidence in you and they want 
you to help the club. Can you do it?” I asked them to give me a week to think about it. 
During that period everybody called me. There was pressure from all around. So I did it. It 
took us two years to get back to the First Division. We started playing in the Premier League 
in 1995/96 and never looked back. 
Ni John Fru Ndi, founder of Cameroon’s main opposition party, the Social 
Democratic Front (SDF), became president of PWD Bamenda in the late 1970s. 
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In those days, he was the well-known owner of the Ebibi Book Centre on 
Commercial Avenue. ‘I was a businessman in town,’ Fru Ndi explained. ‘At first 
I was allowed to just quietly donate some money. I didn’t have much interest in 
football, mostly because some of the things they did were against my Christian 
beliefs.’ He was referring to juju. ‘The team would visit a native doctor. I didn’t 
believe in that fetish thing. I believed in training because that’s how I did it in my 
business.’ Many supporters, however, seemed convinced Fru Ndi should take up 
the presidency of PWD Bamenda: 
I was sleeping in my house when people came over and knocked on the door. They said that 
they were looking for a new president but I told them to go and look for somebody else. But 
they said they didn’t have confidence in the other candidates. Someone said: “Mr. Bibi is a 
strong supporter. We need to bring him on board.” I said that if I were to go to the Congress 
and they would announce me as the new president, I wouldn’t go. I told them that they could 
have my money but that I wanted to concentrate on my business instead. So they tricked me. 
They said: “The whole town is there and they want to see you. Just come along and see what 
happens.” As soon as I got to the Congress Hall people started clapping. Somebody proposed 
me to be the new president and everybody was clapping. That was the end of it. I was so 
confused that I didn’t know what was happening. When they called me to say my first words 
as president, I couldn’t even remember the name of the team that I had to run. 
PWD Bamenda belonged to the Public Works Department. While the Pro-
vincial Delegate was in charge of the club, in reality he did not contribute much. 
The club could more of less be regarded as a community-based club which meant 
that businessmen were needed to become sponsors. Fru Ndi alleged that the 
population tricked him: ‘As soon as I got in, the other businessmen stepped out. 
Off they went. I told the supporters that I had a business to run. I had to visit 
warehouses and bookshops in Douala, Yaoundé, even Nigeria.’ Although Fru 
Ndi does not remember how long he ran the club – some say a decade, others say 
a few years – he was eventually voted out office. ‘The supporters wanted some-
one else,’ he said. ‘They thought that I was blocking access to the team for those 
native men. By that time I had contributed a lot and my business was going 
down. Somebody came in and took over.’ 
Both Eyison and Fru Ndi were asked by the population and/or traditional 
rulers to become club president. The same is true for Eteki Charles Dikonge, who 
became president of Tiko United (Cameroon) in 2000. ‘I used to be involved in 
PWD Bamenda in the 1990s,’ he said, ‘because I was working for the Public 
Works Department. Then I moved to the Southwest Region to become the 
Provincial Delegate of Public Works.’ He explained how he became president: 
A delegation of the club met me at my house in Limbe and pleaded with me to become the 
new president. At first I refused. I had too much work to do and becoming president would 
take too much time. But then everybody pleaded and begged me. Eventually I had to agree. 
I’m originally from the Tiko area and I had to do something for my community. There was a 
Congress and they made me the new president. 
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‘Tiko United is a community team but Tiko is only a small town without 
companies,’ said David Obenge, the club’s former secretary. ‘So we needed a 
sponsor to take the team to the Elite One league. Mr. Eteki was the only one 
available. He’s a son of the soil and he had experience in football management. 
He also has the financial means. When we presented him at the Congress, 
nobody objected to his appointment.’ 
Those wishing to become part of the Asante Kotoko’s management team need 
to wait for the Asantehene to ask them. From behind his desk at the University of 
Legon, lecturer Kwame Baah-Nuako explained how he became Director of 
Communications in 2006. ‘I met the Asantehene at Harvard University where I 
was doing my PhD research,’ he said. ‘We had a chat and he asked me to join the 
management of the club. I went back to Ghana and a few months later he formed 
a new management.’ The management team consisted of five people. ‘Otumfuo 
put me in charge of communication through newspapers, radio, television and 
website,’ Baah-Nuako said. ‘Everybody knows me as a talk show host so that’s 
how I got that role.’ 
A position within Kotoko’s management team is a big deal. ‘When Otumfuo 
asks you to become part of the club, you cannot refuse,’ Baah-Nuako said. ‘You 
have to do what he says.’ ‘Everybody wants to be a management member of 
Kotoko,’ said Kwame Owusu Donkor, a former Circle group leader. ‘Nobody 
sends his resume, they just go to the palace and present themselves. If Otumfuo 
chooses you to run his club, it’s an honour. That’s why people get involved and 
they don’t earn a salary for being a management member. It’s enough for them 
that they were personally asked by the Asantehene.’ Baah-Nuako and the other 
management members were presented to the public at Manhyia Palace. The 
privilege of being installed during such a ceremony will make the loudest 
Ashanti proud beyond belief. 
When it comes to selecting club officials, arch rival Hearts of Oak is prone to 
follow democratic procedures. Former management committee member Frank 
Nelson Nwokolo can testify to that. ‘I’ve been in management for years,’ he told 
me in 2009. ‘I’ve handled the youth department before and even now I’m 
responsible for youth development.’ How did the businessman, specialised in 
construction projects, get to become a high-profile Hearts official? ‘You start out 
as a member of the club,’ he explained. ‘I belong to a Chapter and I am a 
National Member. You have to invest your time, your energy and certainly also 
your money. Sometimes when the club is in a difficult position you have to rise 
to the occasion.’ 
Frank Nelson announced his candidacy for the position of CEO in 2007. Who 
selects the CEO and the members of a management committee, in this case an 
IMC? ‘The patrons decide together,’ he explained. ‘They have a meeting with the 
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Board of Directors. Fortunately I was already a Board member.’ Nelson then 
explained the criteria on which the patrons and the directors base their decisions: 
First of all, they look at your background in terms of club support. How have you been with 
the club? You have to come from a Chapter. Your Chapter will nominate you based on the 
information they have of you: your history, your experience, your know-how, your financial 
strength. The patrons may think that if you are put in a certain position you may be able to 
direct the club to success. The patrons can choose you on so many grounds. You are a very 
reliable person, you are a respectful person, you are a very experienced person. That’s how 
you can be appointment as a management member. 
In 2008, Hearts formed a new IMC consisting of three Big Men, including 
Nelson. ‘I run the administrative side of management,’ he said. ‘The other two 
guys handle the operational side. I deal directly with the secretarial staff. I go to 
the training ground, I talk to the team manager and then I inform my colleagues 
about what’s happening. We also have meetings with the supporters.’ In 2010, a 
new CEO was presented to the public, thereby relieving Nelson and the other 
IMC members of duty. 
The instalment of an IMC clearly sidesteps the voting powers of the support-
ers. After all, Nelson and his two colleagues were chosen by the patrons and the 
members of the Board of Directors, not by supporters at a Congress. However, 
fourteen members of the same Board of Directors were, in fact, voted into office 
by supporters at a Congress in 2005. One of them, Alhaji Fawaz Zowk, told me 
that he had the backing of a significant number of supporters. ‘I’ve been with the 
club for more than 20 years,’ he said. ‘I became the welfare officer of Hearts 
back in the 1970s and worked my way up to become a member of the Board. 
You have to support the club in good times and bad times. I would die for 
Hearts.’ 
A different way of becoming president or CEO of a community-based club is 
by effectively taking over the club altogether. Jamil Maraby, managing director 
of several interconnected companies, among which Avanti Solutions and Global 
Media Alliance, formally requested the paramount chief of Sekondi to take over 
Eleven Wise in 2007. ‘The club was owned by nobody,’ he explained. ‘Because 
nobody owns the team, it is the law of the town that controls it. The chief is the 
highest authority in town which makes him the custodian.’ Nana Kwabena 
Nketia V, the Omanhene of Esikado area, granted Maraby and his associates an 
audience at the palace: 
We came with a proposal to take over the club. He read it and then called for the other six 
chiefs in the area. They announced a Congress and told the public that they should come if 
they wanted to have information about the take-over. We went there and there were about 
500 to 600 people. They asked us what we wanted to do with the club. They all voted in 
favour. We signed the agreement and the Omanhene, the other chiefs and the Queen Mother 
also signed. We took the agreement and registered the club as a company. It was an 
association before but now it’s a company. 
77 
 
Maraby explained that the chiefs allowed him to take over the club because the 
team had been lingering on in Ghana’s lower division for years. ‘The club was 
nowhere. There was no money. Everybody was happy that somebody came to 
rescue the club.’ 
Maraby’s company bought 70 percent of the club’s shares, the other 30 per-
cent remained in the hands of the chief. Maraby, who made himself the club’s 
CEO, explained that he had two main reasons for purchasing Eleven Wise. ‘First, 
Eleven Wise is Ghana’s fourth club in terms of support. Since we want to run the 
club like a business, it’s important to have a lot of supporters. Second, we knew 
that they were building a new stadium in Sekondi for the Nations Cup. So we 
figured that by the time we entered the Premier League we would be playing our 
home matches in a modern stadium.’ I asked him why he did not take over 
Ebusua Mysterious Dwarfs, a club whose support base probably surpasses that of 
Eleven Wise. ‘We actually tried to take over Dwarfs,’ Maraby laughed, ‘but their 
chief asked for too much money.’ 
The question is why Maraby, who indeed managed to get the team into the 
Premier League, would want to take control of a club in the first place. ‘I just 
love football,’ he said, echoing the words of so many Big Men. ‘I wanted to be a 
footballer but there was no money in football in those days. My father told me to 
finish school. But it’s in my blood. I owned my own team when I was 19 years 
old. Before I took over Eleven Wise I owned two Second Division clubs in 
Accra.’ But why Eleven Wise? ‘The problem with lower league teams is that 
there is no support so you cannot really do anything with them,’ Maraby said. 
‘But when you have a communal team you can build things around it. We want 
to make Eleven Wise part of our corporate business.’ 
The take-over of Sekondi Eleven Wise is typical of modern football manage-
ment (see chapter 6). Community-based clubs now want Big Men to come in and 
buy shares. I myself discovered that any beneficiary will do. Kumasi Corner-
stones was once one of Ghana’s top clubs but now struggles in a lower league. 
During a visit to the club’s patron’s house, he and the CEO made it abundantly 
clear that I was invited to place a bid and help the club get back on its feet. ‘You 
can run the club if you like,’ said the club’s CEO, R.K. Morrison. ‘I will make 
way for you to take over the club when you bring in the money. But you have to 
prove your love for the club to the supporters.’ 
How Big Men become FA officials 
Let us now briefly reflect on the way Big Men get to become football admi-
nistrators, FA officials in particular. I have to emphasise that the distinction 
between club and FA officials is both real and false. It is real because, of course, 
Big Men who become club officials deal with matters related to clubs and Big 
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Men who become FA officials perform tasks that relate to their positions within 
the FA. In a sense, FA officials are superior to club officials, and the latter often 
express anger and resentment about the way the former tend to run the game. 
However, the distinction is also false because club officials and FA officials are 
more often than not the same people. Put differently, club officials commonly 
take up positions within the FA and/or within FA committees. 
This has not always been the case. Traditionally, FA officials were appointed 
by government officials. To be more precise, FA officials usually were govern-
ment officials. These days FIFA does not like to see governments interfering in 
football-related affairs. ‘Governments needed to retract from football since the 
late 1990s,’ said Joe Aggrey, the former Ghanaian Deputy Minister of Sports. ‘In 
Ghana these changes came only in 2006. Before that, the government always 
appointed the chairman of the FA. Now we vote for the chairman because that’s 
how FIFA demands it.’ The Ghanaians I spoke to referred to this principle as 
“football being run by football people”. Most governments in Africa nevertheless 
still exert some level of control, not in the least because the president selects the 
Minister of Sports. There are also National Sports Councils whose chairmen are 
government-appointed. 
Nowadays, Big Men who want to become FA president need to register as a 
candidate to stand for election at a Congress. This process is similar to the way 
the FIFA president is chosen or the way Big Men are elected to run community-
based clubs in Africa. Let me explain how it works by taking Ghana as an 
example. As stated in its Statutes, the Congress is the ‘supreme and legislative 
organ’ of the Ghana Football Association (GFA).246 There are two types of GFA 
Congresses. First, the ordinary Congress is held every year during which regular 
matters, such as audited accounts, are discussed. Second, the Extraordinary Con-
gress is held at the request of a fixed number of members and deals with specific, 
often urgent, topics. A GFA Congress is attended by the FA president and 123 
delegates, 80 of whom are club officials. Elections are conducted through a 
secret ballot. 
Anyone aspiring to become FA president must be ‘bona fide representatives of 
members of the Association and must not be less than 18 years and not above 70 
years’.247 In order to stand as a candidate, he (or she) needs an endorsement of 
one Congress member, followed by ten other members. The 123 delegates, ex-
cluding the president, cast their votes and whoever receives a ‘simple majority 
(half of the votes plus one) of valid votes recorded’ is the new president. ‘If no 
candidate obtains a simple majority in the first ballot, the candidate(s) with the 
lowest number of votes shall be eliminated from the next ballot. This process 
shall continue until one candidate obtains a simple majority.’248 Big Men can also 
try to become a member of the GFA Executive Committee, which is comprised 
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of the FA president, 20 elected representatives of clubs and regional FAs com-
bined, and one representative of schools, colleges and universities each. The 
GFA president normally stays in power for a four-year term. 
In 2005, Kwesi Nyantakyi beat four other candidates during the GFA presid-
ential elections by claiming 91 votes. In 2011, he was re-elected unopposed 
which means he will run football in Ghana until 2015. In Cameroon too, the 
FECAFOOT president has been one and the same person for quite some time. 
Iya Mohamed was elected president in April 2000, beating his rivals by picking 
up 134 (out of 148) votes during an Extraordinary General Assembly. He was re-
elected in 2005 and again in 2009. FECAFOOT’s Executive Committee is com-
prised of 33 members, most of whom are drawn from the ranks of the ten 
regional FAs. In 2009, Iya Mohamed and his Executive Committee assigned 168 
officials to supervise 24 committees and league boards.249 However, as we shall 
see later on (in chapter 7), many FAs suffer from power struggles which have 
caused presidents to enjoy their positions only for a short while. 
Many Big Men who are part of football administration take up positions in 
league boards and committees. Football in Ghana is run by a few dozen of such 
bodies whose 150+ members are selected by the Executive Committee every four 
years. Several committees are charged with running the national teams, for in-
stance the Black Stars Management Committee, the Black Meteors Management 
Committee and the Black Princesses Management Committee. Other committees 
deal with specific tasks, for instance the International Relations Committee, the 
Marketing and Sponsorship Committee and the Legal Committee. Well-known 
club presidents such as Sly Tetteh, Emmanuel Kyeremeh and Alhaji Karim 
Grunsah all took up positions within these committees in 2011.250 
League boards, such as the Premier League Board (PLB) and Division One 
League Board (DOL), are slightly different in the sense that its presidents and 
members are said to operate semi-independently of the GFA. In Ghana, the clubs 
also have their own body called the Ghana League Clubs Association (GHAL-
CA). ‘We hold elections every four years,’ chairman Emmanuel Adotey told me 
in 2009. ‘A chairman and six executive members do the day-to-day running of 
the body.’ Finally, there is a relatively powerful body called the Sports Writers 
Association of Ghana (SWAG) whose members organise seminars, ceremonies, 
tournaments and other activities. 
To summarise this chapter, we have seen how different club types own 
different forms of capital in different quantities. On one end of the spectrum is 
the community-based club, richly endowed with symbolic, social and (in theory) 
economic capital. On the other end lies the one-man show, relatively rich in 
economic capital but not so much in symbolic and social capital. Big Men 
wishing to convert capital thus typically become attached to community-based 
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clubs. However, the Big Men at community-based clubs share power with others 
while those at one-man shows make decisions by themselves. Finally, a Big Man 
who becomes FA president controls the forms of capital. Let us now focus in 
more detail on the different forms of capital in football. Starting with symbolic 
capital, it is time to say something about identity and the notion of the Other. 
 
 
 4 
Honour, prestige and the other 
It is quiet around the Municipal Stadium, an area full of repair shops, boutiques, 
beauty salons, phone booths, bars and small restaurants. ‘This place would be 
filled with supporters by now,’ former PWD Bamenda striker Nji Sunday says. 
‘Back in the 1970s and 80s the whole town would come to the field on match 
days. Those were the glory days. I remember playing my first match. I scored 
three goals. Afterwards supporters were putting money in my pocket.’ 
The streets in Bamenda’s city centre are dirty and dusty. The stadium is in a 
rather sorry state. Goats graze inside the stadium’s brick walls. Toilets are ab-
sent; supporters relieve themselves behind the grandstand. In 2009, when Yong 
Sports Academy (YOSA) promoted to the Elite One league, FECAFOOT order-
ed the stadium to be upgraded. Owner Yong Francis paid a contractor 15 million 
CFA francs (€22,800) but no work was done. Eventually a fence was put up to 
prevent supporters from entering the field. 
YOSA will play Canon Yaoundé at four P.M. today. One mechanic waves 
away the request to come and watch the match. ‘I only support PWD,’ he says. 
The PWD supporters’ regular hangout is deserted. ‘No business here today,’ says 
bartender Alhaji. ‘When PWD is alive there is life in Bamenda,’ PWD supporter 
Cleopas explains. ‘The political atmosphere in town changes. When a politician 
calls for a strike on a match day, he’s wasting his time. Even business is fine 
when PWD is in the top league.’ Unfortunately, PWD Bamenda does not play in 
the Elite One league.  
This is YOSA’s first season in the top league. Up to a thousand spectators find 
a spot on the side of the field. Yong Francis is shaking hands near the grandstand. 
Canon’s president arrives just in time for kick-off. After 90 minutes of play, 
radio journalists report to their listeners that the match ended in a 1-1 draw. ‘I 
don’t know why people still support PWD. The team’s in the Third Division, it’s 
gone,’ says YOSA’s secretary Semma Valentine. ‘Our president organised two 
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Congresses but nobody showed up. If people in Bamenda want to see football it’s 
better to come and support us.’ 
Football and identity 
Why do the inhabitants of Bamenda identify with PWD and not with YOSA? 
This is not an easy question to answer. First of all, both clubs are not community-
based clubs in the true sense of the word. PWD Bamenda became a community-
based club only when the Public Works Department withdrew from the team. In 
a way, it is still a club for “strangers”. ‘PWD is mostly supported by migrants 
from surrounding villages such as Wum, Bali, Menchum,’ said one supporter. In 
fact, Bamenda’s true community-based club is another team altogether, namely 
Mankon United, located in an area presided over by a traditional ruler named Fon 
Angwafor III. ‘Mankon United is more than 40 years old,’ said supporter 
Cleopas. ‘But the fon doesn’t support the team. He said that he will contribute as 
soon as the team is successful.’ 
One explanation for PWD Bamenda’s popularity is its link to politics (further 
discussed in chapter 5). This link to politics, in turn, is related to the fact that 
PWD Bamenda is based in Cameroon’s foremost stronghold of opposition to 
president Paul Biya. Indeed, the identification with and popularity of a club can 
partly be explained by examining its home ground. The significance of location 
is evident in the sense that clubs are always based in a neighbourhood, village, 
town, city and/or region. Club names commonly include the names of home 
grounds.251 Examples from Cameroon are Sable Batie, Fovu Baham, Union 
Douala, Coton Sport Garoua, Ocean Kribi and PWD Kumba. A similar observa-
tion can naturally be made of national teams. 
Identification based on a team’s home ground only partly explains the issue at 
hand. Popular clubs such as Yanga, Al-Ahly and Hearts of Oak supersede geo-
graphical boundaries in the sense that their supporters can be found all over the 
continent. In Cameroon, Tiko United receives financial assistance from as far 
away as Ireland. ‘The Diaspora is an important source of revenue,’ said the 
club’s former secretary, David Obenge. In fact, his identical twin-brother is said 
to be among the Tiko supporters who live in Ireland. ‘There are a few well-to-do 
supporters who contribute to the welfare of Tiko United,’ said the Cameroonian 
spiritual adviser (witchdoctor) Zé, who coached several teams in Ghana, Came-
roon and Nigeria. ‘They live in Europe but they still follow the club very closely. 
They all want to see their team win.’ 
We need to look beyond location to determine why people identify with clubs. 
Ethnicity, class, occupation, religion, “race” and other factors also play a role. 
Phyllis M. Martin provides a description of the different forms of identification 
with regard to clubs in urban colonial Congo-Brazzaville: 
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Football teams reflected and shaped emerging identities in the city, where class, occupa-
tional, ethnic and religious loyalties coexisted, just as clubs world-wide have expressed the 
variety of social distinctions that exist among urban populations. Some examples of Brazza-
ville teams illustrate this point: Olympique and Diables Noirs (Bacongo) and Renaissance, 
L’Etoile and Lorraine (Poto-Poto), (city neighbourhoods); ASM and Patronage (religious 
affiliation); Diables Noirs, the Lari team (ethnicity); Cheminots (railway workers), Gendar-
merie, and Police (occupations); CAB (race and class); Ecole de Cadets and Ecole Generale 
de Clercs (future administrative and military elites).252 
These forms of identification are evidently linked to the different types of clubs 
as explained in the previous chapter. Support for AshantiGold FC, for example, 
is partly related to working in the mines in Obuasi. 
Mauritius is a case in point. As with South Africa under apartheid, Mauritian 
clubs also mirrored a multi-ethnic and -religious society, consisting of Creoles, 
Franco-Mauritians, Chinese, Hindu, Tamil, Muslims and ‘gens de couleur’. As 
Edensor and Koodoruth argue, ‘Fire Brigade represented the Creole community, 
and Tamil Cadets, Muslim Scouts and Hindu Cadets were clear in their alle-
giance to communal groupings. There were also Chinese (the Dragons) and 
‘Coloured’ (Racing club) clubs’. As happened elsewhere, there were attempts to 
de-communalise the leagues, but ethnicity and religion still play a role. Violence 
is common and ‘communal identity’ is reinforced by ‘the parading of particular 
clothing and banners, and the rituals of fans including ethnically based songs and 
chants against opposing teams and their supporters’.253 
Many clubs in Africa have over the years become social institutions. Tanza-
nia’s Yanga and Sunderland (later Simba) served as chama (social clubs) that 
were used as ‘a gathering place for friends’. ‘They spent evenings at the club-
house talking over coffee or playing table games, irrespective of their ethnicity or 
class,’ writes Tsuruta.254 Club members would also assist each other in finding 
job and houses; and funds were raised to pay for a member’s funeral. This sort of 
‘burial society’ was common within Orlando Pirates as well. The Soweto-based 
club served as a ‘social institution that instilled civic pride and forged community 
bonds’. ‘Many residents of Orlando supported Pirates because they believed that 
football was a means to develop self-respect and civic-mindedness among the 
youth – a healthy alternative to joining the tsotsis (urban toughs, street criminals) 
in township streets,’ Alegi argues.255 Clubs thus provide an important sense of 
belonging. 
The most common form of identification with clubs in Africa is based on 
ethnic allegiance. This is especially true in the case of community-based clubs. 
Much has been written on the proliferation of ethnicity – or its more popular 
term, tribalism – on the continent. Cohen, in studying Hausa traders in Nigeria, 
defines ethnicity as a political phenomenon. Ethnic groups are ‘an informal 
interest group whose members are distinct from the members of other groups 
within the same society in that they share a measure of (…) compulsory 
84 
 
institutions like kinship and religion and can communicate among themselves 
easily’.256 According to Bayart, ethnic groups are by and large ‘the products of 
the colonial period’: 
Far from the problematic intangibility of tradition, ethnic consciousness reveals social 
change, of which it is a matrix. It cannot be divorced from the changes of this century: 
Urbanisation, the construction of a new communication network, the introduction of new 
relationships of production, and the increase in migratory and commercial movements. If this 
extreme diachronic flexibility of ethnic identities were recognised historically, one would see 
that pre-colonial black Africa was not, strictly speaking, made up of a mosaic of ethnic 
groups.257 
This certainly applies to the Beti and Bamileke in Cameroon, ethnic groups that 
can easily be divided in separate sub-groups. 
National teams evoke a sense of nationalism. Benedict Anderson defines the 
nation as an imaged community ‘because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of 
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’.258 In respect 
to football, Hobsbawm states that ‘the imagined community of millions seems 
more real as a team of eleven named people. The individual, even the one who 
only cheers, becomes a symbol of his nation himself.’259 This imagery is most 
visible during international tournaments where nations are pitted against one an-
other. National team players act as ambassadors. When the Cameroonian player 
Marc-Vivien Foé died during the 2003 Confederations Cup, he was honoured 
with a state burial. 
Calls for nationalism and patriotism pop up during tournaments. Ghana, host 
of the 2008 African Cup of Nations, adhered to the motto “Host and Win” and 
urged all inhabitants to pray for the Black Stars. When Ghana had won its first 
two matches, president John Kufuor told the players at their hotel: ‘I am here to 
inform you that the whole nation stands behind you (…). Ghana is aching for 
victory.’260 When Ghana made it to the semi-finals, the president stated that the 
‘continuous victory of the Black Stars has invigorated the spirit of the nation, 
particularly the unparalleled display of patriotism, the great show of sportsman-
ship and the “can do it attitude” which is necessary for the continued success of 
the country’.261 The host failed to win the tournament, but Ghanaians were proud 
that they had staged a major football event. 
Identity, however, is a tricky concept. For one thing, one’s identity is fluid and 
flexible and has the capacity to change over time. This also applies to the world 
of sports. As MacClancy argues, sport ‘may not be just a marker of one’s already 
established social identity but a means by which to create a new social identity 
by oneself as well’.262 Also, sport-based identities are not exclusive as ‘people 
may have multiple identities either simultaneously, seasonally or consecutive-
ly’.263 Football identities are part of a dynamic process, and Africans regularly 
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switch allegiance. It is common to see Africans support Africa’s last remaining 
national team at the World Cup. Similarly, when Coton Sport Garoua reached the 
2008 CAF Champions League final, it instantly represented the whole of Came-
roon. 
This dynamic character is also visible in the fact that many Africans support 
European teams. Farred, for example, describes the ‘long-distance love’ between 
a South African fan and Liverpool.264 Part of the reason for supporting Arsenal 
by people in Bugamba (Uganda) was that many African players ply their trade in 
England.265 Another reason, A.O. Omobowale argues, is that Africans – in this 
case Nigerians – see European clubs as more professional, and their style of play 
as more entertaining.266 This identification with clubs in faraway places should 
not be taken lightly. A Manchester United fan drove his bus into a crowd of 
Barcelona supporters, who were celebrating their team’s victory over Manchester 
United in the 2009 UEFA Champions League final. Four fans died. Driver and 
victims were all Nigerians. 
It is often claimed that sports serve as a unifying factor. Football, for example, 
is said to, albeit temporarily, unify the divided peoples of Africa’s nations. We 
have seen the example of Ivory Coast’s national team (chapter 2). Similarly, 
Cameroon’s approximately 250 ethnic groups all root for the Indomitable Lions. 
However, ethnic sentiments never cease to play a role in relation to Cameroon’s 
national team. If football brings people together (which it does) it also sets them 
apart. Armstrong and Giulianotti argue that 
beneath the unity of the national side, the cultural politics of identity difference are often 
contested. In which city should the national team play? What club background should the 
national team coach have? Which club players should be selected? These kinds of questions 
and their ensuing public debates capture the processes by which religious, ethnic and 
regional groups typically struggle for symbolic hegemony over the nation’s representation 
through football.267 
Elsewhere, Armstrong and Giulianotti argue that football is inherently a story of 
‘rivalry and opposition’.268 In other words, the game is essentially about binary 
oppositions: Us versus them, the Self versus the Other. 
The importance of the Other is exemplified in the fact that clubs are on 
occasion founded in response to the existence of other clubs. Canon Yaoundé, for 
example, was once set up to accommodate a match between a team from Douala 
and one from Yaoundé.269 Sometimes teams merge in order to create one strong 
team that is able to meaningfully compete against a mighty adversary. This 
happened in colonial Congo-Brazzaville with the formation of a club by the 
name of Diables Noirs. The teams in the Bacongo area were no match for those 
in the Poto-Poto area, particularly a club by the name of Renaissance. This 
brought the leaders of the Bacongo teams to form a new team which would be 
able to beat the Poto-Poto rivals. Diables Noirs entered the Brazzaville cham-
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pionship in 1950 and was undefeated between 1952-54. One reporter remarked 
that the players had a sacred mission to perform, which was to beat the Poto-Poto 
teams.270 
Jeffrey provides us with the example of clubs in Sharpeville, South Africa. At 
one point, a club named Corrugated Fast XI was unable to gain promotion. 
Players, administrators and supporters in Sharpeville came together and formed a 
team that would be powerful enough to beat the Soweto Big Four: Orlando 
Pirates, Moroka Swallows, Moroka Big XV and, later on, Kaizer Chiefs. The 
new team, Transvaal Professionals, was run by other Sharpeville teams and fea-
tured other teams’ players as well. ‘The Vaal Professionals was a new creation, a 
special creation,’ said football administrator George Thabe. ‘There was universal 
support from the whole township because it did not come from a certain area. It 
commanded support because it was considered to be strongly the Vaal team.’271 
Transvaal Professionals brought a sense of pride to Sharpeville as the team was 
finally able to match its rivals. 
The notion of the Other is most visible in intra-city, inter-regional and inter-
national rivalries. Traditionally, the strongest rivalries exist between teams from 
the same city, commonly called the true derby. Some of Africa’s most antici-
pated derbies are the encounters between Al-Ahly and Zamalek (Cairo, Egypt), 
Al-Hilal and Al-Merreikh (Omdurman, Sudan), Wydad and Raja (Casablanca, 
Morocco), Yanga and Simba (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania), Gor Mahia and AFC 
Léopards (Nairobi, Kenya), Africa Sports and ASEC Mimomas (Abidjan, Ivory 
Coast), Canon and Tonnerre (Yaoundé, Cameroon) and Orlando Pirates and 
Kaizer Chiefs (Johannesburg, South Africa). Inter-city or -regional rivalries in-
clude Hearts of Oak vs Asante Kotoko (Accra vs Kumasi, Ghana) and High-
landers vs Dynamos (Bulawayo vs Harare, Zimbabwe). 
Giulianotti observes that derby matches are the ‘definitive moment in the 
football season for opposing supporters, if not the most important dates in their 
emotional calendars’.272 Rivalries thrive on what Ossie Stuart calls the ‘against 
factor’, meaning that supporters of one team rejoice at the prospect of their rival 
being kicked out of competitions.273 It often goes further than this. Harry 
Zakkour, former CEO of Hearts of Oak, said that Hearts supporters sometimes 
‘prefer that Hearts doesn’t lose to Kotoko above winning the league title’. In 
some cases the encounter is such an anticipated event that the country is split in 
two. With regard to the 1970s, one journalist observed that Tanzanians often 
identified one another through team allegiance. A typical question was: ‘Are you 
Simba or Yanga?’274 
Rivalries are subject to change over time. Hearts of Oak initially considered 
Accra Standfast and Great Olympics its fiercest rivals before Asante Kotoko took 
over that role. Similarly, a match between Asante Kotoko and Kumasi Corner-
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stones has for long been seen as ‘a battle between two nations’.275 This true derby 
was a struggle for dominance between the Ashanti and the Fanti in Kumasi. 
When Cornerstones fell into disarray and relegated, the derby lost its meaning. 
This also applies to Canon and Tonnerre Yaoundé when the latter relegated to a 
lower division.276 Tonnerre’s downfall robbed Canon of its fiercest rival in 
Cameroon, which also happened on a slightly more modest scale when Racing 
Bafoussam relegated a few years earlier. 
Rivalries tend to depend on the idea that both teams are approximately of 
equal strength. Matches between Hearts and Kotoko are said to be tough at all 
times, no matter their positions on the league table. In fact, a difference in 
strength between rivals takes away the excitement. Although the Cairo derby 
between Al-Ahly and Zamalek is arguably still Africa’s toughest derby, Al-Ahly 
has become ever more powerful, both in and outside Egypt. When journalist 
Bloomfield joined a Zamalek supporter to see the derby, the latter did not express 
too much enthusiasm. ‘We’re going to lose,’ he said. Many Zamalek supporters 
did not show up and large banners were arranged to obscure the empty seats from 
view.277 
Rivalries and the notion of the Other also exist at an international level. 
Neighbours Cameroon and Nigeria are traditional enemies. So are Ghana and 
Nigeria. Prior to the quarter final match between the Black Stars and the Super 
Eagles at the 2008 African Cup of Nations, the media in Ghana re-lived the 
history and antagonistic feelings between the two nations. A thorn in the Gha-
naians’ eyes was the fact that the Black Stars had not beaten Nigeria in fifteen 
years. The Ghanaian players were thus urged to break the jinx. When they finally 
did, a massive folk fest broke out. 
Arguably Africa’s biggest rivalry is the one between Egypt and Algeria. In 
2009 the Pharaohs and the Desert Foxes played several World Cup qualifiers 
against each other to determine which team would go to South Africa. Prior to 
the encounter in Egypt, Algeria’s team bus was attacked and several players were 
injured. As a consequence, Egyptians living in Algeria were molested. The 
authorities decided to stage the decisive match on neutral territory, namely 
Sudan. Thousands of armed policemen were called up to contain supporters on 
both sides. Algeria prevailed and went to South Africa, which lead to more 
violence between Egyptians and Algerians. 
Histories, traditions and rituals 
It can be argued that the level of identification with a club or national team 
determines its symbolic capital. Put simply, the stronger people identify with a 
team, the stronger the team’s symbolic capital. After all, what do honour and 
prestige mean if nobody cares whether a team wins or loses? We have seen how 
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identification is based on locality, ethnicity, religion, class and nationalism, 
among other things. As we will see in the next chapter, in Africa identification 
with a team is also commonly a result of ethno-politics. 
Whenever I asked someone why he supported a team, he would immediately 
start to sum up his team’s past accomplishments. Indeed, it is with pride that he 
will recall his team’s heroic matches and seasons. Such stories are passed on 
from generation to generation and linger on in people’s collective memories. The 
same person will also make an attempt at explaining his club’s ethos, which 
includes the way he sees his team in relation to opponents. It also includes the 
club’s traditions, rituals, jersey colours, nicknames, mottos and logos. All of 
these stories bear a relationship to the club’s home ground, the community, the 
region and sometimes the country itself. 
Before we move on to the link between Big Men and symbolic capital, I will 
first present the histories, traditions and rituals of some of Ghana’s and Came-
roon’s most well-known clubs. The focus will for the most part be on the com-
munity-based clubs which, as we know, have the greatest support, based on 
strong markers of identification. The following story starts on 11 November 1911 
when, according to the mythology surrounding Hearts of Oak, a group of young 
men sat down at 11 A.M. to sign an agreement. 
Held in Accra’s Ussher Town district, the meeting signalled the birth of 
Ghana’s and West Africa’s oldest existing club, Accra Hearts of Oak. After-
wards, the team jerseys were presented in traditional style. ‘All the players met at 
the home of a Captain Mark Nettey at Ussher Town,’ Stephen Borquaye writes. 
‘From there, they moved to the Korle Lagoon at the Old Fadama Railway 
Crossing, bathed in the Lagoon for some minutes and then put on the jerseys. All 
dressed up in the jerseys, they marched to an open space nearby (…) and put up 
two posts.’278 The first club members were players who would later become the 
founding fathers. One of them was C.B. Nettey, the later chairman of the Accra 
Football Association. When his son S.T. Nettey died in 2007 at the age of 98, he 
had served as player, chaplain, director and patron of the club.279 
Aside from being located in Ussher Town, Hearts is also associated with the 
Ga ethnic group. Nii Tackie Tawiah II, who was installed as Ga Mantse (King) in 
1944, played for the club before becoming chairman. Another Ga Mantse, Nii 
Amugi II, was a staunch Hearts supporter. Although its origins lie within Ga 
territory, the club is nonetheless not overly identified with this ethnic group. This 
can partly be explained by the Ga’s perceived openness towards strangers. Being 
a town of migrants, Accra accommodates migrants from all over Ghana and 
beyond. Many of them support Hearts. One example is the Nigerian businessman 
Frank Nelson Nwokolo who occupied a position in the club’s management team 
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(chapter 3). Hearts thus derives its support from an urban rather than an ethnic 
identity. 
Asante Kotoko, on the other hand, derives its identity primarily from its 
origins as an Ashanti club. A taxi driver by the name of Kwasi Kuma first 
founded the Kumasi Rainbow Club in 1924 before assembling another team in 
1926 with Ashanti players only. Named Ashanti United Football Club, the team’s 
inauguration took place in Ashanti New Town and was witnessed by, among 
others, the later Boamanhene (the paramount chief of the Boaman area). Ashanti 
United, drawing support from Kumasi inhabitants, was renamed Titanics in 1931. 
Then, in 1935, a teacher by the name of J.S.K. Frimpong took control of the club 
and renamed it Asante Kotoko. He had asked permission from the Asantehene 
who, after having lived in exile, had returned that very year to occupy the Golden 
Stool. The inauguration of the new club was done in Ashanti tradition: 
On August 31, 1935, before a great assembly of chiefs, clergymen, intelligentsia and hun-
dreds of men, women and children, all in gala attire, Frimpong opened the inaugural meeting 
of the Asante Kotoko Club with a revitalising address in which he threw open the doors of 
the Kotoko Club to all Ashantis. (…) “We are solidly behind you”, said Nana Boakye Yam, 
Atipinhene of Kumasi, addressing the gathering. “The long-looked-for-day has come in the 
formation of this Asante Kotoko Football Club. That it may succeed will be our constant and 
earnest prayer and desire.” (…) The Otumfuo Asantehene, Nana Osei Agyeman Prempeh II, 
Nana Atipinhene and Nana Anantahene were elected as Patrons. The Atipinhene completed 
the day’s event by pouring libation to invoke the Ashanti gods to guide, guard and “inspirit” 
the Club.280 
‘Kotoko is more than a football club,’ said Kwame Owusu Donkor, a former 
leader of one of Kotoko’s Circle groups. ‘Kotoko is the embodiment of the 
people. It’s the soul of the Ashanti.’ The name itself emphasises the link with 
Ashanti culture. Kotoko means Porcupine in the Twi language, which is also the 
Ashanti’s totemic animal. Moreover, the club’s home ground (Kumasi) was the 
centre of the Ashanti empire. 
Other community-based clubs in Ghana also adopted names based on tradi-
tional and/or religious symbols. The Brong-Ahafo Region is home to several 
prominent clubs, one of which is Bofoakwa Tano, named after the god of the 
river Tano. The last two words in the name of the club Abuakwa Susu Biribi are 
also the motto of the nearby Abuakwa State College, literally meaning “to think 
of something”. Coach Isaac “Opeele” Boateng told me that opponents generally 
dread having to travel to the Brong-Ahafo Region because of the perceived 
spiritual powers of the teams there. In any case, these club names say something 
about their owners’ beliefs. Clubs in the Brong-Ahafo Region typically belong to 
Akan sub-groups.  
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Photo 4.1 Asante Kotoko’s nickname (Fabulous!) and motto (Kum apem a, apem beba) are 
written on the side of the team bus 
 
 
 
Two of Africa’s most beautiful club names can be found in Cape Coast. 
Drawing support from the Fanti ethnic group, this town’s most popular teams are 
Venomous Vipers and (Ebusua) Mysterious Dwarfs. The latter’s name is derived 
from an Akan belief in forest-dwelling spirits, commonly depicted as dwarfs.281 
In the twin-city of Sekondi-Takoradi, one can find Eleven Wise and Hasaacas 
whose support rests on the Ahantas and Fanti ethnic groups, respectively. 
Located in the middle of Ghana, Real Tamale United (RTU) is a predominantly 
Muslim club, drawing support based on territory and religion. 
The interplay between football and ethnicity is markedly strong in Cameroon. 
Clubs in Douala are located in specific quartiers and attached to the ethnic 
groups residing there (chapter 2). Although Douala’s native inhabitants are the 
Duala, urbanisation has led members of other ethnic groups to permanently settle 
in the country’s largest city. The Bassa, whose traditional home ground lies in 
Douala’s hinterland, maintain a large presence in the city. Founded in the 
Nkonmondo area, Dynamo is the principal Bassa club. The Bamileke are notably 
present in Douala as well. Their principal club Union was founded in 1957 (out 
of a club named Jeunesse Bamileke) in the New Bell area. Caiman was founded 
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by members of the Akwa dynasty; Oryx, founded in 1928, by the Déido. Both 
clubs are linked to the Duala. 
Cameroon’s largest ethnic groups control the most successful clubs in the 
country. The area in and around the capital Yaoundé is the home territory of 
various ethnic (sub-)groups collectively known as the Beti. Both Canon and 
Tonnerre were founded by a Beti sub-group called the Ewondo.282 To be more 
precise, Canon was founded in 1930 in the Nkoldongo area by a sub-group of the 
Ewondo while Tonnerre was founded in 1934 in the Mvog-Ada area by another 
sub-group.283 The Bulu, yet another Beti sub-group, founded clubs in Yaoundé’s 
hinterland, for instance Colombe Sangmélima and Epervier Ebolowa. As was the 
case in Douala, the Beti have no monopoly over football in their area. The Bassa 
and Bamileke also founded clubs in Yaoundé, the most prominent of which are 
Dragon and Diamant, respectively. 
André Ntonfo notes how many Cameroonian club names are derived from 
totems and natural phenomena, for instance Caiman, Oryx, Léopard, Tonnerre, 
Panthère, Aigle and Epervier. One reason seems to be to foster a connection 
between the club and the ethnic group. As Ntonfo states, ‘Caiman Douala is 
considered to be the son of the Wouri river, which implies a familiarity with its 
secrets and mysteries, and which is acquired by birth.’284 To be sure, such name-
giving based on totems can be observed elsewhere as well, for instance in Benin 
and Togo.285  
Canon’s name is a case in point. On 9 November 1930, a meeting was held to 
determine the name of the new club. Several names – Guépard, Musaraine, 
Panthère, Epervier, Cobra and Zèbre – were rejected. Then the village patriarch 
asked: ‘What is the name of the famous gun that was brought along by the 
Germans who were defeated in 1916, which was rattling “Kpa” and was followed 
by the detonation “Kum”?’ All cried: ‘Canon! Canon! Canon!’286 Canon and its 
nickname Kpa Kum thus bear reference to warfare in the colonial period (see 
below). 
Such name-giving extends to Africa’s national teams. Togo’s national team is 
called the Sparrow Hawks, the Senegalese squad is known as the Lions of 
Teranga and Tunisia’s national team is named the Eagles of Carthage. It is 
implied that these teams assume animalistic qualities: Strength, endurance, 
speed. An interesting case came up in 2008 when Benin’s Minister of Sports 
questioned the timid nature of the animal that represented the national team, the 
Squirrels. His proposal to rename the national team the Emerging Panthers 
nevertheless fell on deaf ears.287 At one point, president Thabo Mbeki thought the 
nickname of South Africa’s national team inappropriate for a World Cup host. 
Mbeki is no longer president, the name Bafana Bafana (meaning The Boys in 
Zulu) is still there.288 Several national teams did change names over time with 
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Nigeria’s Green Eagles becoming the Super Eagles and Sudan’s Nile Crocodiles 
becoming the Falcons of Jediane after the split with the South in 2011. 
The origins of clubs in Africa can normally be traced back to the founding 
fathers and their families. As is the case with ethnic groups, political parties and 
even nation-states, club loyalties are often visualised through the metaphor of the 
family. The Congolese club Diables Noir was affectionately known as yaka dia 
mama, an expression linking children to their mother. In the football context it 
meant that the fans supported this club through thick and thin.289 Cape Coast 
Mysterious Dwarfs was renamed Ebusua Mysterious Dwarfs, with ebusua 
meaning family or kin in Twi. Similarly, the name of Aduana Stars, a club in the 
Brong-Ahafo Region, is derived from a Twi word, meaning clan. 
Links between football, ethnic groups and familial ties are generally closely 
related to tribal warfare, traditions and/or beliefs in ancestors. For one thing, 
clubs maintain longstanding traditions. Players, coaches and officials all need to 
be initiated into the club’s traditions. Every newcomer at Asante Kotoko has to 
swear an oath in front of the Asantehene. This is to ensure that one abides by the 
customs and traditions of the club. One should not take such oaths lightly. ‘You 
have to promise never to tell the secrets of the club,’ said footballer Ashu. 
‘Whoever does say something may risk his career. Something bad may happen to 
him and he will never play again.’ 
In Africa, there exists a correlation between football and war. George Orwell 
once described sports, referring to football in particular, as ‘war minus the 
shooting’.290 Football is often explained through war-like metaphors,291 and in 
Africa the game can be regarded as a pacified form of tribal warfare.292 N.A. 
Scotch observed the links between football and war rituals in his research among 
the Zulu in South Africa. The way teams go to a camp the night before a match 
resembles the manner in which army regiments used to prepare for war.293 Also, 
a comparison can be made between a team going to the field of play and Zulu 
warriors going to the battlefield in the early 1800s: 
… we perceive many elements of unmistakable similarity: The circle around the fire; the 
medicines to endow strength and courage; the medicines on the weapons (currently, on 
football jerseys and shoes) to increase their potency (currently, to make them slippery); and 
the purificatory emetic which, in Shaka’s time, was taken on the morning of the battle, and 
nowadays on the morning before the football match.294 
It is generally accepted that the traditions and rituals associated with Asanto 
Kotoko go back to the Ashanti’s violent past. As stated earlier, the name refers to 
the porcupine, the Ashanti’s totemic animal. Kotoko is said to play according to 
the foremost physical feature of the porcupine, namely its stingy quills. The 
club’s motto, itself derived from the Ashanti’s culture of warfare, is testimony to 
this view: “Asante Kotoko! Kum apem a, apem beba: Monka ntoa, monka ntoa, 
monka ntoa!” (“Asante porcupine! When thousands are killed, thousands more 
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will come: Get to arms, get to arms!”). Both porcupine and motto feature on 
Kotoko’s team bus.  
The rituals in the era of tribal warfare have by and large been transferred to 
football. An example given by spiritual adviser Zé with regard to Cameroon is a 
good starting point into this issue: 
Those who control Racing Bafoussam have the Rock of Bafoussam. This is something they 
believe in and which they derive powers from. These places have a specific historical 
background. Before the colonial period there was no football. What existed was intertribal 
warfare. When people went to war they would go to these places and meditate to collect 
powers. They believed that after taking these powers they would defeat their enemies. The 
only war we have now is football. But they still uphold these traditions and you will see it in 
football. 
Equivalents of the Rock can be found throughout Cameroon. Menchum has a 
waterfall from which they derive powers. And the people in Baham perform 
sacrifices near a cult named Fovu (not quite incidentally also the name of the 
town’s foremost club). 
These occult powers (ancestors, gods, spirits) give players extra strength in the 
same way they gave strength to warriors in the old days. Chiefs or elders perform 
rituals at specific places to call upon these powers. Ntonfo provides the example 
of the 1993 Cup of Cameroon final between Léopard Douala and Canon 
Yaoundé. On the eve of the match, the players of Léopard underwent a magical 
ritual in the nearby Wouri river, rendering them invisible. This was a tradition 
among the Déido to which the club belonged.295 Those in charge of Mysterious 
Dwarfs consult a Goddess of Cape Coast named Nana Etue.296 The Silures, a 
team from Burkina Faso, have a similar tradition. As Royer explains, ‘the Silures 
regularly visit the popular religious site of Dafra at the source of the river that 
flows through the city. Morsels of sacrificed animals are thrown to enormous 
catfish that live in this sacred water hole.’297 
Cameroon’s Southwest Region boasts several natural phenomena, among 
which a mountain and an ocean. ‘The people who live around Mount Cameroon 
and near the ocean are the Bakweri,’ Zé explained. ‘There is a god of the 
mountain and there is also a goddess of the ocean. Since the Bakweri own the 
land they are the only ones who are allowed to use these powers.’ At one point in 
time Victoria United went to a certain place to receive powers before going to the 
interpools. Zé told me what happened: 
The coastal Bakweri control the villages near the ocean – Wovia, Bota Land, Batoké, Idenau. 
They are the ones who have something to do with the ocean and Nyango na Muna, which is 
the goddess of the ocean. They worship it and have rights over it. Once every while the 
chiefs perform rituals at the shrine – a rock in the sea. Chief Etule of Wovia [who passed 
away in 2007] is the biggest chief of all. When Victoria United went to the interpools they 
took the team there to perform the rituals. They gave them blessings. The team went and 
qualified. That’s how these people do it. 
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As traditional rulers, chiefs and fons are said to have knowledge of the 
traditions of their peoples. No wonder, then, that teams visit them to obtain 
powers. Before Mount Cameroon had to play Sable Batie in the 2002 Cup of 
Cameroon final, the team visited the palace of the paramount chief of Buea. ‘We 
went there at two P.M.,’ footballer Essomba explained. ‘He gave us something to 
drink and told us that we were all one. One by one we had to drink from the 
ancestral cup. The teams from the Northwest and West Regions all go to the 
palace for special powers.’ This is what Ashu told me in 2003 after his team 
Botafogo FC had gone to the interpools a year earlier: 
Before we entered the palace, the top of the mountain was covered in cloud. We all stood in 
a circle – the players, coaches, everybody. The chief took the cup from the ancestors and 
gave it to us. You can only drink from it when he gives it to you. Then the chief grabbed a 
broom and splashed the water from the cup over the players and staff. He said: “Go, my 
children, you will not be sick, you will not break a leg, come back safely. You are guided by 
your ancestors.” We looked up and saw that the clouds on the mountain were clearing. The 
sky was bright, the sun was shining. It meant that the ancestors had accepted us.298 
Kumbo Strikers, a club from the Northwest Region that won the 2000 Cup of 
Cameroon, maintains a close relationship with the palace and the fon. ‘When I 
coached Kumbo Strikers,’ spiritual adviser Zé said, ‘they had their rituals which 
they performed before every match. It was laid down as a club principle from the 
outset. The whole team would go to the palace and have a drink to ensure 
victory. They also slaughter a goat and sprinkle the blood on the players’ feet. 
They have done that for years and everybody believes in it.’ The link between the 
club and the fon went further than that. ‘The fon also had a stick,’ Zé explained. 
‘The team would always bring the stick along to away matches and present it to 
the people in town. The stick represents the fon and signifies his presence. It 
obliged the population to provide us with accommodation and food, and to make 
sure we were safe.’ 
Chiefs and fons also bless the field of play in order to appease the ancestors. 
Scotch notes that those in charge of Zulu clubs slaughtered a goat ‘to open the 
doors to luck’ before the start of the season. Another sacrifice was made at the 
end of the season.299 ‘It’s only done with the traditional clubs (whose owners also 
own the land, see further below),’ said Zé. ‘Elec Sport Limbe is not a traditional 
club, Union Douala is not a traditional club. They do not own the land so these 
are not their ancestors. But when (the Limbe-based traditional club) Victoria 
United was not winning matches I advised them to consult the ancestors.’ Zé 
explained that the chief and his following would go to the field to perform 
traditional libation: 
The ancestors are people who have died many years ago. But they still exist in one way or 
another. They have part-ownership of the place. That is why people come to the field at night 
and sprinkle food and drinks on the field. They believe that the ancestors will eat it. The 
ancestors cannot eat like you and me. You put the food inside a clean pot, wash the plates 
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and put it on the field or at the junction. Then the chief and the lesser chiefs all come 
together and start pouring libation. They call the ancestors and give them drinks. When the 
ancestors are given food and drinks they are happy. 
Such rituals strengthen the bond between club, territory and population. In a way, 
it is the reason people take a club as their own. ‘All the clubs do it,’ said Zé. 
‘When you come to the club they will tell you: “This is how we do it.” The 
population is aware of it and it is their tradition. So anyone who comes there has 
to abide by the tradition.’ 
Clubs in Cameroon also have rituals performed by the players on the pitch. 
The captain of Canon Yaoundé shouts ‘Canon!’ with the other players respond-
ing ‘Bombarde’. Then the captain shouts ‘Arme!’ with the others responding 
‘Défense!’300 The rituals of some clubs go back many years, others are relatively 
new. When the players of Tiko United step onto the pitch, they all place their left 
hand on their heart and their right hand in the air, and recite: “Allez Samba, Allez 
Samba Samba, Allez Samba, Samba Samba, Allez Allez Samba.” It is said that 
this ritual was adopted ten to fifteen years ago during a Congress. The Douala-
based club Les Astres employs a different ritual. ‘They assemble the players and 
wash their feet with a liquid,’ said Ashu. ‘The president is not there but he knows 
about it because he’s the one paying for it.’ 
Clubs also adopt mottos, logos and jersey colours related to their locality and 
identity. Giving teams nicknames is quite common as well (and as we saw in 
chapter 2 this extends to players and others as well). Although community-based 
clubs are certainly not the only ones with nicknames and mottos, they typically 
do have the most impressive ones. All club types, including the often relatively 
young one-man shows, employ such symbols. Nicknames, mottos, logos and col-
ours are a form of pride not only for those who own and control the clubs but 
also for the wider community. 
Some nicknames are based on characteristic features of a club’s home ground. 
For instance, Sable Batie is also called the Sand Sand Boys (with sable being 
French for sand) because the region around the village of Batie is known for its 
prevalence of, indeed, sand. In fact, many Batie inhabitants earn a living digging 
up and selling sand. Mount Cameroon is nicknamed the Lava Boys because of 
the presence of the active volcano near the club’s home base Buea. The origins of 
other nicknames are less clear (to me). Victoria United is known by the in-
habitants of Limbe as Opopo, which means One People One Power. 
Some nicknames simply refer to a club’s home area. Ghana’s Real Tamale 
United (RTU) is known as the Pride of the North for being this region’s only 
high-profile club (at least, until RTU’s relegation in 2011). PWD Bamenda is 
known as the Abakwa Boys because the team originates from Bamenda’s 
Abakwa neighbourhood. Similarly, Caiman Douala is nicknamed the Akwa 
Boys. Once the West Region’s most powerful club, Racing Bafoussam is also 
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called Tout Puissant l’Ouest (TPO). In the same vein, Unisport Bafang is known 
as the Flambeau de l‘Ouest (with flambeau meaning torch). Finally, Dynamo 
Douala’s nickname Bon Ba Job (which means Child of God in the Bassa 
language) refers to both territory and ethnic group. 
Nicknames and mottos are sometimes based on a team’s game approach or 
style of play. Sekondi Eleven Wise is nicknamed the Western Show Boys be-
cause the team, as Bediako states, has a ‘longstanding tradition of playing the 
type of fascinating and entertaining game punctuated with eye-pleasing dribbling 
that keep fans on their toes’.301 The motto of city-rival Hasaacas is “Play the 
game, but lovely”, also referring to playing beautifully; supporters regularly 
chant “Hasmal! We go do!” Tiko United is nicknamed the Samba Boys because 
of their Brazilian style of play. Tonnerre Yaoundé is known as the Kalara Club 
(kalara means book in Ewondo) which is a reference to the team’s scientific 
game approach. The same goes for Liberty Professionals, nicknamed the Scien-
tific Soccer Lads, for allegedly playing Ghana’s best tactical game. 
Nicknames often relate to memorable moments in a club’s history. Heroic 
victories are recounted over and over again, and help shape a club’s identity. 
Hasaacas managed to beat mighty Kotoko on several occasions in the late 1950s 
and so earned itself the nickname Giants of the West. One match in the 1959 
season truly earned them the title of Kotoko’s bogey club. Kotoko travelled to 
Gyandu Park in Sekondi, the ‘grave-yard of their hopes’,302 to play Hasaacas in a 
league match. Everything went well for the Kumasi-based team, who were 
leading Hasaacas 3-1 with only fifteen minutes on the clock. Four late goals, 
including two from the legendary Joe Aggrey-Fynn delivered Hasaacas a spec-
tacular 5-3 victory.303 
Kotoko earned its nickname Fabulous around that period as well. They lost 
twice to Hasaacas but still convincingly took the league title in the 1959/60 
season. As the story goes, one journalist was so impressed that he described the 
team’s display as Fabulous. The nickname is still widely used today. For 
instance, the editorials of the Kotoko Express always end with the phrase 
“Fabulous, The Greatest!” and in 2008 a text message service came into being 
(text FABU to 1935).304 Hearts’ nickname, Phobia, is explained with the phrase 
“You will be struck by the Hearts’ Phobia”. It means that anyone who faces 
Hearts trembles with fear (and thus suffers from the phobia called Hearts). In 
2009 Hearts launched a text service called Phobia 1911 with subscribers re-
ceiving the latest club news.305 
Both Hearts and Kotoko adopted mottos that relate to their histories and game 
spirit. Kotoko’s motto was mentioned earlier. Hearts’ motto is “Never say die 
until the bones are rotten”, referring to the conviction that the team is not de-
feated until the final whistle. This view of “we will never give up” is expressed 
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time and again by those who belong to the club. Hearts’ logo is, unsurprisingly, 
an oak tree. The club also has an anthem named “Arise, Arose, Arisen!”.306 
Cartoonists of Hearts News and Kotoko Express regularly mock each other’s 
nickname and motto. Two weeks before a Hearts vs Kotoko match in June 2009, 
a cartoon in Hearts News featured three cooks pouring ‘Phobia oil’ over an open 
fire, while another man dragged a porcupine along. According to the caption, the 
animal was about to be ‘roasted alive’.307 Another cartoon depicted the Kotoko 
coach and his assistants pushing a trolley with chainsaws and axes towards the 
Ohene Djan Stadium in Accra. The Kotoko coach said: ‘We go cut down that big 
tree.’ The caption read: ‘Ha! Ha! Ha! Fabu, you go need more powerful and 
sharper machine to cut down the mighty oak.’308 A few days later, when Kotoko 
had beaten Hearts, a cartoon in the Kotoko Express depicted a Kotoko man 
chopping down the Oak tree.309 A subsequent photo report was headlined ‘The 
day the bones got rotten’.310 
Accra Great Olympics, winner of the 1974 National League, is widely known 
as the Wonder Club. Several theories exist as to the origins of the nickname with 
Bediako arguing that it was conferred to the club in the early 1960s.311 Many 
players were soldiers and left the club when the army decided to form a team of 
their own (Ghana Army). It forced Great Olympic to assemble a squad consisting 
mainly of young students. The team went on to perform surprisingly well. This 
prompted the famous sports administrator Ohene Djan to grant the club its 
nickname Wonder Club. Great Olympics nonetheless discovered that such a 
name gives room for insults during times of turmoil. The club relegated twice in 
the new millennium and phrases such as “no more wonders” were easily fabric-
ated. 
The relatively young one-man show Heart of Lions already earned itself the 
nickname Giant Killers. The Kpandu-based team beat several high-profile teams 
since its promotion to the Premier League. Of much more importance is the title 
Third Force in Ghanaian football. When Obuasi Goldfields won the Premier 
League three times in a row, the team was expected to break the hegemony of 
Hearts and Kotoko. Thus Goldfields was respectfully named the Third Force. 
Goldfields’ poor performances in recent times made it to lose this title and other 
teams (Liberty Professionals, Heart of Lions) have laid (disputed) claims to being 
called the new Third Force. 
Finally, some nicknames and mottos are based upon notions of luck. Caiman 
Douala’s nickname, which is also uttered during the team’s on-field ritual, is À 
Six Heures. This phrase refers to the common perception that Caiman used to 
beat opponents in the dying minutes of the game. This happened, for instance, in 
1941 when Canon was beaten by a goal in the last minute.312 PWD Bamenda’s 
nickname P-Ton-Ton gives rise to multiple explanations. It first of all appears to 
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be literally meaning Big Uncle. (‘It’s a sign of respect,’ former footballer Nji 
Sunday said.) P-Ton-Ton also signifies the team’s unpredictability in both posi-
tive and negative ways. ‘PWD will always surprise you,’ Nji Sunday said. ‘We 
always beat the biggest teams in the country. But we also lost to lesser teams 
when nobody expected it.’ 
Jersey colours are both linked to identity and to notions of good and bad luck. 
Hearts adopted its current rainbow jerseys (red, yellow and blue) in 1917. It was 
a teacher named T.F. Bruce-Tagoe who designed the jerseys and who ordered 
them to be manufactured in Manchester (England). Borquaye states: 
When the jerseys arrived, a match was arranged with Invincibles, the first club formed in 
Accra. It was played at the London Park, which is the present site of the James Town Police 
Station. Hearts won, 1-0. But what attracted the crowd was not so much the manner of play 
as the bright jerseys of Hearts. This drew both spectators and some players of Invincibles to 
the Hearts camp after the match and thereafter, several players from other clubs began 
streaming into the club in the hope of wearing the bright jerseys.313 
The team still wears the rainbow jerseys today. 
The history of Kotoko’s red and white jerseys goes back to the 1950s. The 
players used to wear gold and black jerseys before switching to red and white in 
1952. The new colours apparently brought them luck since Kotoko did not lose a 
single match that year. In 1954 the club switched to yet another set of jerseys – 
the all-red jerseys – whose origins are still recounted today. As the story goes, 
Kotoko and (the now defunct) Accra Standfast have always been considered 
brothers. Whenever Kotoko or Standfast had to play a strong opponent, their 
“brother” would assist by sending two or three players. When Standfast split up 
and several players formed another club (Great Olympics), Kotoko adopted 
Standfast’s official red jerseys.314 
Somewhere along the line the club started using the red and white jerseys 
again, meaning a red shirt with white numbers. This was, as one supporter argued 
in 2009, the type of jerseys in which Kotoko won the 1983 Cup of Champions 
Clubs. That same supporter, however, blamed the club’s bad streak in the middle 
of the 2008/09 season on the use of the red and white jerseys which, he said, are 
in fact the colours of Sekondi Eleven Wise. Although the traditional colours of 
Kotoko are yellow, black and green (the colours of Asanteman), he pleaded to 
again adopt the all-red jerseys in a letter to the Kotoko Express: 
The all red colours of Kotoko was used when Kotoko had a match with Cape Coast Dwarfs 
in Accra. Both teams came with yellow and green colours. After a toss of coin Kotoko had to 
change their jerseys. Kotoko fell on their traditional friends Accra Standfast who used to 
wear the all red colours. Kotoko beat Dwarfs 2-0. They went on to beat Cornerstones, the 
traditional bogey club of Kotoko by three goals to one.315 
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His arguments in favour of using the all-red jerseys are vague, but his letter 
clearly shows the link between jersey colours and perceptions regarding success 
or failure. 
The prestigious side of the game 
Football’s symbolic capital is linked to territory, ethnicity and traditions, among 
other things. Its power is felt whenever one visits a town with a high-profile 
team. This is true for Kumasi where, on match days, the area around the Baba 
Yara Stadium is as lively as the city’s Kejetia Market. The bars are packed with 
supporters drinking beer. People all over town turn on their radios. A match day 
in Accra is no different. On Sunday 14 June 2009, I took a taxi to the Ohene Djan 
for the match between Hearts and Kotoko. The taxi driver was stopped by 
policemen at a roadblock a few kilometres away from where I needed to be. I 
then joined thousands of Hearts supporters in their march towards the stadium. 
The power of football is also noticeable in towns whose teams have fallen on 
hard times. That is to say, it is felt because of its conspicuous absence. Former 
footballer Nji Sunday explained how the area around Bamenda’s Municipal 
Stadium was a bustling hub of social and commercial activity in PWD’s glory 
days. ‘When PWD is up, you see people walking upright,’ said supporter 
Cleopas. ‘They’re proud of the team, the town and themselves.’ Until a few years 
ago, Racing Bafoussam was the centre of football activity in the West Region. 
Even though the team relegated to the Third Division, its training sessions are 
watched by dozens of supporters (which is more than top league club Fovu 
Baham whose players also practice in Bafoussam). People in Bafoussam wait 
anxiously for someone able enough to return the team to the Elite One league. 
We have earlier established links between clubs/national teams and different 
forms of identity. We have seen how Asante Kotoko represents the soul of the 
Ashanti. I also quoted informants who said that becoming part of Kotoko – as 
player, coach or Big Man – is a great honour (chapter 3). Indeed, standing before 
the Asantehene and being sworn in as director is something no Ashanti will ever 
forget. Also, a businessman who joins Kotoko’s management team instantly 
finds his name being mentioned across Kumasi, the Ashanti Region and Ghana in 
general. ‘Whoever is elected as CEO of Kotoko,’ former Kotoko coach Herbert 
Addo told me, ‘is the third most important person in Ghana (after the president 
and the Asantehene).’ Of course, Addo exaggerated the CEO’s importance. But 
not that much. 
The field of sports is an important avenue through which Africans are able to 
increase their status and popularity – in short, their symbolic capital. (Another 
avenue is religion; religious leaders in Africa literally reach millions of 
worshippers.) From cricket in South Africa, boxing in Uganda, long-distance 
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running in Kenya and football practically everywhere – sport attracts Africans 
from all walks of life. Football is entertainment and religion in one as a match is 
a mass spectacle watched by thousands or millions of fans. As president Eteki 
Charles observed with regard to his club, ‘Tiko United is sort of a religion to the 
people in my town.’ With regard to symbolic capital, Ntonfo expressed it best 
when he said that football ‘serves as the barometer of popularity’.316 
Indeed, those attached to the King Sport (or, in French, le Sport Roi) com-
monly turn into celebrities of sorts. Moreover, the Big Man who is willing to 
become club president or CEO earns the community’s respect and admiration. In 
fact, almost every “man of means and power” wants to be associated with the 
game. The Ghanaian journalist Ibrahim Sannie made the following statement in a 
short documentary: 
Football really took off in Ghana. It spread like wildfire. These players, these teams became 
very popular in the country. (…) The owners or leaders of these clubs became very powerful. 
(…) Every leader or any powerful person or any rich businessman wanted to be known and 
wanted to be associated with football (…). So they took advantage of the situation, pouring 
money into the teams just to make people happy and also to be recognized.317 
Cameroon is a well-known football country. ‘People also become known because 
of football,’ said Ni John Fru Ndi. ‘I remember travelling to Europe with my son. 
Somebody came up to me at the airport and said: “I know only two people in 
Cameroon: Roger Milla and Fru Ndi.” He didn’t even mention the president.’ 
When asked why everybody wanted to become a Hearts official, former 
management member Frank Nelson said that ‘they want to be associated with the 
club’s success and its good name. Shopkeepers, judges, doctors – they’re all 
Hearts supporters.’ 
Big Men generally regard their involvement in football both as a privilege and 
an obligation. Remember Eteki Charles’ election as president of the community-
based club Tiko United. He explained that when he moved to Limbe to become 
the new Delegate of Public Works in the Southwest Region, he felt an obligation 
to contribute to the welfare of Tiko. Being asked to become club president was 
also an honour. ‘The job is a privilege and a matter of pride to my village,’ he 
told me. An important reason for his election as club president was that Eteki 
Charles was born and raised in Tiko. He is, in other words, a son of the soil. Big 
Men who are sons of the soil are more likely to be elected president or CEO than 
those who were born elsewhere. They also tend to earn more respect and 
prestige. Indeed, most Big Men who lead Ghana’s and Cameroon’s most popular 
clubs are sons of the soil.318 
This is best explained through the concepts of traditional clubs and the politics 
of belonging in Africa. A club is traditional when the ethnic identity of its found-
ing father(s) coincides with the ethnic group who owns the club’s home ground. 
A traditional club is always a community-based club but a community-based club 
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is not necessarily a traditional club.319 Racing Bafoussam and Union Douala are 
both Bamileke-owned, community-based clubs. Yet only Racing is a traditional 
club because it is based in the West Region, which is Bamileke territory. 
Traditional clubs tend to be even more popular than community-based clubs and 
as such Big Men who lead these clubs tend to convert most symbolic capital. 
This is also why a Big Man should not switch to a club controlled by a rival 
ethnic group. As I will discuss in chapter 5, there are rivalries between clubs 
belonging to Bassa, Beti and Bamileke. Ntonfo argues that these feelings are so 
strong that a Bamileke Big Man normally never becomes president of Canon 
Yaoundé and no Beti Big Man could lead Union Douala.320  
This leads us to consider another aspect, namely the politics of belonging.321 I 
first became aware of the importance of belonging during my fieldwork in 2003. 
At the time, several Buea residents did not have much flattering to say about the 
owner of Mount Cameroon FC. They asked questions why a Bamileke had to 
invade their land and build a club and academy there. By founding a private club 
in an ethnically hostile area, Calvin Foinding did not seem to gain much in terms 
of popularity. Similar questions were asked in relation to PWD Bamenda’s 
Nigerian president Augustine Iche Ozoemena in 2010. Was there no son of the 
soil (an Anglophone Northwesterner) willing to take up the presidency of this 
club? 
The proliferation of multi-party politics in Cameroon in the 1990s gave rise to 
the politics of belonging. This has led to an autochtones/allogènes dichotomy, 
which can be translated as a struggle between sons of the soil on the one hand 
and strangers on the other. In Anglophone Cameroon, the distinction is labelled 
as one between indigenes and settlers (or kam-no-gos), the latter meaning people 
who come but do not leave. Piet Konings and Francis Nyamnjoh argue that in 
Cameroon a new constitution in 1996 defined ‘identity for the populations 
concerned not by where individuals are born or live, but by their ethnic ancestral 
area’: 
The Cameroonian state insists on patriarchal identification by ethnic area, district and 
province (region) of origin in national identity cards, birth, marriage and other civic 
certificates. Its constitution, like the others, enables ethnic areas to make the distinction 
between what Mamdani has termed “ethnic citizens and ethnic strangers”.322 
The motivations were political; people could now only vote in the territory con-
trolled by their own ethnic group. The politics of belonging is equally visible in 
that many Cameroonian Big Men, especially the Bamileke from the West Re-
gion, started setting up clubs in their ancestral areas. 
The debate between autochtones and allogènes is alive in football as well. 
Eteki Charles, as a true son of the soil of Tiko, is now all the more popular for  
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Photo 4.2 Ghana’s national team player Harrison Afful receives a welcome by FA officials 
and other Big Men after having played a World Cup qualifier 
 
 
 
sponsoring the club in his ancestral area. But Eteki does not sponsor the club all 
by himself. ‘Eteki doesn’t work alone,’ said the club’s former secretary, David 
Obenge. ‘The vice president is a businessman, he also contributes. It’s just that 
he likes to remain in the background. He’s a Nigerian, so people see him as a 
stranger.’ In fact, several clubs in the Anglophone zone, particularly those in 
market towns such as Tiko and Kumba, have been sponsored and run by Nige-
rians for a long time. President Augustine Iche Ozoemena of PWD Bamenda 
made the following statement: 
I’m often provoked by people who say that I’m not a Cameroonian [as said earlier, he is a 
Nigerian]. They just use provocative words: “How can a foreigner be leading this old 
Anglophone club? And they’re giving him all the respect. So why aren’t we Cameroonians 
around?” Had it been that I’m a Cameroonian I would’ve been very far up. I would’ve 
received medals. 
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What Ozoemena is saying is that he would have earned more respect if he were a 
Cameroonian or, more specifically, an Anglophone from the Northwest Region. 
Nantang Jua provides us with an example from Cameroon’s Southwest Region 
between an autochtone (Henry Njalla Quan) and a kam-no-go (Innocent Bonu). 
The former suffered a blow when the latter was elected president of Victoria 
United in the late 1990s. Njalla Quan, a powerful man in the Southwest Region, 
then obstructed Bonu any which way he could. Finally, Bonu resigned as 
president and formed his private club Victoria Shooting Stars while Njalla Quan 
took over the presidency of Victoria United. Matches between Victoria United 
and Victoria Shooting Stars have since been a struggle between autochtones and 
allogènes for prestige and (political) control. Jua points out that both autochtone 
and allogène Big Men use the game to enhance their own as well as their ethnic 
group’s symbolic capital.323 
Being a son of the soil is not the only factor which determines a Big Man’s 
ability to convert economic into symbolic capital. It also depends on his ability to 
publicly display his wealth as well as on his personality and his management 
skills. Let me first present a simple case of the interplay between a Big Man’s 
public persona and the image of the game.324 In 1988 the Indomitable Lions won 
the African Cup of Nations and went on a victory tour around Cameroon. Ni 
John Fru Ndi told me he used his Lions Club membership to ‘bring the trophy to 
Bamenda’. During a ceremony on his compound, he presented the Nations Cup 
trophy to fans and dignitaries. ‘Everybody was really proud of him,’ said a 
supporter, who witnessed the occasion. Fru Ndi thus successfully linked the 
Lions’ victory to himself (which was a political act as well, see chapter 5). 
A Big Man’s ability to publicly display his wealth is related to the theory of 
conspicuous consumption. In his analysis of the (cultural) elite in nineteenth 
century Britain, Thorstein Veblen coined this phrase to explain how they spend 
large amounts of time and money on seemingly non-productive activities, i.e. 
leisure pursuits.325 Extending this theory to present-day Africa, it can be stated 
that Africans, many of whom live in poverty, regard a Big Man who spends a 
fortune on football as a powerful individual. This form of conspicuous con-
sumption enhances his prestige. As Daloz states, a Big Man’s clients or sup-
porters ‘expect their respective leader to display external signs of wealth with 
regard to those representing other networks’ which indicates that ‘he possesses 
more prestigious and impressive goods for these are in some way a credit to the 
whole community or of the faction which identifies with it’.326 
We have earlier seen how clubs benefit from a Big Man’s financial input 
(chapter 3). Now we see how a Big Man himself benefits from sponsoring and 
running a club. In general, a Big Man’s personal and financial sacrifices are very 
much admired. One example is that of the Cameroonian businessman Claude 
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Zoundja, a former president of Diamant Yaoundé, who was said to have single-
handedly financed the club in his days. ‘It was a personal sacrifice,’ said 
Zoundja. ‘I was quite wealthy through my company Etracam and I employed 
around 1,200 people. (…) When I brought up Diamant to the First Division, each 
player received a sum of five million CFA francs (€7,600) as a bonus. And all of 
it came out of my own pocket.’327 His fame undoubtedly grew when it became 
known that he almost had to file for bankruptcy. 
There is indeed a mutual benefit to both Big Man and club. Jeffrey argues that 
clubs in South African townships enjoyed a businessman’s financial support 
while he, in turn, could prove his leadership capacities to a wider audience. In 
Sharpeville, ‘a system of football patronage operated whereby “big men” were 
able to grant favours in return for allegiance, so enhancing their prestige and 
status within the township community’.328 In short, ‘financial sponsorship was 
certainly a way of enhancing their personal prestige, which was more often than 
not achieved in a flamboyant fashion’. In doing so, they became ‘men of 
means’.329 Jeffrey provides the example of the founder and owner of Transvaal 
Jumpers, C.J.J. “Sam” Ngwenya, who controlled the club for four decades; the 
team’s successes were attributed to the Big Man.  
An advertisement in the Kotoko Express in 2009 signalled that the link be-
tween financial generosity and prestige extends to those who are not officially 
part of a club’s management. In the ad, wealthy sympathisers of Kotoko were 
urged to become members of the so-called Patrons Club. It read: ‘The 
PATRONS CLUB is open to an exclusive group of 100 Asante Kotoko SC 
supporters who would be classified as “PATRONS” and who are entitled to 
certain exclusive benefits during the course of every football season.’330 These 
100 patrons (not to be confused with the patrons as explained in chapter 3) would 
not only enjoy certain privileges but also enhance their status among ordinary 
supporters. 
Indeed, many supporters know that in order to grab a portion of their club’s 
popularity one needs to make financial contributions. The example of Kotoko 
will again prove this point. In July 2009, wealthy supporters donated items to 
boost Kotoko’s chances of winning the league title. A supporter named Kwabena 
Takyi donated beef, rice, energy drinks and cooking oil.331 Another supporter, 
Alhaji Lamin, donated beverages and stated that he would ‘stop at nothing to 
motivate the team to deliver’.332 These and other donations were presented in 
public and highlighted in the Kotoko Express. Sponsors also engage in such 
public gift-giving practices. When MTN donated a team bus to Hearts of Oak, 
the club’s newspaper featured a picture of a company spokesperson handing over 
the keys to several of Hearts’ Big Men.333 
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The theory of conspicuous consumption (and the public display of wealth) is 
also visible in the way Big Men fund entire tournaments. One example includes 
the Ethiopian businessman Mohammed Hussein Ali Al Amoudi who sponsored 
East Africa’s CECAFA Cup. In a similar vein, D. Manirakiza argues that ama-
teur football is a means by which Cameroonian Big Men can promote them-
selves. Local and regional competitions and tournaments such as the interquar-
tiers and the deux-zéro are patronised by businessmen, politicians, company 
directors, football personalities and presidents. Some tournaments are sponsored 
by famous players, for instance Tournoi Djemba-Djemba and Tournois de 
football Eto’o Fils; others are organised by Big Men such as Championnat Iya 
Mohammed (sponsored by the president of FECAFOOT) and Coupe David 
Mayebi (sponsored by the chairman of the footballers’ association).334 
I once watched an end-of-year tournament at the Molyko Stadium in Buea. 
Foreign-based Cameroonian players (excluding perhaps those based in England) 
normally return home during the Christmas holidays to spend time with family 
and friends. Buea’s sons of the soil such as Atem Valentine, Eyong Enoh and 
Marcus Mokake then get together to play against locally-based players. When I 
arrived in Buea on Monday 21 December, I learned that a young businessman 
had organised a tournament lasting three days. Dressed in a sharp suit, the 
businessman parked his car next to the field of play and then sat down on the 
grandstand. These kinds of tournaments are commonly organised and sponsored 
by businessmen and politicians who want to make a name for themselves (and 
for their businesses). 
As said, acquiring symbolic capital also depends on a Big Man’s personality 
and his management skills. There tends to be a correlation between a Big Man’s 
personality and the image of the club he runs. For example, Ghanaians label 
Hearts of Oak and Asante Kotoko as their country’s “most glamorous” clubs. 
These perceived identities are reflected in the personalities who make up these 
clubs’ management ranks. A Hearts or Kotoko patron, director or CEO more 
often than not is a charismatic, flamboyant and extrovert person who likes com-
municating with the press. Vice versa, Tiko United is known as a rather modest 
club from a small town, which is echoed in the way president Eteki Charles 
refrains both from celebrity status behaviour and showing off his wealth (thus 
contradicting the principle of the public display of wealth). 
In terms of management skills, some Big Men are successful in a club’s 
business aspects while others are successful in collecting titles and trophies. Of 
course, supporters prefer Big Men to master both, but this does not happen all the 
time. Winning titles evidently increases a Big Man’s status and prestige. Eteki 
Charles was relatively unknown prior to taking up the presidency of Tiko United. 
When the club won the league title in 2009, he became famous throughout 
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Cameroon. ‘I received a phone call from the prime minister on the day we won 
the league,’ he told me. ‘People all over the country now know my name.’ 
Similarly, the Bamileke businessman Prince Emmanuel Ngassa Happi is a house-
hold name in Cameroon, partly because he led Union Douala to win the 1979 
Cup of Champions Clubs title. The then president Ahmadou Ahidjo honoured 
him with the nickname Emperor. 
Mentioning Ngassa Happi brings us to the argument that it helps if a foot-
balling Big Man is active in an era of fierce competition. During the time of 
Union Douala’s domestic and international successes, Cameroon boasted of a 
number of big clubs led by well-known Big Men. A few years ago, the news-
paper Le Messager published a series of articles about so-called “mythical club 
presidents”. At least three of them – Claude Zoundja (Diamant Yaoundé), Fer-
dinand Koungou Edima (Canon Yaoundé) and Martin Omgba Zing (Tonnerre 
Yaoundé) – were active in Ngassa Happi’s days.335 It can be argued that such 
rivalries increase their status and fame.  
One of Ghana’s fiercest rivalries was the one between the CEOs of Hearts and 
Kotoko in the late 1990s and early 2000s, respectively Harry Zakkour and 
Herbert Mensah. As Zakkour’s time as CEO of Hearts is discussed in the next 
chapter, I will limit myself here to saying he became famous for winning various 
prestigious trophies. In contrast, Herbert Mensah’s time as CEO of Kotoko was 
characterised more by his business skills than by the team’s successes (which 
were mostly absent). Mensah’s approach to football management was hailed by 
supporters, coaches and journalists alike. In 1999, he announced a five-year plan 
to professionalise and commercialise the club. The Ghanaian journalist Ken 
Bediako remembers him thus: 
The club was gradually losing its trademark firepower and Herbert actually utilized his 
public relations skills to the full and exploited the popularity of Kotoko to useful advantage. 
He made the numerous supporters feel a sense of belonging and supporters realised the need 
to make contributions to the running of the club and especially the upkeep of the players who 
were dearly motivated. Matches involving Kotoko consistently pulled heavy gates and on 
some occasions special cash donations dubbed “yibima” were collected in specially designed 
boxes. Despite all this the team was strangely not performing all that well. It is to the credit 
of the supporters that they sportingly accepted Herbert Mensah’s oft repeated explanation 
that he was on a team building exercise and continued to back him. Unfortunately some-
where along the line Herbert’s abrasive style of administration and his extrovert nature did 
not go down too well with officialdom and there were many instances of clash of person-
alities.336 
Mensah’s biggest problem was that Kotoko was consistently overpowered by 
Hearts. Although Mensah never won much in terms of titles, it would be difficult 
to find even a single Ghanaian who does not know his name. 
Herbert Mensah’s popularity rested not only on the way he applied his man-
agement skills but also on his extrovert character. Several club leaders in Ghana 
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were flamboyant individuals whose tenure in office were characterised by an 
unorthodox game approach. In 1987 Hearts’ chairman Dr. Nyaho Tamakloe fired 
the entire team and hired a bunch of unknown youngsters instead. Later nick-
named The Musical Youth, the squad ended up in fifth place on the league table. 
Businessman John Ackay Blay Miezah made Sekondi Eleven Wise hugely 
popular in the 1980s. The wealthy Big Man knew how to lure supporters to the 
stadium. He introduced the catch-phrase “Akara Ka Chi” after which the crowd 
would shout “Show! Show!”. 
The founders/owners of some one-man shows are also admired for their man-
agement skills, in this case their ability to buy and sell players. Victor Akpene 
Ahiakor and Alhaji Ibrahim Sly Tetteh have in recent years been very successful 
in what has been become known as the “football business”. Sly Tetteh especially 
was renowned for nurturing some of Ghana’s biggest football stars. The exploits 
of these two Big Men will be further discussed in chapter 6. 
A Big Man’s ethnic background, wealth redistribution abilities, personality 
and management skills aside, it should be noted that football normally also 
generates symbolic capital all by itself. Owning a club is a means by which a Big 
Man increases his status and prestige. ‘It’s prestigious to own a club,’ said Jamil 
Maraby, the former CEO of Eleven Wise. ‘These businessmen found a club just 
to be able to say that they own one.’ Also, a position within the football bureau-
cracy instantly indicates a certain status. This is how Wilson and Mafeje de-
scribed it in 1963: 
Scope for leadership among Africans is very limited and office in almost any sort of orga-
nisation is a source of social prestige. Whereas for a white man or woman, there are many 
alternative opportunities of exercising leadership in work, in politics, in local government, as 
well as in church or social clubs or sport, the opportunities for an African are few. To a white 
man the secretaryship of a rugby club may indeed be a burden, not willingly undertaken, but 
to most Africans office in almost any organisation carries prestige (…).337 
Daloz argues that Big Men are keen collectors of titles: Doctor, Chief, Alhaji, 
Manager, Officer, Chairman, and so on.338 These are exactly the titles that Big 
Men give themselves when becoming part of a club or FA. Whoever is able to 
call himself chairman of the Board of Directors or chairman of the Council of 
Patrons is almost by definition an important, influential and respected person. 
Arguably the most prestigious title in football is that of president. When I 
accompanied Eteki Charles on his daily routine for a few weeks in 2010, literally 
everyone addressed him as president. In Ghana, the top FA official used to be 
called chairman. Kwesi Nyantakyi, who currently occupies this position, changed 
his title from chairman to president. FA officials derive status from the titles they 
get when assuming office. This is the point where “lesser men” become Big Men 
themselves. ‘Sometimes you see a friend who got a position at the FA,’ said Kojo 
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Fianoo. ‘Then you see him in a flashy suit driving a fancy car. Now he’s a big 
man. That’s why everybody wants to be in football.’ 
In fact, FA officials control the game’s most prestigious asset: The national 
team. On Monday 8 June 2009, the Black Stars landed at a military airport in 
Accra after having beaten Sudan in a World Cup qualifier. GFA general secretary 
Isaac Addo invited me to join him in welcoming the squad. When we arrived at 
the airport, several luxurious cars were parked near the landing strip. I asked 
Addo whether it was normal for businessmen and politicians to welcome back 
the national team after an international assignment. ‘Of course,’ he said. ‘Success 
has many mothers and fathers, but failure is always an orphan.’ We could thus 
add that a Big Man’s ability to acquire and increase symbolic capital depends on 
his visibility in the public domain. This behaviour of being visible is most 
notably observed at the VIP section of any given stadium. 
The fact that FA officials become Big Men is also true in respect to players. 
Ivorian star Didier Drogba is a ‘national hero’ to such an extent that to ‘be 
associated with him can bring a lot of political gain to public personalities 
including politicians’.339 A Big Man in Liberia, George Weah ‘seems to support a 
whole industry of Weah worshippers frequently found in his hotel and bar’.340 In 
Ghana, Abedi “Ayew” Pele has acquired a legendary, almost superhuman status. 
I saw him park his Hummer in front of the Black Stars hotel during the 2008 
African Cup of Nations. Out stepped the Big Man, followed by his wife and his 
football-playing sons. Everybody wanted to be around the Maestro, asking him 
for an autograph, an interview or just a favour. Coaches, referees and supporters 
too can earn a name, albeit on an evidently smaller scale.341 
Finally, the game offers Big Men who suffer from a bad reputation the oppor-
tunity to earn themselves a respectable name. I have earlier said that some Big 
Men in Ghana were accused of being involved in illegal activities (chapter 3). 
During an interview with a Ghanaian journalist, Herbert Mensah claimed that the 
majority of club officials are ‘borderline semi-criminals’.342 There are neverthe-
less two sides to the medallion. Big Men who earn a name through football 
sometimes lose it. Jean-Baptiste Nguini-Effa, founder of Renaissance Ngoumou, 
lost his respectability when he was sent to prison on account of embezzling state 
funds.343 The same goes for Issa Bongam, president of PWD Bamenda during my 
fieldwork in 2003, whom supporters described as a ‘very, very important man’. 
Bongam was later accused of embezzling state funds, after which he reportedly 
fled the country. 
The example of Fon Doh Gah Gwanyin has to be mentioned. A traditional 
ruler of a village named Balikumbat in Cameroon’s Northwest Region, Fon Doh 
became famous as president of CAMMARK Bamenda. According to several 
supporters in Bamenda, the fon was an avid football fan. Supporter Cleopas 
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remembered how Fon Doh always sat next to the coach and players on the 
reserves bench during matches. In 2010, I unsuccessfully tried to interview him. 
It appeared that the traditional ruler had other things on his mind, having been 
summoned to court on the charge of murdering a politician. ‘He was a great man, 
a powerful fon,’ said Cleopas. ‘We all knew him for his involvement in 
CAMMARK. But now he has lost everything. He has no more powers.’ 
In sum, we have seen how the symbolic value of teams depends on the way 
people identity with them. Clubs and national teams have histories, traditions and 
rituals that are passed on from generation to generation. Many Big Men are sons 
of the soil who see their involvement in football both as a privilege and an 
obligation. They finance and run teams that are based in their ancestral areas and 
in return are admired and respected by the community – in short, they increase 
their symbolic capital. In Africa, the link between football on the one hand and 
honour and prestige on the other is mostly a result of ethnicity being arguably the 
strongest source of team allegiance. Ethnicity, in turn, is closely related to 
politics and power. This leads us to the next chapter, which deals with social (and 
by implication political) capital. 
 
 
 5 
Politics, power and the football map 
An order of chicken with rice and a Castle beer arrives at my table. Here, at the 
Bus Stop restaurant alongside Accra’s Ring Road, I arranged a meeting with 
Harry Zakkour. A son of a Lebanese father and a Ghanaian mother, Zakkour 
owns this restaurant and the night club next door. A car stops in front of the 
terrace and out steps the Big Man. When he pulls up a chair, he announces his 
allegiance to one of the world’s most popular clubs. ‘Anybody here will tell you 
that I am a Man United fan.’ 
Harry Zakkour enjoys extraordinary fame. He owes this to the fact that Hearts 
of Oak won the treble in the 2000 season: The Premier League, the FA Cup and, 
most important of all, the CAF Champions League.344 It was the first time Hearts 
won the continent’s most prestigious club competition.345 As CEO of Hearts, 
Zakkour was largely credited for these successes. Hearts had an aura of 
invincibility in those days, winning several Premier League titles in a row and 
beating Asante Kotoko 4-0 in 2000. 
Zakkour’s position later came under threat after he fired a popular coach. He 
was also accused of embezzling club funds. ‘I have used my money to run the 
club and it is unfair for people to say that I am in Hearts for financial gains,’ he 
said.346 Although Zakkour quit his post, he never left. At a Congress in 
November 2005, he was elected to a position on the Board of Directors, which 
proved he was still quite popular. ‘The fans listen to me because I did a lot,’ he 
explains. ‘Hearts never won the Champions League but in my time of office we 
won the title. I am the godfather of the club.’ 
Unlike most Big Men in football, Zakkour publicly announced his desire to 
enter politics. ‘I am a key member of the NDC, a party I love so much,’ he told 
the Kumasi-based radio station Angel FM early in 2009.347 ‘It’s through football 
that I’m going into politics,’ he tells me at the Bus Stop restaurant. ‘Football does 
a lot. Everybody knows me.’ In December 2009, Zakkour was elected the NDC 
Chairman of Korley-Klottey constituency in Accra. His victory was marred in 
111 
 
controversy. Reports indicate that he was hand-picked by a regional politician;348 
critics also argued that he was unqualified and that he did not own an NDC 
membership card.349  
Mixing football with politics 
Harry Zakkour is one of those Big Men in Africa who evidently understand the 
game’s political ramifications. As we will see, his club Hearts of Oak is linked to 
one of Ghana’s two main political parties, the NDC. Hearts thus possesses social 
capital to the extent that club officials and supporters tend to be part of a political 
network. In a way, it can be argued that Zakkour (at least partly) owes his man-
agement position to the support he gives the NDC party. In another way, how-
ever, it can also be argued that the Big Man’s attachment to Hearts increases his 
political capital. 
This chapter deals with the political benefits of social capital in football. It has 
to be noted that FIFA as well as CAF frown upon such mixing of football and 
politics. But, as one Nigerian Minister of Sports once said, to say that sports and 
politics should not mix is ‘hypocritical’.350 Indeed, football and politics are so 
intertwined in Africa that it can almost be taken for granted that a Big Man 
would want to get involved for political purposes. We have earlier seen how the 
game’s symbolic capital increases a Big Man’s popularity and social standing 
(chapter 4). Social capital increases a Big Man’s chances of gaining a foothold in 
the political arena. Let us first take a look at how African presidents have used 
football for various purposes. 
 
Ideologies, image and the presidency 
While Africans tended to challenge colonial rule through football (see the exam-
ples of Zanzibar and Algeria in chapter 2), from the late 1950s onwards the game 
was used as a tool for bringing ethnic groups together and fostering a sense of 
nationalism among the populations of Africa’s independent nations. Indeed, the 
links between football and nation-building processes have been notably strong 
throughout the continent. Paul Darby emphasises the role of the formation of 
CAF in 1957 in this respect: 
The need for the co-ordination of the game throughout the continent was great, but the 
promotion of a pan-African sporting body, which limited its membership to independent 
states, was also indicative of the general political mood at that time. The inception of CAF 
was crucial in a political sense in that it lent considerable weight to the use of the game as a 
tool for asserting national and pan-African identity and represented a highly visible podium 
for mediating that identity throughout Africa and on a global basis.351 
In fact, Africa’s international influences grew significantly through its involve-
ment in sports. Africa’s boycott of the 1976 Olympics in Montreal is testimony 
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to that. Yet while football invokes a sense of nationalism during international 
tournaments, the game’s tendency towards divisiveness and violence has been 
‘counterproductive in the uphill struggle to nationhood of many African 
states’.352 
African presidents have used the game for political and ideological purposes. I 
have mentioned the example of Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah. With-
out repeating what I wrote before (in chapter 2), I want to quote part of a speech 
he made after the first Cup of Champions Clubs in 1964 had just ended: 
It is encouraging to note that with progress towards the attainment of African unity at the 
political and economic levels, the interchange of sport and cultural activities is making its 
influence felt in the creation of a healthy atmosphere for African Unity and total independ-
ence. It is for this reason, that I, as a citizen of Africa, have donated the Osagyefo Trophy for 
an annual African clubs championship to help consolidate the foundation of a continental 
movement to bring all Africa together in the field of sports.353 
Whereas Nkrumah strove to promote pan-Africanism, presidents in countries 
such as Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mozambique used the game to promote African-
ised forms of socialism and Marxism (often with the assistance of the USSR). 
Others, among whom Hastings Banda, Mobutu Sese Seko, Idi Amin Dada, Bakili 
Muluzi and Kenneth Kaunda, seemed to have appropriated the game’s appeal 
mainly for personal reasons. Kaunda even named Zambia’s national team after 
himself: KK XI. 
Presidents employ a variety of methods to link their own personas and their 
governments/countries to football. Examples include naming stadiums either 
after themselves or key events in their nations’ history and organising interna-
tional tournaments. For instance, Cameroon celebrated the unification of East 
and West Cameroon in the same year the country hosted the African Cup of 
Nations (in 1972). In case of successes, presidents organise festivities of various 
kinds. When Togo qualified for the World Cup on 10 October 2005, president 
Faure Gnassingbé declared it a national holiday. ‘In giving his people a day off, 
President Gnassingbe was continuing a long and not always honourable tradition, 
but I’m sure it was an act that won him many new supporters,’ a commentator on 
African football wrote.354 
An African president is commonly considered the father of the nation which, 
by implication, makes national team players his sons.355 Pre-tournament rituals 
include gatherings during which the players are urged to perform their patriotic 
duties. Post-tournament rituals include welcoming back the squad and presenting 
players with gifts (bonuses, cars, houses, honorary titles – although these are 
usually mere promises).356 Unlucky squads undergo punishment when disobey-
ing their father and failing to live up to his expectations. Eliminated at the 2000 
African Cup of Nations, Ivory Coast’s national team was sent to a military camp 
for four days. ‘What you have done is not undignified for a country like ours,’ 
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said general Robert Gueï. ‘If you get Ivory Coast into shame again you will be 
locked up for a longer period – of eighteen months.’357 
The politicisation of football sometimes takes a negative turn as dictators have 
been in the habit of using the game to their advantage. Motubu Sese Seko and Idi 
Amin fit into this category. General Sani Abacha is another example (see also 
chapter 2). Hosting and winning the 1994 African Cup of Nations gave Abacha’s 
regime media attention which by all standards it did not deserve. Autocratic 
regimes in particular have made use of the game’s appeal, which is still true, 
considering the fact that recent African Cup of Nations tournaments were hosted 
by Angola (2010), Gabon and Equatorial Guinea (2012). As African presidents 
tend to stay in power much longer than is democratically feasible, football – as 
symbolic capital – is often used as part of a variety of methods to legitimise their 
personal rule. For an interesting example in this respect, let us briefly travel to 
Central-West Africa, namely Cameroon. 
Sworn in for a sixth term in 2011, president Paul Biya and his wife Chantal 
have lived in Yaoundé’s presidential palace for three decades now. Over the 
years, Biya became known as the Maradona of Cameroon, one who manages to 
dribble past his political foes and continues to score goals in the political 
arena.358 He is said to have understood that football, Cameroonians’ favourite 
pastime, has the capacity to mask the realities of economic and political despair. 
Perhaps a more important realisation that follows from this example, however, is 
that a president’s involvement in football is no guarantee for success. He often 
takes a risk for a ‘close association’ with the game can ‘seriously damage the 
reputations of political figures’.359 
The then prime minister Paul Biya and protégé of president Ahmadou Ahidjo 
took over the presidency when the latter voluntarily stepped down in 1982. At 
that time, Cameroon was recognised as an African economic success story. The 
same could not be said of the performances of the Indomitable Lions. Whereas 
Cameroonian clubs performed more than admirably at a continental level, the 
national team had not won any significant titles during Ahidjo’s tenure in office. 
Coincidentally or not, Biya’s reign marked the beginning of unbridled national 
football successes. Cameroon won the African Cup of Nations in 1984, 1988, 
2000 and 2002, collected a Gold medal at the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, and 
participated at six World Cup finals from 1982 to 2010, which is a record in 
Africa. 
There was an overwhelming feeling of optimism when Biya came into power. 
In 1985 he changed Ahidjo’s CNU party into the Cameroon People’s Democratic 
Party (CPDM). In a rather ironic move, the party adopted the motto “Unity, 
Progress and Democracy”. Biya broke away from Ahidjo’s autocratic rule and 
introduced a so-called New Deal philosophy in which he advocated a policy of 
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“rigour and moralization”. At least three events negatively changed the general 
mood. First, Biya soon abandoned his policy and turned to the so-called Beti 
Lobby, meaning the appointment of members of his own ethnic group to top 
positions.360 Second, the country’s economic climate deteriorated from the late 
1980s onwards. Oil revenues dried up, international cash crop prices plummeted 
and Cameroon’s external debts rose. Third, calls for democracy were heard 
throughout Africa (and elsewhere) by the end of the 1980s. 
The late 1980s and early 90s were trying times for Biya and the CPDM. He 
was forced to allow multi-party politics which led to the founding of numerous 
opposition parties. Luckily for him, the Indomitable Lions had just reached the 
quarter finals of the World Cup. Since he had made sure Roger Milla was in-
cluded in the squad, Biya could take (some of) the credits. He declared the day 
on which the Lions returned home a national holiday and then used the Indo-
mitable Lions’ image during his campaign for the 1992 presidential elections, as 
Paul Nkwi and Bea Vidacs state: 
Biya’s propaganda machine created an election poster divided into two panels: On one side 
the president, on the other side a lion with the words ‘Courage Man – Lion Man’ written 
over both images. On one of the panels it also says ‘My President Paul Biya’. People often 
sarcastically refer to the president as Lion Man.361 
Whereas V.J. Ngoh argues that many ‘Cameroonians began to look at the CPDM 
as a winning organization’,362 Biya’s use of the national team was nevertheless 
frowned upon by sections of the population.363 Worse, it was widely believed that 
Biya had rigged the elections and that opposition leader Ni John Fru Ndi had 
won instead. The opposition, referring to the event as the “stolen elections”, 
called for a strike on 11 October 1993. As it turned out, the national team played 
a World Cup qualifier against Zimbabwe on 10 October. The Lions won and 
qualified for the World Cup. Biya declared 11 October, the day on which the 
squad returned home, a public holiday. And so the strike was effectively called 
off.364 
The 1994 World Cup campaign made it clear that Biya’s close association 
with the national team is not necessarily a winning formula. For one thing, the 
Indomitable Lions performed horribly. Prior to the tournament, prime minister 
Simon Achidi Achu had initiated a national collection called Opération Coup de 
Coeur. Amidst poverty, Cameroonians were asked for donations to fund the 
Lions’ stay in the United States. But when the national team’s first match ended 
in a draw and they lost the second and the third (the last one by 6-1), Came-
roonians who phoned in to make comments on radio started to criticise Biya and 
his government. As Vidacs notes, ‘the callers of the program were implying that 
if the government appropriated the glory of 1990, it should also take the blame 
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for the shame of 1994’.365 Moreover, it was unclear what was done with the 
billion CFA francs that was generated by Opération Coup de Coeur. 
The 1998 World Cup campaign did not go as well as planned either. While 
Biya had made sure that preparations went well this time around, the Lions again 
could not get past the group stage. This time Biya found a scapegoat in the 
person of the Hungarian referee Laszlo Vagner, who had denied the Cameroon-
ians a penalty in their last match against Chile. He thus presented the national 
team’s World Cup campaign as a stolen victory. This gave the opposition the 
ammunition to link the match to the “stolen elections” in 1992.366 Although 
Cameroon picked up African Cup of Nations titles in 2000 and 2002, things 
turned ugly when the national team failed to qualify for the 2006 World Cup. It 
was said that Biya forbade the coach to select Pierre Womé, who had missed a 
last-minute penalty in the decisive qualifier against Egypt. 
In the months leading up to the 2010 World Cup, rumours indicated that Biya 
planned to switch the presidential elections from 2011 to 2010.367 It was claimed 
that he wanted to cash in on the national team’s successes in South Africa. The 
political ramifications were already visible on Saturday 6 July 2009, the day on 
which the new coach Paul Le Guen arrived at Yaoundé airport. Three days of 
excessive festivities were organised in the Frenchman’s honour in what was 
undoubtedly a political show.368 Unfortunately for Biya, the national team strand-
ed in the group phase yet again.  
Overall, it appears that Biya wins elections with or without football, which 
was proven once again when he won the 2011 presidential elections. Early in 
2010, one of the ministers in his cabinet gave Biya a new nickname, Elephant 
Man. ‘For 27 years Biya has distinguished himself as the most prestigious animal 
in the forest,’ said the minister, ‘(which is) the great elephant, still very energetic 
to sail the nation through any troubled waters.’369 
 
Clubs, political parties and the football map 
It is evident that there are connections between clubs, ethnic groups and political 
parties in Africa. An example can be found in Zimbabwe. Highlanders FC’s 
home base is Bulawayo in Matabeleland, which is inhabited by the Ndebele 
ethnic group; Dynamos FC’s home ground is Harare in Mashonaland, the terri-
tory of the Shona ethnic group. While the majority of the Ndebele supported 
Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU party, most Shona backed Robert Mugabe’s ZANU 
party. When thousands of Ndebele were killed during the Gukurahundi campaign 
in the 1980s, Nkomo was forced to merge with ZANU to form the Zimbabwe 
African National Union – Patriotic Party (ZANU-PF). These days several 
ZANU-PF barons act as patrons and chairmen of Dynamos. When the club 
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barely escaped relegation in 2005, celebrations were attended by government 
officials, among whom ZANU-PF ministers.370 
Sometimes clubs are directly linked to powerful figures within the govern-
ment. It is widely believed that Tonnerre Yaoundé has (had) close relations to the 
Cameroonian government, especially in the 1980s. At least one minister (of 
Education) used to be part of the club’s management. Another political figure 
and director of Tonnerre was Omgba Damase, who acted as president Biya’s 
confidante. General Pierre Semengue, Biya’s former Chief of Staff, was a pro-
minent leader of Tonnerre as well. Another of Biya’s ministers, Ferdinand Edima 
Koungou, was president of Canon Yaoundé in the 1970s. Although Tonnerre and 
Canon were and still are linked to powerful men in Yaoundé, I did not get the 
impression that Cameroonians overly associated these clubs with the CPDM 
party. 
This begs the question when a club and a political party are indeed perceived 
to be connected to one another. Let me present three general indicators. First, a 
partial or complete overlap between a club’s home territory and a political 
party’s foremost stronghold of support may suggest a link. A second indicator 
may be the presence of members of the same party in a club’s management over 
a longer period of time. Third, club officials who use the popularity of the club to 
enhance a political party’s visibility among the wider population may also be 
indicative of a close connection. Examples of the third indicator include political 
rallies that start or end at the club’s training grounds and banners featuring party 
slogans on the stands during top encounters. 
These three indicators applied to football in Tanzania a few decades ago. 
There existed relationships between the Young Africans Sports Club (now 
Yanga) and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) on the one hand 
and the Wananchi Sports Club and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in Zanzibar on 
the other. Since political rallies were prohibited but group meetings under the 
header of sports were allowed, party members used club meetings as a place to 
discuss politics.371 Young Africans and Wananchi also maintained relations with 
each other, and matches between the two were used to raise funds for the par-
ties.372 H.S. Ndee describes the interconnections between the clubs and the par-
ties thus: 
Both sports clubs had played an important role in the activities of the two political parties in 
their struggle for independence for their respective countries. It is thus fair to state that the 
involvement of the top leadership of the country in the affairs of the two sports clubs was 
aimed at bonding to them, for further use, the affiliates who had been useful for them in the 
past. After all participants and spectators were potential voters who could be subjected to 
political indoctrination. One immediate result was the expansion and consolidation of the 
parties in terms of numbers of members. For example, all members of Wananchi were auto-
matically members of the ASP on the Isles. Correspondingly, the majority of the members of 
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the Young Africans Sports Club were members of the ruling party, TANU, on mainland 
Tanzania.373 
Two events in particular are cited by researchers as being exemplary of the 
relationships between Young Africans–TANU and Wananchi–ASP, and especi-
ally between the four of them. In 1970 the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council 
approved a $300,000 donation for the construction of a new clubhouse for Young 
Africans. The building’s foundation stone was laid by Zanzibar’s president Abeid 
Amani Karume (who would later become vice president of Tanzania) in 1971. 
Julius Nyerere, the then president of Tanzania and leader of the TANU party, 
was also said to have visited the clubhouse. The other event relates to a crisis 
within the ranks of Young Africans halfway through the 1970s. When a coach 
accused his superiors of embezzling club funds, the TANU-dominated govern-
ment fired the management team.374 
The three indicators also apply to Ghana’s two “glamorous” clubs, Hearts of 
Oak and Asante Kotoko. A commonly held belief is that Hearts and Kotoko are 
affiliated to the country’s biggest political parties, respectively the NDC and 
NPP. It appears that these links are a result both of the fact that top club officials 
occupy top positions within these parties and that supporters of both clubs tend to 
support these parties as well. Indeed, a survey within three parliamentary consti-
tuencies conducted by K.S. Fridy and V. Brobbey suggests that ‘respondents who 
support Hearts are more likely to support the NDC than respondents who support 
Kotoko, and respondents who support Kotoko are more likely to support the NPP 
than respondents who support Hearts’.375 Moreover, political rallies have been 
organised by Hearts and Kotoko supporters in relation to the NDC and NPP, 
respectively. I will discuss the case further below. 
The links between clubs, ethnic groups, political parties and regions give rise 
to what I call the football map. It means that by looking at clubs’ home turfs in a 
single league one can deduct the geography of political power vis-à-vis opposi-
tion. A history of clubs and league tables, then, forms a football map which, in 
turn, underscores the idea that football mirrors society. ‘Just as it is easy to 
analyse Kenyan politics along ethnic lines,’ W.W.S. Njororai argues, ‘the same 
applies to sport especially football.’376 This argument leads to two assumptions: 
First, that the biggest and most successful clubs are often (but not always) 
located in the capital and controlled by dominant ethno-political groups; and 
second, that underperforming, marginalised clubs are often (but not always) 
located in opposition strongholds and controlled by dominated ethnic groups. 
The second assumption is related to minority ethnic groups. Njororai describes 
a minority as ‘an ethnic group having a distinctive presence within a society yet 
having little political power relative to other groups within a society’.377 The 
minority-majority dichotomy in Africa is related to ethnic politics and signifies a 
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difference in social-cultural, economic and political power within the borders of 
a nation-state. Indeed, minorities form a distinctive part of the football map. 
Earlier I mentioned the example of the Berbers controlling the Algerian club JS 
Kabylie (chapter 2), whose success in fact clearly is an exception to the premise 
that clubs owned by marginalised groups are underperformers. I also provided 
the example of the Anglophones in Cameroon who control the popular club 
PWD Bamenda. The latter case is discussed further below. 
For an elaboration of the first assumption we will once again travel to Came-
roon, a country where football is heavily enmeshed with ethno-politics (or 
‘political tribalism’, as Peter Geschiere, following John Lonsdale, calls it).378 
While president Ahidjo adhered to a politics of regionalism to keep powerful 
ethnic groups satisfied, the dominance of the CPDM and Biya’s favouritism 
towards his Beti kinsmen led to a distinctly visible football map. This, in turn, 
was mainly a result of the introduction of multi-party politics. The Social Dem-
ocratic Front (SDF), led by Ni John Fru Ndi and based in Bamenda, was and still 
is widely supported by Anglophones in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. 
The Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC) maintained links with the 
Bamileke and Bassa of the West and Littoral Regions. Biya’s CPDM drew most 
of its support among the Beti ethnic group of the Centre and South Regions.379 
Cameroon’s top league is influenced by these ethno-political divisions. Most 
clubs in the Southwest, Northwest, West and Littoral Regions are associated with 
respectively the Anglophones, Bamileke and Bassa. Clubs such as PWD 
Bamenda (Anglophones, Northwest), Union Douala (Bamileke, Littoral) and 
Racing Bafoussam (Bamileke, West) thus belong to opponents of Biya and the 
CPDM. Most clubs in the Centre and South Regions are linked to the Beti. Clubs 
such as Canon and Tonnerre Yaoundé (Beti, Centre) and Colombe Sangmélima 
(Beti/Bulu, South, Biya’s home town) are perceived to be controlled by people 
who support Biya. Since PWD Bamenda and the SDF party are dealt with further 
below, I will now focus on the Bamileke vs the Beti. 
Historically speaking, the biggest rivalries existed between clubs from Ya-
oundé and Douala and, to a lesser extent, between clubs from Yaoundé and 
Bafoussam. Matches between Racing Bafoussam and Union Douala (the biggest 
Bamileke clubs) on the one hand and Tonnerre and Canon Yaoundé (the biggest 
Beti clubs) on the other have invariably had a political undertone. Once a first-
class referee, Louis-Marie Ongoum described officiating a match between Union 
and Tonnerre in Yaoundé. At a score of 1-0 in favour of Tonnerre, Ongoum 
granted Union a penalty. He was immediately surrounded by Tonnerre players 
and, according to Ongoum, Roger Milla said: ‘On marque le pénalty et tu est 
mort’ (‘Allow that penalty to be taken and you’re dead’). The referee’s report on 
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what happened after Union scored, includes references to being beaten up and 
urgently having to visit the hospital.380 
Racing Bafoussam was the Bamileke’s most successful club in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, winning league titles in 1989, 1992, 1993 and 1995.381 En-
counters between Racing on the one hand and Tonnerre or Canon on the other 
were generally chaotic, violent and frightening. The animosity grew in the after-
math of the elections in October 1992. Incidentally, Racing and Canon were 
pitted against each other at the stadium in Yaoundé in the final league round on 
31 October. The author of an article in the newspaper Le Quotidien witnessed 
‘disturbing scenes’ during the match as Canon supporters attacked their Racing 
counterparts. It was clear from the verbal and physical abuse of supporters on 
both sides that the encounter bore a direct link to recent political events.382 
Ethnic and political tensions have never ceased to play a role in Cameroonian 
football.383 In July 2008, Foudre Akonolinga (Beti, Centre Region) and Aigle 
Royal Menoua (Bamileke, West Region) played each other in the semi-final of 
the Cup of Cameroon.384 The encounter was decided in favour of Aigle during 
the second leg in Dschang. When the news reached Akonolinga, Beti residents 
started beating up Bamileke, killing one person. Although the immediate cause of 
the violence was the news that the Foudre delegation had been molested in 
Dschang,385 the underlying causes were linked to politics. Foudre’s secretary-
general was quoted as saying that there ‘are ten Bamileke clubs in the Elite One 
league. This is not normal. We, the people of the Center Region, must unite 
against them. The Bamileke clubs win through fraud.’386 The violence once again 
highlighted the hatred between the two groups. 
 
The route from football to politics 
In 2010 TP Mazembe won the CAF Champions League title by beating Espé-
rance Tunis 6-1 on aggregate. Moreover, Les Corbeaux (the Ravens) made it to 
the final of the FIFA Club World Cup, the first time an African club ever man-
aged to do so. As a son of the soil, club president Moise Katumbi Chapwe enjoys 
massive support in Lubumbashi and the wider Katanga Province. Perhaps 
somewhere in the future Katumbi will decide to run for president. He certainly 
would not be the first to take the route from club president to actual president. 
Ghana’s president John Evans Atta Mills and his predecessor John Kufuor both 
switched the chairmanship of Hearts and Kotoko, respectively, for Osu Castle 
(the presidential residence). 
Nigerians are quite familiar with this particular career path. Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
once a gifted athlete, founded his club Zik’s Athletic Club (ZAK) in 1938. For a 
while, ZAK was Nigeria’s only native-controlled club. The team travelled the 
country on good-will tours during which Azikiwe held anti-colonial post-match 
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speeches. Azikiwe held several political positions as a member of the Mambili 
Party. In 1960 he became Nigeria’s first president.387 More recently, Orji Uzor 
Kalu, at the time governor of Abia State and president of Enyimba FC, steered 
the team towards CAF Champions League titles in 2003 and 2004. Kalu was 
later crowned Pillar of Sport, an honorary title that originally belonged to another 
footballing Big Man, M.K.O. Abiola. Kalu later unsuccessfully ran for president. 
‘I believe the state of football in Nigeria is dead,’ one club owner said. ‘The 
clubs are run as political tools, not as businesses.’388 
The link between football and politics is a two-way street. On the other hand, 
one can see parliamentarians (MPs), ministers, party leaders and chairmen of 
committees, among others, getting involved by taking up club and/or FA posi-
tions. In Africa, politicians interfere with anything related to football, for in-
stance by discussing it in parliament. Cameroon’s Minister of Sports was booed 
by MPs when he explained the national team’s disappointing results at the 2010 
African Cup of Nations. When he suggested that spiritual forces had caused the 
Lions’ demise, MPs shouted ‘Resign! Resign!’.389 Ghanaian MPs congratulated 
the Black Stars on reaching the final at the same tournament. Despite the fact that 
several MPs criticised the Minister of Sports, Honourable Osei Kyei-Mensah-
Bonsu (NPP) made the following comment: 
Thank you very much, Madam Speaker, for the opportunity to also rise to add my voice to 
congratulate the Black Stars for the wonderful display of football artistry last Sunday. (…) 
We all saw that the current Black Stars, which represented us in Angola, was indeed an 
under-strength conglomeration of players. They struggled through but they were extremely 
determined and committed to do their country proud and they succeeded in doing just that. 
Madam Speaker, we should highly commend them for their steadfastness. Madam Speaker, 
all of us Ghanaians should learn useful lessons in commitment and dedication from these 
young lads.390 
On the other end stand Big Men – usually self-made businessmen or company 
directors, but also traditional rulers, military leaders and even former footballers, 
among others – who use their financial strength to sponsor clubs and increase 
their visibility in public life. It seems that such Big Men got increasingly 
involved in football when multi-party politics allowed them to attach themselves 
to political parties. Kojo Fianoo, CEO of AshantiGold FC, argues that this hap-
pened in Ghana after Jerry Rawlings’ ascendancy to power in the 1980s. ‘When 
the Revolution came and the country was driven towards democracy, all those 
who wanted to go into politics aligned themselves to clubs,’ Fianoo told me. 
‘That was the way in which they could project their own names. People came to 
know them through football. When the ban on political parties was lifted, their 
names were already in the minds of people.’ 
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Photo 5.1 A Hearts of Oak player performs a prayer before the match between Hearts and 
Asante Kotoko at the packed Ohene Djan Stadium in Accra 
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The route from football to politics also occurs in Cameroon. It also has a 
historical trajectory, as this account by Clignet and Stark with regard to the 1970s 
testifies: 
While clubs are able to benefit from the network of influences established by a successful 
member of the élite, this also tends to reinforce his socio-economic and political pre-
eminence. In the framework of a one-party state, the ability to mobilize popular energies 
around sports is often viewed as evidence of the local power held by an individual who 
becomes correspondingly a more valuable political asset. In Cameroun, as apparently else-
where in French-speaking Africa, club presidents and league officials are often chosen as 
political candidates, and in return their increased status is used for the benefit of the players 
themselves.391 
An interesting example comes from the West Region. Over the last twenty years 
the top league regularly boasted of at least six Bamileke-owned clubs.392 ‘The 
Bamileke are the richest people and they love spending money on football,’ said 
spiritual adviser Zé. It is claimed that their sponsoring of clubs is politically 
motivated (see also the politics of belonging in chapter 4). This is what Zé told 
me in 2003: 
Let’s take Mount Cameroon. Their president is in parliament. The president of Bamboutos 
Mbouda is in parliament. The president of Racing Bafoussam is in parliament. The president 
of Fovu Baham is in parliament. They use their clubs to gain popularity so that the people 
vote for them. They use football as a stepping stone to a political career. Without football 
they wouldn’t have been known. Everybody will vote for someone who sponsors football. 
And they [the voters] also know that when he [the Big Man] is in Yaoundé he will continue 
to sponsor the club and the region. The club presidents know that they have to spend money 
first and get it back when they enter parliament. It’s all corrupted money. As parliament-
arians they can do anything. Parliamentarians normally receive millions of CFA francs to 
develop their own regions. You cannot compare, let’s say, 100 million CFA francs to the 
money they spend on the club. 
Zé’s statement reveals two issues. First, one becomes an MP by gaining a 
majority of votes in one’s division, which means that Big Men who run “their” 
community-based clubs have a fair chance of getting elected. Second, Big Men 
who spend their money on a club think it will pay off once they get into politics. 
The perception is that there is nothing as financially rewarding as a career in 
politics.393 
Calvin Foinding, president of Mount Cameroon FC, is a case in point. The 
businessman originates from the Koung-Khi division in the West Region. He 
once was the president of a traditional club named Stade Bandjoun. Around this 
time Foinding successfully ran for public office through the CPDM and became 
the division’s elected representative at the National Assembly in Yaoundé. I do 
not know whether his political career jumpstarted because he was club president 
(and the Big Man appears to have remained silent on the issue), but this assump-
tion would most likely not be far off the mark. Foinding’s private club Mount 
Cameroon relegated to a lower division in 2009. Former player Essomba offered 
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one reason for its demise. ‘The president didn’t care about football anymore 
since he became a politician,’ he said. 
From all indications it can be stated that many of the Big Men who take the 
route from club official to politics resort to populist discourse. To be sure, 
football is a sport for the masses. Whoever wants support for voting purposes 
needs to appeal to the problems of the man in the street. Ni John Fru Ndi is one 
club president-turned-political leader who has been labelled a populist and a 
rhetorician.394 His road to fame is said to have started when he took up the 
presidency of PWD Bamenda in the late 1970s. His popularity gained mo-
mentum when he became the chairman of the SDF. At his compound in the 
Ntarikon area in Bamenda, Fru Ndi said he thought people at least partly voted 
for him due to his achievements as club president: 
People came to know me and they saw my sacrificing spirit and because of my ability to do 
certain things, they came to respect me. When I formed the party, the spirit of what I had 
done in PWD followed me into the party. People who had seen me on the field said: “If he’s 
with the party we will support him because we saw how he handled his players on the field.” 
Another example of a Big Man who uses a populist discourse is the afore-
mentioned Harry Zakkour. As one of Hearts’ most successful CEOs ever, 
Zakkour enjoys wide support and popularity among Hearts sympathisers. In 
2009, management member Frank Nelson Nwokolo called the former CEO his 
‘senior brother’ and explained his status within the club to me: 
In his time as CEO he [Zakkour] did well very. He’s somebody who’s always very close to 
the team. He’s the kind of person you can run to when the team is not doing well. He still 
wants to show his support and he will always help out. When we were about to visit the 
former coach of Hearts [Jones Attuquayefio, who was ill at the time] I called Harry and he 
said: “I will be there.” That shows you his moral support. It’s not only money that helps. His 
presence is also very important. And there are a lot of supporters who like him, so it’s good 
to have someone of that calibre around. It brings the club together. 
Zakkour’s appeal to the ordinary man – and the not-so-subtle political motiva-
tions behind it – was obvious during our conversation at the Bus Stop restaurant 
in Accra: 
I just want to help people like them [he points to a couple of Ghanaian journalists sitting at 
our table]. I feel sorry for them. I see how these people live. This guy here works for a radio 
station. What future does he have? He has to work hard, maybe marry a girl, save a little 
money, and pay the rent. (…) But what does he get? Nothing! (…) Every government comes 
in and says: “I will do this and that.” The minute they get into power they forget about the 
poor people who voted for them. But I want this man to enjoy! He’s a young man. If he 
doesn’t have a roof over his head, the boy can be a prostitute, he can be an armed robber. But 
if he has a house and he has paid for it for 20 years, if he is not there the children will take 
over the house. (…) These are the people who vote! It’s not the rich people who vote. That’s 
the reason why I want to get into politics. 
Finally, a top position in football administration not seldom leads to a political 
career. This relationship is not new, as Jeffrey points out in his study on Sharpe-
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ville (South Africa). Described as the Transvaal’s most important football admi-
nistrator, George Thabe controlled the game for fifteen years, having been 
elected president of the Transvaal Football Association in 1965 and the South 
African National Football Association (SANFA) in 1970. Jeffrey argues that 
such Big Men used their status and position to stand as candidates in local 
government elections. Thabe was elected chairman of the Transvaal Triangle 
Community Council in 1977.395 Kenyan FA officials too have gone on to become 
politicians. For instance, Kenneth Matiba was KFF chairman (1974-78) before 
becoming MP, minister and presidential candidate.396 
Several Big Men have made comparisons between football politics and actual 
politics. Joseph Ade Coker compared his career as a NDC politician to his time 
as vice president of Ghana’s FA. ‘I am finding my party politics administration 
easier because I have been toughened by football administration, which is more 
difficult and demanding on (a) daily basis,’ he told a news agency. Although he 
admitted that party politics was ‘dirty’ he said that ‘football politics is the dirtiest 
as people can directly barricade your office and call for your outright dismiss-
al’.397 The aforementioned George Thabe was described as having the ‘patience 
and skill of a Grand Master’ with which he ‘eliminated all effective opposition’ 
as a football administrator: 
This reference to the game of chess suggests the degree of manipulation and control 
required, as well as the political skill doing so. Indeed, such was the politicking in the 
sporting world, it is not surprising that community politics in Sharpeville has been domi-
nated by people who originally made a name for themselves in the arena of sport.398 
Similar statements were made by Ni John Fru Ndi. ‘I came to know people,’ the 
former president of PWD Bamenda said. ‘I came to know the intricacies of 
governing people when they came to social events like football. I learned to 
challenge the referees, the FECAFOOT. If I have gained anything from football 
that I have used in politics is that I became outspoken.’ 
The club and the party: Hearts vs Kotoko 
As it turned out, Sunday 8 February 2009 was a very bad day for sympathisers of 
Asante Kotoko. On that day, Hearts of Oak travelled to Kumasi for the Ghanaian 
version of Spain’s El Clásico.399 As usual, officials and supporters of both teams 
had hurled insults at one another and had accused the other team of dirty play in 
the run-up to the match, particularly with regard to bribery and juju. Many 
thousands of Kotoko fans occupied the stands at the Baba Yara Stadium, only to 
see their team lose the match 1-2. Intense heat, too many spectators and poorly 
trained security personnel led to four deaths and more than 400 injured spec-
tators. Kotoko’s Belgian coach Maurice Cooreman was fired a few days later. 
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The match was a reasonably typical encounter between Ghana’s two biggest 
clubs. There was only one thing that was out of the ordinary. Ghana had just 
witnessed a highly contested presidential election. Nana Akufo-Addo, the candi-
date of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), had taken on John Evans Atta Mills, who 
was attached to the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The first round re-
mained undecided, as both candidates failed to pass the required 50 percent vote 
margin. The run-off took place on 28 December 2008. After a prolonged count-
ing of the votes, Mills was elected president. The match between Hearts and 
Kotoko six weeks later was seen as a rerun of the elections. ‘That’s why people 
say we won twice,’ one Hearts supporter told me. 
It is important to provide a brief historical background if we want to under-
stand these clubs’ links to Ghana’s two biggest political parties. Although Hearts 
and Kotoko were both founded during the colonial days, it is argued that the 
basis of their rivalry can be traced back to the 1950s. To say that the rivalry 
between the two clubs is based on ethnicity – Hearts being Ga, Kotoko being 
Ashanti – is only part of the story, especially in the case of Hearts. The animosity 
between Hearts and Kotoko is rather more predicated on the basis of Accra as the 
centre of the government and Kumasi as the centre of the government’s main 
opposition. It is, in short, a mixture between ethnicity and politics with an em-
phasis on the latter.  
Before the launch of the National League, Accra and Kumasi organised re-
gional leagues and several regional FAs existed throughout the country. One 
administrator, Richard Akwei, proposed to form a national FA by the late 1940s, 
which finally led to the formation of two separate bodies. Akwei himself became 
the chairman of the Gold Coast Football Union while John Darkwa, who com-
manded support from the Ashanti Region, headed the Gold Coast and Ashanti 
Union. A tour by the national team to Great Britain brought the two factions to-
gether and a new FA – the United Gold Coast Amateur Football Association – 
was launched in October 1950. Darkwa, the new FA chairman, was soon voted 
out in favour of Akwei, a move that strained relations between Kotoko and the 
FA.400 Akwei finally resigned at a general meeting in September 1957, having 
been granted the allegedly worthless title of Life Patron. 
Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah and his hand-picked football ad-
ministrator Ohene Djan worsened relations between Accra and Kumasi. Ohene 
Djan launched the country’s National League in 1958.401 In the 1961/62 season, 
Nkrumah and Djan introduced their team Real Republikans which would ‘offer 
leadership and inspiration to football clubs in the country’.402 To their dismay, 
the other teams each had to give the Republikans their two best players. Kotoko, 
forced to let go of Baba Yara and Dogo Moro, threatened to abandon the league, 
prompting the administrators in Accra to replace the Porcupine Warriors with 
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another team. Kotoko finally gave in. Almost instantly, Kotoko and Republikans 
became enemies. Controversy ensued when Hearts played Republikans in the 
final league round.403 Although Akyeampong most likely favoured Kotoko, his 
recollection is revealing nonetheless: 
But the match I will always remember was the last day of the season when Accra Hearts of 
Oak who were only a point behind Kotoko played against Ghana Republikans. Before the 
match, rumours floated round that both Clubs had agreed in advance that Accra Hearts of 
Oak should win the match to enable them to become the League champions instead of 
Kotoko – Republikans’ traditional enemies. I went to the Accra Sports Stadium to watch the 
game and arrived just before the start. It was the funniest match I have seen in my life. From 
the point of view of soccer quality the game was a complete let down. Neither team could 
strike form. In the end, Hearts won and the two points enabled them to finish up with 44 
points, as against Kotoko’s 43 points.404 
Bediako argues that this was perhaps Ghana’s first-ever match-fixing scandal.405 
On 1 July 1960, a Central Organization of Sports (COS) was formed with 
Ohene Djan as its first Director of Sports. Several fights between Kotoko and the 
COS would break out in the years to come. Towards the end of the 1962/63 
season, Kotoko officials accused the Director of Sports of favouring Republikans 
and decided to finish the league on a ‘non-scoring basis’.406 Real Republikans 
won the National League that season,407 but Ohene Djan denied having had any 
bias towards the Swedru-based club.408 The feud between Kotoko and Repub-
likans continued, with the former accusing the latter of receiving help from 
Ohene Djan, even though Kotoko became league champion in 1964 and 1965. 
Ghana’s political climate exacerbated the controversy between Kotoko and 
Republikans. First, Nkrumah had installed a one-party system with his own 
Convention People’s Party (CPP) at the helm. Republikans, nicknamed Osagy-
efo’s Own Club, were perceived to be attached to Nkrumah’s party. His main 
opposition came from the Ashanti Region in the person of J.B. Danquah, who 
unsuccessfully ran for president in 1960, and Kofi Abrefa Busia, who was prime 
minister between 1969 and 1972. Both men were involved in the opposition party 
National Liberation Movement (NLM, later renamed the United Party) and were 
said to be closely attached to Kotoko. Second, the cocoa crisis prior to Ghana’s 
independence caused mutual distrust between the government in Accra and the 
opposition in Kumasi.409 Nkrumah himself saw the unrest as a ‘struggle between 
a modern democratic government and the feudal power of traditional chiefs try-
ing to protect the old order’.410 
When Nkrumah was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1966, Republikans was 
disbanded and the Black Stars’ performances slumped, thereby ending Nkru-
mah’s experiment in mixing football and politics.411 The opposition between 
Accra and Kumasi nevertheless remained visible in the rivalry between Hearts 
and Kotoko. As of today, the hegemony of both teams is unparalleled. Hearts and 
Kotoko have divided the vast majority of league titles amongst each other 
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between 1958 and 2010.412 Ghanaians say that one is either Hearts or Kotoko, 
which applies to everyone including journalists and referees (see chapter 8). 
Similarly, the country is split in two in terms of support for the NDC and the 
NPP. Although sympathisers of both clubs and parties can be found throughout 
the country, there is a correlation between Accra-Hearts of Oak-NDC and 
Kumasi-Asante Kotoko-NPP.413 
It is worth noting that officials and supporters on both sides tend to downplay 
or even deny the links between their clubs and the parties. Indeed, whoever 
speaks to the people around Hearts or Kotoko will hear them cite examples of 
NDC Big Men who were involved in Kotoko and NPP Big Men who were 
members of Hearts’ management team. For instance, Dr. Nyaho Tamakloe, who 
is a member of the NPP, was chairman of Hearts in the 1980s. Another example 
is P.V. Obeng, a former minister of Rawlings, who acted as chairman of 
Kotoko’s Board of Directors. ‘It’s not true that Hearts is NDC,’ said Edmund 
Palmer, secretary of the National Chapters Committee. ‘There’s this idea that 
because the club and the ministers are based in Accra, they turn around to favour 
Hearts. But that’s just a perception.’ 
Kojo Fianoo, CEO of AshantiGold FC, provided an explanation of how an 
NPP Big Man can become CEO of Hearts, despite the club’s connections to the 
NDC party. He told me the following story in April 2009, a few months after 
NDC candidate Mills had won the presidential elections: 
A couple of months ago I was to go to Hearts of Oak as the new Chief Executive Officer. 
Two people were interviewed and from the reports I was on top. Now I happen to be an NPP 
man. During the interview they asked me a question: “How do you see Hearts in the political 
dispensation?” I told them that Hearts has lost a lot of influence under NPP. When NPP 
came into power, nobody from Hearts could go to work and show their face. What Hearts 
wanted to do was this. If NPP had won the elections, Hearts would have appointed me as the 
CEO of the club to add some cloud of NPP to Hearts. But if NDC had won, they would have 
picked the other guy because the winner takes all. So when NPP lost, I told people I lost the 
job. And that’s what happened. 
Fianoo’s case illustrates how an NPP member is able to become CEO of Hearts 
and it also signals the perception among Ghanaians of the necessity to always 
have a link with those in power. Moreover, his case presupposes the view that 
Hearts will reap the benefits if the NDC is in power and, vice versa, that Kotoko 
is at an advantage if the NPP controls the government. I will deal with this 
perception later on. 
The idea that Hearts is linked to the NDC and Kotoko to the NPP has its roots 
in the tumultuous political events of the 1980s. After Nkrumah was deposed as 
president, successive military regimes ruled Ghana between 1966 and 1981. 
Then a Flight Lieutenant named Jerry Rawlings staged a coup d’état on 31 
December 1981 and installed the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). 
Rawlings soon made it clear that Hearts was the government club by wearing 
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Hearts’ rainbow colours during Hearts vs Kotoko matches. Although matches 
between the two clubs were already tense, it can be argued that Rawlings made it 
worse. One match in Accra in 1989 became infamous when Kotoko team captain 
Sarfo Gyamfi refused to shake hands with the president. Kotoko loyalists op-
posed the fact that the match was organised to celebrate the tenth anniversary of 
the 4 June Revolution. Kotoko won the match on penalties. 
Growing opposition to Rawlings’ military rule, particularly by those who 
adhered to the Danquah-Busia tradition, forced the government to adopt a 
National Commission on Democracy. This finally led to the first presidential 
elections since 1979. Rawlings founded the NDC in 1992; the NPP was founded 
in the same year as well. On 3 November 1992, Rawlings won the presidential 
elections with 58.3 percent of the votes against 30.4 percent for NPP candidate 
Albert Adu Boahen. Since the NPP boycotted the parliamentary elections less 
than two months later, the NDC managed to collect 189 out of 200 seats. Raw-
lings and the NDC went on to win the presidential and parliamentary elections in 
1996 as well. 
Several powerful NDC politicians became part of Hearts’s upper echelons. 
First of all, (P)NDC Big Men such as Ato Ahwoi, E.M. Commodore Mensah, 
Bright Akwetey and John Evans Atta Mills have all been involved in the affairs 
of Hearts.414 One newspaper article suggests that Ahwoi, Akwetey and Mills 
were three of the five Big Men who effectively owned the club between 1994 
and 2005.415 Ato Ahwoi and E.M. Commodore Mensah, both of whom acted as 
PNDC Secretary under Rawlings, have been chairman of the Board of Directors. 
Hannah Tetteh, Harry Sawyerr, Aanaa Ennin, Thomas Okine and other NDC Big 
Men and Women also hold/held positions. Similarly, a number of NPP politi-
cians took up positions in Kotoko’s management. George Adusei Poku was a 
management member and a strong NPP supporter. The same goes for Afrifa 
Yamoah Ponkoh, who was an NPP member at the time he acted as management 
member. Another NPP politician, Kennedy Agyepong, was a Board member. 
The link between football and politics surfaced again during the elections in 
2000. Harry Zakkour (NDC) and Herbert Mensah (NPP) had become the CEOs 
of Hearts and Kotoko, respectively. The main presidential candidates were John 
Evans Atta Mills, formerly of Hearts, and John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor, formerly 
of Kotoko. Politics were introduced when Hearts refused a donation from Kufuor 
but accepted one from Mills instead. Mills’ defeat at the hands of Kufuor, how-
ever, was unexpected in the light of recent football events. First, Hearts had 
thrashed Kotoko 4-0 in Accra in March 2000. Second, Hearts had reached the 
CAF Champions League final, which was played over two legs during the pre-
sidential elections. 
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Coincidentally, the 2004 elections were held at a time when both Hearts and 
Kotoko made it to the CAF Confederation Cup final, which was subsequently 
postponed because of ‘political tension’.416 On 4 December, a rally was orga-
nised at Hearts’ training ground in Accra. NDC candidate Mills and Rawlings 
addressed the crowd, urging them to refrain from violence and stating that the 
NDC would win. Kufuor, however, was re-elected. Early in 2005, when Hearts 
won the Confederation Cup title by beating Kotoko, the trophy was presented to 
Kufuor. ‘I am proud and happy to receive a second trophy from Hearts,’ he said, 
continuing in a seemingly joking fashion: ‘In 2001 you presented the Super Cup 
to me. This shows that perhaps there is some hidden relationships between the 
Club and President Kufuor, who is proving to be the lucky President to 
Hearts.’417 Hearts went on to refuse a gift (a new team bus) from the president. 
Finally, the 2008 elections pitted Mills against NPP candidate Nana Akufo-
Addo. The first round was inconclusive, as neither of the two candidates gained a 
majority of votes. There were fears of violence leading up to the second round on 
28 December after chaos had struck Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. 
Mills subsequently won the second round with the narrowest margin possible. A 
little while later, Hearts travelled to Kumasi and beat Kotoko 1-2 (see above). 
Not only was the victory linked to the elections, an investigation into the casu-
alties revealed that too many spectators had been allowed into the Baba Yara 
Stadium. Sylvester Asare Owusu, CEO of Kotoko, was found guilty of illegally 
helping supporters gain entrance; he was banned for five years from all football-
related activities. Asare Owusu went on to blame the NDC government and the 
new NDC Minister of Sports. ‘Most members of the NDC are supporters of the 
Accra Hearts of Oak who just want to destroy Kotoko,’ he said.418 
It is evident that the elections that pitted the NDC against the NPP had some 
sort of relationship with events happening between Hearts and Kotoko. One issue 
that needs to be addressed is whether an NDC government favours Hearts and, 
vice versa, whether the ruling NPP supports Kotoko. Fridy and Brobbey argue 
that that is indeed the perception in Ghana: 
Thus, for a Kotoko supporter, the extremist fan/conspiracy theorist would suggest that the 
CPP government, and later those led by Rawlings, were against them and more favourable to 
the establishment clubs based in the country’s capital city, particularly the Republikans and 
Hearts. (…) For a Hearts fan, the conspiracy theory would be that the NPP government and 
its earlier incarnations in the Danquah-Busia tradition and Ghana’s Akan business and 
political establishment are firmly in the camp of Kumasi Asante Kotoko and, therefore, do 
not want to see Hearts succeed.419 
But is that really the case? Is there any evidence that leads such conspiracy 
theories to have any merit? When taking a look at the Ghana Premier League, 
one is inclined to deny the link between the (P)NDC government and successes 
of Hearts and, vice versa, between the NPP government and successes of Kotoko. 
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League results actually suggest the opposite is true. During Rawlings’ rule, 
Hearts was subdued by Kotoko (9 titles for Kotoko to 6 titles for Hearts). During 
Kufuor’s rule, Kotoko performed worse than Hearts (6 titles for Hearts to 2 titles 
for Kotoko). Results in continental competitions do not overly clearly reveal a 
connection either.420 
Hearts vs Kotoko results, however, suggest that politics does seem to have 
some sort of influence. Put differently, there appears to be a correlation between 
successes of Hearts and the NDC being in power. Prior to 1983, Kotoko had won 
more Hearts vs Kotoko matches; afterwards Hearts took the lead,421 a change of 
luck that coincided with Rawlings coming into power. The period between 1998 
and 2001 in particular – during which Hearts beat Kotoko four times out of six – 
gave way to conspiracy theories. These theories were fed by the fact that former 
Hearts player E.T. Mensah acted as NDC Minister of Sports. Herbert Mensah, 
CEO of Kotoko, accused him of politicising the game. ‘We have had situations 
where referees have told us that they have been contracted by E.T. Mensah to 
ensure that the Cup (…) is an NDC Cup and should be won by Hearts at all cost,’ 
he said.422 
Another subject of inquiry is the perceived link between Accra/Greater Accra 
Region and the NDC and Kumasi/Ashanti Region and the NPP. When looking at 
the parliamentary elections in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008, the data suggests that 
these connections, albeit with a few exceptions, do exist. First of all, the massive 
support for the NPP in the Ashanti Region can be easily distilled from voting 
patterns.423 Support for the NDC in the Greater Accra Region is less straight-
forward. In fact, the NPP won more seats than the NDC in this Hearts stronghold 
during the 2000 and 2004 elections.424 Other voting patterns suggest that the 
NDC is widely supported in the North Region,425 which coincides with Hearts 
being very popular among Northerners.426 Similarly, the NPP commonly enjoys 
more support than the NDC in the Brong-Ahafo Region,427 an area whose inhab-
itants are said to be related to the Ashanti. 
Overall, it is safe to state that the links between Hearts-NDC and Kotoko-NPP 
are real. Put differently, both clubs possess social capital that can be readily 
converted into political gain. Granted, there is a lot of support for Kotoko in the 
Greater Accra Region (an NDC stronghold) and, vice versa, for Hearts in the 
Ashanti Region (dominated by NPP sympathisers).428 What is nevertheless true is 
that both clubs attract different sets of Big Men – with Kotoko relying on 
‘members of Kumasi’s traditional and business elite’ and Hearts on ‘Accra-based 
businessmen and political leaders’ who tend to support the NPP and NDC, res-
pectively.429 Also, the hiring of management members is (often) linked to the 
candidates’ political affiliations. For instance, some supporters opposed the ap-
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pointment of P.V. Obeng as CEO of Kotoko because he had ‘helped Rawlings 
and his NDC cronies’.430 
PWD Bamenda and the Anglophone problem 
Nji Pius sighs. It is dark in his house in Bamenda’s Old Town. As a former 
supporter of PWD Bamenda, Pius initially refuses to talk about the club. ‘I was 
once asked to become an official,’ he says. ‘But I declined. I was a mechanic and 
I had already accepted a few players in my house. I knew I would have no more 
time to do anything except running the club. Football consumes everything so I 
turned them down.’ But then he recalls the Abakwa Boys’ glory days and the 
tricks that were pulled by the Big Men from Yaoundé. ‘PWD Bamenda is in 
Third Division now. What has football brought to this region? Does it build roads 
or schools? No! The Francophones took over the league and the national team. 
They won. They can keep their football.’ 
Cameroon’s dual (or rather triple) colonial heritage has had a lasting effect on 
the post-independent nation-state. Between 1884 and 1916 the country, known as 
Kamerun, was colonised by the Germans. Following Germany’s defeat in World 
War I the territory became a United Nations League of Nations mandate under 
British and French rule. Britain’s area was a strip of land bordering Nigeria, 
called The Cameroons, which covered almost ten percent of present-day Came-
roon. The French controlled an area called Cameroun, which took up most of the 
territory and which was home to around 80 percent of the population. Soon after 
the country’s independence in 1960, the peoples of The Cameroons were pre-
sented with two options: One, to reunite with Cameroun or, two, to integrate into 
Nigeria. It was decided to form a two-state federation; on 1 October 1961, both 
territories merged into the Federal Republic of Cameroon. 
The federation consisted of an Anglophone West Cameroon and a Franco-
phone East Cameroun. When the Anglophone elite headed by prime minister 
John Ngu Foncha decided to join the Francophones, their hopes and expectations 
of equality and power sharing in the new set-up were soon dashed, as Konings 
and Nyamnjoh argue: 
Contrary to expectations, this did not provide for the equal partnership of both parties, let 
alone for the preservation of the cultural heritage and identity of each, but turned out to be 
merely a transitory phase to the total integration of the anglophone region into a strong 
centralized, unitary state. Gradually, this created an anglophone consciousness: The feeling 
of being ‘marginalised’, ‘exploited’, and ‘assimilated’ by the francophone-dominated state, 
and even by the francophone population as a whole.431 
The problems had already started at the Foumban Conference in July 1961 where 
the Anglophones did not have much bargaining power. More importantly, the 
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Anglophones were effectively asked to join the already existing Republic of 
Cameroon.432 
Football in those days was separated as well with the Anglophones and the 
Francophones both organising their own leagues. However, clubs on both sides 
did meet in the annual Cup of Cameroon competition. Several Anglophone teams 
reached the final of this competition in the 1960s – P&T Social Club Buea in 
1964, CDC Victoria United in 1965, PWD Bamenda in 1967 and Prisons Buea in 
1968.433 These finals were all lost to Francophone opponents and especially the 
final in 1968 between Oryx Douala and Prisons Buea still lives on in memory. 
On this day, Prisons captain Joseph Ewunkem urged his teammates to leave the 
field to protest the alleged biased decisions made by the referee. Oryx Douala 
eventually won the match 2-1. 
The unification of West and East Cameroon was finalised on 20 May 1972 
(Unification Day) which to Anglophones signalled the definite take-over of their 
territory by the Francophones.434 Many Anglophones have since called for a 
return to federalism and some have even advocated a secession from Franco-
phone Cameroun by merging with neighbouring Nigeria. Anglophone pressure 
groups have also appealed to the United Nations to reverse the decisions made in 
1961 and 1972. Much has been written about the so-called Anglophone prob-
lem,435 which refers to a relatively powerless minority (Anglophones) being 
dominated by a far more powerful majority (Francophones), operating mainly 
from the capital Yaoundé. The complaints of the Anglophones are well summed 
up by Konings and Nyamnjoh: 
They started to resent their region’s loss of autonomy and the allegedly subordinate position 
of the Anglophone minority in the unitary state. Their numerous grievances were mainly of a 
political, economic, and cultural nature: Notably their under-representation and inferior rôle 
in national decision-making councils; the neglect of their region’s infrastructure and the rape 
and drain of its rich economic resources, especially oil, by successive francophone régimes; 
and the attempts at ‘frenchification’.436 
Whoever talks to supporters in the Anglophone zone – as I did in Bamenda 
and Buea – will notice that the words cheating and Francophones go hand in 
hand. Throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s, only one Anglophone team managed 
to reach the final of the Cup of Cameroon. As we will see below, PWD Bamenda 
went on to lose the match. In 2000, Kumbo Strikers became the first Anglophone 
team to win the Cup of Cameroon trophy after which, according to the Anglo-
phone scholar Walter G. Nkwi, ‘the cup “spoke and understood” the English 
language’.437 The fact that Mount Cameroon FC repeated this feat in 2002 was 
far less important for Anglophones because of the club’s Bamileke identity. 
More significantly, Tiko United has so far been the only Anglophone team to win 
the Elite One league (in 2009, see below). 
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Anglophones felt and still feel that the Francophone-dominated FECAFOOT 
and Francophone-owned clubs obstructed the progress of their teams. Some 
referees, such as Louis Atangana, were said to be biased against the Anglophone 
teams.438 ‘Atangana always cheated us,’ said Ben Bola, who played for PWD 
Bamenda in the 1970s and 80s. ‘He was a Francophone. Sometimes he would 
say: “I know your next match and you can bet I will officiate that match.” How 
could he know? FECAFOOT assigned him to handle PWD matches.’ Ben Bola 
recalled how Anglophones were cheated in other departments as well. ‘Once I 
was voted Man of the Match but they pulled some tricks and named (former 
Francophone footballer) Théophile Abega instead. They did the same thing with 
Anglophones who became top scorer.’ 
Although other Anglophone clubs are also said to have been victimised by the 
Francophones, PWD Bamenda truly seems to have been at the heart of the 
Anglophone struggle against Francophone domination, particularly in the 1970s 
and 80s. The Big Men in Yaoundé were thought to have obstructed the 
Bamenda-based club any which way they could.439 In fact, one match in 1979 is 
still perceived as the key moment in the history of PWD Bamenda – and perhaps 
to some extent of Anglophones as a whole. In that year, PWD reached the final 
of the Cup of Cameroon and found its opponent to be the Bassa-owned team 
Dynamo Douala. Finally, Dynamo Douala beat PWD Bamenda 3-1 in a contro-
versial match which infuriates Anglophones to the present day. 
Anglophones state that P-Ton-Ton was one of Cameroon’s strongest teams in 
the late 1970s.440 Famous squad members included goalkeeper Agwa, Ngo 
Franklin, Nji Sunday and Ben Bola. ‘Even Thomas Nkono, who was Canon’s 
goalkeeper, feared us,’ said Ni John Fru Ndi, former president of PWD Ba-
menda. ‘He especially feared our attacker, Franklin. Nkono would go to him and 
say: “Please don’t disgrace me.” And Franklin would reply: “I will only score 
two goals.” If it were not for all the cheating, PWD was better than Canon and 
Tonnerre.’ PWD Bamenda also had a large following. ‘PWD was very popular in 
the 1970s,’ said Fru Ndi. ‘At one point PWD was the most popular team in 
Cameroon.’ In the run-up to the final, PWD Bamenda had beaten both Tonnerre 
and Canon Yaoundé, and had demolished l’Etoile Filante 7-0. To Anglophones, 
these facts made losing the final all the more suspicious. 
As usual, president Ahmadou Ahidjo watched the final at the stadium in 
Yaoundé. Immediately after presenting the trophy to Dynamo Douala, Ahidjo 
reportedly ordered an investigation. It was discovered that a PWD defender 
named Epesse was bribed by Minister of Sports Felix Tonye Mbock, who hap-
pened to be a Bassa. Indeed, supporters in Bamenda remember how Epesse 
directly caused one or more of the Dynamo goals.441 This is what supporter 
Cleopas told me: 
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Epesse did it because he was a Bassa himself and because he needed the money. He went to 
the minister and to the officials of Dynamo and told them how PWD operated. He told them 
how PWD prepared themselves for the finals, at which hotel they stayed, everything. Sup-
porters of Dynamo even travelled to Bamenda to get soil from the training ground at the 
stadium. We know this because they were arrested for that. 
‘Dynamo resorted to psychological warfare,’ said Fru Ndi. ‘They disturbed us on 
the road. The police detained us because they said there was something wrong 
with our vehicle.’ But, as Fru Ndi explained, that was not the only thing Dynamo 
Douala, with the help of the Minister of Sports, did: 
They poisoned the boys. This famous match, this is where we saw fetishism and oc-
cultism in practice. There was an investigation and they found out that Dynamo played a 
dubious role with our food. They poisoned the food of our players. They put something in-
side our food which made them so tired. They couldn’t run. 
We didn’t have a lot of money in those days. Normally I could feed a team of fourteen to 
sixteen players. But we didn’t have the type of supporters then who could cook for all the 
players. That’s why we had to resort to eating out. We were not as mobile as today where we 
would have women who could cook the food and bring it to us. We were in a strange area 
and we had to take the food from someone else. When you have four or five people who are 
doing the cooking, they can approach one of them. It can still be done today with this degree 
of poverty. People can be bought with money. 
The Minister of Sports was later fired by Ahidjo who was said to have been 
annoyed by the favouritism to the Douala-based team. 
Anglophones say that Biya’s ascendency to the presidency in 1982 made life 
more difficult, football included. ‘The club presidents from Yaoundé always 
thought that they were better than us,’ said Fru Ndi. ‘They saw us as villagers. 
When they came to Bamenda they treated us with disdain.’ He claimed that the 
clubs from Yaoundé had a financial advantage over the Anglophone clubs. 
‘These club presidents were all ministers and they financed the clubs from gov-
ernment monies,’ he said. ‘They embezzled state money. Sometimes a minister 
would give out contracts worth 100 million CFA francs (€150,000) only when 
the contractor was willing to put 20 percent aside for the club.’ Fru Ndi added 
that it was ‘rare to see Anglophone ministers in those days. So we couldn’t make 
use of state money.’ 
There were numerous violent encounters on and off the field during the 1980s. 
Similar to what I wrote with regard to Bamileke teams, matches between Anglo-
phone teams and those from Yaoundé, particularly Tonnerre, were said to have 
left the Anglophones with bitter feelings. This is how Justice Mbuh describes it: 
In many of the first division encounters between the Abakwa Boys and Tonnerre Yaoundé, it 
was and still is common for the games to end in total confusion, as the crowd find it 
unbearable, ends up disrupting plays when discrimination becomes too intolerable. It was 
almost common place for there to be tensions between these teams whenever they met, 
simply because, before then, Tonnerre would have been close to or being the favorite to win 
the national Championship, but which without a home and away win over most Anglophone  
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Photo 5.2 President Eteki Charles of Tiko United is standing near the Mungo river. In 2007, 
supporters rolled out a red carpet over the bridge (left) to celebrate their team’s 
promotion to the top league 
 
 
 
teams, they would hardly make it. The Anglophone teams were thus prime targets for either 
elimination or point distribution to the Yaoundé and Douala based teams that almost always 
topped the national league, most of the times with conspicuous ease.442 
A PWD Bamenda vs Tonnerre Yaoundé match in 1984 degenerated into chaos 
when the Anglophones thought the referee was biased. ‘During the fight that 
ensued, the army and police jumped in,’ Mbuh writes. ‘They made the big mis-
take of beating everyone, at random. So there was general pandemonium. (…) It 
was like a war zone.’443 An angry mob went on to burn down the Bamenda 
Mobile Wing Police Barracks. ‘They shot one person that day,’ said supporter 
Nji Pius. ‘The gendarmes were Ewondo. I never went to the stadium again.’ 
Supporters in Bamenda regularly mentioned police brutality. Fru Ndi recalled a 
match between Federal Foumban and PWD Bamenda: 
The field in Foumban had no inner perimeter. They had put gendarmes and policemen all 
around the field of play, intimidating us and our players. They even intimidated us on the 
way to the stadium by setting up road blocks from Bamenda to Bafoussam. And they were 
armed in combat uniforms! The gendarmes gave the referee a free hand to cheat us. When 
our supporters protested the police would throw teargas into the crowd. 
One reason for the violence during matches involving PWD Bamenda and the 
Yaoundé teams was that the Anglophones were Biya’s main opponents. This was 
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due to the founding of the SDF at Fru Ndi’s residence in Bamenda. Set on 
Saturday 26 May 1990, the authorities tried to stop the launch of the party. All 
rallies were banned, markets and bars were closed and security forces were 
deployed from Yaoundé. ‘At 11 p.m. on May 25, 1990, Bamenda was a town 
under siege; a town in an undeclared state of emergency; a town ready for 
confrontation with armed members of security forces and unarmed civilians,’ 
wrote Jerome F. Gwellem.444 When thousands of SDF supporters occupied the 
City Chemist Roundabout the following day, chanting “Suffer Don Finish” (our 
suffering is over), security forces opened fire. Six people were killed.  
In December 1990, the National Assembly legalised the forming of both 
political parties and media outlets. A student demonstration at the University of 
Yaoundé was nevertheless brutally suppressed, leaving at least six students dead. 
The government responded by stating that no deaths had been reported, which 
led the term Zéro Morts to enter the Anglophone lexicon. This, and Biya’s re-
fusal to organise a National Conference, caused Cameroonians to resort to a civil 
disobedience campaign (known as Operation Ghost Town) in May 1991. The 
campaign quickly spread to towns throughout the country and lasted until Janu-
ary 1992. A rally in Bamenda on 2 October 1992 led the government to deploy 
military forces, including a helicopter, which left two people dead and several 
wounded.445 
The parliamentary elections in March 1992 were boycotted by 35 of the 69 
parties, including the SDF. When asked why he refused to take part, Fru Ndi 
answered that parliament was ‘a rubber stamp’ with ‘no powers’.446 As a group, 
the Anglophones had become the object of scorn from high-profile Franco-
phones.447 The presidential elections were set on 11 October 1992, with Fru Ndi 
being Biya’s main competitor. When the government publicised the voting 
results, Biya was elected president with 39.9 percent of the votes to 35.9 percent 
for Fru Ndi. Observers reported numerous irregularities, after which the oppo-
sition spoke of the “stolen elections”. Biya declared a state of emergency in Ba-
menda and placed Fru Ndi under house arrest. 
It was in this political climate that PWD Bamenda had to play its last match of 
the 1992 season against Colombe Sangmélima, a team from Biya’s home town. 
The match was scheduled to take place in Bamenda but had to be taken else-
where due to political unrest. Kuper writes that PWD ‘had had trouble training 
before the match, as the state of emergency forbade gatherings of more than three 
people in the North-West’.448 ‘This match was played without spectators,’ said 
supporter Nji Pius. ‘PWD and Colombe needed a win because they were both in 
the relegation zone. Colombe beat PWD 1-0 and we were relegated.’ When 
Kuper asked whether the match had been played fairly, the answer was that 
137 
 
nobody knew what had transpired. Finally, four teams were stuck at the bottom 
of the league table and FECAFOOT established the final ranking: 
I am not sure which system they chose. All I know is that the relevant committee voted on 
the matter, and PWD and Diamant Yaoundé were relegated. What is clear is that since a vote 
had to be held, the correct method of computing the table was plainly in doubt, and secondly, 
that the final table thus produced was predictable.449  
Indeed, PWD and Diamant belonged to Biya’s most prominent opponents, the 
Anglophones and Bamileke, respectively. 
PWD Bamenda did not “recover” from the 1992 elections and, for that matter, 
neither did the Northwest Region. Fru Ndi went on to boycott the 1997 elections, 
leading Biya to be re-elected with 92.6 percent of the votes. PWD Bamenda 
promoted to the top league again in 1994, only to be relegated four years later. 
The Bamenda-based club again promoted in 2002, this time with the help of 
businessman Issa Bongam, who led the team to third place in 2003. Things went 
astray when players revolted over non-payments of salaries and bonuses. 
Bongam fled the country due to accusations of embezzlement of public funds and 
PWD Bamenda relegated at the end of the 2004 season. These days the team 
lingers on in the Third Division. Chairman Eric Mukala bemoaned the lack of 
financial assistance from the Northwest elite: 
Nobody wants to invest in the club. This is the only real club from the Northwest Region but 
the elite is pulling its hands off the team. Look at John Fru Ndi. He has been the club 
president for so many years but now he’s in politics and he doesn’t care about the club 
anymore. Is that how you show affection for the club? The problem with PWD is that there’s 
no name. What can people benefit from sponsoring it? Nothing! Only when this team is in 
Division One you see so many businessmen and politicians donating money to the team: 
100,000 francs here, one million francs there. They use the club for political purposes. Now 
they won’t even give you five francs. I sent out letters to prominent people in the Northwest 
begging them for money, but they don’t respond.  
Practice sessions still draw dozens of supporters to the Municipal Stadium, 
indicating that PWD Bamenda has not lost its popularity. ‘That’s part of the 
problem,’ said Mukala. ‘These supporters don’t contribute any money but when 
you lose matches they want to burn down your house.’ Augustine Iche Ozoe-
mena and others agreed with this statement, having had first-hand experiences 
with irate supporters. The supporters are reportedly so violent that no Big Man 
dares to take up the running of the club. There have been plenty of rumours 
though. ‘We heard that there is a Bamileke businessman who wants to join forces 
with a Nigerian to sponsor the club,’ said supporter Cleopas. ‘There have been 
Bamileke in our management before. It’s quite common. We’re all brothers. 
Some management members even supported the CPDM. We could use a cloud of 
CPDM which is why we would allow CPDM politicians to run our team.’ 
Mentioning the CPDM brings us to the other side of the Anglophone problem, 
one that leads to the town of Tiko. While PWD Bamenda’s failures are most 
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likely due to its perceived connections to the SDF, Tiko United’s recent suc-
cesses may partly be a result of its closeness to the CPDM. It is first of all 
important to note that Biya adheres to a policy of divide-and-rule to maintain his 
power base.450 Nyamnjoh argues that his tactics of ‘strife and conflict and the 
struggle for power are thus tactfully relegated to the regions, while the president, 
like a master juggler, plays the regional or ethnic elites off against one an-
other’.451 The Anglophones are a case in point. Ahidjo divided the Anglophone 
zone into the Northwest and Southwest Regions, and both he and Biya have 
capitalised on the differences between the inhabitants of both regions.452 
The Northwest-Southwest divide and the tendency of Southwest elites to 
favour the CPDM appears to have had an impact on football. Tiko United (whose 
history briefly surfaced in chapter 2) is based in Fako, one of six divisions in the 
Southwest Region. In 2007, the team established promotion to the top league. 
Two years later, Tiko United became the first Anglophone club to win the 
championship title. Early in 2010, I visited Tiko and Limbe to ask the question 
that was on many people’s minds. What was Tiko United’s secret?453 The ex-
perience and financial strength of club president Eteki Charles were cited as well 
as the fact that Fako consisted of a close community. These plausible explana-
tions notwithstanding, it turned out that the members of the Southwest elite who 
were sponsoring Tiko United had one thing in common. 
On Tuesday 23 October 2007, the players and officials of Tiko United were 
welcomed at the Mungo river which demarcates the Francophone-Anglophone 
border. ‘We had just qualified for the Elite One league,’ said Eteki Charles. 
‘They rolled out a red carpet over the bridge. We all walked over the carpet in the 
presence of thousands of supporters.’ To be sure, the Mungo bridge is a signifi-
cant Anglophone landmark. When in 1995 a delegation of the Southern Came-
roons National Council (SCNC) returned home from a visit to the United Nations 
headquarters to protest Francophone domination, rites were performed at the 
Mungo river.454 Indeed, Anglophone teams are referred to as being located “West 
of the Mungo”. 
When Tiko United won the league title in 2009, Eteki Charles received ‘con-
gratulations from many club presidents’. Many Cameroonians wondered how 
Tiko United pulled it off. After all, Tiko is quite a small and impoverished town 
and the club is not backed by the Big Men in Yaoundé in the same way as 
Canon. Although the inhabitants of Tiko are known to generously support the 
club – for instance, sellers at the main market voluntarily and sometimes oblig-
atory donate money – it is nevertheless not perceived to be a wealthy club. One 
widely given explanation for the club’s success is the unity of the peoples of the 
Southwest Region in general and Fako division in particular. Zé, who spiritually 
handled Tiko United on several occasions, made the following statement: 
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The main reason for their success is togetherness. The majority of the players have been 
there for several years now so they know each other and there is a good team spirit. Another 
reason is that the entire Southwest is behind the team, both morally and financially. Eteki 
Charles Dikonge is a provincial delegate and uses government money to sponsor the team. 
Also, the chief of Buea, Endeley, and the CDC general manager, Njalla Quan, and even the 
governor of the Southwest are helping the team financially. Coincidentally, all these good 
Samaritans belong to the CPDM party.  
Indeed, several members of the Southwest elite financially support the team since 
its promotion, the majority of whom are also members of the CPDM.455 
The fact that members of the Southwest elite donate money to a top league 
club in their area is hardly unique. What is significant is that most of them are 
CPDM barons. Those in charge of Tiko United did not talk openly about this 
connection but it is evident that there is unease with Northwesterners and the 
SDF among the Southwest elite. At one point, Eteki Charles lashed out at Ni 
John Fru Ndi. ‘We all think he made a mistake by not participating in the 1997 
elections,’ he said. ‘I myself – I’m into politics as well. I’m with CPDM. I was 
chosen president of CPDM in Fako 4 in 2007. The opposition is quarrelling with 
CPDM from the outside. We can be quarrelling, but from the inside.’ It is 
rumoured that the support of the Southwest elite for the CPDM was rewarded 
with the league title. 
In sum, there is a strong link between football and politics in Africa. Big Men, 
mostly businessmen, use the game as a stepping stone to a political career and, 
vice versa, politicians are involved in the affairs of both clubs and national teams. 
Clubs may be connected to political parties (as in the case of Hearts and Kotoko) 
and/or are linked to minorities (as in the case of PWD Bamenda). Community-
based clubs in particular, already endowed with symbolic capital, also possess 
social capital that can be converted into political connections. A football map 
arises when one considers the geography of clubs that belong to powerful ethno-
political groups as opposed to clubs that belong to ethno-political minorities. In 
short, we have so far seen how wealthy Big Men convert economic capital into 
symbolic and/or social capital through football. Our next step is to see how Big 
Men convert economic capital into more economic capital.  
 
 6 
The football business 
‘I’ve been cheated three times,’ he says. ‘But I would do it again if I got the 
chance.’ Ashu lives in a small room in a suburb of Yaoundé. ‘It takes me 45 
minutes to get to the city centre,’ he tells me, ‘but our training ground is close to 
my house.’ He used to be captain of a Second Division team in Buea, but left 
when he got into an argument with the new coach. He later joined a Second 
Division team led by famed Cameroonian coach Jules Nyongha. His goal is to 
earn a transfer abroad. 
A few years ago, Ashu sought the help of a friend who worked at CRTV, the 
government-owned radio and television network, and paid him money to 
assemble a DVD. ‘That’s what most players do,’ he explains. ‘You post it on the 
web or you send it to a club abroad.’ This was the first time he was cheated. ‘One 
gendarme came to see me and said that his sister had contacts with a Belgian 
club. He needed 300,000 francs (€450) to fix everything. He also asked for my 
video clip. Then he disappeared.’ 
Some time later, Ashu agreed to a new deal. The vice president of an Elite 
One league club told him he would arrange a test match abroad. ‘He asked for 
600,000 francs (€900),’ Ashu says. ‘Later on I heard that another player had 
given him one million francs (€1,500). So the vice president sent him instead.’ 
That money is gone too. The third time he lost 1.2 million CFA francs (€1,800). 
‘I met this guy through a friend,’ he says, ‘who told me he had contacts. When I 
gave him the money he disappeared. There are good guys and there are cheats. 
It’s all a matter of trust.’ 
Today, Ashu is practising with his new team, Saint Paul Warriors. ‘We’re 
officially based in Ebolowa but we’re all living in Yaoundé,’ he says. Jules 
Nyongha, who has coached the national team on several occasions, leads the 
training session. Afterwards, Ashu explains the goals of the club owners. 
‘They’re not interested in gaining promotion,’ he says. ‘One owner is a FIFA-
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licensed agent, another is a Cameroonian businessman. They have a lot of con-
tacts in France and Italy. Our goal is to play at tournaments in Europe to show 
what we can do.’ 
The business side of football 
Football in Africa has always been a Big Man’s hobby. One took up the 
presidency of a club or the task of running the FA simply for the love of the 
game. Of course, they did not ignore the game’s symbolic and social capital 
either. However, a new motivation for sponsoring and running the game has 
emerged over the last two decades or so, one that is closely related to the forces 
of globalisation. As more money is poured into football, some Big Men now see 
their involvement as a business opportunity. Although the professionalisation and 
commercialisation of the game in Africa has so far done little for grassroots 
development, it certainly has increased a Big Man’s chances of converting eco-
nomic capital into more economic capital. Indeed, the football business has given 
rise to a new type of Big Man: The football entrepreneur. 
 
Professionalisation and commercialisation 
Hakeem’s appearances at the 2008 African Cup of Nations were characterised by 
a mixture of traditionalism and commercialism. Carrying livestock into the 
Ohene Djan Stadium, the self-proclaimed jujuman performed traditionally-
looking rituals prior to the tournament’s opening match. ‘With feathers of a 
chicken or fowl firmly clenched between his teeth, and with live chickens 
dangling in his hands, Hakeem would go into a trance, accompanied by gory 
dance steps and signals of slaughtering,’ wrote one Nigerian reporter.456 He held 
two chickens in one hand and a fowl in the other, signifying that Ghana would 
beat Guinea 2-1. I usually saw the so-called Chicken Man wearing a green robe 
with cowry shells around his neck. At one point, I noticed he had a keen eye for 
business: He had painted MTN’s yellow logo on his chest. 
Telecommunications company MTN is a prominent sponsor of African 
football, having patronised the 2006 and 2008 African Cup of Nations as well the 
2010 World Cup, and still patronising the CAF Champions League as well as 
leagues and clubs. Moreover, MTN has organised the CAF Awards and a TV 
programme called the African Soccer Show. ‘Football is a common global 
language,’ the company states. ‘MTN is about delivering communication serv-
ices, and our sponsorship of football on the continent is a natural extension of 
this commitment.’457 Elsewhere the company states that as long ‘as our custom-
ers continue to have football fever, we will remain passionately involved with the 
beautiful game’.458 As Africa was ‘the world’s fastest growing telecoms market’ 
by 2011,459 providers cash in on the game’s popularity. 
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In terms of commercialisation, Africa has come from far. When national 
leagues were set up after independence, there was hardly any sponsorship. Clubs 
and leagues were funded mostly by governments and businessmen. The company 
CEOs who set up teams in Ghana in the 1970s and 80s were mainly avid football 
fans who strove to increase production among the workers. In 2003 Cameroon-
ians complained to me about companies failing to see advertising opportunities in 
football. Where were the billboards inside the stadiums? Whatever happened to 
jersey sponsoring? Naturally, several companies had taken an interest in sponsor-
ing football, for instance Guinness (“Believe in Greatness”) and Export (“Official 
sponsor of Cameroonian football”). Yet this could barely be regarded as a com-
prehensive effort to turn football into business. 
This lack of business acumen was also visible at a continental level. In an 
article published in 1998, journalists Osasu Obayiuwana and Anver Versi argue 
that Africa’s football administrators ‘did not know how to handle’ the game’s 
increased popularity since the early 1990s: 
The way most African national soccer associations were run can be compared to amateur 
soccer clubs in the rest of the world. The governments allocated a small amount of money 
for international competitions and placed political appointees to head the associations. They 
did not invest, except in a few instances such as Morocco and Tunisia, in playing fields, or 
training facilities. The football associations became top-heavy with officials who understood 
neither soccer, the modern African player nor the commercial value of international football. 
Many associations became arrogant and dictatorial. They imagined that officials were more 
important than players and the performance of the team on the field.460 
The same journalists went on to make the following statement with regard to 
CAF: 
The Confederation of African Football when it started was a collection of antiquated officials 
with antiquated ideas – hopelessly inadequate to deal with the business side of football. 
During one African Nations Cup tournament in Morocco [in 1988], CAF officials seemed to 
be doing their utmost to discourage press coverage of the tournament! The more sophis-
ticated Moroccan hosts however, were doing their best to give the tournament the widest 
coverage. Confusion ensued.461  
These things still happen today. Members of the press were quite unhappy with 
the treatment they received at the 2008 African Cup of Nations. Some of them 
felt that the organisers were discouraging them from publicising the event. 
Matches at Africa’s most prestigious tournament are still commonly watched by 
small groups of spectators. Lousy advertising, difficulties in obtaining visa, (rela-
tively) expensive tickets and the complicated ways to purchase them in advance 
are cited as reasons.462 
Still, something has changed from the 1990s and arguably even from the 
1980s onwards. The advent of the professionalisation and commercialisation in 
European football as well as FIFA’s successful ways of bringing in high-profile 
sponsors turned the game into a multibillion dollar enterprise. This led Obayi-
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uwana and Versi to wonder whether Africa was ‘getting a fair slice of this luc-
rative cake’.463 When we take a look at CAF’s sponsorship deals in recent times, 
the answer is affirmative. Alegi argues that broadcasting rights provide the big-
gest source of income: 
The television revolution established the dominance, if not the legitimacy, of commercial 
football in Africa. In addition to selling broadcasting rights to its competitions, CAF also 
signed lucrative sponsorship deals with transnational corporations. Coca-Cola, for instance, 
was named official sponsor of the finals in South Africa in 1996 and in Burkina Faso in 
1998. Cellular phone manufacturer Nokia took over the role in 2004. South African com-
panies also entered the market. Most notably, between 2002 and 2004 MTN (…) acquired 
naming rights to both the Champions League and the Nations Cup. The latter deal was 
reportedly worth $12 million through 2008.464 
Orange and Globacom are major investors as well. In 2011 the French sports 
agency Sportfive paid $137 million for the marketing and broadcasting rights of 
six CAF competitions, including the African Cup of Nations and the Champions 
League. The deal is said to last till 2017.465 
I have stated elsewhere that the commercialisation of football is most devel-
oped in South Africa (chapter 2). Merryman Kunene argues that since the early 
1990s the football ‘industry’ was ‘rapidly developing into a multimillion rand 
sport’.466 Professionalising the game meant restructuring South African football 
analogous to the English league system. First, a new Premier Soccer League 
(PSL) was founded in 1996 which, as Paul Darby and Eirik Solberg state, ‘laid 
the foundations for the multimillion Rand business and heavily commercialized 
entity that professional soccer in South Africa is today’.467 Second, league ad-
ministration was now governed by a semi-autonomous body, also called the PSL. 
Its task is to ‘concern itself with all matters governing professional soccer’; its 
aim is to provide the game ‘with better media coverage and much-improved 
revenue through strong sponsorship deals’.468 This set-up led to increased spon-
sorship deals, as Scarlett Cornelissen writes: 
Corporate linkages and sponsorship of South African clubs by some of the country’s largest 
corporations have increased significantly over the years. Spanning diverse sectors such as 
finance (ABSA, First National Bank and Metropolitan), travel and hospitality (Avis; SAA; 
Southern Sun), sport apparel (Adidas), telecommunications (Vodacom), beverages (Castle 
Lager and Coca Cola), energy (Sasol), and automobiles (Daimler), these corporations have 
become key players in the marketing and promotion of South African football. In all, cor-
porate sponsorships rose to R5bn (approximately US$500m; currency conversion March 
2009) in 2008.469 
In 2011 the PSL signed a new deal with SuperSport worth $277 million to 
broadcast Premier League matches, which placed the PSL among the ten most 
valuable leagues in the world.470 Football and business are indeed a tandem in 
South Africa, which was exemplified when eleven million voters chose the 
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starting line-up of an “SMS derby” between Orlando Pirates and Kaizer Chiefs in 
July 2011.471 
A similar pattern emerged elsewhere on the continent, albeit evidently without 
the financial prowess that characterises South African football. Countries like 
Ghana and Nigeria implemented the English league system even before the South 
Africans did. For instance, the Nigeria Premier League was inaugurated in 1990; 
the Ghana Premier League three years later. Other countries followed suit with 
the Tanzanian Premier League in 1997 and the Kenya Premier League in 2003. 
The Cameroonian league system changed into a professional set-up only by 2007 
when MTN stepped in as league sponsor. These days the (MTN) Elite One and 
Elite Two leagues are run in a commercial fashion, at least on paper. 
Ghana professionalised its league system at the behest of the then Minister of 
Sports, E.T. Mensah, who assembled all stakeholders in the coastal town of 
Winneba. ‘There was an outcry for football to move on,’ said Joe Aggrey, the 
former Deputy Minister of Sports. ‘We needed to introduce certain elements of 
professionalism in the game. The whole idea was to make football to be orga-
nised better.’ ‘Until that point we had the First Division and the Second Divi-
sion,’ said Kwame Ntow-Fiako, who became an administrator in the new set-up. 
‘Two committees were installed to propose modalities for the registration of 
professional clubs and to set up guidelines for the new structure. We held a series 
of workshops at Winneba. Then, in November, a Congress with 90 delegates was 
held for two days at the British Council in Accra. That’s where we implemented 
the Winneba Declaration.’ The First Division officially became the Premier 
League, which began the 1993/94 season with 12 clubs. 
Professionals needed to come in and take over. ‘We wanted to lift football to a 
higher level so that we could gradually become like Europe,’ Aggrey said. ‘The 
idea was that clubs should become limited liability companies so that club 
ownership would not lie with one man but with a Board of Directors who had all 
put their money into the club.’ ‘The clubs in the Premier League had to register 
as companies as was written down in the 1963 Companies Code,’ said Ashford 
Tetteh-Oku, Hearts of Oak’s general secretary. ‘We had to write down the names 
of the directors and the number of shares that they owned.’ However, Aggrey 
told me that the implementation of the Winneba Declaration did not go as well as 
anticipated: 
Everybody was enthusiastic about it. But how to get the clubs to do what the stakeholders at 
Winneba wanted? That was a problem. It was difficult to get people to understand the 
benefits of the things that were being introduced. It all took so long because people were not 
prepared to accept change. The idea behind Winneba was very good but the implementation 
of the declaration was disturbed with problems at all levels. The problem was that it was not 
a law. It was only a declaration. It had no legal backing. 
We will return to this issue in the next chapter. 
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In line with South Africa’s PSL, another outcome of the Winneba Declaration 
was the formation of the Professional League Board (PLB). ‘The PLB was 
brought in to oversee the professional league,’ said Joe Aggrey, who acted as one 
of its seven initial members. ‘The idea was that the FA had other things to do so 
we needed a body that would take the responsibility of running the league. The 
PLB was to register the clubs, register the players, draw up the rules and regu-
lations of the league, appoint referees, and so on.’ Another task of the PLB was 
to find sponsors for the Premier League. ‘At first we had an amateur league,’ said 
Tetteh-Oku. ‘There was no sponsorship, there was no money. In 1993 football 
became business. ABC, Pharma – each year we had a new sponsor for the Pre-
mier League.’472 
In reality, league sponsorship was a lot less rosy. The very first Premier Lea-
gue season went without a sponsor altogether. The Ministry of Sports offered the 
clubs a compensation package which, as Bediako writes, ‘turned out to be 
peanuts, as gate takings continued to dwindle because of poor patronage’.473 It 
was announced in 1994 that the league would be called the IKAM Premier Lea-
gue. IKAM, an Accra-based printer company, stated that they had never signed a 
contract with the FA.474 Even though companies did sponsor the Premier League 
in successive years, club officials complained that the league money could not 
sustain their teams. The Nigerian company Globacom became sponsor of the 
Premier League in 2008 and invested $3 million in its first season alone. Reports 
in 2010 indicated that the company had failed to pay its sponsorship fees.475 
Similar problems plagued other leagues. 
The battle for broadcasting rights has equally brought turmoil in Africa’s lea-
gues. In 2007 the GFA signed a three-year deal worth $3 million with Gateway 
Broadcast Services (known as GTV). The same company also signed deals with 
the top leagues in Tanzania and Uganda. GTV went into liquidation in 2009, 
citing ‘the current financial and global crisis’ as the reason for its demise.476 
Optimum Media Prime (OMP) took over the broadcasting rights in Ghana for a 
sum of 1.7 million cedi (€800,000) until 2011.477 Another player in the television 
market is the South African company SuperSport. Aside from sponsoring South 
Africa’s top league, SuperSport signed a deal with the Zambian FA for $2.7 
million in 2007. After the liquidation of GTV, SuperSport reportedly took over 
some of its competitor’s portfolio.478 
The problem of companies sponsoring leagues and purchasing broadcasting 
rights is that they tend to be unreliable with regard to their contractual agree-
ments with FAs. Moreover, club officials have for years complained that league 
sponsorship does not trickle down to the clubs. In 2003 Ghanaian clubs officials 
announced a plan to take over the Premier League from the GFA and PLB, 
claiming that they would do a better job of managing the league.479 Similarly, 
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Cameroonian club officials have on occasion protested the fact that FECAFOOT 
did not pay out sponsorship fees.480 Nigeria’s top clubs have staged boycotts as 
well. This occurred, for example, in 2004 when clubs were in financial straits. 
‘The pro-League Board promised to pay the money but nothing has happened,’ 
said the chairman of the Premier League Clubs Association.481 
Similar problems have plagued Africa’s continental competitions. The Came-
roonian government used to sponsor clubs in the Cup of Champions Clubs and 
other competitions. These days club presidents complain about lack of govern-
ment support. Canon Yaoundé, Mount Cameroon FC and Coton Sport Garoua 
were the country’s representatives in CAF competitions in 2003. Officials of 
both Canon and Mount Cameroon complained about the government support of 
€23,000 and €5,800, respectively. ‘It’s not even enough to buy out (sic) flight 
tickets to Sudan which cost £23,000,’ Canon’s secretary-general stated. Calvin 
Foinding, president of Mount Cameroon, called the money ‘peanuts’.482 Indeed, 
each year various clubs pull out of the preliminary stages of both Confederation 
Cup and Champions League because they cannot afford to pay for tickets and 
accommodation. 
Clubs have nevertheless enjoyed private sponsorships over the last years. In 
2000 Cintra Yaoundé was reportedly Cameroon’s first club to receive sponsor-
ship from a foreign (Spanish) company. When the contract was abrogated two 
years later, the company had already invested $500,000. City rivals Canon signed 
a deal worth $200,000 with the Belgian club Lokeren in 2001.483 King Faisal was 
reportedly Ghana’s first Premier League club to obtain a sponsorship deal (with 
Nokia). Real Tamale United has been sponsored by Dutch agro-company Wienco 
for years. It was evident during my fieldwork that Hearts and Kotoko received 
sponsorship from telecommunications companies. When I told Kotoko coach 
Isaac “Opeele” Boateng my phone number, he said: ‘027? That’s very good. 
You’re using the phone of our sponsor, TiGO. Calling from TiGO to TiGO is 
cheap. We all own a TiGO phone.’ 
In general, the professionalisation and commercialisation of the game has not 
helped clubs much, especially those in Africa’s lower divisions. Indeed, finding a 
title sponsor for Ghana’s Division One League (DOL) has proven to be difficult. 
‘At our Congress in 1998 at the Bay View Hotel, I proposed that a small fraction 
of the (Premier League) sponsorship be set aside to help in running the DOL 
(…),’ explained DOL chairman Kwame Ntow-Fiako. ‘Some premiership clubs 
kicked against it and said if you want the money come and play in the premier-
ship. Some of those clubs were relegated just the following year and soon began 
to appreciate the harsh conditions of the DOL terrain.’484 In 2005 South Africa’s 
PSL clubs each received R320,000 (€32,300) a month from league sponsorship; 
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First Division clubs, in contrast, only received R30,000 (3,000).485 Relegation to 
a lower division is, in the words of Kunene, a ‘financial disaster’.486 
Yet even top clubs suffer from what in most African countries can rightfully 
be regarded as semi-professional leagues at best. Many clubs in Ghana and 
Cameroon do not own training grounds; some teams practice on primary school 
fields or university campuses. Even if they do own training grounds, the pitches 
are typically sandy, dusty and full of holes. One may think that the situation in 
Botswana (which in 2012 participated at the African Cup of Nations for the first 
time) is not typical of the continent at large, but it actually is. It was reported that 
only one out of 16 Premier League clubs owned proper training facilities; the 
other 15 clubs practiced at ‘desert-like training grounds’. One coach claimed that 
it hindered progress because of his players’ inability to ‘reach their desired 
technical levels’.487 
The ones who suffer most from Africa’s semi-professional leagues are the 
players. Monthly salaries are generally low. Cameroon’s richest club Coton Sport 
Garoua does not pay its players more than €400 each. The majority of the players 
of Mount Cameroon FC had to make do with monthly salaries of 50,000 to 
100,000 CFA francs (€75 – €150). Ghana’s best paid player in 2009, Kotoko’s 
Jordan Opoku, was paid 400 cedi (€200) a month. Hassle over non-payments of 
salaries and bonuses is common throughout Africa. Contracts do not mean much. 
Health insurance and other benefits are generally not included. The Kotoko 
Express ran a story about a goalkeeper who had been limping on the sideline for 
two years, unable to afford a surgery costing $6,000. Finally, a charity match was 
organised to raise funds.488 
In sum, the professionalisation and commercialisation has not fully material-
ised in Africa as of yet. Even in South Africa ‘the PSL may benefit from the 
presence of domestic multinationals that constitute a source of capital, and it is in 
size and profitability more advanced than most other African leagues, the degree 
of professionalisation within the league is low when compared to the successful 
clubs in Europe’.489 Significantly, Ghana’s Professional League Board was re-
named the Premier League Board in 2008. Although nobody gave a formal 
reason for this decision, Bediako argues that ‘there appears to be nothing pro-
fessional about the Ghana league’: 
The participating clubs and the players themselves would agree that the tag professional 
prefixing the league is just the name. We need not even go far to compare ourselves to the 
practitioners in Europe, but just look north to our fellow Africans and the contrast is clear. 
Apart from the blatant show of indiscipline at times by both players and officials who show 
utter disregard for rules and regulations of the competition, we never seem to have a clear-
cut programme going and meet deadlines. (…) In sum, I agree perfectly well that we drop 
the tag ‘professional’ until we are able to act as such.490 
We will look at some of the causes in the next chapter. 
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The football entrepreneur 
The story above does not necessarily mean that the football business is just a 
fancy phrase. For some Big Men it really exists. Although many clubs have not 
benefited from the game’s professionalisation and commercialisation, there cer-
tainly is a business side to football in Africa. Recall how CAF signed multi-
million dollar sponsorship deals for its competitions and tournaments. Indeed, 
CAF has over the years been transformed from an amateur organisation to a 
prosperous enterprise. In 2002 CAF moved its headquarters to a new modern 
building in a town called 6 October City, on the outskirts of Cairo.491 A few years 
later, in 2006, the organisation recorded an annual income of $12.3 million.492 
Such figures make it increasingly interesting for Big Men to come and be part of 
football management. 
FAs in Africa earn money from various sponsorships. As of 2005, the mining 
corporation AngloGold agreed to annually invest $3 million in Ghana’s national 
team. The Ghana Commercial Bank, Guinness and several other companies 
sponsor the Black Stars as well. Telecommunications company Orange was 
Cameroon’s main sponsor for the 2006 World Cup and the 2004 and 2006 Afri-
can Cup of Nations.493 Nike, Puma and Adidas also invest in African football. 
Puma signed its first sponsorship deal in Africa in 1997. By 2011 the German 
company sponsored more than a dozen African national teams.494 For instance, 
Puma closed a three-year deal worth $12 million in 2005 to become Ghana’s 
national team jersey sponsor. A new four-year deal worth $25 million was signed 
in 2008.495 
FIFA financially assists FAs in Africa as well. Apart from its Goal programme 
and Win in Africa with Africa project,496 FIFA also pays out millions of dollars to 
Africa’s national teams that participate in international tournaments. Let me 
provide the example of Ghana’s participation in the 2010 World Cup. The GFA 
received €675,000 in advance to prepare for the tournament. For reaching the 
quarter finals, another $14 million was transferred to the FA’s accounts. Finally, 
an extra $300,000 was handed out as a share in World Cup profits.497 The GFA 
also collected money from participating in the African Cup of Nations, the U17 
and U20 World Cups, the CHAN tournament and various regional tournaments. 
Football administrators in Africa have benefited from these increased flows of 
money in terms of lifestyle. The status and prestige that they enjoy (see chapter 
4) is accompanied by the financial benefits of running the game. There are 
meetings, conferences, award ceremonies, friendly matches, tournaments and 
other events that call for their attendance – and they tend to do so in style. For 
example, CAF president Issa Hayatou and the other members of the Executive 
Committee conducted meetings at a five-star hotel in Khartoum (Sudan) in 
February 2011. They had earlier (during the African Cup of Nations in 2010) 
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occupied rooms in a five-star hotel in Luanda (Angola). Football administrators 
throughout Africa tend to travel first-class, stay in upscale accommodation and 
take generous daily allowances.498 
The question is how Big Men can profit from these cash flows. First of all, and 
as was stated above, being a football administrator in itself implies all sorts of 
(financial) benefits. Second, FA officials cut deals with sponsors and receive 
bonuses in the process. Third, hosts of international tournaments need to develop 
large-scale infrastructures. FA officials, members of the Local Organizing 
Committee (LOC), the Minister of Sports and other stakeholders are close to the 
many business deals that are made in this respect. When it was decided that 
South Africa would host the 2010 World Cup, contracts worth millions of dollars 
went to companies that were specialised in building airports, highways, railways, 
stadiums and other facilities. To some extent, the Big Men who broker such deals 
could be regarded as football entrepreneurs. 
Seen this way, football entrepreneurs are people who occupy positions at the 
top of the food chain. They are, in other words, owners and presidents of the 
biggest clubs and/or are top FA officials. The commercialisation of football in 
South Africa has led the game to be increasingly dominated by ‘a handful of 
moguls’ who control both the top clubs and the game’s administrative side. A 
notable example is Irvin Khoza, nicknamed the “Iron Duke”, who became the 
owner of Orlando Pirates: 
Yet he was but one of a number of African entrepreneurs who, in one of the few fields of 
economic enterprise left open to them under the restrictions of apartheid, used football as an 
avenue to accumulation and wealth. Other individuals who emerged to similarly dominate 
their clubs were Jabu Phakathi of Amazulu, Melika Madlala of Golden Arrows, David 
Chabeli of Moroka Swallows, and not least Jomo Sono, who purchased Highlands Park, a 
historically-white club based in Johannesburg’s northern suburbs in 1983, and renamed it 
Jomo Cosmos. Yet none was to become so prominent as Kaizer Motaung, who, drawing 
inspiration from the clubs he had played for in the US (particularly Atlanta Chiefs), used his 
own capital to found his own club in Soweto.499 
These Big Men work closely with those who control SAFA and the PSL (and in 
many cases, they are the ones who occupy positions within these bodies). 
Famous – or rather, notorious – administrators who profited from the commer-
cialisation of the game include Solomon “Stix” Morewa and Abdul Bhamjee. 
A new breed of football entrepreneurs seems to have emerged in Africa. Some 
Big Men have taken a novel approach to club management. The Nigerian club 
Enyimba FC is a good example. Orji Uzor Kalu, mentioned in chapter 5, took a 
personal interest in the club when he became governor of Abia State in 1999. 
Enyimba has since been transformed into a corporate business model. That, at 
least, is how the club presents itself on its website. ‘Enyimba has become a 
brand, well equipped to become part of the broader entertainment industry in 
ways consistent with its development strategy, and any advertising partnership 
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with one of Africa’s best known and most popular soccer brand will enable you 
achieve significant economic results, increase profitability and maximize share-
holders value,’ it reads.500 
The football entrepreneur is not a new phenomenon. As Alegi writes in respect 
to South Africa, as early as the 1920s the ‘presence of thousands of black 
spectators at weekend matches across the country made the game increasingly 
attractive to private manufacturers, retailers, and African entrepreneurs’.501 Alegi 
cites the career of Henry Ngwenya who, as president of Durban’s Football Asso-
ciation (DDAFA), introduced admission fees for matches and used the money to 
buy a bus, hire a coach and organise tours. In short, he ‘used his considerable 
influence, visibility, and access to association funds to build a powerful client-
ship network which he directed with growing authoritarianism’ and through 
which he became a powerful football entrepreneur.502 
What may distinguish men like Ngwenya from modern-day football entre-
preneurs is the idea that a club itself is a business object. I have described how 
Jamil Maraby’s company Global Media Alliance purchased a majority of shares 
of Sekondi Eleven Wise in 2007 (chapter 3). His goal, he said, was to make the 
club part of their corporate business. ‘We want to build a brand,’ he explained. 
 
 
Photo 6.1 Hundreds of players show up at a gravel field behind a church in Bamenda for a 
recruitment period of top league club Yong Sports Academy 
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‘We want to become the biggest brand in Ghana. Eleven Wise will turn 90 this 
year (in 2009). We want to bring the team back to the glory days. We’ve been 
out of the system for ten years so it will take time. But we’ll make it.’ Maraby 
was pleased with the club’s massive support. ‘It was a dream come true. The 
supporters who come to the stadium are not even a quarter of those that could 
come. But the potential is there.’ 
Maraby’s ultimate goal was to link the image of the club to that of the 
company. ‘We want to mix business with entertainment,’ he told me. ‘We al-
ready own a lot of companies that are into entertainment. We have our radio 
station Happy FM, we have the Silverbird Cinema, we have the Lifestyle Shop. 
We’re also starting a television series with a South African company.’ Eleven 
Wise was meant to be the cherry on the cake. ‘Everything comes together with 
the club because there’s nothing that portrays the company in the way Eleven 
Wise does,’ Maraby explained. ‘Everybody will talk about Eleven Wise and 
think about Global Media Alliance.’ One obstacle – promotion to the top league 
– had already been overcome. ‘We bought the shares and managed to get to the 
Premier League in one season,’ said Maraby. ‘Now we need to win prizes.’ 
Solid infrastructure and modern facilities are essential in this regard. Eleven 
Wise started playing its home matches at the modern Essipong Stadium on the 
outskirts of town. The stadium is beneficial to Maraby’s aspirations in several 
respects. First, spectators who occupy this 20,000-seater stadium can watch the 
match in a seat under a roof, two features that are absent in many other league 
centres. Second, Premier League matches are broadcast (live) from the four new 
stadiums in Accra, Kumasi, Tamale and Sekondi. This would imply visibility for 
Eleven Wise and, hence, Global Media Alliance. ‘If you don’t play your matches 
in these stadiums, they won’t tape your game,’ Maraby explained. ‘If your match 
is broadcasted, it will also be shown outside the country. This means that you can 
market your players.’ 
Another requirement is to make the team attractive for fans to watch matches. 
‘The current lack of supporters coming to stadiums in Ghana is a problem,’ said 
Maraby. ‘That’s why there are certain things we need to do. My plan is to do 
what the Americans are doing. You have to get cheerleaders, you need give-
aways that come with the tickets, you need free popcorn for the kids.’ The CEO 
proved to have some knowledge of marketing. ‘You know cotton candy? It 
wouldn’t cost us much to supply everybody in the stadium with cotton candy. 
We could say: “Wear our red and white jerseys and take your cotton candy for 
free!”’ Violence is a matter of concern. ‘There’s always trouble here,’ Maraby 
admitted. ‘We need to calm down the supporters. We need entertainment. We 
need to make the game like a Sunday activity.’ 
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Sekondi Eleven Wise is not the only community-based club where sports and 
business have come together. In fact, Gamba All Blacks was Ghana’s first 
Premier League club to be taken over by a foreign party. A Japanese business-
man named Toshihiro Iwasa bought 70 percent of the club’s shares in 2008.503 
Gamba All Blacks, nicknamed the Black Magicians, had already promoted to the 
Premier League by the time Iwasa stepped in. Iwasa’s Ghanaian-based company 
Gamba Tours became the club’s sponsor. The Japanese businessman then an-
nounced the construction of a sports complex near the club’s home town Swedru, 
consisting of an 18,000-seater stadium, three training pitches, a gym, a club 
house, hostels, classrooms and tennis courts. ‘My vision is to make All Blacks a 
model club in Ghana,’ he said.504 
Another development in African football is television networks either buying 
themselves into or completely taking over clubs. The Ghanaian television net-
work Metro TV acquired a majority of shares of a club named Zaytuna FC 
through its parent company, Optimum Media Prime (OMP). OMP originally 
planned to take over a club named Kade Hotspurs but went for Zaytuna when the 
latter promoted to the Premier League at the expense of the former. Founded in 
1997 by businessman Alhaji Franko Lamptey under the name Stay Cool Pro-
fessionals, Zaytuna FC had two earlier stints in Ghana’s top league. In 2007, 
Lamptey agreed on a partnership with OMP. He remained president of the club; 
Alhaji Tallal Fattal, CEO of Metro TV, became Zaytuna’s new CEO. 
The purchase was Metro TV’s attempt to increase its visibility in the Premier 
League. The network also bought the rights to broadcast Premier League matches 
and it introduced a reality show called the MTN Soccer Academy (see below). 
Metro TV thus created a whole business strategy around Ghana’s most popular 
sport. Indeed, it was stated that OMP ‘with their expertise in management, media 
and public relations will market, promote and advertise as well as syndicate 
sponsorships to launch Zaytuna United credibly in the premiership and generally 
work towards the improvement of the game of football in Ghana’.505 When 
Zaytuna relegated at the end of its first season in the Premier League, OMP and 
Metro TV turned to another freshly promoted club, St. Mirren (which also rele-
gated after only one season). 
The involvement of Metro TV and OMP signals a mixing between football 
and the world of entertainment. In 2008 former Ghanaian international Ebo 
Mends came up with the idea to launch a reality show called the Ghana Goal 
Hunt. The show’s winner – the best striker – would earn a two-week trial at a 
Norwegian club. MTN launched the aforementioned Soccer Academy Reality 
Show in 2007. Its synopsis was quite simple: A handful of players would stay 
together for a certain period of time during which TV viewers would send text 
messages in support of their favourite resident. The player with the least amount 
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of votes had to leave the premises. The show’s fourth edition featured players 
from several countries, including Togo and Nigeria. The winner earned a two-
bedroom apartment and a trial period at SuperSport United. 
An example of the merger between a television network and a football club is, 
in fact, SuperSport United. A company named M-Net took over Pretoria City FC 
in 1994 and renamed it SuperSport United. The chairman of M-Net, Khulu 
Sibiya, doubled as the chairman of the club. According to the club’s website, the 
purchase had a dual purpose: 
1. M-Net wanted to become involved with local soccer, not necessarily only through 
television rights, but by buying a struggling team which they could build into one of the 
better teams in the country. The future of decoder purchases lies with the emerging market 
and soccer is beyond doubt the most popular sport in South Africa – so the creation of strong 
brand awareness within soccer made sense to the long term goals of M-Net. 2. To qualify for 
the CAF competition in Africa within three years (and as often as possible thereafter) and 
therefore use the team as a marketing tool for the SuperSport Television Channel that 
broadcasts sport into Africa.506 
A more prominent case of the merger between football and business in Africa is 
hardly conceivable. SuperSport United is now one of South Africa’s top four 
clubs. 
The commoditisation of the player 
The remainder of this chapter deals with a particular kind of economic capital, 
namely the football player. The global transfer market is a potentially lucrative 
source of income for a Big Man. Many of them have set up private clubs, 
generally one-man shows with matching academies, with the aim of unearthing 
talented players and selling them for a handsome profit. Those who are engaged 
in buying and selling players may very well be regarded as true football 
entrepreneurs. On the one hand, the trade is said to resemble neo-colonial trends 
of extracting Africa’s finest resources. On the other hand, poverty makes players 
to look for a future abroad. Businessmen, politicians and former footballers, 
among others, create the (economic) infrastructures and (social) networks to 
make that happen. 
 
Africa and the muscle drain 
‘When we played the final of the Cup of Champions Clubs in 1983 we played 
because we loved the game,’ recalled former Kotoko player Ernest Appau. ‘We 
beat Al-Ahly 1-0 that day. One club official came to see us after the match. He 
handed each of us an envelope of 5,000 old cedi (€3). We didn’t complain. We 
were just proud to play for Kotoko.’ Playing for one’s club was considered a 
matter of pride. ‘Do you know how much they offered me when I joined PWD 
Bamenda in 1979?’ former player Nji Sunday asked rhetorically. ‘They gave me 
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1,000 CFA francs (€1.5). I really wanted to play and as a son of the soil you 
couldn’t ask for much money anyway.’ 
Times have changed. I met one player in Buea in 2003 who had become 
league top scorer a few seasons earlier. His Italian manager had arranged test 
matches in Europe. ‘The man cheated me,’ he said. ‘He made me sign a contract 
and sent me to all those places. But no club took me and he kept the money.’ He 
has refused to play in Cameroon since. ‘The level of play here is too low. I don’t 
want to play for whatever token of money they give me. I just want to go out.’ 
This attitude can be observed throughout the country. ‘Players have no affiliation 
to their clubs anymore,’ president Eteki Charles of Tiko United told me in 2010. 
‘We’re now preparing to go to Burundi for a Champions League match but four 
of my players have disappeared. I know their managers took them abroad for 
trials. The players didn’t even inform us.’ 
The players’ estrangement and lack of responsibility towards clubs and the 
desire to “go outside” is a familiar problem throughout Africa. The legendary 
coach C.K. Gyamfi said in 2008 that the mentality of Ghana’s national team 
players leaves a lot to be desired. ‘The players that I worked with played for the 
love of the game and were totally committed to playing for their country,’ he 
said. ‘Today’s players don’t know the value of the national jersey but my players 
were prepared to die for their country. Obviously, not all football players are 
motivated by money but there are many who only think about money instead of 
the jersey they’re wearing and what it means.’507  
The desire to go abroad is understandable. The dream of playing in front of 
thousands of spectators in modern stadiums for handsome weekly salaries is 
simply too hard to resist. Even the case of the modestly well-to-do Kalle Sone, 
who played for Vitesse Arnhem in the Dutch Eredivisie, proves that Europe is 
the place to be. I was in his native town Buea when Sone returned during the 
summer break. He drove his car around town, handed out gifts (mainly boots and 
jerseys) and was acknowledged as a sort of Big Man. Similarly, supporters in 
Bafoussam said that when Geremi Njitap visited his native town in 2009 he 
looked up a car washer. The old man had supported the Cameroonian inter-
national when he was still a young boy. Njitap handed him 500,000 CFA francs 
(€760). ‘He had never seen so much money,’ one supporter remarked. 
As the professionalisation of the game in Africa has not significantly im-
proved the prospects of a financially rewarding career, it is no wonder that the 
continent’s fragile economies are cited as the main cause of the so-called muscle 
drain. Darby and Solberg state that ‘due to the broader levels of poverty that exist 
in Ghana, coupled with a weak football infrastructure which offers extremely 
limited economic opportunities, those players with the necessary talent see their 
futures outside of Ghana’.508 Elsewhere, Darby sums up the issue quite nicely: 
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In Africa’s two primary player exporting ‘zones’, North Africa and those coastal nations in 
the sub-Saharan west of the continent, there are only a few clubs such as Al Ahly and Arab 
Contractors in Egypt and Esperance in Tunisia that have the professional infrastructure and 
financial resources to pay players the sorts of salaries that might encourage them to remain at 
home. The domestic club game elsewhere in the continent but particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa has been undermined by extreme poverty, political instability, poor administration, 
corruption, limited state investment and government interferences.509 
Cameroon is no exception. When I lived in Buea in 2003 my football friend 
Essomba looked after a young teammate who went by the name of Veron. Seven 
years later, Essomba slept on the floor of a friend’s shop. Veron, on the other 
hand, signed a new, lucrative contract at Ajax Amsterdam under his real name 
Eyong Enoh. 
There is a fair amount of academic research on the exodus of African players 
to countries outside the continent.510 According to Pierre Lanfranchi and Mat-
thew Taylor, the trade goes back to at least the 1920s and 30s when South 
Africans and North Africans were active in the English and French leagues, 
respectively.511 The movement of players followed patterns of colonisation in the 
sense that many players who left their own country ended up in the motherland. 
Africa’s most significant colonisers – France, England, Portugal and Belgium – 
all dealt with the influx of African players in their own way. As I stated in 
chapter 2, England and France employed different colonial policies, which can be 
summarised as indirect rule and assimilation, respectively. Belgium and Portugal 
more or less followed France’s policy. 
Arthur Wharton was black Africa’s first footballer in the English league. He 
played for Preston North End and Sheffield United, among other clubs, in the 
1880s and 90s. The Ghanaian’s initial journey to England had nothing to do with 
football. Like many others Africans, Wharton came to Europe to pursue an 
academic career. This was also true for the Egyptians who moved to England in 
the first decade of the twentieth century. These ‘student-footballers’, as Lanfran-
chi and Taylor call them, wanted to ‘further their education or learn a trade’.512 
While white South Africans travelled to England for football-related purposes 
from the 1920s onwards, it took black South Africans three decades longer to get 
there.513 Nigerians too went to England to play from the 1950s onwards. 
The French policy of assimilation or Frenchification was visible in the foot-
ball domain. Algerians and Moroccans were among the first to play in the French 
leagues in the 1930s. The prominence of North Africans in France increased after 
World War II. A total of 117 Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians played in the 
French professional league between 1945 and 1962; 12 of them played for the 
national team.514 The influx of players from West Africa started in the 1950s. 
Ivory Coast and Cameroon were major suppliers, and so were Benin, Togo and 
Senegal. As Alegi states, football migrants from West Africa were not only 
156 
 
cheap labour, a prohibition by French clubs to attract foreign players also made it 
logical for them to look at the colonial territories.515 
African players moved to Portugal from the 1950s onwards and a decade later 
the numbers almost equalled those of the French colonies.516 In concordance to 
colonial ties, the majority of these players came from Angola, Mozambique, 
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.517 Portugal’s most famous African-born player is 
Eusebio da Silva. Born in Mozambique, the Black Panther moved to Benfica in 
1961 for a sum of £7,500. He also became a Portuguese citizen. Although these 
players were caught between their native and their adopted countries, most of 
them were financially better off in Portugal. For instance, Fernando Freitas’ 
career in Portugal ‘had brought him wealth and fame in both Africa and Europe. 
With the money he made from football, he was able to buy a house and secure 
his future, buying a hair-dressing salon run by his wife.’518 
Finally, Belgium imported African players – most of them from Belgian 
Congo – from the late 1950s onwards. And although several players from other 
parts of Africa (Nigeria in particular) found their way to Belgium in the 1980s, 
the traditional route from Congo to Belgium remained an important one. Belgium 
became known for a new form of trade as it increasingly turned into a transit 
terminal to Europe’s richer leagues. This is how Lanfranchi and Taylor put it: 
Belgian football provided an early indication of the changing attitudes of European clubs 
towards the African market. Diversifying their recruitment, clubs began to contract profes-
sionals from hitherto untapped nations such as Sierra Leone and Zambia. The reasons for this 
were purely economic. As with the Danes in the late 1970s and the Eastern Europeans in the 
late 1990s, Belgian clubs have considered young foreign players as an investment, to be 
bought cheaply (with the help of agents whose activities were recognized much earlier here 
than in the rest of the continent) and sold abroad for a significant profit.519 
Three Belgian journalists indeed describe how African players commonly first go 
to play in Belgium before signing contracts at clubs elsewhere in Europe.520 
Although the trade in African players has quite a long history, it is said to have 
accelerated from the 1980s and 90s onwards. Africa has indeed turned into a 
major player on the transfer market. Europe remains a popular destination. 
Between 1994/95 and 2004/05, the recruitment of non-European players by 
Europe’s top clubs in the top leagues more than doubled.521 They came from 
three zones: Europe, Latin America and West Africa. Although Latin Americans 
come in first in terms of migration to Europe, Africans lie a good second.522 In 
the 2002/03 season, 1,156 players from Africa played in 78 leagues in 52 UEFA 
countries, which added up to a total of 19.6 percent of all players.523 The former 
colonial powers are prominent beneficiaries of Africa’s talented players, al-
though Italy’s and Germany’s imports are also relatively high.524 
An increasing number of African players are transferred to Eastern Europe 
these days. They also find themselves playing for clubs in the Middle East or 
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South East Asia. Another development is that African players are transferred to 
clubs in either Northern Africa or South Africa. Indeed, South Africa has become 
a popular destination since the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. As Cor-
nelissen and Solberg state, club officials ‘cast their recruitment nets wide, and 
while immediate neighbours such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Malawi and Zambia 
yield a large number of foreign footballers into South Africa, many players from 
Cameroon, Uganda, the Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo also 
play in South African clubs’.525 Like Belgian, South Africa serves as a through-
way to the wealthy leagues in Europe. 
The exodus is concentrated around a select number of countries. Bale argues 
that Nigeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Morocco and Angola were responsible for more 
than half of the entire movement of African players to Europe in 1999. Nigerians 
constituted almost 16 percent of total output, followed by Cameroon (close to 11 
percent) and Ghana (slightly under 10 percent). Numbers six to nine were the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Algeria, respec-
tively.526 It is worth noting that many of the African players in Europe today 
were actually born there. It reveals a complicating factor in the story of migration 
in the sense that African players constitute such a ‘mixed, heterogeneous 
group’.527 This is, for example, the case with the Belgian-born player Romelu 
Lukaku whose father is a former Congolese international. 
It is argued that the trade in African players can be understood through notions 
of neo-colonialism and exploitation. Andre Gunter Frank’s theory of under-
development and Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory have received 
specific attention in this regard.528 Drawing upon these theories, Magee and 
Sugden developed a model of football migration with Europe as core, Latin 
America as semi-periphery and Africa as periphery.529 As Lanfranchi and Taylor 
note, ‘football mirrors the neo-colonial trends in which raw materials are traded 
without genuine investment in infrastructure and training’.530 One aspect that 
contributes to the ideas of neo-colonialism and exploitation is that African 
players are still regarded as cheap labour.531 Poli nevertheless urges to go beyond 
world system theory towards a ‘connectionist approach’ (see below).532 
One visible result of the ‘increasing numbers of scouts, agents, and talent 
speculators who recognized in the trade of African football labor an opportunity 
for personal financial gain’ is the proliferation of football academies on the 
continent.533 Darby, Akindes and Kirwin list four types of academies: Those that 
are run by local clubs or FAs; those that are run by a European club in 
collaboration with a local partner; those are run by individuals or corporations; 
and those that are of a ‘non-affiliated, improvised’ and often illegal nature.534 
There are thousands of academies in Africa; Ivory Coast’s former capital Abidjan 
alone reportedly boasts of 450 academies.535 Although some academies combine 
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football with education, Darby, Akindes and Kirwin point out that the main goal 
of any academy is to transfer players: 
There is little question that European clubs that enter into partnerships with African acade-
mies or, as in the case of Ajax, buy controlling stakes in African clubs are essentially 
creating nurseries that allow them to reserve African talent until it can be legally transferred 
to Europe. This arrangement may be more favorable that the previous system of talented 
players being transferred to Europe at a very young age because it allows African youths to 
remain within their country of origin and family networks for longer and hence reduces the 
psychological and cultural problems associated with adjusting to foreign climes. However, 
the ultimate objective of these academies is to export African talent, thus strengthening 
European football at the expense of the African game.536 
Indeed, the Feyenoord Academy in Ghana enrols its players in various classes 
but the academy’s main aim is to ‘deliver players to Feyenoord in the Nether-
lands’, as director Karel Brokken told me in 2009.537 
The fourth type of academy especially gives rise to the view of African 
players being exploited. As Darby, Akindes and Kirwin state, ‘these private, non-
affiliated academies expose young Africans to the greed of noncertified agents 
who are able to acquire recruits cheaply and convince them to sign exploitative 
contracts if they are successful during their trials’.538 Although academies norm-
ally have to be registered, journalist Dan McDougall claims that this type of 
academy is generally of an illegal kind: 
Many are run by the roadside; most have no proper training facilities. With biblical names 
such as ‘Sons of Moses’ and ‘Lovers of Christ’, each will have its own tatty bibs or T-shirts 
to distinguish it from the others. At the children’s side, egging them on to run, pass, think 
quicker, will be a legion of unlicensed agents and coaches. Ninety per cent of the academies 
we visited in Accra and Abidjan (…) were run by local men with limited experience of the 
game. Most described themselves as former footballers; but none was able to produce proof 
of his career. They are intent on finding one thing only: The next Essien or Didier Drogba. 
The next multi-million-pound golden ticket.539 
The players are not the only ones who suffer from those who run these aca-
demies. As their families commonly provide the funds that are asked for, it is the 
whole family that suffers. 
In fact, agents have a rather negative reputation. The story of Nii Odartey 
Lamptey is telling in this respect.540 The Italian agent Domenico Ricci’s role in 
the transfer of underage Ghanaians players in the early 1990s is said to have 
triggered a trade in ‘baby-calciatore’ or ‘soccer children’.541 Broere and Van der 
Drift list cases whereby players sign contracts that are very lucrative for their 
agents.542 As many players are illiterate, they do not always understand the con-
tent of such contracts. ‘I went to Cairo with three teammates,’ one Ghanaian 
player told me. ‘We went there for trials and afterwards the Egyptians presented 
us with contracts. These contracts were written in Egyptian so we couldn’t under-
stand a single word. I refused to sign and returned to Ghana but my teammates 
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were too eager to play for a big club, so that they all signed the contract. They 
were forced to work for some agents for many years.’ 
A related aspect is that the image of the successful African player in Europe is 
to some extent false. This image is fed by the fact that most media direct their 
attention to Africa’s most famous players, thereby creating ‘the myth of football 
as a means of upward social mobility’.543 Unfortunately, many Africans play in 
Europe’s lower and financially less rewarding leagues, and they are susceptible 
to discrimination in terms of salaries and longevity of contracts.544 Some of them 
end up living in the streets of Europe’s major cities and are simply too embar-
rassed to go home. As Emmanuel Maradas argues, for ‘every Aruna Dindane 
who makes the leap from ASEC (Mimomas) to Anderlecht in the Belgian top 
division, there are thousands of others investing millions of hours of practice – 
time that could be spent on school work or learning another trade – without even 
reaching the first hurdle’.545 
Although there is evidence that the trade could to some extent be regarded as a 
form of plunder, human trafficking or slave trade,546 I think that the push factors 
are just as great as the pull factors.547 Three arguments underscore this premise. 
First, Africans want to leave Africa as much as clubs in Europe want to employ 
them. In fact, the exodus is part of a broader migration of Africans to non-Afri-
can countries.548 Cameroonians call those who leave the country for Europe or 
the United States bushfallers; they migrate to earn money and return home as 
wealthy individuals. Football has over the years become a respectable route to 
wealth, often even more so than via a formal education, as Nantang Jua argues 
with regard to Cameroon: 
This is clearly borne out in Just for Fun, a program broadcast by Cameroon Radio and 
Television (CRTV). In one of its short sketches, a woman returns from the farm with a 
football for her son. In the ensuing dialogue she urges the son, who was doing his homework 
in mathematics, to play football so as to earn a lot of money. “Don’t you see Kameni, 
Njitap? … Since when did the Bamilekes (…) start playing football? Don’t you see that 
Kameni has even constructed a house for his mother. Where do you think that he had the 
money from?”549 
A second argument that focuses as much on push as well as pull factors is the 
fact that Africans themselves are involved in the trade as well. This makes the 
idea that Europeans plunder Africa not less probable but it does point out that it 
may be a one-sided approach. In adopting his connectionist approach, Poli sug-
gests that the transfer of players is facilitated by various actors who together 
constitute an international network. He argues that world system theory may be a 
sound analytical framework for understanding the macro-economic logics behind 
the trade, but that the connectionist approach explains the ways in which players 
are transferred.550 Recently, Darby has begun to apply Klein’s analysis of the so-
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called Global Commodity Chain (GCC) in baseball to the migration of Ghanaian 
footballers.551 
The view that only European scouts and agents recruit and transfer players is 
not true. African coaches, businessmen, politicians and former footballers assist 
at different levels of the trade. Ashu once told me that players tend to enjoy 
sponsorship from wealthy benefactors in the early stages of their career. When I 
met him again in 2010, he explained that he was financially supported by a 
businessman from Douala. ‘The deal is that when I become famous I cannot 
forget about him,’ he said. I have referred to such sponsors as Godfathers 
elsewhere.552 Recently, the Qataris have indulged themselves in the trade through 
the so-called Aspire Academy. African coaches, agents, club officials and 
businessmen screen hundreds of thousands of players each year, of whom only a 
handful are admitted into the academy.553 
African journalists also operate as agents. ‘It’s mostly the top journalists from 
the top media outlets who are involved,’ said one club CEO in Ghana. ‘They all 
have their boys.’ ‘It’s very easy,’ explained the Ghanaian journalist Nana Kwasi 
Agyeman, who doubles as manager of both players and coaches. ‘I travel to 
every corner to watch matches. I just pick out the talented ones from the press 
stand.’ Although Agyeman admitted that he did not yet sign a first-class deal, he 
stated that the business could potentially be lucrative. ‘I get fifteen percent of 
every aspect in the transaction,’ he told me. ‘I’m now working on a deal in-
volving a German coach for Hearts of Oak. His signing fee should be around 
$80,000 to $100,000 which means I will take about $15,000. I will also take 
fifteen percent of his salary.’ 
A third argument in favour of including both push and pull factors is that 
Africa’s football administrators appear not to do much to slow down the trade. 
Moreover, they are often involved in the trade themselves. There was a time 
where Africa’s leaders tried to minimise player migration to Europe. As Poli 
argues, the post-independence period brought forth a phase in which ‘African 
states set up national team squads and adopted protectionist policies to hold on to 
the best players’.554 It happened in Zaire under president Mobutu Sese Seko, in 
Marxist Mozambique and even in Mali, which forced Salif Keita to flee to 
Liberia and from there to France. However, the 1980s witnessed a shift in policy 
from, as Dietschy and Poli state, an ‘endogenous’ to an ‘exogenous’ strategy.555 
Mozambique lifted its ban in 1987 when a flow of footballers to South Africa 
had made the ban untenable.556 
Top administrators from around the world have spoken out against the 
movement of players from developing to developed regions. ‘After the flight of 
brains Africa is confronted with the muscle exodus,’ CAF president Issa Hayatou 
said in 1998. ‘The rich countries import the raw material – talent – and they often 
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send to the continent their less valuable technicians (coaches). The inequality of 
the exchange terms is indisputable.’557 FIFA president Sepp Blatter once called 
the trend by European clubs to go ‘shopping’ in developing countries ‘unhealthy, 
if not despicable’. ‘Europe’s leading clubs conduct themselves increasingly as 
neo-colonialists who don’t give a damn about heritage and culture, but engage in 
social and economic rape by robbing the developing world of its best players,’ he 
said.558 
Yet today’s realities seem to make such rhetoric somewhat meaningless. For 
one thing, it is claimed that clubs in Europe circumvent FIFA’s new regulations 
with regard to underage players by directly investing in academies in Africa.559 
Moreover, CAF appears to be incapable of reversing the trend. Issa Hayatou has 
said that his organisation is effectively powerless by stating that FAs are 
responsible for implementing rules and regulations.560 Although some FAs have 
taken measures in this respect, it is evidently not enough to halt the exodus. In 
fact, FA officials in Africa have been caught conspiring with club officials and 
agents in transferring players out of their respective countries. They also use 
national teams and international tournaments for these purposes (see chapters 7 
and 9). 
 
Grooming and quick-win methods 
These days a number of clubs are founded for business reasons. Ashu’s club 
Saint Paul Warriors is one example. Rainbow FC is another. This club from 
Bamenda was set up by an American FIFA-licensed agent in collaboration with 
an African Big Man. ‘We want to establish promotion to the Elite One league,’ 
the coach told me. ‘The goal is to act on a platform on which we can showcase 
our players. A player’s value increases when he plays at a very high level. So it’s 
in the top league that a player can get a good resume.’ Where Saint Paul Warriors 
aspires to sell players by staying in a lower league, Rainbow FC wants to do so 
from Cameroon’s top league. Big Men who own clubs each have their own 
strategies which partially depend on their financial strength. 
I argue that there are at least two methods by which a Big Man is theoretically 
able to make money out of selling players, namely the method of grooming and 
the quick-win method. The discussion below is limited to clubs and academies in 
Ghana and Cameroon that I have personally visited. Since these two countries, 
together with Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Senegal, are Africa’s biggest exporters,561 
the picture may be somewhat different in countries that are less prominently 
entangled in the global transfer market. In any case, for the first method – that of 
grooming – we will focus our attention on a Premier League club in the 
Dansoman area of Accra, Ghana. 
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If one needs to mention a famous football entrepreneur in Ghanaian football, 
one would be wise to remember the name Sly Tetteh. Together with his business 
partner Felix Ansong, the late Alhaji Ibrahim Sly Tetteh founded a club named 
Liberty Professionals in 1997 and transformed it into one of Ghana’s power-
houses. It is said that Liberty Professionals has brought a scientific approach to 
the game. Although Tetteh tended to stay away from the limelight, his dreams 
and ambitions were no secret. As a football entrepreneur par excellence, Tetteh 
reportedly made a lot of money on the global transfer market by selling, among 
others, John Paintsil, Sulley Muntari, Asamoah Gyan and Michael Essien. Exem-
plary of his success was the fact that five members of the Black Stars squad at 
the 2006 World Cup were former Liberty players. 
Tetteh’s method was to find talented players, groom them and then sell them. 
‘There are many clubs that have failed because of poor recruitment policies, 
always going for quick-fix transfers,’ he said. ‘But at Liberty, we believe in 
scouting and developing our own players from a very young age.’562 Tetteh 
enjoyed a lot of contacts abroad through which he was able to send his players on 
trials. Another advantage is that Liberty Professionals boasts of all the facilities 
one needs to train footballers. At one point, Tetteh expanded his empire by 
opening academies in Togo and Kenya. In short, the Big Man possessed all three 
forms of capital: Economic (to set up a club/academy), social (to sell players 
through contacts) and symbolic (for being a famous football entrepreneur and 
Godfather of several members of the Black Stars). 
It appears that only a few Big Men have (so far) been able to rival Sly Tetteh 
in terms of success. Most clubs in Sub-Saharan Africa have rudimentary infra-
structures and underdeveloped youth programmes. A notable exception is Roger 
Ouegnin, a Ivorian lawyer who, as president of ASEC Mimomas, co-founded the 
club’s successful academy. Famous former pupils include Salomon Kalou, Kolo 
Touré and Aruna Dindane. Ouegnin is known as an eccentric, shrewd business-
man who operates in a similar vein as Tetteh. He once received the CAF Merit 
Order of Achievement for developing youth football in Africa. The legality of the 
links between ASEC Mimomas and the Belgian club Beveren has nevertheless 
been questioned.563 
There are a few Big Men in Cameroon who could modestly rival Tetteh’s 
empire. Gilbert Kadji, whose father founded the beverage company UCB, set up 
the Kadji Sports Academy (KSA) after the 1994 World Cup. Famous graduates 
such as Eric Djemba-Djemba, Carlos Kameni, Stephane Mbia Etoundi and 
Samuel Eto’o Fils used to practice at the academy’s training grounds along the 
road between Douala and Tiko. Kadji took over a Swiss club named FC Sion in 
1999 as part of an attempt to transfer his players to Europe. (He is currently no 
longer the club’s owner.) Poli argues that in transferring players Kadji was 
163 
 
assisted by members of the Cameroonian Diaspora in France. By 2008 more than 
forty academy players had found their way to Europe.564 
I visited the premises early in 2010. The complex – consisting of gravel and 
grass pitches, a tennis court, a basketball field, dormitories, a restaurant and bar, 
and a go-cart race track – evidently had seen better days. The whole area looked 
neglected and my football friend Essomba confirmed that Kadji had recently lost 
some of his interest in the academy. ‘There are about 150 pupils living on the 
premises,’ said one coach, who worked there on a permanent basis. ‘Each player 
pays tuition for one year but very talented players are allowed in for free. Eto’o 
was one of those players who was scouted by Kadji and brought to the academy.’ 
Charging tuition fees is quite common in this type of football business. 
Less than an hour’s drive from KSA on the road to Buea lies the Mount 
Cameroon Sports Complex. Owned by the aforementioned businessman and 
parliamentarian Calvin Foinding, the academy at first was only part of the Big 
Man’s larger project: Elite One league club Mount Cameroon FC. Ever since the 
team relegated and practically ceased to exist, Foinding is said to have set his 
eyes on developing his academy. A visit in 2003 already showed the largesse of 
the terrain. Joseph Ewunkem, former captain of Prisons Buea, gave me a tour 
past the dormitories, training pitches, basketball field, auditorium and bar/restau-
rant. Some moderately known players such as Atem Valentine and Eyong Enoh 
played in Buea before signing contracts elsewhere. 
A prominent figure in the Cameroonian football business is Henry Njalla 
Quan, who is mostly known for being the general director of the Cameroon 
Development Corporation (CDC). Although he acted as president of community-
based club Victoria United for several years, these days he is primarily involved 
in sponsoring his private clubs, ACADA Sports FC and the Njalla Quan Sports 
Academy (NQSA). I met Njalla Quan at the academy’s headquarters in Limbe. 
In response to the question why he sponsored football in the first place, he used 
the rhetoric heard so many times before from fellow Big Men. ‘First, we want to 
give young people something to do in this part of the country where there are few 
leisure activities,’ he said. ‘Second, we are grooming young players so that they 
will be ready to play for the big clubs or even the national team. Third, we want 
to improve the level of our local football.’ 
In the club’s magazine ACADA news, Njalla Quan added that he is 
‘determined to put top quality athletes into the market (and) shape the under 
privileged children into people who can help their families tomorrow’.565 His 
words, and those of other Big Men, resemble what Darby concludes with regard 
to the motivations of the Big Men who have set up in academies in Africa: 
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Photo 6.2 Businessman Yong Francis has ordered workers to turn a bush area near Nkwen 
into an academy ground, featuring two training pitches and dormitories 
 
 
 
It has been suggested that the establishment of [football academies] make a positive con-
tribution to the development of African football and the lives of those aspiring footballers 
who pass through the academy system. This hypothesis espoused by those involved in 
academies as managers, directors, owners, or partners typically argues that these facilities 
provide proper training and a coordinated and systematic approach to youth player develop-
ment and in doing so contributes to the game at both local and international levels. Beyond 
the impact of academies on football it is also suggested that some contribute to the broader 
development of African society through the provision of academic and vocational training 
that “students” might otherwise not receive.566 
I believe that at least part of these Big Men’s motivation is to give something 
back to their communities (remember what I wrote about Big Men seeing their 
involvement in the game as an obligation, see chapter 4). Having said that, I do 
think that football entrepreneurs consider their clubs/academies as businesses 
first. 
Another case comes from Bamenda where businessman Yong Francis founded 
Yong Sports Academy (YOSA). Yong, who once began a typewriting school but 
who now owns four public schools, was in the process of setting up an academy 
by the time I met him in late 2009 (the name Yong Sports Academy may suggest 
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otherwise but the club originally did not feature an academy). Yong drove me to 
a huge plot of land in Nkwen. Dormitories, a kitchen, toilets, a water tower and 
other facilities were already in place. Work was underway to clear the area for 
the construction of two pitches. It seemed likely that Yong started his academy to 
teach youngsters the game of football in the same way his schools train students 
in various disciplines. The Big Man, however, made it clear that he wanted to 
make a profit. He was still looking for contacts abroad. 
The method of grooming is used by famous former footballers as well. Salif 
Keita, Abedi Pele, Anthony Yeboah and others have set up clubs and/or acade-
mies after ending their professional careers. An interesting case study is Marcel 
Desailly, the robust French defender of Ghanaian descent, who completed his 
Lizzy’s Sports Complex on the outskirts of Accra in 2011. When I visited the 
premises earlier that year, I observed three grass pitches, a swimming pool, hotel 
rooms and several other facilities. Everything looked state of the art. ‘I’m not like 
the other guys who fund their academies all by themselves,’ he said. ‘They 
depend on selling players to maintain their academies. That’s not a viable busi-
ness. I’m working with partners to commercialise this place. That’s how you 
make it sustainable.’ 
According to Desailly, selling players was not his primary objective. ‘I want to 
offer young people the chance to do sports,’ he said. ‘Trading players is not the 
first goal. I want to keep young players in Ghana until they are eighteen. This 
way they are close to their families, they can eat the food they are used to.’ One 
remark by the former defender indicated that selling players and making money 
was his goal after all. ‘I want to groom players for the big clubs in Europe,’ he 
said. His plan was to put players up at his property, groom them in their own 
habitat and then transfer them. As opposed to Yong Francis, Desailly does not 
lack relevant contacts in Europe. Famous former footballers commonly have a 
wide network in international football circles. 
It appears that an increasing number of Big Men understand the potentials of 
grooming players, which effectively entails turning players into marketable 
products. However, it is not true that just about anyone is able to make use of the 
method of grooming. First of all, most clubs in Africa, specifically those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, lack the facilities to implement this method. Second, initial 
investments to start an academy tend to run into the thousands or even hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. It has to be noted, though, that the distinction between a 
club and an academy is usually a fine line. KSA, NQSA and Feyenoord Fetteh 
are generally known as academies, yet all of them had a team participating in the 
top league at one point in time. Vice versa, YOSA and Mount Cameroon FC 
started out as clubs but are now evolving into academies. 
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The second way for a Big Man to make money out of selling players is 
through what I call the quick-win method. For a prominent example, we need to 
take a look at a club in Ghana’s Volta Region. Founded by businessman Victor 
Akpene Ahiakpor, Heart of Lions has been quite successful in the Premier 
League. The club’s main success lies elsewhere, namely in the buying and selling 
of players. ‘Victor is a football enthusiast,’ said Alex Aboagye, the club’s chief 
scout. ‘He’s originally from the Volta Region and decided to form his own team 
there. He named the club Heart of Lions because we fight like lions.’ I asked the 
scout whether he sees similarities between his club and Liberty Professionals. 
‘Definitely,’ he answered. ‘Liberty is a role model for us. We look at their 
accomplishments and try to emulate their success. Victor is just like Sly. They 
are both self-made businessmen who want to make a mark in football.’ 
There is indeed a similarity between Heart of Lions and Liberty Professionals. 
Both clubs came up suddenly to the Premier League and went on to rival Hearts 
and Kotoko. Heart of Lions ended up in the top four on several occasions. 
‘Victor Ahiakpor is called the Abramovich of Ghana football,’ said sports jour-
nalist Emmanuel Prempeh.567 ‘He managed to take the team from nowhere on the 
road to success. He has put a lot of money into his club.’ There is, however, one 
major difference between the two clubs. While Tetteh groomed young players for 
years on end, Ahiakpor instead picks them when they are all ready for a major 
transfer. The quick-win method thus implies bringing in big players, making 
them part of a winning team for a few seasons, and then selling them for a profit. 
Victor Akpene Ahiakpor is said to be quite successful in the quick-win meth-
od. Heart of Lions players such as Haminu Dramai, Eric Bekoe, Osei Banahene 
and Obed Ansah earned transfers to clubs in Ghana or abroad. This method’s 
ingredients are a keen eye for talent and making sure the players act on a 
platform on which they are visible to scouts. One example is Dominic Adiyiah 
who started out as a pupil of the Feyenoord Academy. He later earned a transfer 
to Heart of Lions and was soon a nominee in the category Most Valuable Player 
of the Season. A call-up for Ghana’s U20 national team announced the young 
player’s international breakthrough. Adiyiah was first transferred to a Norwegian 
club and then to AC Milan. Quite a few Heart of Lions players made it to one of 
Ghana’s national teams, including the Black Stars. 
It could be stated that all clubs make use of the quick-win method. After all, it 
is in the nature of clubs to buy and sell players. The community-based clubs in 
particular are still considered to be the vehicles through which players leave the 
country or continent. A typical route for a young Ghanaian player who plays for 
a mediocre Premier League or a lower league club is to be picked up by Hearts or 
Kotoko before earning a transfer abroad. Similarly, for a long time the clubs from 
Cameroon’s largest cities – Douala and Yaoundé – were seen as the biggest ex-
167 
 
porters of players. These days, however, clubs like Heart of Lions are chal-
lenging the community-based clubs as the main gateways to a career abroad. 
Several private clubs in Ghana own better facilities and employ better youth pro-
grammes than some of the biggest community-based clubs.  
A proponent of the quick-win method in Cameroon is businessman Dieudonné 
Kamdem, a Bamileke who used to own two Elite One league clubs. Kamdem 
started out as president of Fovu Baham, a West Region-based club known for its 
training schemes and professional set-up.568 In 2002 Kamdem founded his 
private club Les Astres in Douala. The team has performed quite well since. 
Also, several players were transferred to clubs abroad, among whom Lucien 
Owona-Ndong who went to Paris Saint-Germain after playing in Douala for two 
seasons. More significantly, Les Astres has been one of Cameroon’s few clubs to 
have delivered players for the Indomitable Lions in recent years. Both Kamdem 
and Ahiakpor thus make sure their players get selected for one of their country’s 
national teams. 
The status of these football entrepreneurs became visible when two of them 
passed away. Alhaji Mohammed Musah, popularly known as Alhaji Bimbo, 
owned the Ghanaian First Division club Maamobi Midtjylland FC. He sold many 
players, for example Prince Tagoe, Kweku Essien, Razak Pimpong and Isaac 
Vorsah. At one point, Alhaji Bimbo also acted as a member of the Black Satel-
lites Management Committee. When he died in August 2007, ministers, parlia-
mentarians, footballers and administrators paid their respects at the burial 
ground. ‘If life were to be a commodity, we would have contributed to save 
Bimbo,’ said GFA president Kwesi Nyantakyi at the funeral.569 When Sly Tetteh 
unexpectedly died during a friendly match in Cape Coast on 3 September 2011, 
hundreds of dignitaries attended his funeral. ‘It’s a sad day,’ said Nyantakyi. ‘We 
have lost an inspiration, a role model, colleague and friend.’570 
It may seem as if the football business is a guaranteed way to get money in the 
bank. This, however, is a false assumption. As is the case with Big Men who get 
involved in football for political purposes, those who engage in the football busi-
ness do not always succeed in what they had set out to accomplish. For example, 
both Jamil Maraby and Toshihiro Iwasa were quite positive about turning their 
community-based clubs into profitable businesses. Yet both Sekondi Eleven 
Wise and Gamba All Blacks relegated within two years after the Big Men’s take-
overs. This finally led Maraby and his company to resell their shares to the 
Sekondihene. It would be safe to state that neither Maraby nor Iwasa was given 
enough time to start making a profit. 
I have stated elsewhere that one-man shows such as Liberty Professionals and 
Kessben FC are reasonably unpopular among the wider population, resulting in 
low gate proceeds (chapter 3). Founding and funding a private club (or academy) 
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solely to make money through selling players or through club branding is thus 
not without certain risks. The Big Man will have to make huge investments 
without having the guarantee that he will reap the benefits. Somewhat ironically, 
it was Jamil Maraby himself who argued that the football business can be a very 
risky business indeed: 
This business depends on chance. You never know whether you can make a profit out of it. 
That’s why you see a lot of businessmen owning a club in the First Division. Maintaining a 
team there is not too expensive. They may spend ten percent of their income on the club so it 
doesn’t cost them too much. But, like I said, it’s a chance. It’s a lottery. Everybody does the 
lottery. Everybody lives off hope. One day these businessmen think they can come to the 
Premier League and make money through the selling of players. 
His words were echoed by Emmanuel Kyeremeh, owner of Tema Youth and 
Bechem Chelsea, who stated that football ‘is business. If you do it well you will 
recover money and move into the profit zone. If you don’t do it well it can even 
affect you.’571 
Journalist Nana Kwasi Agyeman, who doubles as manager of coaches and 
players, agreed that it is a risky business. ‘You need to scout players and pick the 
good ones,’ he told me. ‘The next step is to take care of the player who’s under 
your wing. Most clubs don’t give them a regular salary, boots and jerseys. That’s 
where you come in. So it’s an investment, and an investment is never without 
risk.’ The coach of Rainbow FC in Bamenda told me a similar story. ‘You may 
need to invest about 600,000 francs (€900) in a player,’ he said. ‘But by the time 
he’s ready to be sold, he may be worth 10 million francs (€15,000).’ In short, the 
football business is a potentially lucrative yet uncertain business, capable of 
increasing and diminishing one’s economic capital. 
I know of cases where Big Men either lost their investments or were on the 
verge of losing them. Alhaji Karim Grunsah, the Muslim businessman who 
financed King Faisal for decades, found his team being relegated at the end of the 
2010/11 season (which means a loss of income). Another example is business-
man Kwabena Kesse, founder of Kessben FC, who reportedly was partly 
involved in football to sell players. He evidently discovered that maintaining a 
squad required economic capital. At one point, I learned that Kesse planned to 
construct a sports complex. In 2010, however, he reportedly sold his club to 
another businessman for a sum of $600,000. It was claimed that the club was in 
debt.572 
Let me summarise this chapter before we move on to the next part. The 
professionalisation and commercialisation of football worldwide has, albeit on a 
relatively modest scale, increasingly led various companies to sponsor the Afri-
can game. This has lured Big Men who act as football entrepreneurs and who see 
their involvement as a business opportunity. Some Big Men take a majority inte-
rest in a club for branding purposes. Other Big Men found and finance clubs in 
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order to sell players, either through the method of grooming or the quick-win 
method. In short, Big Men in football convert economic capital into more eco-
nomic capital. The football business, nevertheless, is a risk in the sense that get-
ting a return on the investment is not guaranteed. 
We will now move on to the second part of this dissertation, which deals with 
the consequences of Big Men’s attempts at converting capital. In this respect, Big 
Men employ tactics and strategies that sometimes go against FIFA’s Fair Play 
Code. Recall the idea that winning has no value if achieved in a dishonest way. 
However, quite the opposite appears to be the case: Winning is to be preferred 
above anything else, even if the victory was achieved by cheating. Our first point 
of inquiry is the (bureaucratic) organisation of clubs and FAs. This is where we 
turn to issues dealing with power play, boardroom struggles, mismanagement 
and accountability. 
 
 
 7 
Power play, mismanagement  
and accountability 
When his secretary hands him the file on PWD Bamenda, chairman Eric Mukala 
sighs. The file contains one piece of paper, revealing notes of a meeting some 
years back. ‘The club doesn’t really have an office,’ the lawyer states. ‘Most files 
are kept by the businessmen who used to be president of the club.’ One of them, 
Augustine Iche Ozoemena, holds office near the Municipal Stadium. The office 
is pratically empty. 
Until recently, clubs in Cameroon were not obliged to maintain secretariats.573 
‘For example, (…) mighty Canon Yaoundé did not have any permanent address,’ 
wrote journalist Martin Etonge in 2003. ‘That was the situation with many clubs. 
No post box, no telephone. So-called presidents had the clubs in their houses or 
suitcases as they live with the times.’574 Having an office does not necessarily 
mean anything. At the club’s secretariat, Eteki Charles advises me to meet up 
with a former management member, Nana Hamza. ‘He’s Tiko United’s walking 
encyclopaedia,’ he explains. 
Premier League clubs in Ghana are obliged to own secretariats. Hearts of 
Oak’s secretariat contains offices, a conference room and a gift shop. Asante 
Kotoko’s secretariat, located near Santasi Circle, was a gift from the Asantehene. 
The club’s management members are typically businessmen who spend their 
time elsewhere. Even though Sekondi Hasaacas maintains a secretariat in Tako-
radi, CEO Ben Nab Eyison has effectively run the club from his house(s) over 
the past two decades. 
One-man shows typically own better offices than their community-based 
counterparts. Kessben FC’s headquarters at Liberty House in Kumasi featured 
separate offices for the secretary, the coach and the directors. The president of 
Heart of Lions built a clubhouse and a secretariat in an Accra suburb. The leather 
couches, the mahogany desks and the flat screen televisions exhume wealth. 
171 
 
Football entrepreneur Henry Njalla Quan built an office in Limbe. A secretary 
answers the phone. 
The Big Man as boss 
Recall the statement that clubs are organised analogous to companies on paper 
but run through a system of patronage in reality (chapter 3). This chapter deals 
with the way football in Africa is run in reality. Ask a Ghanaian how the game is 
organised in his country and his answer will feature many references to Europe 
and England in particular. He will say that clubs in Ghana are organised and run 
the same way as their counterparts in England, namely as corporate entities with 
a CEO at the helm. He will state that clubs need to float shares on the stock 
exchange, for that is how the English do it. He will also point out that the leagues 
in Ghana are set up professionally and that companies pay money to broadcast 
Premier League matches. 
In theory, he is right. But he is also very wrong. The professionally organised 
league systems and club structures are nothing but a façade that hide the reality 
of Big Men running the game in a personal capacity through patron-client net-
works. In other words, the official power structures with checks and balances 
obscure day-to-day power relations. A CEO, for example, is not always one of 
the most influential people in a club. To determine a club’s most powerful in-
dividual(s), one must go and find its main financier(s). ‘In general, for the man in 
the street, the leader of the club is the person who occupies the foremost position 
within the club,’ one Cameroonian journalist wrote in 2004. ‘Notably, the pre-
sident or any other major financier.’575 
Power within one-man shows is clear-cut. The most powerful individual of 
Heart of Lions, King Faisal and Yong Sports Academy (YOSA) is its founder, 
owner and president which, in all three cases, is the same person. A president is 
nevertheless obliged to appoint a CEO. When I spoke to King Faisal’s CEO 
Vincent Sowah Odotei, he said he strove to make the club more professional. 
‘Mr. (Alhaji) Grunsah used to interfere with my work, but now we’ve come to a 
mutual understanding,’ he said. ‘I have also succeeded in separating the finances 
of the owner from the finances of the club.’ Odotei’s words were an example of 
wishful thinking. Several informants – coaches, club officials, journalists – told 
me that Grunsah interfered with every aspect of the club. ‘We all know Odotei 
cannot make important decisions,’ one of them said. 
The position of CEO reveals a contradiction within the organisation of clubs. 
Since a CEO normally does not spend his own money but receives a salary, he 
should not expect to be making important decisions. In a one-man show, a CEO 
is the president’s subordinate. The situation at community-based clubs is more 
complicated. Some CEOs – for instance Hearts’ Harry Zakkour and Kotoko’s 
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Herbert Mensah – have become famous for spending their money. The same goes 
for CEO Ben Nab Eyison of Sekondi Hasaacas. However, Eyison acts as 
president and CEO at the same time and so renders the club’s professional set-up 
meaningless. In other cases, it is doubtful whether the CEO financially contri-
butes. When Odotei was CEO of Hearts, supporters wondered why someone who 
contributed so little should have so much power. 
We know that so many clubs in Africa depend on the Big Man as a wealthy 
benefactor, which makes the link between money and power all the more sig-
nificant. Members of the Board of Directors and the Council of Patrons were 
usually promoted after having served the club for many years on end, both in 
terms of finances and leadership. There are nevertheless also directors and 
patrons who are said to have made only minimal financial contributions. Harry 
Zakkour told me that the ‘patrons are a problem because they don’t finance the 
club’. ‘The patrons feel they own the club but they only contributed 10,000 cedi 
(€5,000) when they assumed their positions,’ he said. ‘How can you make 
decisions when your own money is not involved?’ 
In Ghana, the Winneba Declaration proposed certain modalities for qualified 
officials to come in and run clubs and FAs in a professional manner (see chapter 
6). Things went astray as soon as these plans had to be implemented because it 
was here that the Big Men who had been running these clubs all along realised 
they would lose their positions. In other words, if clubs were to be run profes-
sionally, it meant that certain Big Men needed to step aside and make way for 
these “professionals”. Recall Joe Aggrey, the former Deputy Minister of Sports, 
saying that ‘certain power brokers’ were not prepared to accept change and that 
the declaration was not a law (chapter 6). He went on to make the following 
statement: 
The clubs needed to float shares so that the supporters could become part owners. That has 
never happened [by 2009]. All the supporters do is go to the game and pay their tickets at the 
gates. In most clubs, especially the one-man clubs, the ones who controlled them didn’t want 
to release their hold of the club. Kotoko is still fully owned by Otumfuo. It has been very 
difficult to convince the Asantehene that other people would come in and take over the club. 
That’s the situation we’re in today. 
The professional set-up of clubs as proposed in the Winneba Declaration never 
fully materialised. For instance, the limited liability company “Hearts of Oak 
Sporting Club Limited” came into being on 3 February 1994 when 100 million 
shares of no value were issued to five individuals.576 One of them later took other 
management members to court, thereby preventing the club from holding its 
annual Congress until the year 2005.577 This meant that the supporters of the club 
were unable to elect new directors and management members. Since then, Hearts 
has predominantly been run by Interim Management Committees (IMCs). IMC 
members are drawn from a circle of Big Men, some of whom were involved in 
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Hearts prior to the professionalisation in 1993. Similarly, the Asantehene Opoku 
Ware II suspended the Kotoko constitution shortly before he passed away in 
1999. At Kotoko too, IMCs are a normal phenomenon. 
These days clubs in Ghana and Cameroon are not professionally run. To me, 
there are six interconnected reasons why this is true. First, Big Men typically hire 
family members and friends, people from their ancestral areas or employees from 
their own companies as management members. The vice president of Heart of 
Lions is the president’s brother. The vice-chairman of Kessben FC is the presid-
ent’s personal friend. ‘We’re close friends,’ he told me. ‘When the team pro-
moted he asked me to become part of the club.’ The vice president of Mount 
Cameroon FC is also a director of one of the president’s companies. Some of 
YOSA’s management members work at the president’s schools. Since club and 
FA positions often have political connotations (see chapter 5), Big Men also tend 
to hire political affiliates for certain positions. 
Second, as most people are hired by a Big Man, they tend to work under his 
influence. The aforementioned position of CEO is a good example. Kotoko’s 
management members are selected by the Asantehene and so only report to him 
(see further below). A club’s professional hierarchy therefore does not mean 
much, especially within one-man shows. Since the directors of Kessben FC were 
hired by president Kwabena Kesse, it does not matter which one is superior to the 
other. They all listen to the Big Man. This is true for coaches as well. ‘It’s not the 
CEO who hired me,’ said Bashir Hayford. ‘The owner (Mr. Kesse) wanted me 
and hired me. As much as I respect the administrators in the club, I owe alle-
giance to the owner who gave me this job. They’re also working for the owner. 
Everybody’s working for the owner.’ 
Third, club officials may be professionals in certain areas of expertise but not 
in football management. Big Men are not excluded. The fact that the president of 
a one-man show is almost always a businessman does not guarantee that he will 
run the club as successfully as his company. ‘The people who are appointed by 
the Asantehene to run Kotoko are not selected based on their performance,’ said 
Joe Aggrey. ‘That doesn’t matter. It’s based on friendships. They are sports 
enthusiasts.’ Most club officials consider their involvement in football more as a 
part-time hobby than a full-time job. As Aggrey concluded, the problem ‘lies 
with those people who have the money but who don’t know how to run a club’. 
The same applies to FA officials. In Cameroon, the composition of FECA-
FOOT’s top administration seems to be not so much predicated on qualifications 
and experience but on economic and political connections. This is what the 
authors of a report on football management in Africa wrote in 2010: 
All the members of the executive committee of Fecafoot are businessmen, except the 
President, Iya Mohammed, who is General Manager of a state corporation (SODECOTON), 
Vice President John Ndeh, who is General Manager of the Northwest Development 
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Authority – popularly known by its French acronym MIDENO – and the Secretary General 
Tombi à Roko, a civil servant. All others are real estate owners, sports good manufacturers’ 
agents, lawyers (who organize player transfers), transport and hotel contractors, and public 
relations agents.578 
These Big Men have personal motives for taking up positions in football ad-
ministration. It does not mean that they are necessarily the right people for the 
job. 
Fourth, club (and FA) officials are randomly assigned to certain positions. At 
Hearts, Frank Nelson was responsible for administration but it was not clear why 
he was the most qualified person for the job. Several of Kotoko’s management 
members are former footballers with no management experience who all of a 
sudden become Director of Operations or Director of Public Relations. This point 
(again) leads to the view that positions in the professional set-up of clubs actually 
have little meaning. The individual who takes up one position could easily have 
been asked to take up another position altogether. In short, it is not the position 
that matters, it is the person who occupies it. The directors for administrative and 
legal affairs may be exceptions because these positions are normally taken by 
accountants and lawyers, respectively. 
Fifth, club (and FA) officials tend to interfere with each others’ duties. I some-
times asked myself why Helena Cobbina, as Director of Finance and Admini-
stration, would always travel along with Kotoko for away matches. It made me 
wonder whether she understood that she was not the Director of Operations. 
‘They (Board members) all sit on someone else’s chair,’ said Kotoko Express-
reporter David Kyei. ‘After a while problems start because his colleague will say 
that he’s been crossing his domain.’ The Public Relations Officer in particular 
has to share his job with his fellow officials. Indeed, club and FA officials 
typically behave as PROs in the sense that they all speak their minds in public. 
One Board member would say x on radio while a management member would 
say y in a newspaper. 
Sixth, club (and FA) officials tend to occupy different positions within the 
same organisation over a longer period of time. This is a common phenomenon 
within community-based clubs such as Hearts and Kotoko. When the Asantehene 
chose Sylvester Asare Owusu as CEO in 2006, he already knew what to expect. 
After all, the businessman had taken up the same position in 2003. ‘I’ve been a 
management member at least seven times,’ Helena Cobbina told me. She fulfilled 
several roles, none of which seemed to relate to her work as a police officer. ‘The 
same group of people have managed (Hearts) for decades,’ said Odotei. ‘This 
person is in charge for five years and then gives it to the next person. We call that 
the musical chairs. The club has been run by IMCs for donkey’s years.’ To be 
sure, he was referring to the same people who obstructed the implementation of 
the Winneba Declaration. 
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The professional nature of clubs is mostly absent in terms of contracts which, 
in turn, is partly related to “lesser” club officials, coaches, players and ground 
personnel being so dependent on Big Men. Footballer Essomba once told me that 
his club Mount Cameroon FC was ‘an amateur club’. ‘If I received my salary 
every 25th, 26th or 27th of the month, then yes, I would consider it to be a 
professional club. But we never get our salaries on time. Sometimes we have to 
wait for months to get some money.’ There are stories of presidents who refused 
to pay when the team was not performing well. One coach told me that the 
president of a Ghanaian one-man show had an opportunistic approach in respect 
to salaries and bonuses. ‘The president thinks that if they (the players) don’t 
deserve it he’s not going to pay,’ he said. 
Let us now focus on broader issues with regard to hierarchy and power. Bar 
the Minister of Sports, the most powerful position in football administration is 
that of FA president/chairman. In general, the Big Man is all-powerful and he 
demands unquestioned obedience. For an understanding of this phenomenon we 
must go back to colonial times. The British institutionalised the colonial regime 
and created a gap between the elite and everyone else in the Gold Coast (now 
Ghana). Robert Price describes the consequences of that policy thus: 
Those in authority were not held responsible or accountable to the public at large, and were 
thus left free to behave in an arbitrary and domineering manner towards those they ruled. 
The mere occupation of an official position gave to the colonial administrator the right to 
demand unquestionable obedience and deference from Africans, whatever their social status, 
economic wherewithal, or educational attainment.579 
The relationship between European officialdom and the African population was 
that of a master tutoring his children who were to show respect and obedience in 
return. Price argues that this pattern of role expectation between the powerful and 
the powerless was copied by the African elites who came to rule the country after 
independence. 
The result is what Price has labelled the Big-Man Small-Boy Syndrome. 
Although his analysis is related to Ghana and to formal bureaucratic settings, it is 
applicable to other parts of Africa and to wider societal settings as well. It is 
common to hear Ghanaians speak about others as big men or small boys. These 
terms ‘represent an institutionalized pattern of expected behavior between indi-
viduals of unequal status that is highly authoritarian in nature’: 
Big Men are those of social weight, worth, and responsibility; while small boys are, like 
children, insignificant social actors, of little consequence in the affairs of the community. 
Big Men are expected to make decisions, give orders, and look after the material well-being 
of their social inferiors. In turn, small boys are expected to exhibit unquestioning obedience 
and obsequious public deference towards big men.580 
The status of a Big Man depends on his ability to show off his wealth – also 
through his physique – and on his generosity towards inferiors. Another visible 
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aspect of his status is that a Big Man refrains from doing manual labour; instead 
he ‘issues commands, normally from a seated position, while subordinates do the 
running’.581 
The way the Big Man and the Small Boy play out their roles in public con-
firms their positions and social standings. The unequal status between Big Men 
and Small Boys depends on five dimensions: Formal institutional positions, 
wealth, education, occupation and age.582 In the old days, age denoted authority 
(hence the term elders). “Big Man” and “Small Boy” do not refer to age or 
maturity but to hierarchies of authority. The best way to distinguish a Big Man 
from a Small Boy is by looking at someone’s position (which is why a senior 
civil servant can be younger than his subordinate) or by taking into account the 
context within which two individuals meet. Yong Francis, president of YOSA, 
gave up his seat to president Henri Claude Mvondo Mbédé of Canon Yaoundé at 
the stadium in Bamenda in 2009. ‘He’s my big brother,’ Yong said, explaining 
that his colleague used to be one of Biya’s ministers. 
The relationship between a Big Man and lesser men goes further than merely 
being a matter of employees obeying their boss. Let us start out with an example 
as provided by Ebow Daniel and reprinted by Paul Nugent: 
Naturally, at staff meetings, nobody speaks till the big man does, his contribution at once 
becoming the consensus. This story is told of a National Serviceman in a public corporation 
who was given the draft of a memorandum in the big man’s own handwriting to look at, who 
did not know his duty was to offer praise; far from commending the draft, he dared to pencil 
in an amendment! He had his discharge coming, the Serviceman, but not before the show-
down in the Board Room, where summoned to explain his conduct, the Serviceman appeared 
to be doing very well indeed, pressing home all his several points, carrying the Board until 
Thunder boomed ‘SIT DOWN, you small boy!’583 
Such behaviour is typical within the football setting as well. The Big Man who 
owns a one-man show does not expect to be interrupted, corrected or contra-
dicted by an inferior (meaning everybody else). I earlier made reference to the 
difficulty of working as a CEO at King Faisal. Coach Steven Polack told me the 
following story: 
King Faisal is a one-man show. Alhaji [Grunsah] is a one-man show. When there’s a meet-
ing it’s a one-man show. It’s not when I’m in the meeting because I ventilate my opinion. 
But all the others just agree with him. We would be standing outside and one manager could 
agree with me on something. But when we go inside and I bring it up – I’m thinking we’ve 
already talked about it and he has agreed. No chance. This manager is just sitting there like 
he’s never heard it before. Because they’re all afraid to lose their breadline. But why are they 
there? Why do you have Board members if they cannot give input and output of what we are 
talking about? The one who puts in the money just got all the say. I think most clubs are like 
that. They are controlled by one man. He does what he likes, he can say what he likes. And 
nobody will say anything about it. 
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Photo 7.1 Coach Herbert Addo (left on the bench) watches a practice session at Asante 
Kotoko’s training ground near the military barracks in Kumasi 
 
 
 
The consequence of the Big-Man Small-Boy Syndrome is that the Big Man 
does not tolerate criticism. Combine this with the fact that club officials tend to 
interfere with other people’s duties, thinking that Big Men are always superior to 
lesser men, and one stumbles upon one of African football’s most typical draw-
backs. I am referring to Big Men influencing team recruitment and team select-
ion. First of all, the recruitment is commonly not done by a technical director (a 
position that most clubs lack in the first place) or a coach but by a Big Man. 
Yong Francis once invited me to observe a recruitment period. While the coach 
was leading a practice session, Mr. Yong said ‘I’ll take him and him,’ and then 
we left. In 2011, Hearts formed a Recruitment Committee including five Big 
Men and one coach.584 
Generally speaking, a coach in Africa does not have a free hand in the sense 
that he is not allowed to work independently and make his own decisions. This is 
how spiritual adviser Zé, who has had years of experience as a coach, explained 
the situation: 
We have coaches who work under the influence of the executives, so there’s no democracy. 
They have to take instructions from the club executives. The club president tells him: “I 
spend my money so you will do what I say.” Let’s say that the president sends a player to the 
coach. Will the coach say no to that player? No! He cannot do that. But within professional 
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clubs, it’s not only one person who spends his money. This is why the lack of sponsorship is 
killing us because most clubs belong to one man.585 
Big Men typically behave as if they are qualified coaches. Zé told me a story 
about a striker in Cameroon who came back from an injury. ‘You could see he 
had not been training well so the coach put him on the bench,’ he explained. ‘The 
president forced the coach to include him. The president is not a technician. They 
felt that this striker could turn water into wine at any time, but it’s not true.’ 
The problem of club officials interfering with the coach’s job is most marked-
ly strong in respect to African coaches. A local coach almost by definition has to 
acknowledge the club president and other officials as superiors. He will thus find 
it difficult to refuse orders (or, to put it more mildly, requests) that come from 
above. Also, as Zé’s statement made clear, the coach is paid by the club presid-
ent, making it even more difficult to ignore the boss’s suggestions. The Ghanaian 
coach Bashir Hayford admitted that local coaches, in contrast to expatriate 
coaches, cannot work independently because of the Big-Man Small-Boy Syn-
drome: 
It’s not that they [the white coaches] are better than us but we are so compromising. A white 
coach will not allow anybody to interfere but the black coaches are more considerate. They 
know the chairman and will not say no to him. The white coaches don’t listen to him. That’s 
what happened to [the Belgian coach Maurice] Cooreman [at Kotoko]. He did it his own way 
and they sacked him and said he didn’t listen to them. The issue is that they don’t com-
promise and we compromise because of our background. If an elder talks to you, you have to 
listen. Your boss will say this or that and you will say okay. You cannot say: “No, no, no!” 
But the white coaches say no. 
The pressure is heightened by the fact that club officials blame the coach for not 
listening to their advice. ‘If you stand by your decisions, they say that you don’t 
respect management,’ said coach Hayford. ‘When you lose, they say that you 
refused to listen to them.’ Hayford explained that losing a match means getting a 
call from upstairs: 
The first person to call you is the CEO. “Come to my house and explain why you lost.” You 
have to do that. He doesn’t understand why you lost so you have to explain it to him. “Why 
did you field these people and not these people?” All the pressure is coming from the 
management. In Europe it’s not like that. Everything is in the hands of the coach. Nobody 
asks you why this player is not playing. In Africa, in Ghana, the management members have 
their interest in the boys in the sense that they brought them. They like their players to play. 
If they don’t play, they will ask you why. 
But foreign coaches too will find the power and influences of Big Men hard to 
deal with. At first, Kosta Papic was hailed as a great coach who would be given a 
free hand. Eleven months later, Hearts’ Board and management members alike 
criticised his coaching tactics and stubbornness and fired him. The Serbian 
claimed that his dismissal was related to his ‘persistent refusal for some Hearts 
gurus to interfere with his work’: 
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When I arrived to handle Hearts, the management and all the people gave me assurances that 
such a situation wasn’t going to happen but along the lines they started to interfere with my 
job which I resisted. It was always sad how some club members wanted some particular 
players to play some specific matches even when they were not on form. I made sure they 
did not have their way and this to me could have influenced their decision to sack me 
because I heard rumours out there that I never listened to advice from them. That is never 
true because I gave them all the respect but with interferences I said no.586 
Papic’s words were confirmed by Board member Harry Zakkour. When Hearts 
lost 0-1 to Kotoko in 2009 (which finally led to Papic’s lay-off), Zakkour 
publicly stated that ‘we lost the game from the bench. The coach doesn’t want to 
listen to anybody and does things his own way and this is one of the reasons why 
we lost.’587 
Big Men, factions and power struggles 
I have described the organisation of football as being run by Big Men who resort 
to patronage politics to maintain power. As power in Africa is perceived to be 
indivisible, Big Men do not like to share it.588 In the past, one-party states were 
the norm on the continent. Nowadays, presidents make sure their political party 
completely dominates the political arena. Elections are a formalised method to 
crush rivals, as Nyamnjoh’s description of a sketch by the Cameroonian co-
median Tchop Tchop testifies: 
‘Elections,’ the victors in his sketch claim, ‘are like a football match where you must prepare 
your players physically and psychologically. You can consult the Pygmy witchdoctor, 
corrupt the referee, or motivate (bribe) your opponents. … You organize your elections 
knowing full well that you are going to win them. You have yourself to blame for not having 
known what to do.’589 
So what happens when several Big Men all fight for power? As each Big Man 
relies on his own supporters to ward off competitors, power struggles often end 
up in infighting within the management ranks. This results in clubs and FAs suc-
cumbing to chaos and, sometimes, falling into disarray. 
I have earlier discussed the various ways in which Big Men beget certain 
positions in the football domain (chapter 3). Some of them, such as Eteki Charles 
Dikonge, were asked to become president of a club. This is especially true in 
situations where clubs are in financial difficulties and Big Men are needed to 
come in to provide sponsorship. In most cases, club and FA positions are very 
popular, causing Big Men to compete against one another. This competition is 
streamlined through elections at the Congress. A Big Man needs to build up sup-
port for himself to collect enough votes. In the discourse of network analysis, a 
Big Man needs to form a faction which, as Jeremy Boissevain argues, is ‘an 
exclusive coalition of persons (followers) recruited personally according to struc-
turally diverse principles by or on behalf of a person in conflict with another 
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person or persons within the same social unity over honour and/or control over 
resources’.590 
Before Frank Nelson Nwokolo became a management of Hearts of Oak, he 
was part of a faction (the Chapter) which consisted of about 100 supporters. The 
members of the Chapter may select one candidate from amongst their midst who 
they think to be potential management material. Members of different Chapters 
will each come forward with a candidate who will compete at the Congress. The 
overall goal of the candidate is to represent his faction at the club’s highest level 
or, as H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen argues, to create a ‘common fund’: 
The most important feature of an interest coalition or faction is a common fund of resources 
and honour. Its backbone is an exchange circuit, the particular system of paths through 
which goods and services circulate among members of the coalition. If this flow-system is 
asymmetrical (hierarchical), the common fund is controlled by only a small proportion of 
coalition members (the core). Other coalition members, the followers, hope to benefit 
through the channels of transactional linkage.591 
The big community-based clubs typically consist of several factions, some of 
which serve their own interests rather than the general good of the club. Frank 
Nelson commands the loyalty of a section of the club’s supporters but he will 
never enjoy everybody’s support because there are plenty of supporters who back 
other Big Men. These clubs thus suffer from innate friction within the manage-
ment ranks. 
Big Men spend time and money on campaigning and lobbying. It appears that 
incumbents normally have the advantage over newcomers, as they control the 
channels and resources through which to influence either supporters or fellow 
administrators. One case came up when GFA president Kwesi Nyantakyi an-
nounced his desire to become a member of the CAF Executive Committee. One 
month before the Congress in February 2011, Nyantakyi invited 20 FA presid-
ents to attend an opening ceremony of a kitchen and a canteen at the Prampram 
School of Excellence, which formed part of FIFA’s Goal programme. The 
Graphic Sports understood Nyantakyi’s motivations and stated that ‘the invita-
tion thrown to officials of 20 other football federations in Africa, we dare say, 
was an over-kill and largely unnecessary’.592 
Not everyone shared this criticism. One journalist praised Nyantakyi for en-
gaging in international football politics. ‘For me, the significance of last week’s 
inauguration goes beyond the mere commission of a Kitchen and Canteen Com-
plex,’ he wrote. ‘Let no lazy mind over-simplify the issue. The fact that 20 Africa 
FA Presidents (…) would abandon their heavy schedule to partake in the cere-
mony should offer you an idea of the significance of the occasion.’593 He then 
made the following statement: 
Lobbying constitutes a major part in all elections. It is absolutely legitimate. Last week’s 
ceremony therefore provided a fertile platform for the [sic] Kwesi Nyantakyi to canvas for 
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votes for the upcoming elections. Indeed, his Excellency the vice-President John Dramani 
Mahama who graced the occasion minced no words when he appealed to the various FA 
Presidents to endorse Nyantakyi’s candidature.594 
During a visit to Ghana early in 2011, I saw how delegation members of the 
Liberian FA forgot their heavy schedules at the poolside of Accra’s top-rated La 
Palm Royal Beach Hotel. Several FA presidents publicly pledged their support 
for Nyantakyi who went on to win the seat by claiming 34 out of 53 votes. 
Getting elected is often a combination of campaigning and forging the relevant 
political alliances. Big Men aspiring to become Hearts or Kotoko directors stand 
a better chance if they belong to the NDC or NPP. A Transparency International 
report not only highlighted the link between Kenyan Football Federation (KFF) 
elections and politics but also the way Big Men manage to stay in office: 
(…) KFF elections are always more of a political process than a simple headhunt for capable 
managers to help the game grow. It is those with political guile are cunning and have money 
to buy their way around who get into KFF office. Such people will be voted in along with 
their line-up which usually just comprises hangers-on and sycophants. After being elected 
into office, the conspiracy continues. Because many of the members of the national 
executive committee owe their allegiance to the chairman, none of them dare blow the 
whistles.595 
Such “hangers-on” and “sycophants” can be explained within the framework of 
the Big-Man Small-Boy Syndrome. Indeed, the obedience and deference to the 
Big Man may very well be regarded as sycophancy on the part of lower-ranked 
officials.  
Since Big Men rely on factions, it is clear that supporters play a large role in 
the quest for power. There exist an antagonistic relationship between Big Men 
and supporters. After all, the supporters can catapult Big Men into positions of 
power but they can also vote them out of office. Supporters have more tools at 
their disposal to show the Big Men where power lies. First, they can stop attend-
ing matches, which affects the club’s financial base. Second, supporters can stage 
protests, either peacefully or violently. Both Hearts and Kotoko supporters have 
on occasion taken their grievances towards the directors and management 
members to the streets. They organise marches to the training ground, secretariat 
or stadium, and present petitions to a patron or director (in the case of Hearts) or 
the Asantehene (Kotoko). 
A third way for supporters to exert influence is to become violent. ‘It can be 
dangerous to be a Board member or CEO,’ said Alhaji Fawaz Zowk, a Hearts of 
Oak Board member. ‘I have been beaten dozens of times. If you win they will 
carry you on their shoulders. If you lose they will beat you. Sometimes I had to 
hire bodyguards to protect me.’ Supporters tend to employ all three methods 
simultaneously. At one point, a group of Hearts supporters objected to Vincent 
Sowah Odotei being the club’s CEO. ‘Last year (in 2008) we ended up in the 
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number eight position,’ said Edmund Palmer. ‘We were dying. So the supporters 
said: “The CEO is not running the club well and he should leave.” But he was not 
leaving so we had to chase him out of the stadium.’ Finally, the Council of 
Patrons instructed the Board of Directors to sack Odotei. 
On their part, Big Men maintain positions of power through the “blame 
game”. In case of a loss, club officials blame it on biased refereeing or the 
dubious tactics of the opponent team. Moreover, they blame everything on other 
club officials. Probably most important, however, is the Big Men’s habit of blam-
ing the coach. After all, the coach is the ideal scapegoat because he is the prime 
person responsible for team performance and thus the supporters’ foremost 
target. And although club officials usually tell the coach what to do in private, 
they tend to wash their hands of the affair in public. ‘A coach loses three matches 
and is fired,’ one coach in Ghana told me. ‘He will ask the management: “How 
can you fire me? I listened to you and I did what you told me.” And the director 
would answer: “But you’re the coach. You’re responsible.”’ 
Once a Big Man is voted into office he commonly turns the club or the FA 
into a one-man show, meaning that he regards the organisation as his personal 
property. There are stories of club and FA presidents who turned into dictators 
overnight. In 2008, the Cameroonian musician Petit Pays was asked to become 
president of community-based club Caiman Douala. He was later sent away on 
account of running the club in an autocratic manner.596 In 2010 several Executive 
Committee members accused the president of Benin’s FA of being a dictator.597 
It is rather common to find Big Men and their factions challenging the ruling Big 
Men for the way they run the affairs of the club or FA. I wish to highlight four 
types of power struggles. 
The first type of power struggle occurs between Big Men who are part of the 
same club, particularly the community-based clubs. Sometimes the struggle is 
one between sons of the soil and strangers (chapter 4). Sometimes club officials 
all want to become president or CEO (see case study below). Sometimes club 
officials come in conflict with those who founded the club. When Antoine Es-
somba Eyenga became president of Tonnerre Yaoundé in the 1990s, he at-
tempted to turn the club into a business. However, the team’s performance 
deteriorated and the founder’s family started a campaign to get the club back. 
These struggles finally led Tonnerre to relegate with some blaming black magic 
as the cause.598 Similarly, the reign of former footballer Théophile Abega as 
president of Canon ‘has been dogged by negative publicity and plots by rival 
factions at the club, bent on ending his tenure’.599 Both Tonnerre and Canon 
Yaoundé have underperformed for years due to infighting. 
Power struggles within the management ranks of community-based clubs are 
often a result of Big Men being accused of mismanagement. The Tanzanian club 
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Yanga plunged into chaos in the 1970s when the Zairian coach accused his 
management of embezzling funds that were intended for match preparation. 
These allegations were directed at one of the club’s founders, Magara Tabu 
Mangara. Two rival camps emerged, one led by Mangara, the other by the 
secretary-general, David Mwambungu. This is where the trouble became worse, 
as Tsuruta writes: 
A series of revelations over alleged financial scandals fuelled a growing rift between the two 
factions. The tension reached a peak in late September after Mwambungu and his aides 
appointed a new chairman, declaring the suspension of 22 prominent members including 
Mangara and Shiraz, leading to violent clashes between the rival factions. As the pro-
Mangara faction gathered around the former headquarters of Mafia Street, Kariakoo, 
Mwambungu and the anti-Mangara camp congregated at Yanga’s new stadium. They 
marched to the old headquarters, where they clashed with supporters of Mangara, throwing 
stones and exchanging harsh words, until the unrest was quelled by police armed with tear-
gas.600 
As Tsuruta concludes, these ‘intra-club disputes’ were a result of ‘money-related 
scandals, combined with the struggle for power over these nationally popular 
clubs’.601 
A second type of power struggle occurs between the Big Men within the FAs. 
This happened with the Togolese FA in the new millennium, when several Big 
Men – Rock Gnassingbé, Tata Avlessi and Gabriel Ameyi in particular – strug-
gled to gain control over the position of president. FA president Gnassingbé had 
to make way after the national team’s disastrous World Cup campaign in 2006. 
Avlessi was elected president but later a rift erupted between him and his vice 
president Ameyi. Then, surprisingly, Gnassingbé was voted back in office in 
2008. He, however, soon had to make way for an interim management team. In 
2010 Ameyi was elected president. Several FAs have fallen into disarray because 
factions fiercely fought to gain power.  
A third type of power struggle is the one between top FA officials and those 
who run league boards. In Ghana, the GFA runs football in general whereas the 
Premier League Board (PLB) runs the league. At one point, the GFA and the 
PLB clashed over a proposed friendly between the English club Everton and 
Kotoko. While the GFA confirmed the date, the PLB scheduled a league round 
and refused to change the fixtures. This led Kotoko’s PRO to ‘wonder why after 
sanctioning and endorsing the game, the same association will turn round and 
inform officials of Everton that we will not be available on the said date’.602 The 
Kotoko Express alleged that the ‘cancellation of the game was a result of nothing 
more than a senseless show of power by assigns of the PLB who think they now 
wield more power than the GFA’.603 
A fourth type of power struggle is the one between FA officials and the 
government. FIFA’s demand for autonomy of FAs brings forth a few problems. 
First, governments in Africa typically own their countries’ sports infrastructures. 
184 
 
For example, the Cameroonian government appoints directors who control the 
stadiums on its behalf. Second, several governments still effectively own football 
in general and national teams in particular. This is, for example, laid down in 
Nigeria’s Government Decree 101. Cameroon’s Ministry of Sports is officially in 
control of the Indomitable Lions. Third, governments still invest a lot of money 
in the game. Keeping the adage of “whoever pays the piper plays the tune” in 
mind, these governments feel that they have a right to interfere. 
The ownership, control and funding of football by governments has put them 
at odds with FAs especially when national team coaches need to be hired. Sierra 
Leone’s Minister of Sports hired a coach without the FA’s consent in 2011, 
arguing that he was the one paying for him. The same argument has been put 
forward in Cameroon. In 2007 FECAFOOT solicited for a new national team 
coach on its website. A commission set up by both FECAFOOT and the Ministry 
of Sports and Physical Education (MINSEP) narrowed the 70+ applicants down 
to a shortlist with German coach Horst Köppel clearly as the favourite. When 
Köppel declared that he had reached an agreement with FECAFOOT, the 
Minister of Sports had already signed an agreement with another German coach, 
namely Otto Pfister. 
The infighting has led several clubs and FAs to be run in a haphazard manner. 
Although some FA officials manage to hang on to their positions through 
football politics, many FAs are characterised by a rapid succession of 
administrations. As I will argue later on as well, Big Men who run clubs and FAs 
do not only tend to focus on short-term interests, they would not be given the 
chance to implement long-term strategies anyway. As an example, the GFA has 
had no less than 25 chairmen/presidents from its inception in 1960 until the year 
2011.604 Nigeria’s FA has had a little over 30 Big Men at the helm between 1960 
and 2011, many of whom stayed only one year in that position.605 The same 
applies to Ministers of Sport.606 
 
Case study: Big Men vs Asantehene 
The supporters of Asante Kotoko already know the outcome of today’s pro-
ceedings. The Okyeame’s golden staff, called the poma, is visible for all to see. 
Each of his many staffs stands for a different Ashanti proverb. This one depicts a 
man and a tree, which signifies the proverb “If one man alone scrapes bark, it 
falls”. It means that only cooperation leads to success. The Okyeame (or Chief 
Linguist), who is the King’s spokesperson, interpreted recent events well. Ko-
toko’s management members, lined up in front of the Asantehene and his ad-
visers, realise their time has come. But until they are relieved of their duty, they 
are entitled to speak their minds. That is the King’s tradition and the supporters 
are preparing themselves for a long afternoon. 
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It is Saturday 16 May 2009. Several hundred supporters have flocked to the 
Manhyia palace in the centre of Kumasi for the ‘big family meeting’.607 Many of 
them occupy positions within Kotoko’s Circle groups. My translator today, 
Kwaku Anor, is the Public Relations Officer (PRO) of the Ashanti Regional 
Circles Council. Today’s public hearing will take place in the area where the 
King normally resides over court cases. The plastic chairs near the Asantehene’s 
seat have all been taken by prominent supporters. Everybody rises when Otum-
fuo Osei Tutu II enters the court with his following. When his Okyeame speaks 
he uses no microphone, and supporters rush forward to catch his words. Soldiers 
armed with guns and bats restore the peace. I am stuck in the crowd, with Anor 
close to my left ear. 
Sylvester Asare Owusu’s eyes are fixed to the ground. The Kotoko CEO is 
standing about three meters from the King, who sits on his throne under an 
umbrella. On Asare Owusu’s left stands Jerry Asare, Director of Operations, fol-
lowed by George Amoako, Director of Finance and Administration, and Kwame 
Baah-Nuako, Director of Communications. Kwame Boafo, Director of Legal 
Affairs, will join us as soon as he has taken care of an urgent matter elsewhere. 
Otumfuo asks his CEO to give an account of what happened recently. When 
Asare Owusu says that things are not as bad as they may seem, he is interrupted 
by the King. ‘Every week someone pays me a visit and tells me: “Sire, they have 
lost again!” And now you are telling me that everything is fine?’ 
Otumfuo appointed the current management team in late 2006 amidst unrest 
within the club. The position of CEO in particular was highly contested. Jerry 
Asare, a representative from Accra, openly vied for the position on radio in the 
latter part of 2005. Other names popped up in the media around that time as well, 
George Amoako and Sylvester Asare Owusu among them. In October 2006, the 
King picked five Big Men to lead his club and chose Sylvester Asare Owusu as 
the chairman of the management team. However, the fact that Asare Owusu was 
labelled as CEO was opposed by the other members who stated that they had 
been appointed as equals in terms of power. 
Trouble loomed barely five months after their instalment as Asare Owusu had 
to counter rumours about an alleged divisiveness among the management ranks. 
In April 2007, the Supporters Union issued a statement, exposing internal con-
flicts and the management’s ‘immaturity to solve problems’.608 Soon afterwards, 
supporters organised a rally in Kumasi and petitioned the Asantehene to sack 
Jerry Asare. ‘Mr. Asare continues to betray members of the management and 
even make public, issues discussed at meetings which are supposed to be secret,’ 
my current translator, Kwaku Anor, told GNA Sports.609 A meeting between the 
management team and the King solved all differences, Kwame Baah-Nuako told 
the press in December 2008. ‘We are now more united than ever before and hope 
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to work in collaboration with all other stakeholders to foster the development and 
progress of the club,’ he said.610 
Today’s public hearing is a direct result of the team’s abysmal performances 
in the current 2008/09 season. After losing to Hearts of Oak in Kumasi in 
February 2009, Kotoko’s fortunes quickly left them. The Porcupine Warriors lost 
several matches both at home and away and also bowed out of the preliminary 
stages of the CAF Champions League. Coach Isaac “Opeele” Boateng came 
under increased threats and needed protection from irate supporters on several 
occasions. He resigned immediately after his team drew 1-1 against Kessben FC 
at the Baba Yara Stadium on Sunday 11 May. By the time the Asantehene called 
for the public hearing six days later, Kotoko was in eighth position on the league 
table. Prolongation of the Premier League title seemed further away than ever, 
and internal struggles were cited as the main cause. 
A visit to the club’s secretariat on Wednesday 15 April already indicated that 
there were problems on the horizon. James Dampranie, a former player and now 
working as Welfare Officer, made the following remark: 
The CEO and the other management members all have their own interests. Everybody wants 
to be the boss because whoever is the boss will be loved by the supporters. They also have 
their own players in the team. Sylvester has his players, George has his players. They all 
make sure that their investments are taken care off. They are trying to sell their players 
abroad for big money. The supporters are now split in two. There are those who support 
Sylvester and those who want to get rid of him. The supporters wanted to stage a protest 
rally today to express their anger and frustration. But the Asantehene didn’t give his per-
mission because he doesn’t want anybody to disturb his tenth anniversary. So there was no 
protest. I’ve heard that the King will dismiss the management members and form a new team 
within a few days. He already knows those who will replace them. 
Dampranie’s words proved to be prophetic. So did Kwaku Anor’s. I spoke with 
him on 5 May about the current crisis within the club. This is what he said: 
The current management team is not united. The reason is that they are all handpicked by 
Otumfuo, the Spiritual Leader and Life Patron of the club. So the members feel that they are 
only accountable to the Asantehene himself. They think they owe only allegiance to him and 
not to the CEO of the club, who is Sylvester Asare Owusu. Normally the CEO is the one 
who runs the management team, but in this case they don’t listen to him. Let’s say the 
Director of Operations is in charge of team affairs. He has to take control over all the issues 
leading up to the match. But he doesn’t report anything to the CEO – he feels his only 
responsibility is to report to Otumfuo. So Sylvester doesn’t get any information about what’s 
going on. There’s no unity. Even though they say that they are friends, we can see it’s not 
true. They’re fighting over the radio and in the newspapers.  
I already heard something similar from Kwame Baah-Nuako in 2008. He told me 
that since he was personally appointed by the Asantehene, he would only report 
to the King himself. Combine this with some of the management members 
aspiring to become the CEO and one can imagine Asare Owusu’s limited 
authoritative powers. 
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The sun is at its peak when Otumfuo charges his management team to explain 
themselves. Sylvester Asare Owusu takes the opportunity to blame Jerry Asare. 
‘Jerry lives in Accra,’ Anor translates. ‘He has the responsibility to make sure the 
matches are being prepared well. But since he’s not in Kumasi, we’re not com-
municating and he’s not functioning well.’ Jerry Asare rebuffs Asare Owusu’s 
claims. ‘Sylvester’s problem is that he wants to do everything himself. I’m not 
given the chance to take up my tasks.’ The third person in line, George Amoako, 
says he feels like the middle man. ‘My role has been to mediate between my 
friend the CEO and the other management members. Sylvester is not on good 
terms with the others.’ ‘There’s no mutual understanding between us,’ Kwame 
Baah-Nuako states. ‘Since Otumfuo has appointed us, we haven’t even met five 
times with all the members. I propose that this team is dissolved.’ 
The technical staff, the players, members of the Circles, Kotoko Ladies and 
the association of old players (AKOPA) are all allowed to express their views. 
Coach Isaac “Opeele” Boateng is visibly relieved to finally be able to address the 
Asantehene. ‘The problem is that there’s no cooperation between the manage-
ment members and you can see how that affects the playing body,’ he says. ‘My 
players all have their own management members to whom they owe allegiance 
and to whom they feel accountable. That’s why the playing body is divided. And 
that’s why we’re losing matches.’ Opeele’s words are confirmed by the players. 
‘There’s no cooperation among us,’ says captain Godfried Yeboah. ‘If we had a 
meeting and someone would mention a management member, he would be in-
formed right away and call me.’ 
It is now the Asantehene’s turn to reflect on the crisis within the club. Osei 
Tutu II traditionally settles disputes in his capacity as occupant of the Golden 
Stool and president of the Kumasi Traditional Council. He thus listens to his ad-
visers first:  
When the King presides as head of Asanteman Council, comprising the Kumasi chiefs and 
all the paramount chiefs, all chiefs present are allowed to express their opinions on issues. 
Formerly, it was the leaders of the groups who spoke on behalf of their colleagues but 
Otumfuo Osei Tutu II now insists that any paramount chief in the group can express his idea 
if he wants. So, in the Right Wing, Mamponhene, the leader, will express his view, followed 
by the Adansehene, the Offinsohene, the Edwesohene, the Asokorehene, and other chiefs in 
the division. In the Left Wing division, the Essumegyahene will speak, followed by the 
Kwamanhene, Kumawuhene, Agogohene and other chiefs of that wing.611 
Approximately ten chiefs are present today, and they all accuse the management 
members of shaming the King. Then the Asantehene gives his verdict. ‘I’m very 
disappointed,’ Anor translates. ‘In 2006, when I asked you if you were up to the 
task, you answered yes. If you’re not able to unite, it means you cannot work as a 
team. It’s therefore not necessary for you to continue working. I’m not firing 
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you, you have sacked yourselves.’ A new management team is presented on the 
spot. 
The Kotoko Express applauds the Asantehene’s decision, welcomes the new 
management team and speaks of the ‘dawn of a new era’.612 ‘Nana was very 
disappointed when the management team said they were divided,’ Kwaku Anor 
tells me a few days after the public hearing. ‘He was angry and he even shouted 
at Asare Owusu. Nana made a wise decision to sack them. They have put their 
own interests before that of the club.’ However, it cannot have escaped Anor’s 
and the other supporters’ attention that history keeps on repeating itself. Anor 
admits as much: 
We the supporters are getting tired of the managers. Even the King doesn’t understand. He 
always asks a few capable men to take over the affairs of the club and as soon as they’re in 
charge they start fighting amongst each other. They all want to be the boss. It also happened 
four years ago when Kwabena Kesse, Osei Kwame and Alhaji Njie were managing the team. 
Some of them resigned, others were sacked. 
Indeed, the life cycles of several management teams and IMCs have been cut 
short by infighting among its members. Reports from 2005 indicate that Board 
member Kwabena Kesse eyed the position of CEO, causing friction among 
several Big Men.613 In the same year, IMC member Afrifa Yamoah Ponkoh 
resigned, apparently after complaining on radio about a disagreement with the 
other members.614 
The installation of a six-member IMC after the public hearing promised to be 
an improvement. One thing remained the same: All members were appointed by 
the Asantehene. Reverend Osei Kofi told the Kotoko Express that he was selected 
after a meeting with the Asantehene.615 Luckily, the management members chose 
Alhaji Njie, a former player and management member, as the new chairman (or 
CEO), which gave the impression that his position was acknowledged by the 
entire management team. One year later, Osei Kofi accused fellow members of 
spending money on juju, followed by the threat to sue his colleagues.616 After the 
Asantehene installed a new Board of Directors in May 2010, its chairman an-
nounced a new IMC but did not immediately appoint a new CEO. Several crises 
have plagued the club since. 
Incompetence, mismanagement and corruption 
Our discussion has so far mainly focused on Big Men who invest economic 
capital to become a club official. However, what happens when Big Men become 
part of football administration without having had to invest capital of their own? 
Many top FA officials control funds that were provided from outside sources (see 
chapter 6). This is where we stumble upon one of African football’s most typical 
woes, namely mismanagement and corruption. It is said that many football 
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administrators get involved in the game to reap its financial benefits. First, let us 
start with a rather unfortunate quality of football administrators, namely incom-
petence. For one thing, it proves that many of them were not (s)elected because 
of skills or expertise. 
‘An African nation that is not at war,’ journalist Kuper once remarked, ‘and 
that can afford to enter the World Cup, and that remembers to do so (sic), and 
that completes its schedule, turning up at every match with at least eleven able-
bodied men, has already outdone most of its competitors and has a fair chance of 
reaching the finals.’617 This statement from 1994, albeit exaggerated, still holds 
true. Ghanaians castigated the GFA in 2008 when they found out their national 
team did not feature in the qualification round of the CHAN tournament. It was 
rumoured that someone had forgotten to send in the registration forms. Fortu-
nately, CAF decided to include Ghana and nine other countries that had all 
missed the registration deadline. Senegalese FA officials were less fortunate 
when they forgot to register for the 1990 World Cup.618 
Both club and FA officials – many of whom were selected based on friend-
ships or politics – tend to make the silliest mistakes. Goldblatt, who refers to 
these mistakes as an ‘administrative weakness’, provides us with a few examples: 
In 1996 shortage of funds saw the Cameroonian team arrive in Johannesburg only two days 
before their first game in the Cup of Nations. That gave the team two days to acclimatize to 
the thin air of the high veldt. They didn’t and one of the pre-tournament favourites was out 
of the group stages. When Zimbabwe played El Salvador in a warm-up game for the 2004 
Cup of Nations, the following day’s papers found that not a single member of the Central 
Americans’ squad had ever played for any of the national senior or junior teams before and 
that the side appeared to have been cobbled together by the kit manufacturers who had 
promised Zimbabwe the game. They managed a 0-0 draw.619 
To prepare for the 2000 African Cup of Nations, Zambia travelled to Ghana and 
Ivory Coast to play a couple of friendly matches. Upon arrival, they discovered 
that their FA had forgotten to inform the hosts, and to avoid embarrassment a few 
matches with local teams were organised.620 In August 2009, the Zambians 
arranged a friendly with Ghana in London but then forgot to get visa for the 
players. As a result, three Zambian students in England were called up to make 
up numbers. Soon afterwards, Zambia’s FA had to cancel a training camp after 
its sponsor was informed too late. 
Nigerian FA officials make mistakes as well. After a training camp in London 
in the run-up to the 2010 World Cup was cancelled, more trouble loomed for the 
NFF when news came out that its pre-booked hotel in Durban was noisy and 
mosquito-infested. Nigeria’s Sports Minister told NFF officials that they had to 
look for accommodation elsewhere. The cancellation of the hotel cost the NFF 
the sum of $125,000.621 The Nigerian newspaper Daily Independent took the op-
portunity to vilify the NFF officials: 
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Photo 7.2 In April 2009, the Otumfuo Challenge Cup and other festivities were organised in 
honour of the current Asantehene’s ten year anniversary on the throne 
 
 
 
The episode highlighted the managerial ineptitude (to choose a polite term) that has, over the 
years, become the hallmark of the NFF. As usual, such incompetence goes along the char-
acteristic whiff of untoward, corrupt practices. In a more sensible climate some of the top 
officials of the NFF would have by now accepted responsibility and, as it were, fallen on 
their own swords. Sadly, that sort of action rarely takes place here. There has, on the con-
trary, been a lot of buck-passing and trading of blame. What is obvious is that without 
anyone being held accountable, the matter will soon be swept under the carpet. No lessons 
will have been learnt, no new procedures put in place to avoid a repetition of the embar-
rassing incident. For the NFF crowd, this is all very convenient and self-serving.622 
Such mistakes are arguably caused by a combination of incompetence and 
short-term thinking. Nigerians refer to these factors as the Fire Brigade Ap-
proach. ‘Simply put it means that in Nigeria, people (…) always wait until the 
last minute before they take action on something that they should have done a 
long, long time ago,’ wrote the Nigerian blogger Aderounmu. ‘In the end, we 
always try to do things when it is almost (too) late. We rally round, try a few 
urgent steps and we end up messing up the job.’623 Africa’s leagues suffer from 
the incompetence on the part of club and FA officials. One can never tell when a 
league season commences or, for that matter, ends. Ghana’s Premier League, for 
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example, is plagued by endless cancellations and postponements.624 Coach Ste-
ven Polack made the following comment about league fixtures in 2009: 
The fixtures showed that we played on the 11th, the 15th, the 18th and the 29th. That’s the 
work of the GFA. I told them: “Excuse me, but the Black Stars are playing on the 29th so 
when are we playing?” They told me the 29th. I said: “I just told you the Black Stars are 
playing.” This is the GFA! They don’t even know when the Black Stars are playing. Now 
they called me and said: “Oh, it’s the 25th.” They probably realised it because I said some-
thing. It’s quite simple, really. You tell one guy to do the fixtures. And not just one day but 
the whole season. So you have to check the FIFA website. There you’ll find all the World 
Cup dates, the friendlies, and so on. Then you go to the CAF website and see what dates are 
the CAF dates. And you put our league around those dates. 
Indeed, GFA officials consistently fail to check the international football cal-
endar. 
These cancellations and postponements negatively affect both leagues and 
clubs. Club officials in Ghana were told that the CHAN tournament in 2009 
would halt the league for three to four weeks. It later turned out to be more than 
seven weeks. ‘I can wake up in the morning and get a phone call that a game is 
cancelled,’ said Polack. First, clubs suffer because salaries need to be paid out 
even though no money comes in from gate proceeds. Second, leagues suffer 
because sponsors find these continuous cancellations bad for business. This is 
true for publicity as well. It is difficult to advertise matches when nobody is sure 
if (and where) they will take place. For example, it took me five hours to travel 
from Kumasi to Accra by bus on Saturday 6 June 2009. I wanted to watch 
Ghana’s biggest match (Hearts vs Kotoko) on Sunday. As soon as I arrived in 
Accra, I was told that the match had been postponed. Apparently, the GFA 
officials had failed to realise that the Black Stars also played that weekend. 
There is also the habit among FA officials to change the rules as they see fit, 
which leads to conspiracy theories. In 2009 the GFA announced that all the 
matches in the 27th league round would be played simultaneously so as to avoid 
matches of convenience (see chapter 8). First, however, the PLB changed the 
venue of the encounter between Liberty Professionals and Asante Kotoko three 
times within a couple of days. Kotoko sympathisers ‘read meaning’ into this flip-
flopping behaviour and accused the PLB of wanting ‘to thwart the team’s efforts 
in the ongoing league’.625 This change of venues caused another match to be 
postponed until later in the evening which rendered useless the plan of having all 
matches kick off at the same time. 
Incompetent behaviour also influences the performances of national teams. 
‘Even if you give us 10 years to prepare, it will be the same because up till now 
many of these (African) countries don’t recognise professionalism in their prepa-
ration,’ said Amos Adamu, a former FIFA Executive Committee member, during 
the 2010 World Cup. ‘One of the problems we must get right here in Africa is 
that we need to plan ahead.’626 Preparations for major tournaments commonly do 
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not go as planned simply because there was no plan in the first place. During the 
2000 African Cup of Nations, Togo’s coach Gotlieb Goeller resigned his post, 
blaming the FA president for the team’s poor preparations. ‘On the day I left, I 
was fighting with my (…) president,’ he said. ‘He does nothing and has no idea 
of what the players need. I asked, where are the vitamins and the minerals, where 
are the carbohydrate drinks? They said “Oh we forgot” and I became mad be-
cause we only have a few days’ recovery between games.’627 
Issues of incompetence also surround the hiring of coaches. Even after being 
coach of South Africa’s national team for months, Carlos Alberto Parreira still 
had no valid working permit. Early in 2007, a government spokesperson said that 
SAFA had submitted the papers only that very week (the Brazilian was appointed 
in August 2006). The Belgian coach Tom Saintfiet was expelled from Zimbabwe 
by immigration authorities while preparing the national team for a World Cup 
qualifier in 2010. FA officials had forgotten to apply for a work permit. More 
serious is the fact that football administrators tend to replace their national team 
coaches at the last possible minute. Especially when an African coach manages 
to qualify his country for a major tournament, he is commonly fired in favour of 
an expatriate coach. It is claimed that FA officials, ministers and the like want to 
score politically for having acquired a reasonably well-known foreigner whom 
they claim will deliver the title. 
This kind of short-term thinking has proven to have an adverse effect on the 
performance of national teams. Sven-Göran Eriksson signed a lucrative contract 
with the Ivorian FA a few months before the 2010 World Cup. With no ex-
perience in coaching African teams, Eriksson met his squad at a training camp in 
Switzerland on the eve of the tournament. ‘The time is short, yes,’ admitted the 
Swede.628 Otto Pfister, a veteran when it comes to coaching African teams, has 
occasionally been called up to replace African coaches. He replaced Stephen 
Keshi as coach of Togo at the 2006 World Cup while the Nigerian was respon-
sible for qualification in the first place. The following year Pfister led the Indo-
mitable Lions at the 2008 African Cup of Nations. In both cases, the German had 
less than three months to prepare his players. 
Powerful Africans also have irrational expectations of their coaches’ capabi-
lities. ‘The country expects the title win – without yielding a goal,’ coach Berti 
Vogts said after the 2008 African Cup of Nations.629 He failed to lead the 
Nigerians to the final and was dismissed. His successor Lars Lägerback faced a 
bigger challenge prior to the 2010 World Cup. ‘This is a call to national duty and 
I expect the Eagles to prepare well and win this trophy,’ president Goodluck 
Jonathan said. ‘That will be a birthday gift for our country and set the stage for a 
golden jubilee celebration of our independence as a nation.’630 Nigeria did not 
win the World Cup and Lägerback was dismissed. When I first talked to the 
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Namibian national team coach in 2008, Arie Schans told me that the powerful 
men in the country did not expect anything of him. Later on they wanted him to 
qualify for the 2010 World Cup. He found this a mission impossible and left. 
Most criticism is directed not so much at incompetence but at mismanagement 
and corruption. African countries are generally ranked low on Transparency 
International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index which, to be sure, is not a 
positive thing in this respect.631 ‘In France, you might expect that for every $100 
coming into football, $10 might disappear. In Africa, for every $100 coming into 
football, $90 disappears!’ said Joseph-Antoine Bell, a former Cameroonian goal-
keeper.632 Similar words were used by George Weah. ‘Our officials are too 
selfish. Everything is money. They use us, the players, to get money, to steal the 
money,’ he once said.633 As McHenry argues with regard to Tanzania, ‘football 
appears to have succeeded (…) in providing individuals with an opportunity to 
acquire personal wealth and status (…)’.634 
One aspect that increases corruption is that Africans still largely rely on cash. 
‘In Africa nobody trusts cheques anyway,’ said Kalusha Bwalya. ‘We expect to 
be paid in cash.’635 A former senior administrator told a British journalist that in 
Africa the federations are run ‘with cash’. ‘There are no cheques, no bank trans-
fers,’ he said. ‘They only use cash. Even when they pay the players it is in cash. 
They do this willingly because they know that it’s too transparent to use other 
methods. (…) It’s easy that way to rob it.’636 I have come to know the cash side 
myself. I once entered a bank with YOSA’s team manager, who carried a bag 
containing the gate proceeds from the last match, totalling 1.8 million CFA 
francs (€3,000). In 2001 a Ghanaian Sports Minister lost a suitcase filled with 
$46,000 en route to Sudan; $236,000 was stolen from the Nigerian FA’s head-
quarters in 2009 with police suspecting an inside job.637 
I have heard stories of money disappearing in private pockets in every con-
ceivable situation. Coaches tend to ask players for money if they want to feature 
in the line-up. Players share a percentage of their signing fees with those doing 
the recruitment. Club officials are known to have pocketed club funds. One way 
to do this is by selling the club’s players, another is to ask the club’s Big Man for 
money to hire a jujuman. He will pay the jujuman a portion of that amount and 
pocket the rest. Jujumen too are known to rob clubs and FAs of their money. 
Players cheat as well, for instance by signing up at two clubs at the same time, 
thus doubling their signing fees. 
The game offers a plethora of possibilities for Big Men to mismanage funds. 
Fraud with gate takings is a typical example, and it is not a recent phenomenon. 
Football entrepreneur Henry Ngwenya, mentioned in chapter 6, used his position 
as president of a regional FA to enrich himself. Alegi describes his methods as 
follows: 
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Football notoriety benefited Ngwenya in economic terms. Located near Somtseu Ground in 
the central business district, his restaurant flourished. The president was not only a popular 
host, he also awarded himself catering contracts for the provision of meals to visiting teams 
and delegations – a lucrative deal that produced nearly £700 in net profit one year. Ngwe-
nya’s hand-picked gate attendants defrauded the association by deliberately, and consistent-
ly, failing to document tickets sales. After matches, these men delivered cash to the president 
who, instead of depositing the funds into the DDAFA bank account, stuffed the cash into 
envelopes, which he sealed and locked in his office desk drawer together with the treasurer’s 
financial records.638  
Matches tend to generate less money because tickets sellers, stadium directors 
and/or FA officials either pocket gate proceeds or let in friends for free. One 
FECAFOOT president was once sent to prison for illegally selling 3,000 World 
Cup tickets. In March 2009, 19 fans died and 132 people were injured in a stam-
pede at a stadium in Ivory Coast. An investigation revealed that the chairman of 
the Match Commission had printed thousands of extra tickets. He was sentenced 
to six months in prison. 
Corruption also occurs with regard to league sponsorships, TV deals and FIFA 
funds. The Cameroonian journalist Jean-Lambert Nang worked as general man-
ager of FECAFOOT for a period of six months in 2007. After being fired, he 
wrote a book, albeit with a personal undertone, in which he described FECA-
FOOT’s top officials’ involvement in several illegalities.639 Nang’s investigations 
into what he called the “haunted house” led to a state-funded audit which, in turn, 
led to the indictment of four FECAFOOT administrators. The court documents, 
obtained by journalists from an organisation called FAIR, showed that FECA-
FOOT officials overpaid themselves for services rendered and that ‘vice presid-
ent David Mayebi received regular payments from sports manufacturer Puma 
into his personal bank account’.640 
The same FAIR reporters also discovered that Amos Adamu, the then presid-
ent of the Nigerian FA, ‘ruled over a situation in which Nigerian football clubs 
were able to access only about 10% of the $7 million yearly donated to them by 
their sponsor, Globalcom (sic). The rest has stayed with the officials on the board 
of the Nigeria Premier League.’641 With regard to Ivory Coast, the same reporters 
spoke to insiders who ‘pointed out mismanagement at all levels of the FIF’: 
Local soccer clubs for example, haven’t seen any of the FCFA 800 million (US $1.6 million) 
per year that was habitually donated to them by the Ivorian Petrol Refinery company Societé 
Ivoirienne de Raffinage, SIR, through [president Jacques] Anouma’s FIF. Since nobody 
knew of these donations, nobody complained, until 2007, when the SIR itself found out that 
national clubs had not seen any of it. A letter written by the SIR, announcing the suspension 
of the yearly donation until further notice fell into the hands of one of the clubs’ presidents, 
after which it was made public. In response to the ensuing criticism, FIF director Anouma 
argued that “that money was not supposed to the clubs anyway”, without explaining where 
it, then, went.642 
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Both Amos Adamu and Jacques Anouma were part of FIFA’s Executive Com-
mittee. 
Mismanagement and corruption are an important reason why league sponsor-
ships and other funds tend not to trickle down. A lot of funds from corporations 
and FIFA are earmarked for grassroots development yet Africa’s football infra-
structures have deteriorated over the years. More worryingly, several FAs man-
aged to become indebted. SAFA had a budget deficit of more than $8 million in 
the early 2000s which, as journalist Mark Gleeson asserts, was a result of ‘regu-
lar first-class overseas travel for top executives and the employment of family 
members, friends and neighbours’.643 In 2006 SAFA announced it had reduced 
its debts from $12.5 million to $1.6 million, largely thanks to a FIFA grant.644 
When the officials of Kenya’s KFF were expelled in 2006, they had left the 
accounts with $320,000 in debt.645 There have been reports of lower-level em-
ployees at various FAs who have gone without pay for months.646 
Several organisations and individuals have criticised Kenya’s FA officials. A 
report by the African Centre for Open Government (AfriCOG) lists three KFF 
administrations that were sacked for mismanagement and corruption since the 
1960s.647 A case study by Transparency International indicates the number may 
be higher. ‘The history of KFF is punctuated by claims of corruption, abuse of 
office and financial mismanagement,’ a TI-Kenya newsletter states.648 Bob 
Munro, founder of the Mathare Youth Sports Association (MYSA), specifically 
accused the Maina Kariuki-led administration between 2000 and 2004 of mis-
managing gate takings and FIFA funds. He went on to make the following state-
ment at a conference in 2005: 
During 2000-04 Kariuki presided over a culture of corruption which crippled Kenyan foot-
ball. It also spread like a cancer from the national to local levels. While national KFF 
officials looted the national KFF and FIFA funds, many local KFF officials pocketed the 
KFF share of gate receipts from the matches in their areas. In a corrupt bargain the national 
officials overlooked the theft of KFF gate receipt deductions by local officials while they in 
turn overlooked the embezzlement of KFF and FIFA funds by the national officials.649 
The KFF accounts were finally frozen due to non-payment of taxes. 
South African football is no exception. The reign of the powerful administra-
tor Abdul Bhamjee came to an end in 1992 when he was charged with 35 counts 
of theft: 
One of the charges related to the negotiation of broadcasting rights for league matches with 
the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). On behalf of the NSL Bhamjee had 
negotiated a contract and agreed upon a set fee for the broadcasting rights. These had been 
presented to the SABC Board, which had then made the money available. At the same time, 
a second contract, which included a considerably lower figure, had also been drawn up. This 
had been presented to the NSL executive, which had agreed to the terms. Bhamjee, together 
with a few others, had pocketed the difference.650 
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Bhamjee was found guilty of misappropriating hundreds of thousands of dollars 
and went to prison. Five years later, Sports Minister Steve Tshwete set up a 
Commission of Inquiry after SAFA officials had been accused of corruption. 
Justice Benjamin Pickard concluded that SAFA president Solomon “Stix” More-
wa had sold the national team’s marketing and television rights to an Irish com-
pany. Journalist Perlman wrote how the Big Man ‘had a certain logic’ in wanting 
to sign the deal: 
Pickard found that just before the contract was sealed, ASI boss Brian Mahon gave Morewa 
a R500 000 loan [100,000 dollars]. And there was more. A local company, Foodcorp, which 
was seeking renewal of a three-year contract with SAFA, made the president a present of a 
Mercedes Benz worth more than R400 000. Morewa was found to have paid himself a 
performance bonus R45 000 [10,000 dollars] – and then paid himself the same bonus again. 
And the shabbiest of all, he and other SAFA members were found to have dipped liberally 
into the organisation’s education trust which was meant to fund the studies of promising 
players.651 
Yet another opportunity for Big Men to embezzle funds is through internati-
onal tournaments, which give rise to politically motivated investments and vari-
ous business deals. For example, the Angolan authorities invested $1 billion in 
building stadiums, airports, roads and hotels for the 2010 African Cup of Nati-
ons. These are huge amounts of money, especially considering the fact that the 
majority of Angolans live off less than two dollars a day. When the organisers of 
the 2009 U17 World Cup announced a €158 million budget, the Nigerian govern-
ment suspected foul play and threatened to cancel the tournament unless the 
budget be cut by a factor four. Accusations of corruption surfaced in the run-up 
to the 2010 World Cup, for instance with regard to the construction of the sta-
dium in Nelspruit. Powerful football administrators were given bonuses of $1.2 
million for their role in bringing the tournament to South Africa. 
Funds to accommodate national teams at tournaments are occasionally em-
bezzled. After the 2010 World Cup, four top NFF officials were arrested on 
charges of having spent €620,000 on travel costs for 47 delegates and 173 
‘friends and girlfriends’. They were also accused of having handed out 1,263 
complimentary tickets to ‘associates’.652 The Ghanaian Minister of Sports was 
dismissed for having illegally collected daily allowances during the CHAN 
tournament in 2009. He had also used public funds to take his ‘girlfriend’ along 
to the final.653 In Cameroon, media reports of a scandal dubbed Trop Perҫu 
forced FECAFOOT officials to refund 235 million CFA francs (€360,000) which 
they had awarded themselves after the 2010 African Cup of Nations.654 
Coaches and players suffer from corruption. Former international Mulamba 
Ndaye claimed that the hammering of Zaire by Yugoslavia (9-0) at the 1974 
World Cup was caused by players realising their bonuses had disappeared. Each 
player was entitled to a FIFA bonus. ‘Before the first match against Scotland, we 
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hadn’t seen any money yet,’ Ndaye said. ‘Sport Minister Sampassa Kaweta 
joined the team at the camp ground. (…) He said: “I will get the money from 
FIFA at the bank tomorrow. Then I’ll return.” But he never did. That’s when we 
refused to play. That was two days before the match against Yugoslavia.’655 
Goldblatt argues that nothing has changed since: 
In Zaire, by the end of Mobutu’s reign, there were no incomes of any kind paid to anyone. 
There was only flagrant predation. The money allocated for the team at the 1996 Cup of 
Nations completely disappeared only to reappear in the shape of a new villa for the team’s 
senior administrator. The renamed Democratic Republic of Congo just made it to the 2004 
Nations Cup with the help of the Egyptian FA. The squad found themselves penniless in 
Cairo and reduced to dormitory accommodation as the money from Kinshasa never arrived. 
Again the Egyptian FA stepped in to pay their hotel and flights.656 
The case of Zaire in 1974 shows that embezzlement of national team funds by 
FA officials and other powerful individuals can have a disastrous effect on player 
performances. In fact, fights regularly break out between players and Big Men. 
According to Hill, this happened during Ghana’s campaign at the 2006 World 
Cup: 
The meetings had included almost everyone in the team, all the players and senior officials 
of the GFA. One of the players had stood up in the middle of the meeting and shouted at the 
executives, “You are not the people who deserve the money. You cannot play football. You 
are useless. We are the people who play the game, we deserve the money.” The argument 
had been over the allocation of the sponsorship and FIFA money. The players had thought 
that they should get paid well for their efforts. The officials claimed that they wanted the 
bulk of the money for the future development of the game in Ghana. For the officials, 
unfortunately there was a high level of distrust of the soccer authorities by players. Some of 
the players thought that the officials simply wanted to skim the money for themselves.657 
Togo’s maiden World Cup appearance, also in 2006, shows the extent in which a 
hassle over bonuses can result in non-performance. The players went on strike on 
several occasions before and during the tournament, accusing FA officials of not 
paying out bonuses. Government officials travelled to Germany to resolve the 
matter but the players agreed to play only when FIFA promised them their 
bonuses. The Sparrow Hawks lost their three group matches. Months later, 
players still complained about non-payments, prompting Togo’s FA to suspend 
some of them for indiscipline. 
Transparency, accountability and FIFA 
Accusations of mismanagement and corruption are exacerbated by the non-ac-
countable way in which club and FA officials run the game. Big Men are secre-
tive in their dealings on the one hand and well-versed in the art of rhetoric on the 
other. GFA president Kwesi Nyantakyi made a speech about governance, ac-
countability and integrity at the African Football Executive Summit in 2011. 
‘Effective governance involves regular periodic submission of reports on 
198 
 
stewardship to stakeholders,’ he said. ‘Accountability requires the presence of 
internal and external procedures for auditing systems.’658 These sentences could 
easily have come out of a college textbook. 
The question of how Big Men plan to improve accountability in practice usu-
ally remains unanswered. At the same time, African journalists have a low in-
centive to poke their noses into the affairs of Big Men. One Cameroonian 
journalist who attempted to investigate the financial dealings of CAF president 
Issa Hayatou was subsequently threatened and beaten up. The aforementioned 
FAIR reporters found out, just like I had done, that Big Men try to avoid talking 
to critical members of the press. ‘Numerous telephone calls, emails and question-
naires addressed to those in charge of the FIF only resulted in promises for 
interviews,’ one Ivorian journalist wrote. ‘One of the contributors to this investi-
gation went to a few such promised meetings, only to be stood up several times. 
He concluded that “they do not want to be disturbed”.’659 
Whistleblowers have suffered a much worse fate. A local government official 
in South Africa who had blown the whistle on cases of fraud and corruption with 
regard to a World Cup stadium was shot dead. Journalist Thomas Kwenaite once 
spoke of the difficulties of investigative journalism in South Africa. When he 
was investigating the SAFA corruption scandal that led to the installation of the 
Pickard Commission, Kwenaite was threatened with baseball bats, sued for 
thousands of dollars, and offered money to make him stop doing his job.660 The 
aforementioned Cameroonian journalist who wrote a book about FECAFOOT 
found himself discredited in the media. One of his former colleagues at CRTV 
made the following statement: 
This book disgusts me. This is not the work of a journalist or a writer. It’s the work of a spy. 
A spy who observes, makes notes and betrays. This is what Jean-Lambert Nang did. (…) 
The way he wants to condemn people is wrong. He insults people, he disrespects VIPs, so I 
think his approach is inappropriate. (…). One gets the feeling that he wants to get dirty, he 
wants to do evil.661 
A common way of being transparent and accountable is for clubs and FAs to 
present audited accounts. But although GFA regulations demand Premier League 
clubs to submit their accounts at the end of the season, their consistency leaves a 
lot to be desired. ‘No club submits a full audited account at the end of the sea-
son,’ said sports presenter Nana Kwaku Agyemang. ‘When you propose at a 
meeting that a club should not be in the Premier League if it cannot submit a 
proper account, everybody will say yes. But afterwards nothing will happen be-
cause they’re all in on it. And if clubs were expelled for not presenting accounts, 
there would be no club left in the Premier League.’ ‘Not even Hearts and Kotoko 
produce accounts,’ said Kessben FC’s Financial Director, Samuel Ellis Obir. 
Even if an audited account would be submitted, it would be supervised by 
directors who publish whatever the Big Man wants them to. 
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The failure by clubs in presenting audited accounts has caused quite a few 
problems. In 2011, a former Asante Kotoko player named Samuel Inkoom was 
transferred from a Swiss club to a Ukrainian club for a reported fee of €700,000. 
As Kotoko was entitled to ten percent of the fee, the move was welcomed by a 
newly installed management team. They then discovered that the file containing 
Inkoom’s contract was apparently stolen from the club’s secretariat. ‘Where were 
all the security men at the Kotoko Secretariat?’ asked journalist Yeboah. ‘How 
come neither doors nor cabinets were broken into? An “inside job?” Whose 
interest is being served?’662 Kotoko’s new CEO questioned his predecessors 
Sylvester Asare-Owusu, Jerry Asare and Kwame Boafo, all of whom claimed 
either not to know anything about the deal or not to have been involved.663 The 
€70,000 transfer fee, so it seemed, was gone. 
For Kotoko fans and Ghanaians in general the Inkoom saga must have felt like 
a déjà vu. An investigation in the late 1990s uncovered a plot with regard to the 
transfer of players. One of them involved the transfer of a former Kotoko player 
named Robert Boateng. In 1997 Boateng moved to a Norwegian club side for a 
reported fee of $250,000. He later told a Commission of Inquiry that he had 
received only $5,000. He said the transfer was facilitated by the CEO of Kotoko 
at the time, a Big Man named George Adusei Poku a.k.a. Georgido. When 
questioned, Georgido alleged that a briefcase containing Boateng’s contract had 
been stolen. The Commission asked the then CEO of Kotoko, Herbert Mensah, to 
look into the matter. Mensah found out that Robert Boateng was transferred for a 
sum of $800,000 and not $250,000. 
In the end, the so-called Gbadegbe Commission discovered that GFA officials 
and officials of several top clubs had conspired to transfer players. Worse, GFA 
officials (for instance, Joseph Ade Coker, Nana Sam Brew-Butler and Jones Abu 
Alhassan) took up positions within these clubs and misused this apparent conflict 
of interest. Eventually, several clubs were found guilty and ordered to repay 
$784,802.664 The perpetrator, however, by and large got away with it. This is 
what former Deputy Minister of Sports Joe Aggrey said: 
Back then there was a lot of scandal. I was the president of the SWAG and the vice president 
of the committee. What came out? There were a lot of people who transferred players and 
who could not account for the money. The money didn’t go to the club, it went to them. Can 
you imagine that they transfer a player to a foreign club for say $50,000, declare $20,000 
and pocket the rest? Isn’t that stealing? Wouldn’t you have to go to jail? But here they are 
walking around free! It’s clear to you that something is wrong. I don’t whether you read it in 
the newspaper? (Former GFA president) Ben Koufie came on the FMs and said that the 
people who are making all that noise are thieves. He said it! When they were in the FA, they 
stole so much money. They should have been prosecuted. It didn’t happen and they are walk-
ing around. 
The community-based clubs in particular suffer from this type of corruption 
because Big Men who pocket transfer fees deny their club an important source of 
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income. This is all the more worrisome when they leave office. There have been 
reports of club officials who sold players and kept the profits before stepping 
down, thereby leaving the club even more bankrupt than when they assumed 
office. In the early 2000s, a group of Fanti and Ashanti businessmen took over 
the affairs of the once mighty club side Kumasi Cornerstones with the aim of 
earning promotion to the Premier League. ‘They put in a lot of money but they 
failed,’ said CEO R.K. Morrison. ‘So they came back from their mission im-
possible and abandoned the club.’ ‘A lot of players were attached to management 
members,’ said the club’s secretary, Ekow Padson. ‘So when they left the club 
they sold the players and kept the money. Now we’re poorer than before.’  
The problem is made worse by the fact that the economic capital a Big Man 
puts into a club tends to be a loan. This is how Frank Nelson Nwokolo explained 
it: 
It’s an investment. Most of us give loans to the club. When the club has money, you get your 
money back. Most of us don’t take interest, that’s what it takes to be a director. I can loan the 
club $50,000 and tell the club that they can repay me in five months with no interest. That’s 
my contribution to the club. But there’s no crime for a director to ask for interest because if I 
borrow from the bank I pay interest so why should this be different? There’s nothing illegal 
about it. Sometimes the director says: “The bank will take seven per cent so I will only take 
two per cent.” It’s just something to make sure that the value of my money doesn’t go down.  
This is the paradox of those community-based clubs that are not self-sufficient. 
They depend on Big Men in order to survive, but when the wealthy benefactor 
leaves, these clubs find themselves even more indebted. When Herbert Mensah 
resigned as CEO of Asante Kotoko in 2002, it was reported that the club owed 
him over 5 billion old cedi (€250,000). ‘These people always claim that the club 
owes them money,’ said Kwaku Anor. ‘Nana told Mensah, (Kwabena) Kesse and 
the others to present him with an audited account. But Mensah and Kesse never 
handed over an account.’ 
FAs also suffer from a lack of transparency and accountability. It was reported 
in 2010 that a regional GFA office had not presented an account in nine years. Its 
chairman told a journalist that it was too costly to produce such an account.665 
Despite efforts by club officials to get some insight into income and expendi-
tures, Kenya’s FA officials stalled the presentation of an audited account for 
years in a row.666 A former secretary-general of Tanzania’s FA once acknow-
ledged that they did not have audited accounts before 2000. ‘We used wisdom to 
decide the best way to spend the association’s money,’ he stated.667 When FAs 
do present accounts, they regularly contain inconsistencies. An audit of the 
GFA’s 2009/10 accounts revealed that spendings worth hundreds of thousands of 
dollars were not backed up by receipts.668 
Governments used to be involved both in appointing FA officials and in 
keeping an eye on their FAs’ financial affairs. McHenry lists several cases in 
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which FA officials in Tanzania were sacked for corrupt practices in the 1970s 
and in Kenya too the government disbanded several administrations.669 Now-
adays governments are cautious when it comes to interfering with football af-
fairs. When the aforementioned discrepancies in the GFA’s accounts came out, 
Minister of Sports Akua Sena Dansua refused to get herself involved. ‘I do not 
want to be drawn into this matter because the GFA is an organisation on its own 
and its management should take ultimate responsibility for the outcome of any 
investigation into its operations,’ she stated.670 
I have earlier stated that FAs and governments still fight each other to 
determine who is in control of the game. But FIFA states that FAs are to run 
football ‘independently and with no influence from third parties’ and that 
elections or appointments of FA officials are to be regulated by ‘a procedure that 
guarantees the complete independence of the election or appointment’.671 One of 
FIFA’s reasons was to stop dictators and military regimes from using the game 
for political purposes;672 another was to prevent its funds from ending up in the 
wrong pockets.673 Yet this rule of non-interference appears to protect corrupt FA 
officials as they now find themselves working in an environment free from 
external meddling. FA officials nevertheless operate within the laws of a country. 
Joe Aggrey described the issue as follows: 
The national teams in Ghana are almost exclusively funded by the government. So the 
problem is that if I put in all my money, how can you say that I should stay out? That’s 
where the government interferes. They want to make sure that the money they bring in is 
spent in a proper way. I think that there should be a way for the government to invite the FA 
and talk quietly to accept the fact that the government should know what’s happening there. 
For instance, it’s normal for the government to appoint auditors to account for the money 
they give you. For that I can honestly say that you can’t say that the government is inter-
fering because it’s their money! 
FIFA has enforced its rule of non-interference by suspending several African 
countries over the years.674 FIFA tends to intervene, first, when elected FA 
officials are deposed by the Ministry of Sports or rival factions and, second, 
when governments launch investigations into their FAs. The Ghanaian authori-
ties suffered humiliation when an Accra Human Rights Court deemed a raid by 
the Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) into the GFA’s headquarters 
in 2010 invalid. While EOCO said it was investigating suspicions of tax evasion, 
FIFA threatened to suspend the country. The court’s dismissal of the raid was 
predicated on its assumption that the GFA was a private entity.675 Earlier that 
year, FIFA banned Nigeria after president Goodluck Jonathan (briefly) suspend-
ed the Super Eagles. FIFA also opposed the fact that four FA officials were 
arrested on the charge of embezzling funds.676 
FIFA put its weight behind the re-election of FA president Ibrahim Galadima 
in 2005 even though Nigeria’s Minister of Sports deemed the election invalid on 
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ground of irregularities during the voting process. The FA later solved the issue 
by voting Galadima out of office.677 A similar situation occurred in Zambia 
where former football star Kalusha Bwalya was elected FA president in 2008. He 
was later accused by government, FA and club officials of being involved in 
dubious transfers of players and of running the FA in an autocratic manner. 
Chaos ensued when a rival faction led by a businessman broke away with the aim 
of starting a parallel league. FIFA nevertheless blocked efforts to launch an in-
vestigation and reiterated its support to Bwalya, who can only be voted out of 
office during the next elections (scheduled for 2012).678 
A comprehensive case study of the link between corrupt FA officials, a lack of 
accountability and FIFA’s interventionist policy comes from Kenya. The trouble 
began with the installation of the aforementioned Maina Kariuki-led administra-
tion in 2000. Eight Premier League clubs later set up an Inter-Clubs Consultative 
Group (ICCG) in response to alleged malpractices of FA officials. Bob Munro, 
founder of one of these clubs, argues that the ICCG found it difficult to obtain 
the KFF’s audited accounts: 
KFF officials initially welcomed but then started stalling on the inspection of their accounts. 
On February 19, 2001 the KFF Secretary General met with the club representatives who 
were accompanied by auditors from Deloitte & Touche plus John Githongo, the Executive 
Director of Transparency International in Kenya. He confirmed the clubs had the right to 
inspect the KFF accounts. But after that meeting, whenever the clubs and auditors requested 
a date for starting their inspection, KFF officials kept inventing new excuses for delaying the 
inspection. Despite many later requests, the Kariuki regime repeatedly refused to allow their 
member clubs to inspect the KFF accounts for the next three years.679 
When a copy of one of the audited accounts finally surfaced, it revealed financial 
irregularities with regard to gate takings and FIFA funds, among other things.680 
Since the ending of the Kariuki-led administration in 2004, various Big Men 
have struggled to gain control over the FA. FIFA has consistently backed one 
man, Mohammed Hatimy, who ironically was one of the key members of the 
corrupt Kariuki administration. Hatimy listed a new company by the name of 
Football Kenya Limited (FKL) in 2008. FIFA immediately recognised the FKL 
as the country’s official FA, thereby ignoring the hitherto official KFF which was 
now led by a government-backed man named Sam Nyamweya. AfriCOG ques-
tioned the legitimacy of Hatimy’s takeover: 
FIFA’s intervention in the Kenyan crisis since 2004 raises concern; in what seems to be a 
case of double standards, Dr Joseph Mifsud (Malta, UEFA Executive Committee) accused 
the Sports Minister of being “very inconsistent since one day he supports the leaders of the 
KFF and the next day he does something against them.” Yet, FIFA itself is guilty of such 
‘flip-flopping’: With the Hatimy theft case yet unresolved, and a FIFA ban from football 
management, Hatimy registered FKL and consequently hijacked KFF functions with FIFA 
support in gross violation of Kenyan – and indeed, FIFA – laws.681 
The court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) later ruled in favour of the FKL. 
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The administration of Kenyan football is still a mess, a situation that has not 
helped the national team. The Harambee Stars now come under the responsibility 
of the FKL. ‘They are no better than the KFF,’ said sports editor Elias Makori. 
‘In fact, they are worse, because they are a private company comprising just three 
people.’682 The prime minister of Kenya even pleaded with the FKL officials to 
step down. FIFA nevertheless kept on supporting the Hatimy-led administration. 
Paradoxically, the Premier League appeared to be doing quite well. The rebellion 
of top clubs against FA officials paid off. In 2003, eleven Premier League clubs 
turned away from the FA and created the Kenyan Premier Football Group 
Limited (KPFG), later renamed the Kenyan Premier League Limited (KPL). The 
KPL is now reportedly one of the best run leagues in Africa.683 
Despite the overall lack of transparency and accountability and FIFA’s inter-
ferences, several Big Men have been found guilty of corruption and have been 
sent to prison.684 Their imprisonment has nevertheless not solved African foot-
ball’s managerial problems because, first, they often only serve a fraction of their 
sentence and, second, they tend to return to football administration. The Big Men 
who were found guilty in Ghana’s player transfer probe never went to prison. On 
the contrary, Joseph Ade Coker ran as a candidate for the GFA presidency in 
2005, Nana Sam Brew-Butler became the chairman of a GFA Committee in 
2006, and Jones Abu Alhassan was elected chairman of the Player Status Com-
mittee in 2006 (see chapter 9). 
Club officials have been known to return to occupy positions in football ad-
ministration as well. Recall Odotei’s statement about Hearts of Oak’s musical 
chairs, a process whereby Big Men alternate between influential positions over a 
longer period of time. It has certainly happened that supporters of both Hearts 
and Kotoko were (in-)directly responsible for sending away club officials. Para-
doxically, Big Men have been asked to return by the same supporters who were 
responsible for their dismissal. Harry Zakkour had to step down as CEO of 
Hearts but was later elected as a board member. ‘We wanted to tap from his 
experience,’ explained Edmund Palmer. ‘We sometimes ask these people to 
come back. It’s just a warning that you don’t own the club.’ 
One reason why many Big Men are allowed to return to football administra-
tion is that they can still rely on their factions. A Big Man’s demise is commonly 
blamed on dirty political tricks by his adversaries. It has happened that when a 
corrupt FA official dies, he is remembered as someone who contributed to the 
growth of the game. An example is the death of Solomon “Stix” Morewa in 
2005. ‘Mr Morewa will be remembered for his many achievements within South 
African football, but most specifically for the pivotal role he played in bringing 
South African football back to the international community,’ said CAF president 
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Issa Hayatou.685 Hayatou thus celebrated the life of a man who withheld thou-
sands of dollars to the detriment of the game. 
To sum up, clubs and FAs are organised professionally on paper but run by 
Big Men through a system of patronage in practice. Big Men who control the 
organisation also control the forms of capital. They do not like to share power 
with other Big Men, resulting in boardroom struggles in the management of clubs 
and FAs. We have seen how such struggles between Big Men have affected how 
Asante Kotoko is run. Moreover, incompetence as well as corruption on the part 
of FA officials negatively affects the development of the game. There is little 
accountability and FIFA tends to protect FA officials from investigations. Yet 
controlling clubs and FAs is not enough to convert capital. Big Men also need to 
be successful on the field of play. To this end, they sometimes break the rules of 
the game. This will be the subject of the next chapter. 
 
 8 
The art of winning 
No extraordinary events took place in the first half of the 2008/09 Ghana Premier 
League season. There were pockets of violence. Several coaches became the 
object of scorn – and some of them were laid off. There were also allegations of 
match-fixing and juju. Welbeck Abra-Appiah, chairman of the Premier League 
Board (PLB), was a happy man prior to the start of the second half. ‘There has 
been a keen competition so far and the way clubs are winning their away matches 
is a clear evidence of that,’ he said.686 
The chairman’s statement may have sounded somewhat awkward. First, did 
teams win more away matches than usual? No. Out of 120 matches played in that 
time period, 21 were won by visiting teams. That is average if one looks at the 
statistics of all matches played in the first half of Premier League seasons 
between 2000 and 2010.687 Second, the chairman appeared to link the occurrence 
of a ‘keen competition’ to the winning of away matches. Why would he say that? 
Steven Polack, who coached King Faisal, said that supporters ‘expect you to 
lose away. We don’t have many supporters who go along for away matches, so 
they don’t care. They think it’s normal to lose away from home.’ ‘The perception 
in Ghana is that when you play outside you will be cheated,’ coach Bashir 
Hayford said. ‘You don’t even think about those matches.’ This is also true for 
matches in the CAF Champions League. ‘They (the home team) frustrate you,’ 
said Hayford. ‘Those who win their home matches go to the semi-finals.’ 
The difficulty of winning away matches also means that teams are more likely 
to win their home matches. In a way, a home match is like a war, an election or a 
business deal; one needs to prepare well to maximise the chances of success. 
Failure is not an option as supporters regularly assault their players, coaches and 
club officials when the visiting team leaves town with three points. To avoid 
such troubles but also to earn credits, Big Men tend to do whatever it takes to 
guarantee victory. To this end, they sometimes break the rules of the game. 
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Match-fixing, hospitality and gift-giving 
So far we have seen that people identify with teams based on geographical 
location and ethnic considerations, among other things (chapter 4). I also stated 
that football can to some extent be regarded as a form of tribal warfare. Indeed, 
we have seen how many clubs in Africa are associated with ethno-politics 
(chapter 5), making a team’s home ground more than just a field on which to 
play the game. Seen this way, I assumed before I went to Ghana and Cameroon 
that home teams would undertake severe measures to ensure victory. This turned 
out to be true. In fact, the people I spoke to all acknowledged that winning at 
home is much more important than winning away. 
Anyone who is familiar with team sports knows the principle of home advan-
tage. The ‘home-field effect favoring the home team and disadvantaging the 
away team’ is ‘reflected in evidence that teams playing at home win significantly 
more often than chance would dictate’.688 Richard Pollard argues that home 
advantage in football occurs all over the world, including Africa.689 Indeed, home 
advantage applies to the Ghana Premier League as well.690 Home teams tend to 
put the visitors into rat-infested and sometimes bewitched hotels, assemble sup-
porters to sing and drum all night so as to deprive the visitors of their sleep, and 
make sure the visiting team is harassed in and around the stadium. Teams parti-
cipating in the African Cup of Nations have complained about visa problems, 
delays at customs and missing luggage, among other things. 
Although Pollard states that the causes of home advantage ‘are still not well 
understood’,691 he and others have listed a number of causes including crowd 
support, travelling, territoriality, referee bias and rule factors.692 I will deal with 
(some of) these causes along the way. Let me now present three factors that in 
my view contribute to home advantage in Africa. These factors are: Match-
fixing, hospitality and gift-giving; juju and other occult forces; and intimidation 
and violence. Starting with match-fixing practices, it can be stated that some 
forms of bribery fit into the category of referee bias. Many informants main-
tained that the referee is “the most important man on the field”; slip him an 
envelope and he may be more sympathetic to one’s cause. However, the referee 
is not the only one susceptible to bribery. 
Ian Preston and Stefan Szymanski list three types of cheating in sports: 
Sabotage (reducing the opponent’s performance), doping (improving one’s own 
performance) and match-fixing. These types fall into two categories: Cheating to 
win and cheating to lose.693 They go on to give three different instances of 
match-fixing: 
Match-fixing occurs either because one side ‘needs’ to win to the extent that it is willing to 
make side-payments to persuade the other side not to make effort or to persuade the referees 
to make biased decisions, or because players or officials stand to gain financially from 
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gambling on the outcome of a match. Both types of activity are specifically banned in most 
sports, and therefore these represent clear breaches of the rules.  
Less clear is a third type of situation where a competitor, possibly in collusion with op-
ponents, aims to produce a particular kind of result in a match (other than winning by the 
widest possible margin) which is convenient to them in the wider context of tournament 
play. This may not be explicitly prohibited within the sport, but can clearly serve to under-
mine the sport’s credibility.694 
Interestingly, Preston and Szymanski include a form of cheating that does not 
violate any rules. Indeed, in Africa hospitality and gift-giving are used as means 
to influence the outcome of a match (see below), but the rules do not prohibit 
such practices. 
I wish to make three general points in relation to match-fixing. First, match-
fixing occurs not only in football but in several other professional sports as 
well.695 Second, it is argued in various studies that match-fixing usually occurs 
when the rewards for winning are asymmetrical, meaning that victory is more 
important for one team than for the other.696 Also, the setup of leagues and 
tournaments “encourages” cheating. As Preston and Szymanski state, it is a 
‘contest design issue, where the structure of the competition creates perverse 
incentives in certain matches’.697 Third, match-fixing in sports is not as easy as 
one might think. With regard to football, Declan Hill explains the steps a “cor-
ruptor” needs to undertake, including gaining access, brokering a deal, the (non-
)performance and the payment.698 
There are several types of matches in Africa that are susceptible to match-
fixing: City or regional derbies, tournament matches, end-of-season matches. 
One could argue that when the stakes are high the chances of money passing 
hands increases significantly. It is also a matter of what Preston and Szymanski 
called a “contest design issue”. Cup matches are sudden-death type of matches, 
meaning that a single match determines whether a team progresses to the next 
level. The same is true for end-of-season matches where one match can deter-
mine who will win the championship and who will relegate. Moreover, both 
Ghana and Cameroon hold tournaments (called Middle League and Interpools, 
respectively) whereby a select number of teams struggle to gain access to the top 
league. This is where teams will do everything to beat their opponents. 
The aforementioned issue of asymmetry dictates that winning a match may be 
more important for one team than for the other. First, home teams generally have 
more incentives to win than away teams. For home teams victory is essential, for 
away teams losing is almost expected. Coach Steven Polack told me the follow-
ing story:  
We [King Faisal] played an away match against AshantiGold in Obuasi and won 0-1. We 
drew the following home match 1-1. The supporters said: “It’s not good not to win at home.” 
I asked: “If we had lost the game in Obuasi and won this one at home, would you be happy?” 
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They said yes. I said: “So you’re happy with three points and I’m happy with four points.” 
But they didn’t understand. That’s the mentality of the supporters. 
‘There is now overwhelming evidence that referee decisions favor the home 
team,’ Pollard states.699 In Africa, several factors contribute to a referee’s bias 
towards the home team: Bribery, hospitality, intimidation, violence. All of these 
factors will receive due attention. Coach Steven Polack agreed that referees are 
biased: 
It’s because they get paid, don’t they? Club officials go to their hotel and pay them. We 
played a game at Wa against All Stars. At half time the score was 0-0. I heard that the referee 
went to their changing room and told the club officials: “Tell your players to get into the 
penalty area if they want a penalty.” He told them to fall over. And then he gave a penalty. It 
was laughable. Can it be more obvious? The penalty he gave was so diabolic. This here is the 
edge of the penalty area. One of our players kicks the ball out of the box. I see it as a good 
clearance. Our player turns to look where the ball is going and touches one of their players. 
He falls over and it’s a penalty. We lost the match 1-0. 
Second, some teams have more incentives to win end-of-season matches than 
others. This is true when a match is played between a team capable of clinching 
the league title and a team that stands to earn nothing no matter the outcome. 
Hearts and Kotoko, for instance, both occupied the top spot at the end of the 
2008/09 Premier League season. Hearts travelled to Berekum to play Arsenals in 
their second-to-last league match while Kotoko visited Obuasi for a match 
against AshantiGold. Reports indicated that Hearts first delayed the match for 
twenty minutes and that the referee also delayed the match by pretending to have 
loose bowels. It seemed that Hearts wanted the Kotoko match to end first. When 
Hearts was leading 1-0 and everybody at Berekum learned that Kotoko had lost 
their match, the referee awarded Arsenals a penalty. For Hearts a draw was 
enough to win the championship.700 The point is that Hearts played a team 
(Arsenals) that had nothing to gain while Kotoko played a team (AshantiGold) 
that was on the brink of relegation. AshantiGold thus did everything to ensure 
victory.701 
By far the most suspicious matches are end-of-season matches involving 
teams that struggle to avoid relegation. ‘Most of the matches are reasonably fair 
and square until it gets to a point where relegation comes in,’ said Mr. X, an 
informant whom I will introduce later on. ‘So it’s in the second part of the season 
that you’ll see strange things happening.’ As journalist Bediako states, ‘the 
interesting phenomenon is that you only get surprise results mostly involving 
relegation threatened clubs and it is always towards the end of the compe-
tition’.702 The Ghana Premier League has indeed had ‘a rather bad reputation’ in 
this respect.703 Cameroonian supporters too are familiar with suspicious end-of-
season results. 
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One of Ghana’s biggest-ever match-fixing scandals occurred in the final round 
of the 1988/89 National League season. Both Sekondi Hasaacas and B.A. United 
needed a win to avoid relegation. Hasaacas beat Eleven Wise 19-0 in Sekondi 
while B.A. United beat Man U 20-0 in Sunyani. ‘Eleven Wise helped us out,’ 
CEO Ben Nab Eyison of Hasaacas told me. ‘Normally these two clubs are 
enemies but now the Show Boys were willing to lend us a hand. They were 
promised a lot of money.’ The CEO explained how they kept themselves in-
formed of what happened in Sunyani. ‘There were no mobile phones so we 
communicated through the railway tracks. We had supporters at the railway 
station in Sunyani and we used Morse Code to receive the scores.’ The second 
half turned into a ‘funny match’, explained the linesman at the time, Atta Baf-
four: 
First, the goalkeeper of Eleven Wise faked an injury. He was lying on the ground and asked 
the referee to be replaced. But Wise had already used all their subs, so they put an outfield 
player between the goalposts. Eleven Wise defenders were losing the ball so clumsily and 
some of them were pulling the jerseys of Hasaacas players for no reason. The referee was 
giving a lot of cards to Wise and free kicks to Hasaacas. Before we realised it, Hasaacas 
scored so many goals. One player would score a goal and carry the ball back to the centre 
circle, only for another player to rush forward and score again. And the spectators were 
shouting “Goal! Goal!”. Then it was 19-0. There was no news from Sunyani so people were 
partying, thinking that they would stay in the league. But later that evening the news came 
that B.A. United had outscored them. 
The Ghanaian Times called the four teams ‘gangsters’ and demanded action.704 
‘After the match I told the referee to write down that this was a match of 
convenience,’ Baffour said. ‘But he refused. He was later banned from offi-
ciating.’ 
Strange things still happen in Ghana. Real Tamale United (RTU) and Zaytuna 
FC were both tied at the bottom of the league table in the 2007/08 Premier 
League season. Coincidentally, the two teams were pitted against each other in 
the final league round, which instantly led to numerous speculations, as journalist 
Bediako testifies: 
Top of the list is the match between Dansoman based Zaytuna and Real Tamale United. This 
is an explosive pairing and both clubs need the points like mad. Whilst the Tamale team, 
11th in the league table with 35 points, need only a draw to escape relegation, Zaytuna, third 
from the bottom with 33 points, would have to win to make their stay in the top division a 
reality. You cannot have a more controversial match than this.705 
The match, which ended 2-1 for RTU, could indeed aptly be called explosive. 
The referee was attacked by Zaytuna players after allowing a goal from RTU 
well into extra time. ‘They played for six minutes into extra time,’ said journalist 
Kamkam Boadu. ‘Then RTU scored and the referee blew the final whistle. It was 
a clear offside goal.’ 
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The stories mentioned above were reported by media outlets. Many match-
fixing practices, however, never reach the public ear or become subject to 
investigations. This is, of course, due to the fact that those involved in match-
fixing tend to keep their mouths shut. I nevertheless gained information from 
those with first-hand experience – players, coaches, referees, club officials and 
some journalists – with regard to “fixed matches”, “matches of convenience” or 
“uncompetitive matches” in Ghana and Cameroon. An important source was the 
Big Man of a top league club in Ghana. Since he told me stories of how he 
himself fixed matches, I will not mention his name and instead call him Mr. X. 
His statements were checked with other sources. 
It is evident that match-fixing occurs in African football and, moreover, that it 
is a widespread phenomenon that goes back several decades.706 There are those 
who say that all matches are fixed in one way or the other.707 If we broaden the 
concept of match-fixing by including hospitality and gift-giving (see below), this 
assumption is probable. There are also those who say that most matches are fixed 
in one way or the other. When I asked the Cameroonian referee Nde Christopher 
Ade how often club officials approached him in a season, he said ‘many times’ 
and then told me half a dozen stories. Retired referee Ngu Fabien Neba, also 
from Cameroon, said: ‘I cannot deny it. Most of the times club officials will try 
to make contact with you.’ This is what Mr. X said: 
Most matches have been fixed by bribery in one way or the other but the teams make sure 
that they win by reasonable figures, such as 1-0, 2-0 or 2-1. This is to make sure nobody gets 
suspicious. Sometimes teams really need all the goals they can get in order to avoid 
relegation. This is where you see teams winning by 20 or 30-0 and this is where teams get 
caught in playing a match of convenience. 
Mr. X’s statement also gives us a clue as to the difficulty of finding out how 
often these practices actually occur.708 
Let us take a look at match-fixing from a Big Man’s point of view. First of all, 
it should be noted that Big Men are by no means always involved in these 
practices. In many cases, however, they are indeed responsible – either person-
ally or through intermediaries – for influencing referees or opponents. The reason 
for a Big Man to want to influence the outcome of a match is simple. In order to 
convert capital he needs to be successful, i.e. he needs to win matches. As the 
outcome of a match cannot be predicted beforehand, club officials are ‘searching 
for certainty in the very uncertain world’ of football.709 In other words, Big Men 
increase the probability of winning matches by engaging in match-fixing. Also, 
bribery does not come cheap and Big Men are generally the ones who are able to 
provide the funds. 
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Photo 8.1 Winning increases the chances of converting capital. An Asante Kotoko player 
celebrates his team’s victory over arch rival Hearts of Oak 
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There are generally speaking three ways in which Big Men influence matches 
through match-fixing: Bribing/influencing referees and linesmen, bribing/influ-
encing opponent team officials, and bribing/influencing opponent team play-
ers.710 The first way is to bribe the referee, the two linesmen and preferably also 
the match commissioner. The first thing to do is to find out which referees are 
assigned to handle matches.711 Several referees told me that it is mostly home 
teams who approach them, although away teams also contact them. Let us con-
sider the following story from Mr. X: 
Let’s say [his team] plays a match against Hearts of Oak. The referee is from Tema. The 
referee and his linesmen will arrive in [his team’s town] a day before the match. We will try 
to make them feel at home. We’ll pay for everything: Their lodgings, food, drinks. Some-
times the referee may be negotiating. He may ask: “What is it that you need? A victory? A 
draw?” This is where we know he’s willing to accept money. But since the referee came 
from Tema, he will also have received officials from Hearts. The distance from Tema to 
Accra is twenty kilometres. They will send someone two days before the match. So they can 
even do it before the home team can do anything. They will tell the referee: “We’re in your 
hands. What are you going to do?” Before they leave they may drop an envelope and say it’s 
for transport. 
When club officials figure out that the opponent team has also bribed the referee, 
they will want to find out how much money was involved so that they can top it. 
So who approaches referees and how much money is involved? Club officials 
naturally like to keep their meetings with referees as secret as possible. ‘We 
normally make sure that nobody can point fingers at the club,’ Mr. X said. ‘The 
referee also wants to have as few witnesses as possible. This is why we send 
supporters to his hotel to see whether he needs anything. Sometimes it’s our 
Public Relations Officer who does it, sometimes it’s the Operations Director.’ 
The aforementioned Ghanaian linesman and referee Atta Baffour, who is pres-
ently retired, said it can be ‘any person’. ‘It’s not always the CEO. He’s the big 
man. All eyes are on him. So if he’s involved, he will be afraid to get caught. 
That’s why he sends other people, sometimes the coach or a friend.’ Referee Nde 
Christopher Ade had the following story to tell: 
The presidents don’t call me directly. They don’t want to expose themselves. They want to 
hide their identities because it’s very dangerous. The referee can call on them and make them 
known. So they won’t use their own phone to call you because you will see who’s calling. 
Sometimes they will go to a phone booth and call you. 
The amounts of money involved are invariably diverse, depending on the 
match and on the person one is talking to. One Ghanaian Premier League referee 
said that club officials sometimes offer referees 1,000 cedi (€500) and assistants 
500 cedi (€250) each. These figures can go up significantly for important 
matches. One Cameroonian referee told me that he was once offered 500,000 
CFA francs (€750) by a Foumban-based club. He added that the average amounts 
lay somewhere between 50,000 and 300,000 CFA francs (€75 to €450). In 2003, 
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the team manager of a top league club told me that they sometimes bribed 
referees one million CFA francs (€1,500).712 A police investigation in South 
Africa in 2004 revealed that referees were being paid bribes from $1,500 for 
Premier League matches and between $4,500 and $6,000 for Cup matches.713 
Big and powerful clubs are thought to pay bigger bribes. ‘I used to work at 
Okwawu United,’ said Kojo Fianoo, CEO of AshantiGold, ‘and we all had the 
idea that AshantiGold was heavily involved in influencing referees. That was the 
perception that most of us had in those days, when they were called the Third 
Force and were challenging the Big Two.’ Similarly, it is claimed that Came-
roon’s top club Coton Sport Garoua keeps prominent referees on the pay-roll. 
These perceptions are, of course, fed by the fact that these clubs win lots of 
trophies and are, at least theoretically, financially able to bribe referees. Mr. X 
offered another reason, one from a referee’s point of view. ‘The bigger the 
building the more the windows,’ he said, implying that big teams are forced to 
pay more money because they have more means. He continued: 
Some of these clubs are so big that they’ve become brands. That means that everybody 
knows they’re rich. Let’s say I’m driving a Volkswagen Beetle. People will say that I must 
be a poor man. If I’m driving a Mercedes Benz, I must be a rich man. So if you go to the 
repair man to fix the Mercedes, it will cost you a lot of money. But if you go there with a 
Beetle, you will pay only half. 
Mr. X said that there are three types of referees in Ghana – a classification that 
probably extends to other parts of Africa as well. The first type is the one that has 
proven himself to be incorruptible. Several coaches, club officials and referees 
stated that there are only ‘a few’ of them in Ghana. This, of course, is merely a 
perception, albeit from individuals with experience in the world of football. 
Referees commonly present themselves as incorruptible and instead blame club 
officials for wanting to bribe them. This was well put by the Cameroonian 
referee Divine Evehe who pleaded with club officials to stop offering bribes. 
‘Please stop calling us on the eve of your games,’ he said during a meeting with 
stakeholders in 2006. ‘If you stop making proposals and attempts to corrupt 
referees, we shall be impartial. Leave us alone.’714 
The story changes when we consider the second type of referee, namely the 
one who has proven to be corruptible. In 2002, the Cameroonian referee Bernard 
Fokouo, who was fired by FECAFOOT for being corrupt, publicly stated that 
referees take bribes. ‘The (referees) corps is very sick and can’t operate 
impartially because its hands are tied,’ he said.715 Mr. X said that this type of 
referee can be sub-divided into those that wait for club officials to approach them 
and those that are actively seeking to receive bribes. The referees that actively try 
to receive bribes are ‘players’ or ‘businessmen’, he said. ‘They want to negotiate: 
“How much is this match worth to you?”’ I once visited a lower league club in 
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Ghana hours before they were scheduled to play a match. At one point, the coach 
said: ‘The referee’s already here. He’s waiting for his money.’ 
The third type of referee is the one who is a fan of or otherwise emotionally 
attached to a specific club. In Ghana, many referees will be either a Hearts or a 
Kotoko fan. ‘They receive less money from these clubs when they are a fan,’ Mr. 
X said. ‘They will only receive some money for transport and they will say: 
“You can give me whatever comes from your heart.”’ This is another reason why 
supporters commonly think that the big clubs have the upper hand against lesser 
opponents. Aside from the fact that these clubs are thought to pay referees bigger 
bribes, they are also thought to receive help from referees who are admirers. Of 
course, not all referees are fans. ‘When the referee is not a fan it’s business as 
usual,’ said Mr. X. However, whether the referee is corruptible, incorruptible or a 
fan, he will always find himself under suspicion.716 
The football authorities employ several methods in trying to minimise bribing 
the referees. First, referees generally do not officiate matches in their own 
regions.717 Second, referees are accompanied by a match commissioner who files 
a report of his own. Already in 2003, however, I heard that club officials solve 
that problem by giving the match commissioner (or delegate) his share.718 Third, 
sometimes secret observers are sent to stadiums to check on the referee. In 2005, 
Tanzania’s FA started hiring secret match inspectors to curb bribery.719 Earlier 
still, in 2002, FECAFOOT decided to appoint undercover match inspectors.720 
The authorities in Ghana also send independent observers (retired referees) who 
‘come in as spies’, as referee Atta Baffour explained. ‘The idea is good. But they 
abuse the system. The referee, linesmen, commissioner and inspector all work 
together and share the money.’ 
The second way for Big Men to arrange a fixed match is to approach the 
officials of the other team. This is where people say they played a match of 
convenience, meaning that one team will play softly to give the other team the 
chance to win. Let us start with a story involving Hearts and Kotoko in the latter 
part of 2005. One Kotoko management member told journalists that he was in 
possession of a tape recording which proved that Hearts of Oak and Heart of 
Lions had conspired to play a match of convenience.721 Hearts officials retaliated 
by suing Kotoko for defamation and by claiming that the Porcupine Warriors had 
played a match of convenience themselves – against Real Tamale United (RTU). 
In fact, RTU supporters had issued a statement claiming that their own man-
agement had given the match to Kotoko.722 
Mr. X said that deals with officials of opponent teams are based on money 
and/or friendships. ‘It depends on the fixtures at the end of the season,’ he said: 
It’s all about life at the top and life at the bottom. There are teams who fight their battles at 
the top of the league table and teams who fight their battles at the bottom. The teams in the 
middle are there to help. They cannot win the title and they cannot go on relegation. So for 
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them it’s big business. The teams who need assistance have two options. One is to bribe the 
referees. The other is to go to the opponent team and strike a deal so that they play softly. 
The last option is the lesser evil because it’s more expensive to bribe referees. 
While most teams at the top are reasonably wealthy, most teams at the bottom 
often suffer from a lack of money. In either case, Mr. X said, friendships can be 
of great use. ‘Sometimes you play against a friend who can do something to help 
you,’ he said. ‘This friend can even make another team play softly. Then one day 
you’ll be playing softly against your friend’s opponent. But if I give away a 
match, I ask the other team to pay my players’ match bonuses.’ Mr. X called 
such deals a ‘favour for a favour’. ‘As club president you always have to ask 
yourself: What if I’m going to end up in a situation like them? So why don’t I do 
this team a favour? They may return the favour later.’ I will return to the issue of 
friendships and favours in the next chapter. 
Let us see how a match of convenience works. Mr. X told me the following 
story: 
Last season we played a match against [team x] here in [location]. I had other businesses to 
attend to so I couldn’t make it. So I called [the president of team x] and said: “My brother, 
there is this important assignment I have to do. But I’m also playing against you. If we lose, 
we will go on relegation.” He said: “Don’t worry. All you have to do is arrange accom-
modation for my team and I will assure you I will bring a second-string team. I’m not 
charging you anything.” And he kept his word. So I went and travelled. Now, the agreement 
was that we should win by a one goal difference only. But unfortunately, my players were 
driven and wanted to win. They beat [team x] [by a three goal margin]. But the way we 
scored was no proof of a fixed match. It was just that their team was reduced in strength. 
People were calling the GFA to investigate but we made sure that it was a competitive 
match. On returning I called the man and said: “I’m very grateful.” He said: “No worries. In 
football we’re friends.” 
This case proves, first, that match-fixing does not necessarily involve money and, 
second, that not everyone within the club is always aware of such deals. The 
coach, for instance, told me the president did not tell him anything; he resigned 
when he found out. 
Mr. X then told me another story involving the same Big Man: 
I remember one time when he was the CEO of [team y] and in his time we were playing 
[team y] in [location]. He called and said he wanted to meet me. I replied: “One week before 
the match? No! If anyone sees us, people might think I want to fix the match. It’s dangerous 
so I don’t want to come to [home base of team y] and I don’t want you to come to [his own 
home base]. Let’s meet midway.” I talked to my management and said that this guy wanted 
to meet up with us. We went and he came with 100 million old cedi (€5,000). I said: “I can 
take your money and we play the match. But [team y] is stronger, so you will probably beat 
us so why should I take money? Let’s play and if your team wins on merit, no problem.” I 
don’t see myself standing before the players and tell them to play softly. No, I would never 
do that. So I told him the truth and he pleaded with me. He didn’t believe me. We played and 
he beat us 2-1. And can you believe it? He sent the 100 million cedi to us. He told me to take 
it for Christmas. 
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For one thing, this story shows that meetings between Big Men are secret affairs. 
Another aspect is that it is usually better to deal with the top officials personally, 
namely the president or CEO. ‘It’s always better to talk to the CEO,’ Mr. X said, 
‘but that’s not always how it happens. In my case, they usually find someone 
close to me. They would say to him: “Talk to your friend. We’ve got so much to 
offer him.”’ 
When clubs conspire to play a match of convenience they can either include 
the referee in the plot or leave him out of it. ‘Sometimes representatives of both 
teams first consult each other and then go to the referee,’ said Mr. X. ‘They will 
explain the situation to make it credible. Then they will try to make a deal. One 
of the two teams will pay the referee. But sometimes the teams leave the referee 
out. That means nobody wants to pay the referee.’ If the referee is kept out of the 
deal, how can he find out whether the teams play a match of convenience? ‘You 
can tell when the two teams are not playing up to standard,’ said referee Atta 
Baffour. The Ghanaian Premier League referee Reginald Lathbridge gave me a 
simple piece of advice. ‘You can easily spot a match of convenience,’ he said. 
‘All you have to do is look at the league table.’ 
The third way for Big Men to fix a match is to approach the players of the 
opponent team. Recall, for instance, the PWD Bamenda defender Epesse who 
was bribed by Dynamo Douala and/or the Minister of Sports in the 1979 Cup of 
Cameroon final. In 2003, footballer Ashu told me how some of his teammates 
threw a match of which they knew it would have no consequences for the 
team.723 ‘In the past people used to infiltrate by calling our players,’ said 
AshantiGold CEO Kojo Fianoo. ‘But we’ve made sure they cannot be reached 
anymore. Our players now stay in barracks inside the stadium before the match. 
When they enter the barracks, we take away their mobile phones.’ Also, secret 
camps are common in Ghana (and not only there), although secret is a relative 
concept as teams’ whereabouts are more often than not common knowledge.724 
It is generally not easy for club officials to either avoid opponents from 
bribing their players or to find out that it actually happened. Players who have 
been bribed will be very careful on the field of play. Also, since it is highly 
unlikely that the entire team is bribed, it is difficult to spot which ones have 
money in their pockets. ‘You can never bribe the whole team,’ Mr. X said. 
‘Never! You can only bribe a few players. It’s mostly goalkeepers and defenders 
who can cause penalties. So for me these are the areas I look at.’725 Even ex-
perienced club officials cannot prevent infiltration of their teams. Recall Mr. X’s 
story of the CEO who offered him 100 million old cedi to throw the match. He 
refused by saying that he thought the other team would beat his team anyway. 
That, Mr. X said, was not the end of the story: 
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He couldn’t get to me so he decided to bribe players in my team – especially the ones who 
would fall prey to him. He needed players with [name of ethnic group] inclination, people 
who would be sympathetic to the [name of ethnic group] cause. We had some boys in our 
team [who come from the same region as team y] and they managed to infiltrate. The 
goalkeeper and the central defenders were [name of ethnic group]. We were leading 1-0 and 
then their goals were caused by collisions between the goalkeeper and the central defender. 
That’s how we doubted them. We put them on the transfer list.  
A similar story was given to me by Tiko United’s president Eteki Charles. In the 
final round of the 2008/09 season, Sable Batie surprisingly beat Tiko United, 
which by that time had already been declared champions, and so saved itself 
from relegation. Eteki said he was unaware his players would throw the match: 
Becoming the league champion was not as beautiful as I hoped. First of all, we already knew 
it four days to the end of the season. We then played the final match against Sable Batie. It 
was a disgrace. We lost 5-1. I wasn’t there but later on I heard that our players were simply 
handing over the ball. I sacked the coach and some of the players. I cannot prove it but I 
know for sure that they sold the match. Sable was going for relegation and the FECAFOOT 
from Yaoundé did everything to save them. The vice president comes from the West Region 
so they made a deal. Our coach was also from Yaoundé. 
I have stated earlier that match-fixing or otherwise influencing matches does 
not necessarily involve money. This is true with regard to hospitality. It is custom 
throughout Africa to welcome strangers into the community, to give them shelter, 
and to provide them with food and drinks. In football, everyone is effectively a 
stranger as teams travel to remote corners of the country. ‘We’re all journey-
men,’ said Kojo Fianoo. ‘We’re always on the move. That’s the nature of our 
profession.’ So when a referee arrives in town, he will be treated as a guest and 
experience the hospitality rule, which is a concerted effort of the community at 
large. Mr. X explained it as follows: 
We will send someone to the referee a few days prior to the match to give him money for 
transport and lodging. Sometimes the referee will arrive in town early enough, expecting to 
receive a special treatment. We will pay for his accommodation, his meals, his drinks. Some 
teams are even prepared to use their female supporters as bait. You may call for a young and 
beautiful girl and tell her to go to the referee’s hotel and see whether he’s feeling lonely. 
Sometimes she takes him to see tourist spots in town. Sometimes she will spend the night in 
the referee’s hotel room. When you don’t have a conscience, it’s very difficult to resist. 
Sources claimed, as was the case with bribery, that the Director of Operations – 
and in some cases the Public Relations Officer (PRO) – is responsible for hos-
pitality. 
Hospitality is certainly not limited to Africa. Officials of clubs in Europe also 
court referees by offering them female companionship.726 The same is true for a 
practice that is closely related to hospitality, namely gift-giving. Sugden and 
Tomlinson argue that there is a ‘gift culture’ in the world of sports.727 I have 
heard similar stories. ‘The Director of Operations will come and see you,’ said a 
Ghanaian referee. ‘He will say: “This match is very important. We want you to 
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be fair and we don’t want to influence you. We only want to give you this 
package to show you our appreciation.”’ It appears that hospitality and gift-
giving are normal procedure. ‘These things happen every time you officiate a 
match,’ the aforementioned Ghanaian referee said. ‘They always come and tell 
you that they will pay for food and lodging,’ one Cameroonian referee explained. 
‘They will also give you all sorts of presents.’ 
The following story by retired referee Atta Baffour indicates, first, that the 
practice is not new and, second, that some gifts tend to be bigger than others: 
I once had to officiate a match between Great Olympics and B.A. United in Sunyani. On 
Friday I was working when some people from B.A. came up to me. They said: “Sunday is 
going to be a very serious affair so you have to help us.” They tried to give me 100,000 old 
cedi but I rejected it. The next day they came again and tried to give me 10,000 old cedi. 
They told me it was for transport but we all knew it wasn’t for transport. 
On Saturday night I had to attend a funeral and a friend came to see me. He directed me 
to the chairman of Olympics who was there with two Europeans. Olympics was trying to get 
sponsors from Europe and really needed to win the match. We went outside to their car. 
They opened the trunk and inside I saw a colour television set. This was a big thing because 
in those days TVs were mostly black and white. They said I should take it as a gift. I refused. 
It turned out my friend was also a friend of the chairman of Olympics. 
Then we had to play the match. I was careful not to give one team the advantage over the 
other because then they would think I was favouring the other. Olympic scored first but B.A. 
equalised. After the match Olympics claimed I robbed them. B.A. too claimed I robbed 
them. If two teams think you robbed them it means you did a good job. 
This story confirms once again that both teams will approach the referee and that 
they have their ways of contacting him. 
Hospitality and gift-giving create a serious problem for referees, not in the 
least because they find it difficult to say no. Referees who accept these influences 
enter into a relationship that, in the words of Marcel Mauss, is far from ‘free and 
disinterested’.728 ‘If you take the gifts,’ said referee Lathbridge, ‘you’re in 
trouble. A gift may only be a gift but we consider it a bribe nonetheless. When 
you accept the gift, you sign a contract. You have to do whatever the giver wants 
you to do.’ He continued: 
It’s a normal human thing that if I come to a village where I’m being treated with respect, 
that I will want to return the favour. After such a good treatment you will just want to help 
them. One way of doing that is by giving the home team that extra advantage they need to 
win the match. If you don’t help out, you will be considered an ill guest which is equal to 
insulting them. It’s like accepting the kindness and gifts of the population, have drinks with 
them in the evening, then wake up in the morning, eat their food and leave without leaving 
something behind. Let me put it another way. Let’s say the man who accommodated you 
wakes up in the morning and finds out you slept with his youngest daughter. That’s how 
insulting it is to them. 
Hospitality and gifts are sometimes provided by Big Men such as government 
officials or traditional rulers, which makes refusing such “friendliness” all the 
more difficult.729 Also, referees who do say no are commonly accused by the 
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approaching party of already having accepted a bribe from the other team.730 
Apart from these arguments, referees have every reason to accept it because they 
are generally underpaid.731 
The question whether hospitality and gift-giving should be regarded as bribery 
is complicated by the practice of presenting gifts after the match. One case 
concerned a match in Ghana’s Premier League in 2000. Oheneba Charles, then a 
director of Kwaebibirem United, was accused of bribing the referee before a 
home match against Asante Kotoko. The Disciplinary Committee found no evid-
ence, yet discovered by interviewing the people involved, that Kwaebibirem’s 
team manager had given the referee 500,000 old cedi (€25, but at the time it was 
worth more than it sounds now) after the match. In fact, officials of Kwaebibirem 
United were in the habit of presenting referees with gifts after each home match, 
regardless of the outcome. The Disciplinary Committee was told that such post-
match gift-giving was quite normal.732 
Indeed, referees and officials alike have told me that offering post-match gifts 
or packages, as some referees called it, is normal practice. ‘We call that a bribe in 
disguise,’ said referee Lathbridge, ‘because you have not been influenced before 
the match so we cannot consider it a bribe. It’s completely normal. In fact, re-
fusing to accept the package is considered rude.’ He continued: 
Almost all the home teams give packages. When you leave the stadium, someone will stop 
you and direct you to his car. The package will be there in the boot. Sometimes after the 
match they will offer to fill up the tank of your car. The reason is that they want to become 
friends with you. Next time you officiate one of their matches you will think about the 
friendliness they have gave you. 
Referee Nde Christopher Ade was also familiar with post-match gifts. ‘These 
packages sometimes include money,’ he said. ‘They offer you 50,000 or 100,000 
CFA francs.’ He was aware of the motivation behind this practice. ‘It means they 
want to influence you for the next match,’ he said. ‘I sometimes ask them: “Why 
do you only give me these items during the season? Why not during the summer 
break?” So I see this gift-giving as throwing corn to the birds, persuading you to 
come into their net.’ 
Referee Lathbridge explained that in Ghana the contents of these post-match 
packages differ from region to region. In the north, he said, referees get ‘cow 
meat, cow legs for making soup, and sometimes even chopped cow head’. ‘They 
will have smoked the head,’ he added. ‘It’s very nice! Sometimes they present 
you with sandals made of cow leather.’ In the Brong-Ahafo Region, they give 
referees ‘yams, cassava and plantains’. What about the Volta Region? ‘I don’t 
usually go there, but from what I’ve heard from my colleagues is that they give 
you dried fish and yams.’ What about Accra, Cape Coast and Sekondi-Takoradi? 
‘The Central and Western Regions are the coastal areas,’ he explained, ‘so they 
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give you fresh and dried fish and sometimes also coconuts.’ Lathbridge argued 
that one item is regularly included in most packages: 
The only thing that all teams do equally, is that they give you replica jerseys. They will say: 
“You can use this for your training sessions.” This is even done at an international level. We 
went to officiate a match in Burkina Faso and we had to make a short stop in Abidjan. There 
we unexpectedly met an official of ASEC Mimomas. He didn’t know that we would be 
landing in his town so he quickly left and came back with four sets of replica jerseys. He 
said: “We’re all playing the same game and we never know where we will meet again.” He 
meant that you never know if we, as FIFA referees, would be officiating a match involving 
ASEC Mimomas in the future. So he was trying to establish a friendship. We went on to 
officiate the match in Burkina Faso and after the match they presented us with four boxes of 
cow meat and replica jerseys. 
Replica jerseys are usually handed out by officials who claim they are merely 
providing the visitors with souvenirs. In the same way as hospitality, calling gifts 
souvenirs is also a way of avoiding repercussions.733 
The advantage of giving gifts after the match is that club officials are able to 
argue that no one was influenced before and during the match. This issue was 
explored after a World Cup qualifier between arch rivals Nigeria and Ghana in 
2001. I have to note that this match was crucial for Nigeria who could still 
qualify; Ghana, on the other hand, was already eliminated. It was reported that 
after the match the governor of the State that hosted the match had given the 
Ghanaians $25,000. When Ghana lost the match 3-0 and the news came out, 
there was an outcry over the question whether this should be regarded a gift or a 
bribe. GFA chairman Ben Koufie maintained it was a gift. ‘I initially refused the 
money because of the rumours and suspicions of bribery surrounding the fixture,’ 
he said. ‘But I changed my mind after the Nigerian governor said that it is part of 
their tradition to extend hospitality with such a donation.’734 
Nigerian FA officials also held the view that it was merely a gift to confirm 
the diplomatic relations between the two countries. One NFF official stated that 
‘it is a common thing in Africa to give gifts to visitors when they are about to go. 
In the olden days, our forefathers gave yam tubers, goats, cowries and so on. So 
if the Governor of Rivers State in his magnanimity decides to give a visiting 
team some money after a game, he is keeping to the culture of his people.’735 
NFF spokesman Austin Mgbolu called the allegations of bribery ‘ridiculous and 
absurd’: 
We didn’t offer any financial inducement to the Ghanaians. It was the Rivers State governor 
Peter Odili who gave both the Super Eagles and the Ghanaians money in a gesture of good-
will because the match was played in the city he oversees. What governor Odili did was to 
merely cement the cordial relationship and spirit of unity between our two countries. So it’s 
wrong and unfair for anyone to capitalise on this and smear the image of Nigerian football.736 
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The Ghanaian Chronicle nevertheless ran an editorial, stating that the ‘thin line 
between a gift and a bribe’ is determined by ‘the context within which the offer is 
made’, and concluded that in this case the gift should have been rejected.737  
The power of juju 
If it seems that Big Men already have a lot on their minds, one probably has not 
heard anything about witchcraft, sorcery and magic in football. Called juju in 
West Africa and muti in Southern Africa, these spiritual practices occur all over 
the continent with striking similarities. Rituals are performed so as to give one 
team the upper hand over the other. By controlling the field, the dressing rooms 
and the entire stadium, home teams are commonly at an advantage in this spirit-
ual battle. Although Big Men are definitely not the only ones involved in hiring 
spiritualists, they are typically the ones who give the orders and provide the 
money. Football administrators have in recent years tried to ban juju from 
Africa’s football fields. From all indications, however, juju remains an important 
aspect of a match in Africa. 
Recall Preston’s and Szymanski’s classification of cheating: Sabotage, doping 
and match-fixing. It could be argued that juju and other occult forces fall into the 
first two categories. Indeed, one of the most common statements about juju is 
that the practice is aimed at reducing the performance of the opponent team 
(sabotage). However, it is also claimed that some of the ingredients in juju rituals 
can be regarded as performance-enhancing substances (doping). ‘I have a big 
concern and I confess that,’ said FIFA Medical Committee chairman Michel 
D’Hooghe prior to the start of the 2010 World Cup. ‘We were learning a lot 
about the traditional African medicines (at a conference) and we are not sure 
what all of these products contain.’ He suspected some products may ‘deliver 
stimulation and diuretic activity’.738  
I will start by giving an example of juju at the African Cup of Nations. The 
opening match between Ghana and Guinea gave a good insight into the spiritual 
warfare in African football – if only the average spectator knew about the things 
that happened behind the scenes. On Sunday 20 January, both teams took to the 
field under the watchful eyes of 40,000 ordinary fans and hundreds of dignitaries. 
All was well, except for the fact that the Guinean players spat water onto the 
pitch. ‘There was a lot of chaos,’ a man named Nuru told me later. ‘That’s why 
nobody saw them spitting the water on the field. They had hidden the water 
inside their mouths. Luckily, we anticipated their tricks.’ What he meant was that 
Ghana had found an antidote to Guinea’s alleged holy water. 
The following afternoon, I sat down with Nuru, his friends Hudu and Pollo, 
and a Dutch journalist on the far side of the Ohene Djan Stadium.739 Apparently, 
the three men stood in between malams (Islamic witchdoctors) and Ghana’s 
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national team. They were, in other words, the FA’s middlemen. On Saturday they 
visited six malams in the suburbs of Accra who ordered them to get different 
kinds of juju for Sunday’s opening match. Nuru told me that he went to a horse 
track at four A.M. to get the urine of a pregnant merry. ‘It had to be done very 
early in the morning,’ he said. ‘I caught the urine in a plastic bottle.’ Nuru gave 
the bottle to his friend Pollo and then went to a cemetery to bury something (he 
later said that it was a seed of some kind). 
Meanwhile, Pollo rushed to the hotel of the Guinean delegation. ‘I first 
sprinkled the urine in a circle around the hotel,’ he explained. ‘Then I went inside 
to sprinkle it on the chairs and tables in the dining room.’ By that time, Hudu had 
taken up position inside the Ohene Djan Stadium. After some time he spotted 
movement on the field of play. ‘There were four dwarfs who each went to a 
corner of the field,’ he told me. ‘The dwarfs were invisible so it was easy for 
them to sneak past the guards. But I saw them. I didn’t do anything. I just 
watched what they were up to.’ Later that night, when the dwarfs had left, Nuru 
and Pollo joined Hudu at the stadium. They sprinkled the urine on each of the 
four corners of the field. Now everything was set for the big showdown. 
On match day, at five P.M., the referees and the players stepped onto the pitch. 
Not coincidentally, the Ghanaian players wore immaculate white jerseys. The 
Dutch journalist told me how he sat in a taxi with Nuru and his friends a day 
earlier. ‘Pollo received a phone call,’ he said. ‘When he hung up he said: “To-
morrow’s going to be a white day!”’ Nuru, Hudu and Pollo had taken their seats 
on the stand, fully dressed in white robes. At halftime, the score was still 0-0. 
‘Did you see how many chances we had?’ Nuru asked me on Monday. ‘The 
Guineans blocked the goal with their water.’ The three men then called their 
malams who advised them to pray and chant. In the second half, both teams 
scored a goal. ‘Now we were directing our prayers towards the goalpost,’ Nuru 
said. ‘We were trying to force a goal.’ It worked. Sulley Muntari scored the de-
cisive goal in the dying minutes of the match. 
Holy water, horse urine, dwarfs – juju or muti comes in different guises. Juju 
is also known under many names. Some call it witchcraft or sorcery, others 
prefer gris-gris, wak, voodoo, fetishism, black or white magic, Satan’s work or 
African electronics. In Ghana the practice is generally known as Ways & Means. 
The practitioners have different names as well, sometimes depending on the 
region from which they hail, sometimes depending on the type of juju they 
perform. Some would say witchdoctor while others would rather speak of a 
féticheur, nganga, marabout or spiritual adviser.740 ‘In Ivory Coast I had a staff of 
fetishists,’ French coach Philippe Troussier told a couple of Belgian journalists. 
‘They called themselves les mécaniciens.’741 
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Some countries, particularly those in West Africa, are known to be especially 
knowledgeable in juju. ‘Benin is the birthplace of voodoo,’ a Liberian sports 
journalist told me, ‘and therefore we consider it Africa’s number one country in 
terms of juju.’ Indeed, when the Ugandan national team travelled to Benin for a 
World Cup qualifier in 2008, it was written that ‘the Cranes will confront a 
nation so deeply entrenched in its practice of juju that it considers it a national 
religion’.742 Benin went on to beat the visitors 4-1. ‘The atmosphere in the 
stadium was weird,’ Uganda’s goalkeeper Dennis Onyango recalled afterwards. 
‘There were so many witchdoctors around the turf, the stadium was extremely 
windy, with thunderstorms and yet there wasn’t rain. These are no excuses but 
just shocking facts.’743 
The 2010 World Cup in South Africa triggered journalists from around the 
world to focus on muti or juju in African football. One journalist learned that ‘80 
per cent of South Africans patronise traditional healers’, especially in relation to 
events where the outcome is uncertain.744 Leseth, referring to witchcraft (juju) in 
Tanzanian football, argues that the practice ‘rationalizes the element of unpre-
dictability in football’.745 Indeed, good and bad luck are commonly explained 
through the discourse of juju. When Asante Kotoko lost several matches in the 
2008/09 season, it was said that someone had blocked the team. The Kotoko 
Express reported that the club was contacted by people claiming to know about 
its ‘problems and the antidote to it’.746 There are reported cases whereby teams 
have been blocked by angry jujumen.747 
Juju is generally perceived as a spiritual fight above the heads of the players. 
Ancestors play a major role. Thomas Q. Reefe argues that in Africa there is a 
connection between games, gods and gambling. The outcome of contests are a 
‘matter of doubt’, he writes. ‘The future is uncertain without the intervention of 
the ancestors and their supernatural powers. Sensible people do not risk precious 
things without first seeking the assistance of the forces that influence or predict 
the future.’748 He continues: 
The knowledge that competition among men is the mirror of combat between supernatural 
forces has endured from the precolonial era to postindependence. It is a fact accepted by one 
group living on the Zaire River upstream from Kinshasa that each team in a soccer match 
starts out with a preordained number of goals. In the days preceding the match, team 
magicians do battle with medicine and supernatural force to steal the opponent’s points and 
to defend their own. Actual play is the public enactment of what the magician’s combat has 
already determined.749 
This leads us to the question that if matches are determined by supernatural 
forces, why bother hiring coaches and have players practice every day? The 
answer is that juju and practice sessions are seen as complementary elements of 
match preparation,750 with juju also being regarded as having a strong psycho-
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logical impact.751 It is nevertheless claimed that juju hinders the development of 
the game.752 
It is difficult to explain the system of juju. From all indications it is an amal-
gamation of traditional beliefs in ancestors, gods and spirits. Several players, 
coaches and club officials have all admitted to not really knowing how juju 
works or why they need to perform certain rituals.753 To me, juju can be per-
ceived as a game within the game of football, especially because an important 
aspect is to find out the juju of the opponent team. This information is essential 
because it gives one’s team the chance to look for the right anti-juju. One type of 
juju thus needs to be countered by another. In Cameroon, there are spirits such as 
dwarfs and mermaids which can be distracted with bananas and coconuts, res-
pectively. Salt and urine are ideal anti-juju ingredients.754 
The idea that juju needs to be countered means that both the home team and 
the visitors have to be alert at all times. The opponent is supposed to be kept in 
the dark so that they will not be able to produce anti-juju. The problem is that 
juju can be performed or accommodated by just about anyone. Therefore it is 
common to see people looking suspicious at anyone who is either a stranger or a 
known sympathiser of a rival team. In other words, everyone is either a potential 
spy or a potential carrier of juju. The Ghanaian photojournalist David Kyei told 
me an interesting story: 
Everybody knows that I work for the Kotoko Express so they think I’m not an independent 
journalist. I’m always in trouble in two places: Berekum and Obuasi. The supporters in 
Berekum think that I’m Kotoko’s lucky charm. In the old days, back in 2002 and 2003, 
Kotoko would beat Arsenals in their own house. The supporters realised that every time their 
team lost, I was on the pitch taking photographs. So they started harassing me. They would 
take away my bag because they thought I was hiding something inside. The same thing 
happens in Obuasi. You know, these people [of AshantiGold] like juju too much. For several 
years now they won’t allow me to enter the inner perimeter to take photographs. They will 
refuse me even though I have a press card. Every time I go to Obuasi, they send these big 
supporters to come and guard me. I cannot do anything without them following me. 
I experienced similar scepticism in Obuasi when supporters of the visiting team 
almost attacked me for photographing their team bus.755 
Overall, juju is more prominently employed in those matches that are also 
prone to match-fixing practices: Derbies, tournament matches, end-of-season 
matches. Home teams are said to be spiritually dominant over visiting teams. 
Informants say that the “proof” lies in home advantage statistics. Similarly, they 
argue that the host nation of the African Cup of Nations is more likely to claim 
the title than chance would suggest. From 1957 until 2010, 11 out of 25 finals (44 
percent) were won by the host nation. Moreover, the host reached the final no 
less than 14 times. The reason is that playing on one’s home turf is supposed to 
give the home team extra spiritual strength (see chapter 4, see also further  
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Photo 8.2 Coaches C.K. Akonnor and Nii Lamptey of Eleven Wise give instructions during a 
home match against Asante Kotoko at the Essipong Stadium in Sekondi. Their 
white shirts signal victory 
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below). ‘Nobody can beat you in your own house,’ Nuru said. ‘When it’s in our 
house we’re spiritually much stronger.’ Little wonder, then, that so many 
Africans thought South Africa or another African team would win the 2010 
World Cup.756 
Juju also explains why big teams are more likely to beat lesser opponents. 
‘What do the jujumen want?’ journalist Kamkam Boadu asked me rhetorically. 
‘They all do it for the money. So if you are the richest club, you also have the 
jujumen. Also, most players dream about playing for Hearts and Kotoko. The 
same goes for these jujumen. Even if they want to make money, they also just 
want to be attached to these clubs.’ It also explains why some of the relatively 
lesser teams are so hard to beat. One mediocre team in Cameroon, Dynamo 
Douala, was feared throughout the country. For one thing, Dynamo was seen as 
being specialised in rainmaking, which would result in victory on the field of 
play. Moreover, the team was (and still is) owned and controlled by the Bassa 
who are perceived to be well-versed in the art of black magic. 
There are those who claim that juju is, in the words of Patrick Royer, ‘a 
remnant of obsolete beliefs’.757 Put differently, juju is said to fade away due to 
modernising forces in Africa. However, the anthropologist Peter Geschiere 
argues that the opposite is true: Witchcraft, sorcery and magic thrive in modern 
African life.758 It is also said that Africa’s national teams are less inclined to 
employ juju because most players are Christians or Muslims. Moreover, most of 
them play at Europe’s biggest clubs and therefore cannot be bothered with juju 
anymore. But, first, players need not be involved in juju rituals and, second, juju 
easily mixes with other religions.759 One only needs to refer to the Nigerian 
pastor T.B. Joshua who is said to spiritually assist the national teams of both 
Nigeria and Ghana.760 
Some of Africa’s top football administrators argue that juju gives the game a 
bad reputation, which is why they try to stop the practice. Milan Vesely writes 
that the ‘issue is bedeviling many football clubs across Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda 
and Rwanda. Incidents have reached epidemic proportions and many national 
soccer bodies are clamping down on (juju).’761 In 2003, Tanzania’s top clubs 
Yanga and Simba were both fined $500 after performing juju rituals.762 CAF 
even threatened to arrest witchdoctors at the 2002 African Cup of Nations, 
fearing the practice would enhance Africa’s Third World image.763 ‘We are no 
more willing to see witch doctors on the pitch than cannibals at the concession 
stands,’ said a CAF spokesperson.764 Ghana’s three helpers laughed such state-
ments away. ‘The president of CAF knows his own country uses juju,’ Nuru said. 
‘So what’s he going to do about it?’ 
Let us now focus on Big Men and other club officials of whom many are said 
to be involved in juju. I will begin with a story of the matches between Hearts 
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and Kotoko in the 2008/09 season. Before each encounter, officials of both teams 
challenged each other over the airwaves and in newspapers. First, Sabahn Quaye, 
for long Hearts’ team manager, publicly prophesied his team’s victory prior to 
the match in February 2009. Several informants told me that he went on radio to 
challenge his opponent to call his bluff. His counterpart at Kotoko, Sarfo Gyamfi, 
however, stayed silent. Hearts did indeed beat Kotoko 1-2 in Kumasi. A few 
months later it was Kotoko’s turn. Gyamfi, a former player of Kotoko and oc-
casionally part of its management team, declared on radio trottoir that his team 
would beat Hearts 0-1. And so it happened. 
Whoever takes care of the juju depends on the individuals who make up the 
club’s management or technical staff at any given time. Quaye and Gyamfi were 
said to be Hearts’ and Kotoko’s spiritual experts, respectively, and their public 
statements were interpreted from a spiritual angle. Gyamfi is popularly known as 
Black President, a nickname that refers to black magic. Kotoko also had a sup-
porter named Ali Maradona, who became a management member in 2010, and 
who looked after the team’s juju. Supporters are thus actively involved in these 
spiritual affairs. The team manager of a Cameroonian top league club once 
claimed he was in charge of juju affairs. Some time later, it was the coach who 
visited his native village before each match. A witchdoctor allegedly lived there 
who provided the coach with the necessary spiritual powers. 
We have seen how national teams are spiritually prepared as well. Sometimes 
the Minister of Sports will bring in spiritual advisers or will order others to do so. 
In some cases, that job is fulfilled by a team manager, an assistant-coach, a 
supporter or an FA official. The latter was true in the case of Nuru, Hudu and 
Pollo. First of all, they were quite familiar with the Black Stars delegation. I 
witnessed how the three men walked around the lobby of Accra’s Fiesta Royal 
Hotel greeting players, coaches and administrators. They clearly knew everybody 
and everybody knew them. At first, Nuru, Hudu and Pollo claimed that they 
worked on a voluntary basis. ‘We never ask for a reward,’ Nuru said. ‘But the 
people around the team give us money to pay for the jujumen. Sometimes we get 
compensation ourselves.’765 They later revealed to be in contact with a GFA 
official. ‘We cannot tell you who he is,’ said Nuru. ‘He’s our secret middleman. 
Nobody can accuse Ghana because officially they’re not involved.’ 
In terms of juju, Big Men can be categorised in those who believe and actively 
encourage it, those who do not believe but who accommodate the practice 
anyway, and those who do not believe and actively discourage it. Although most 
of them will never admit that they believe in juju and hire spiritualists, several 
Big Men – club presidents and FA officials alike – are strong believers and act 
accordingly. ‘Most club presidents will never show anyone that they are in-
volved,’ said spiritual adviser Zé:  
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They have their way of making sure nobody finds out. To give you an example, I went with 
Victoria United to the interpools somewhere in the 1990s. The club president was very much 
into juju. He gave us money before the start of the tournament and told us to do whatever we 
needed to do. He said: “The money is there. Just make sure you win. And if you win, don’t 
tell me anything. I don’t want to know how you did it.” The president wrote down the 
expenses under “miscellaneous”. He gave us enough money for us to know that we could 
spend it on magic and motivation for the referees.  
The idea that many Big Men fall into the first two categories makes sense when 
one considers the fact that juju is expensive. As Leseth argues with regard to 
Tanzania, juju in football is ‘big business’.766 She writes: ‘Waganga (witch-
doctors) have enriched themselves enormously through the “wages” they receive 
from leaders of the various clubs’.767 Zé told me that matches in Cameroon are 
typically prepared for 200,000 to 300,000 CFA francs (€300 to €450). ‘Some 
jujumen are hired for the whole season,’ he explained. ‘They give you five 
million CFA francs (€7,500) if you give them the championship.’ Big Men are 
thus needed to provide financial support. 
There are also Big Men who say they do not believe in juju but still go along 
with it. They simply do not want to deal with angry supporters. ‘I know it exists,’ 
Mr. X said. ‘I usually give the supporters some money so that they can look for 
these native doctors. Most of them strongly believe in it. If I refuse to allow juju 
and we lose the match, they will come after me.’ In the 2008/09 season, Kotoko 
supporters bemoaned their club officials’ unwillingness to spend money on juju. 
‘This management does not want to give us money for spiritual assistance,’ 
Kwaku Anor told me. ‘Some people complained about it during the stakeholders 
meeting at Manhyia Palace.’ A new management team seemed to have got the 
message. One management member claimed that the club had spent 90,000 cedi 
(€45,000) on juju in the 2009/10 season.768 
Finally, there are Big Men who do not believe in juju and who do not want to 
see spiritualists near the team. This means that others have to do it behind the 
president’s back. Ni John Fru Ndi, former president of PWD Bamenda, stated in 
chapter 3 that he opposed juju. Eteki Charles is another example. ‘Magic was my 
biggest challenge,’ the president of Tiko United said. ‘I had to convince every-
body that there is no magic in football. So now we only pray before the match. If 
you as a player come with us you have to become a soldier of God.’ Even though 
such Big Men do not approve of juju, they are still up against those within the 
club who are prone to employ spiritualists. ‘Eteki does not like juju,’ spiritual 
adviser Zé told me. ‘But I know that when the team became league champion 
there was magic involved. The coach, the supporters and the Diaspora in Ireland 
all contributed to the hiring of spiritual advisers.’ 
Club officials regularly get involved in juju rituals and are commonly asked to 
follow rules. Failure to abide by such rules is often cited as a reason why a team 
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loses a match. One common rule is to stay away from women. Zé said that 
women ‘spoil magic’. Put differently, women are bad luck. Players are certainly 
not allowed to sleep with girls for then the juju will lose its power. Daimon 
describes how Henriette Rushwaya, the then female chairman of the Zimbab-
wean FA, was prevented from attending a Champions League match because she 
was thought to be a bad omen.769 Aside from being a male-dominated sport, this 
could be an explanation for the general absence of female club officials and 
football administrators. However, women who occupy top positions in football 
are sometimes held in high esteem. 
Many Big Men and/or other club officials are thus personally involved in juju 
practices and are quite busy with it. Since they typically assume the opponent 
team will have prepared the match, they are almost obligated to engage in such 
activities as well. The most important thing to do is to find spiritual advisers who 
can counter the opponent team’s juju and who know how to strengthen the 
client’s team. Although most juju is prepared far away from players and pitches, 
one can observe some of the reactions to these spiritual beliefs before and during 
matches. Let us focus on three match “components” where juju is commonly 
employed: Going to a camp (including travelling), making use of the facilities 
inside the stadium, and playing the match. 
The first component is going to a camp, meaning that the squad stays together 
the night before the match (see chapter 4). This is where home teams have the 
advantage over away teams for the simple reason that their accommodation is 
most likely safe and secure. Typical camp grounds are academy complexes, 
clubhouses, hotels or even the club president’s house. The Zambian journalist 
Ridgeway Liwena provides us with an account of a player named Lasky Mwandu 
who played for Roan United decades ago: 
Whilst at Roan, it was the club rule that we gathered at the chairman’s house on every 
Saturday evening, before the match the next day. All the officials and players selected to 
play in the Sunday match met at this house and drank “munkoyo” (a traditional non-intoxi-
cating opaque sweet beer) prepared by the chairman’s wife. While there, we sang songs of 
unity and received instructions such as not to have sex with our wives or girlfriends. (…) On 
the day of the match we would be at the chairman’s house again a few hours before kick-off. 
There would be a dish containing herbs, roots and other objects submerged in water. Each 
player was expected to wash his face and hands from the dish. Thereafter, cigars containing 
African herbs and other powdered stuff were lit for us and we all smoked.770 
Away teams, on the other hand, need to find safe accommodation to avoid 
harassment from the home team. Earlier I mentioned secret camps, intended to 
prevent opponents from bribing players. As hotels, buses and training grounds 
can be spoiled (because of juju), secret camp grounds are necessary to prevent 
such bewitchment.  
Away teams also face the problem of travelling. Fatigue on the part of the 
visiting team is cited as a potential reason for home advantage.771 In many parts 
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of Africa, travelling appears to negatively influence team performance.772 Dis-
tances can be enormous and are best abridged by air yet, few teams have the 
financial resources to do so. Rainy seasons and war-torn areas add to travel 
anxieties.773 Religious beliefs regarding certain regions make travelling even 
more complicated. The Ghanaian coach Isaac “Opeele” Boateng, who claims that 
‘there are a lot of superstitions that surround (team travels)’, wrote the following 
story: 
For example, teams that travel to a region that shares border with Togo have the fear that if 
they cross a certain river they will lose. No one wants to sleep in any hotel in the town for 
fear of losing, hence most teams choose to sleep in the regional capital to travel that far on 
hills for over one hour thirty minutes on a match day. (…) 
Still on team travels, clubs travelling to a town of a premiership side which is yet to lose 
at home in the last five years, decided to abandon a particular roundabout in the city to avoid 
ill-luck. Teams which believe this has (sic) only one other option to get to the stadium. (…) 
There is also this belief among certain clubs to pacify the gods with a sheep or any other 
animal in a particular river before entering Brong Ahafo Region, i.e. when coming from the 
south. Once, two teams went to Sunyani to play a game. Team A sacrificed a sheep in that 
river. When Team B arrived to perform theirs, they saw some young boys in the town 
grilling meat and the boys came to tell Team B that the meat on fire was that of Team A’s 
sacrifice in the river.774 
Such beliefs force club officials to take appropriate measures. 
The second component of a match is the moment where both teams make use 
of the stadium facilities. Here too, the home team will have the spiritual advan-
tage. Recall how teams employ animistic powers (chapter 4). Fields and stadi-
ums, of course, are built on ancestral lands which, as Royer argues, intensifies 
home advantage: 
Playing away always seems to put the visiting team at a disadvantage, however talented they 
are. The ground at Bobo Dioulasso [a city in Burkina Faso], although built like all football 
stadiums as a public space, is above all home to the local team and to the local spectators. 
This home advantage is compounded by the predominance of the power of local occult 
forces over those of the visitors. The physical and social environments are under the control 
of the hosts in the same way that spirit powers and shrines associated with a village territory 
are perpetuated and controlled by its inhabitants.775 
There is another reason why visiting teams fear the home team’s venue. A 
common juju ritual is the burying of concoctions inside the stadium premises, 
preferably on the pitch. One Cameroonian writer wrote a hilarious yet quite 
serious story of a goalkeeper who dug up the ‘already decomposing carcass of a 
black sheep’ in his penalty area. Upon removing the carcass, the opponent sud-
denly ‘lacked the confidence, coordination and combination they had exhibited 
during the earlier half’.776 Footballer Essomba once told me that concoctions 
usually include animal parts, such as fowl, goats and cows. Kumbo Strikers, a 
team from Cameroon’s Northwest Region, used to bury cats: 
We had one strong man who was working with the team manager. The man came to the field 
and wrote down the names of all the players in the first-division teams. Then he put the 
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medicine and the paper in the mouths of a white cat and a black cat. He buried the cats under 
the field very deep. We the players were not there. We would only be there on the eve of the 
day when we are going to play a match. We just come and surround the centre and pray and 
leave.777 
The effects of such concoctions on the players of the opposing team are fatigue, 
dizziness, confusion, heaviness, weakness, slowness, and so on. 
The burying of concoctions leads club officials to take at least two measures. 
First, they guard the stadium to prevent visiting teams from either burying 
something or removing the home team’s juju. One Cameroonian club president 
hired supporters to light torches at night to chase away visitors. Away teams are 
also denied entry for practice purposes. Arie Schans, at the time Namibia’s 
national team coach, told me that the Ghanaian hosts prevented him from prac-
tising at the Ohene Djan Stadium during the 2008 African Cup of Nations. ‘They 
came up with all sorts of excuses but the bottom line was that we didn’t get 
permission,’ he said. The Nigerians had a similar experience. ‘I’ve lived here for 
many years and it’s obvious – they don’t want us to use the stadium because they 
want time to lay down all their juju,’ one Nigerian supporter said.778  
Second, visiting teams generally receive orders from their spiritual advisers to 
avoid coming into contact with potential concoctions. If the alleged concoction is 
buried near the entrance or on the path leading to the pitch, players are advised to 
take an alternative route. I witnessed how team buses drive straight through the 
main gate, only to stop right next to the pitch. Players are occasionally ordered to 
jump the fence or the stadium walls. It is equally possible to observe players 
walking backwards to the field of play, or supporters carrying players on their 
shoulders. It has to be noted, though, that jumping the fence and taking alter-
native routes are against the rules, at least in Ghana and Cameroon, and most 
likely elsewhere as well.779 
While visiting teams obviously have a lot to think about, there is yet another 
obstacle they need to overcome. I am referring to dressing rooms. It is unlikely to 
witness visiting teams enter a strange – and thus suspect – dressing room. In 
Cameroon, I observed how they rather endured the scorching heat for an hour. 
Liwena provides us with an example of a Cup match in Zambia in 1993. The 
visitors (Roan United) were on the road, unaware of the fact that they were 
followed by reporters. They ‘drove their bus a few kilometres out of town 
towards the Kasumbalesa border with Zaire’: 
The reporters found the bus parked by the roadside while the players were in the bush 
changing into their uniforms. Immediately they realised they had been discovered and 
photographer Charles Mumba was taking pictures, some of them scampered behind thickets. 
But the rest were unmoved and continued with their business. From the bush “dressing-
rooms” [sic], Roan trooped straight into the Konkola Stadium and played an exciting 2-2 
draw match.780 
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In Ghana’s Western Region, coach Isaac “Opeele” Boateng wrote, there is 
‘this belief that a particular dressing room has been cursed, so whoever goes 
there loses, and because of that, away teams refuse to dress there’.781 He is 
referring to a dressing room located inside the Essipong Stadium in Sekondi, a 
venue where away teams are consistently heckled. ‘It’s always the officials and 
supporters of Eleven Wise who are harassing the away teams,’ said Mr. X. On 
Sunday 24 May 2009, when Asante Kotoko travelled to Sekondi to take on 
Eleven Wise, I witnessed the harassment first-hand. The following story is de-
rived from what I wrote in my diary: 
When Kotoko plays an away match, it’s always a big deal for the home team. This time the 
match is especially tense, because Eleven Wise beat Kotoko in Kumasi earlier this season. 
The Asantehene recently installed a new management team and now they’re all here. This is 
a do-or-die match for Kotoko. The match is shown on Metro TV.  
Around four P.M. the team bus of Eleven Wise arrives at the gate with the usual noise 
that comes with it. Half an hour ago something happened. One man sprinkled a liquid from a 
plastic Voltic bottle on the stairway that gives access to the stadium’s main entrance. Now 
the bus stops in front of the entrance. The players jump straight onto the stairway, clearly 
trying not to touch the ground. Supporters are frantically held back. 
When Kotoko’s team bus arrives there is a delay at the gate. A colon of black SUVs 
arrives at the scene. Out step Kotoko’s new management team: Opoku Afriyie, Opoku Nti, 
Alhaji Nji, Helena Cobbina. The bus now drives through the gate and stops in front of the 
stairway. One guy, who is part of Kotoko’s entourage, also sprinkles a liquid from the top of 
the stairway to the front door of the bus. The players do not touch the ground either. They’re 
all on flip-flops and jump straight onto the stairway. Home team security is trying to prevent 
them from entering the stadium. Helena Cobbina, a physically impressive woman, pushes 
them as she tries to protect her players. 
Once inside the problems continue. Match commissioner Kweku Ampim-Darko later tells 
me that there was a mix-up with the keys to the dressing rooms. ‘Away teams are normally 
assigned to a specific dressing room,’ he says. ‘But when Kotoko tried to unlock the door, 
they found out that they were given the wrong key. Then they saw that Eleven Wise had 
occupied the dressing room that was reserved for them. Kotoko refused to enter the other 
dressing room.’ 
The Kotoko players put on their jerseys in the central hallway before stepping onto the 
pitch. Two-thirds of the seats in the stadium are taken, many of them by Kotoko supporters, 
but the home supporters make the most noise. 
The coaches of Eleven Wise, former players C.K. Akonnor and Nii Lamptey, are standing 
in front of their dug-out. They both wear white shirts. Rather than being a fashion statement, 
it is a spiritual gesture signalling victory. 
It’s halftime. The players of Eleven Wise disappear into their dressing room. Those of 
Kotoko still refuse to enter the other dressing room and sit on the ground in the central 
hallway. Kotoko’s new coach Herbert Addo is giving them instructions.  
It’s time for the second half. Late into the match, Kotoko scores the decisive goal. The 
final score is 1-2. 
There’s unrest in the central hallway. The CEO of Eleven Wise enters his team’s dressing 
room. When he comes out again, he is harassed and beaten by the supporters of his own 
team. ‘He ran into my dressing room,’ the match commissioner later reveals, ‘and he was 
weeping.’ The CEO later tells me that the supporters thought he sold the match. Meanwhile, 
the Kotoko players immediately enter the team bus and leave town. 
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When I ask the match commissioner about the dressing room, he says there’s nothing he 
can do. ‘A dressing room is a dressing room,’ he says. ‘We don’t know why Eleven Wise did 
it. We told them it’s not how it’s supposed to be. But there are no FIFA rules against it and 
Kotoko never lodged a complaint. Maybe that was because they won.’ 
I ask a former director of Eleven Wise about the dressing room. ‘When you enter that 
dressing room,’ he says, ‘you’ll see blood stains on the wall.’ 
This match between two of the country’s most popular community-based teams 
thus generated intimidation, juju and bribery allegations. Club officials on both 
sides were actively involved in making sure their team would win. 
The third component of a match is, not surprisingly, the match itself. Goal-
keepers regularly keep suspicious objects in their goalposts. As said earlier, 
players urinate on the pitch to counter juju; they also throw salt (or rocks or 
coins) in the opponent team’s goalpost. Players typically refuse to shake each 
other’s hands during the pre-match line-up. These manifestations of juju aside, 
we need to go back to what is known in Ghana as the pre-match meeting. This is 
where basic issues are resolved, for instance checking player licences and squad 
jerseys, and handing out keys to dressing rooms. This is, in short, the time and 
place where juju practices can be avoided. The problem is that teams tend to stay 
away from the pre-match meeting. 
A first example of juju during match time is teams entering the pitch wearing 
the same jersey colour. When jerseys clash, the visiting team has to go and 
change.782 Jersey clashes usually lead to delays,783 and they are commonly a 
result of one team failing to attend the pre-match meeting. ‘Some teams refuse to 
come to the pre-match meeting because they don’t want the opponent to see their 
jerseys,’ said Mr. X. ‘They fear that someone might do something with that in-
formation.’ But why do teams deliberately wear the same colour jerseys in the 
first place? ‘Some spiritualists know the outcome of the match,’ Mr. X said. 
‘Someone might say: “Today red is not the colour.” That means you must change 
jerseys.’ It is not always easy to find a new set of jerseys at the eleventh hour, as 
Mr. X explained: 
Last season we played a match against [a certain Premier League team]. In that match we 
didn’t wear the prescribed jerseys. So our opponent filed a protest. You need to understand 
that each player has two sets of jerseys with a specific number on the back. These are the 
jerseys that we need to present to the GFA at the start of the season. Now we’re going for a 
match with a team of sixteen players. All these players need a new set of jerseys. So you 
need to find a tailor who can fabricate jerseys and affix all the numbers to the back. The 
problem was that our tailor had travelled out of town. We couldn’t get the jerseys on time. 
It happens that the jersey numbers are sewn on so badly that they fall off during 
play. 
A second example of juju during the match has to do with timing. ‘Sometimes 
the spiritualist will tell you to go to the field early,’ said Mr. X. ‘Sometimes he 
will tell you to come late. Let the opponent come to the field first.’ Also, teams 
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sometimes leave their eleventh player on the bench. ‘Bamboutous Mbouda 
brought it to the Elite One league in the 1990s,’ said Zé with regard to Came-
roon. ‘Their spiritual adviser tells them that they cannot win if they are the last 
ones to step onto the field. So that’s why they leave one player behind.’ In 
Ghana, Wa All Stars is said to be specialised in such practices. ‘I’ve seen some-
thing similar in Kumasi,’ said referee Lathbridge. ‘RTU (Real Tamale United) 
started the match with ten players. Kotoko then did the same thing.’ What does 
Lathbridge do when that happens? 
They’re not breaking any laws. The rules dictate that you cannot play a match if one team 
has less than eight players in the field. So if a team starts out with ten players, it’s allowed. I 
wouldn’t call this an incident. I wouldn’t worry about it. There are no laws in Ghana football 
that prohibit teams from fielding one player less on the pitch. So when you fill in your report 
afterwards, you’ll just mention the facts, which means that both teams started the match with 
ten players each. Nobody at the FA will ask you for an explanation because it’s not con-
sidered to be an offence. 
FECAFOOT does not have any rules and regulations that prohibit teams from 
starting a match with ten players either. 
A last example is the habit of preparing match balls. When Kotoko played 
Dawu Youngstars in the late 1990s, Kotoko supporters claimed that the opponent 
used “juju balls” and deflated them. This reportedly almost resulted in a fight 
between the chairman of Dawu and the CEO of Kotoko.784 Nguini lists several 
cases of prepared balls in Cameroon in the 1980s and 90s.785 The effects of such 
balls are diverse: Players may fail to get a grip on the ball or they may become 
hallucinogenic (seeing, for instance, animals instead of the ball). When the other 
team realises that juju balls are being employed, their supporters will spoil the 
match by deflating them. Sometimes the spiritual adviser will order the team to 
deflate all the balls inside the stadium. Nowadays, teams who so spoil matches 
lose the match by forfeiture. 
Intimidation, violence and no-go areas 
A prominent aspect of African football is the level of violence on and off the 
field of play. Universally labelled as hooliganism, such football-related violence 
is made worse due to mismanagement, poor infrastructure and minimal security 
measures. Intimidation and violence are related to the level of identification with 
clubs and national teams. In a sense, the fierce defending of one’s territory makes 
hooliganism in football to resemble conventional warfare. Whereas match-fixing 
and juju are more directly orchestrated by the Big Men themselves, intimidation 
and violence are mostly the result of actions by diehard supporters. Relative 
lawlessness gives the home team the opportunity to exploit home advantage to 
the fullest. 
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We have so far dealt with referee bias, territoriality and travelling. Referee 
bias occurs, among other things, when he accepts a bribe. Referee bias and terri-
toriality are present in the sense that referees receive hospitality and gifts from 
the population. Territoriality also occurs in a spiritual sense, namely through the 
idea that the home team is assisted by occult forces that reside in the team’s 
home area. Travelling appears to have some sort of effect to the extent that visit-
ing teams oftentimes play a match after a long journey. Now it is time to focus on 
a combination of referee bias, territoriality and the impact of home crowds to 
determine home advantage in Africa. Taking Preston’s and Szymanski’s classi-
fication into consideration, it may be argued that intimidation and violence are 
forms of sabotage. After all, the physical and/or mental performance of the visit-
ing team may be reduced. 
I have occasionally come across violence during my fieldwork. One experi-
ence occurred during a match between AshantiGold and Kotoko in Obuasi on 12 
July 2009. At this point in time, AshantiGold was on the brink of relegation and 
badly needed the three points. Kotoko, on the other hand, still had the chance to 
become league champions and was equally motivated in taking the points home. 
As usual, trouble started when Kotoko’s team bus tried to gain entrance to the 
stadium. Armed police officers as well as home team security and Kotoko body-
guards pushed the several dozen AshantiGold supporters away from the bus. 
When I took pictures of the chaos from a balcony behind the stadium, home team 
supporters tried to block my view. ‘You should concentrate on football,’ one of 
them said. ‘There’s nothing to see here.’ 
The 20,000-seater Len Clay Stadium was practically filled to capacity. Since 
the atmosphere was incredibly hostile, I decided not to enter the inner perimeter 
to take pictures. None of the Ghanaian journalists went onto the pitch, and Koto-
ko Express-reporter David Kyei was indeed hassled by a couple of impressively 
built AshantiGold sympathisers. The stadium erupted when the players entered 
the field through a tunnel. The trouble started after a Kotoko player scored the 
opening goal in the first half. As the newspaper Africa Sports later bombastically 
reported, ‘the stadium degenerated into a mass of anarchy and chaos, Lucifer 
releasing his angels from hell’: 
Fans of Ashantigold began a frightening bout of stonethrowing towards the Kotoko fans who 
reacted instantly, throwing back the stones at the Ashgold fans. In the ensuing confusion, a 
police officer was hit by a stone as he bled profusely. Incensed by the terrible attack on their 
officer, the policemen on duty started firing live ammunition into the air. When that failed to 
serve as a potent deterrent, the police fired tear gas to restore sanity. That failed to calm 
nerves as irate Ashgold fans attacked whoever they perceived as a Kotoko disciple.786 
When a cloud of teargas approached our section, we all climbed over a fence and 
ran towards the exit near the VIP section. 
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While I escaped the chaos and confusion unharmed, this could not be said of 
some of Kotoko’s supporters and management members. One supporter, a former 
Kotoko player named Yaw Serbeh, was stripped naked after being suspected of 
carrying juju. Kotoko’s juju afficionado Sarfo Gyamfi was ‘severely brutalised’ 
and ‘assaulted like an armed robber’; and Kotoko’s PRO Nana Godbless had to 
be ‘rushed to the hospital and was still on admission at the time the team was 
leaving (for) Kumasi’.787 When play resumed, AshantiGold scored two goals in 
quick succession (one through a penalty). The match ended in a 2-1 victory for 
the home team. Although a biased medium, the Kotoko Express had a point when 
concluding that the referee ‘virtually officiated in a manner that would save lives 
at the packed stadium’.788 
Intimidating and violent acts are widespread in African football. Journalist 
Hawkey gives the example of the final of the 2000 African Cup of Nations 
between host Nigeria and Cameroon. The visitors had ‘become anxious to the 
point of paranoia about how far their hosts would go to win the match. The 
Indomitable Lions’ squad had had lunch, sitting on the floor, crammed into the 
home of their ambassador in Lagos, urged at late notice not to eat hotel food in 
case it was poisoned. They had been taunted at the hotel into the early hours by 
noisy Lagosians.’789 When Hearts of Oak had beaten Union Douala 1-0 in the 
first leg of the 1979 Cup of Champions Clubs final, the Ghanaians travelled to 
Cameroon for the return match. It was ‘an ordeal as they (56 Hearts supporters) 
had to be guarded by armed soldiers when the Cameroonian spectators started to 
throw missiles’.790 Union finally won after a penalty series. 
Violence occasionally leads to loss of life. One could easily make an extensive 
list of football-related deaths791 but I will limit myself to two of Africa’s worst 
tragedies (I will deal with a third one later on): The stadium disasters in Ghana 
and South Africa in 2001. On May 9, 126 supporters died during a Hearts vs 
Kotoko match at the Accra Stadium. Hearts was leading 2-1 with only five 
minutes on the clock when Kotoko supporters started throwing plastic chairs and 
bottles. A study of the disaster found that police officers were not only busy 
watching the match but also aggravated the situation by firing teargas into a 
10,000-strong crowd at the Ade Coker stand: 
The damp staircase smelt death. A thick cloud of teargas – most likely CS Teargas, that 
usually burns the skin, tightens the lungs and makes breathing difficult and blinds those 
exposed to it – was trapped within; and the stampede and pile-up set the stage for a gory 
scene. 126 people died in those tunnels. “Some died of suffocation,” said Brigadier Twum, 
“but the majority of them seem to have been killed by being crushed.”792 
A commission pointed fingers at the police force but no one was sentenced to 
prison.793 However, the firing of teargas into a violent crowd has a long history, 
sometimes with fatal consequences, and no adequate measures have been 
implemented since.794 
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One month earlier, on 11 April 2001, South Africa’s biggest football disaster 
occurred during a Chiefs vs Pirates derby at the Ellis Park Stadium. While the 
players were kicking the ball around, 43 fans died and 158 were injured due to 
‘overcrowding, an ill-timed announcement that the stadium was full, the use of 
teargas, and unruly spectator behaviour’.795 The final report of a Commission of 
Inquiry identified causes and suggested new legislation, but its analysis focused 
on ‘microscopic details’ and failed to point fingers at the ones thought to be 
responsible.796 The underlying causes nevertheless resembled those of the Orkney 
football disaster ten years earlier: 
At the Orkney disaster in January 1991, 40 people were either trampled or stabbed to death 
in the pandemonium and fighting that broke out at the ‘friendly’ match in the Oppenheimer 
Stadium. Armed spectators were allowed into the grounds and rival supporters were allowed 
to congregate on the same grandstand with no adequate barriers separating them. There were 
only 35 security guards to control a crowd of 20,000 and no police were on standby. When 
fighting broke out among hundreds of the spectators after the Chiefs scored a disputed goal, 
thousands of people stampeded towards the gates. A locked gate and blocked passages 
contributed to the deaths as the stadium was overcrowded and medical help was unavail-
able.797 
The later assessment that the disaster was caused by ‘inadequate infrastructure, 
management and security’ also applies to other parts of Africa.798 Having re-
searched a stampede during a World Cup qualifier between Zimbabwe and South 
Africa in 2000, F.D. Madzimbamuto concludes that the authorities fail to learn 
from past disasters.799 
Although unsafe league centres in Africa allow room for hooliganism, it does 
not explain why intimidation and violence occur in the first place. The most 
direct instigators of violence are actions by players and referees on the field of 
play. Two factors in particular raise the level of aggression: Referee bias and 
juju. Let us consider the following statement by Armstrong about football in 
Liberia: 
Fan disorder always seemed to involve the supporters of the big two teams [Mighty Barolle 
and Invincible Eleven], if not with each other then with fans of the smaller teams. But 
nobody I spoke with was ever aware of a “hooligan” problem, and the fixtures were not 
occasions for chants and fights bound up in ethnic and socio-political antagonisms. Disorders 
tended to arise as a consequence of disputed refereeing decisions or cheating by players. In 
such instances, games have been abandoned after assaults on match officials.800 
Indeed, most of the violence I observed was directed at the referee. A common 
image in Ghanaian football is the referee and linesmen being escorted off the 
pitch by policemen in battle uniforms. Referees are on occasion beaten to death. 
Juju practices also lead to violence. The 13 deaths during a match in DR 
Congo in 2008 were a result of a stampede caused by juju. ‘It started at half-time 
when the keeper of Nyuki removed stuff from his jerseys and threw it into the net 
of their opponents,’ one eyewitness said. ‘Socozaki players caught him and 
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started beating him after alleging that he had tried to throw witchcraft in their net. 
His Nyuki teammates intervened and a fight broke out between the two sides.’801 
One police officer then shot teargas into the crowd. A match in Cameroon’s top 
league in 2003 got out of hand when home team supporters suspected the visiting 
team’s goalkeeper of hiding a strange object (a bottle of water) inside his 
goalpost. When one supporter snatched the bottle away, a general pandemonium 
ensued in which the same supporter allegedly died.802 
Supporters know that if the opponent team resorts to bribery or juju, their team 
may lose the match. Any act that goes against the wishes of the home crowd may 
lead to violence. That was the case at the Cairo International Stadium in April 
2011 during a CAF Champions League match between Zamalek and Tunisia’s 
Club Africain. When the referee disallowed a much-needed goal for Zamalek, 
home team supporters invaded the pitch and attacked both the referee and the 
Tunisian players. It was a painful reminder of an earlier incident in 2007 when 
Cairo hosted the CAF Champions League final between home team Al-Ahly and 
Etoile du Sahel. Immediately after Al-Ahly lost the match 1-3, supporters started 
throwing objects onto the pitch. Journalist Farayi Mungazi called it ‘Al-Ahly’s 
night of shame’: 
Granted, football matches involving Egyptian and Tunisian teams are always a flammable 
mix, and there was always a chance that defeat for Al Ahly in their own backyard would see 
an ugly end to the game. But to see some Egyptian journalists who were sitting in the press 
area with the rest of us also hurling objects at Etoile players was particularly disgraceful. 
What was even more shocking was that a thick line of stewards and police officers just stood 
by watching, doing absolutely nothing to stop the wave of flying objects. Worse still, bottled 
drinks are officially banned from the stadium but they were clearly in abundance as Al 
Ahly’s quest for a sixth Champions League title dissolved into a night of utter shame. It all 
made a mockery of the airport-like security scanners fans faced before being allowed into the 
stadium.803 
Related to the failure to accept defeat is the assumption, uttered by several 
informants in both Ghana and Cameroon, that most supporters are simply not 
conversant with the basic rules of the game. ‘In football you can win, draw and 
lose,’ said one coach in Ghana. ‘But some supporters only want to see their team 
win. If anything else happens, they immediately become violent.’ The expatriate 
coach Steven Polack called for supporters to be ‘educated’ on the rules: 
When you lose the supporters want to kill everybody. What’s that all about? I remember one 
home game where we drew 1-1. When I was walking towards the gate, one man said: “Don’t 
go out there. There are 60 to 70 people waiting for you and they’re really pissed off.” I 
thought of my two children so I went back in. The next day I heard they wanted to lynch me. 
They were angry with me because we didn’t score more goals. I went on radio and said: “I 
hope the supporters are listening because we must have been at a different match. We had 
eight chances and six of them should have been goals. Is that the fault of the coach? We’re 
just having trouble finding a real goal scorer.” Then one supporter phoned in and said that 
it’s true and that they couldn’t blame the coach. So you see, I educated them on the radio.  
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Photo 8.3 A match between Eleven Wise and Asante Kotoko at the Essipong Stadium in 
Sekondi ends in a victory for the visitors. Immediately afterwards, armed police 
officers escort the referee and his linesmen off the pitch 
 
 
 
Next match at home we drew 1-1. I walked out of the gate. The supporters said: “It’s not 
your fault.” Then they went after the players instead. 
Alcohol is a quite serious problem as well. The availability of cheap strong liquor 
near league venues results in supporters getting heavily intoxicated. As Alegi 
writes with regard to South Africa, alcohol ‘often acted as a catalyst for 
disorder’.804 
Globally, hooliganism is seen as ‘a complex and many-sided phenomenon’.805 
With regard to Africa, Igbinovia lists a number of causes, among which the 
aforementioned ‘bad officiating’ and the use of ‘charms’ but also the loss of 
national pride, ethnic insensibility and political convictions.806 Similarly, Martin 
relates violence to ‘social identity, political animosity, unemployment and econo-
mic deprivation, high stakes in gambling, drunkenness, the ‘rebellion’ of youth 
and the unemployed, inexperienced referees and ‘lack of leadership’ on the part 
of sports organizers’.807 Burnett argues that football matches in South Africa 
‘present a public stage where men “fight” for their prestige and that of their team, 
finding temporary relief from anxiety through physical violence and alcohol 
abuse without considering the consequences in the quest for excitement and 
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temporary “empowerment”’.808 Theories about masculinity and violence are put 
forward in a book about gender and football in Africa.809  
Fan cultures in Africa are often perceived to be an expression of a happy-go-
lucky attitude, including lots of singing and chanting, vigorous dancing rituals, 
the beating on drums and the blowing on vuvuzelas. As Alegi writes, in the early 
days ‘the games were spectacles, feasts, and popular entertainment all wrapped 
into one’.810 However, the sudden outbursts of violence are bewildering. This is 
all the more strange because the concept of organised supporter groups who find 
pleasure in beating each other up is rather uncommon in Africa. Lately, however, 
there are reports of such groups (so-called Ultras) in Egypt and Tunisia.811 I have 
not heard of similar groups in Ghana and Cameroon – in fact, supporters of 
Hearts and Kotoko sit side by side during the fiercely contested interregional 
derby – but it does seem that Ultras and the related inter-fan fighting phen-
omenon are on the increase in Africa. 
Mentioning the Ultras leads us to a third football tragedy which happened on 1 
February 2012 in Port Said (Egypt). After a match between rivals Al-Masry and 
Al-Ahly, which ended 3-1 for the home team, Al-Masry supporters invaded the 
pitch and attacked players and supporters of the visiting team, killing 74 people. 
It was suspected that the violence had been planned beforehand. Several mem-
bers of Al-Ahly’s Ultras had protested Hosni Mubarak’s regime at Tahrir Square 
in 2011. In fact, they had reportedly been a major factor in the Arab Spring 
revolution in the first place. As it turned out, many supporters of Al-Masry were 
Mubarak sympathisers and it was claimed they were bent on taking revenge. 
Many Egyptians later protested the inadequate response by the security forces 
inside the stadium.812 
It is indeed argued that hooliganism in African football is closely related to 
ethnic and political realities. I have described how ethnic and political animosi-
ties caused violence to occur during matches in Cameroon (chapter 5). On the 
island of Mauritius, too, such violence is generally related to ethnic strife: 
Since 1982, most of the teams that have played in the Premier League have been regionally-
based, but, nevertheless, rivalries between Sunrise, Scouts, Cadets and Fire Brigade have 
only intensified, perhaps mirroring wider ethnic tensions throughout the island. There have 
been a catalogue of incidents – at least twenty-three cases of violence between 1985 and 
1999 – including assaults on rival fans, damage to stadia, battles with the police, assaults on 
referees, players and officials, and pitch invasions.813 
The fact that ethno-politics plays a role in African football is partly the reason 
why intimidation and violence is more common during the types of matches as 
described earlier. As the prospect of relegation is unbearable, home crowds resort 
to violence to prevent such things from happening. Derbies are typically very 
violent affairs because of the strong ethno-political connotations during such 
encounters. 
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Ethnic and political factors also increase violence in a more sinister way. In 
the days of Idi Amin, violence in stadiums in Uganda was often government-
sanctioned. Express FC was the people’s club, it had no affiliation to the gov-
ernment; Simba, on the other hand, was the team of the army. ‘Whenever Simba 
played, Amin’s army officers were waving their rifles on the stand,’ writes 
journalist Edwin Schoon. ‘They drove to the stadium in full-armoured jeeps, to 
intimidate their opponents.’814 In his book on Amin’s rule, the then minister 
Henry Kyemba writes how he was in charge of culture, including sports. It is his 
only reference to football but a revealing one nonetheless: 
I had to ensure that football matches between army teams and civilians were properly con-
trolled, otherwise the bitterness towards the army tended to erupt into open violence. One 
particular club, the Express (since banned by Amin), was nicknamed the “Club of the Dead” 
because so many of its officials and supporters had been murdered. In any Army-Express 
match the army team had to win. If it lost, the crowd would be in for a beating for being 
“anti-army”.815 
When Express FC defeated Simba in a match in 1977, supporters and officials of 
Express FC were arrested and tortured at Makindye prison.816 
The ethnic and political factors occasionally lead violence to expand beyond 
the confines of the stadium. I have already given the example of a match between 
Foudre Akonolinga and Aigle Royal Menoua in Cameroon (chapter 5). Another 
example is a 1993 Cup of Champions Clubs match between ASEC Mimomas 
and Asante Kotoko in Abidjan. There were reports that Kotoko’s delegation was 
abused abroad, which led to retaliation from Kotoko fans. This, in turn, led to the 
killing of several Ghanaians in Ivory Coast.817 Another case concerns the “foot-
ball war” between Cameroon and Gabon in May 1981. When players of a 
Gabonese team were molested in Douala, angry mobs in Libreville and Port-
Gentil attacked Cameroonians. By May 28, 6,000 Cameroonians were repatriated 
by planes sent by the government in Yaoundé.818 
Let us return to the topic at hand, namely home advantage. Home crowds 
evidently have an effect on team performance. Drawing on Tuan’s ideas about 
topophilia and topophobia,819 Bale argues that a stadium either evokes a sense of 
love or affection (topophilia) or a sense of fear or anxiety (topophobia).820 On the 
one hand, he states, stadiums can be viewed as sacred places or symbolic 
homes.821 This is how Desmond Morris describes the mood at a home ground: 
At the heart of each Soccer Tribe lies its great temple, the stadium. So strong is its magic 
that, for a tribesman to approach it, even on a day when no match is being played, creates a 
strange feeling of mounting excitement and anticipation. Although it is deserted he can sense 
the buzz of the crowd and hear again the roar of the fans as the ball hits the back of the 
enemy net. To a devoted tribesman it is a holy place, with a significance that it is hard for an 
outsider to appreciate.822 
On the other hand, Giulianotti argues, topophobia ‘will strike spectators as they 
anticipate visiting grounds where the home team is commonly successful, or 
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where the fans have notorious reputations’.823 This, to be sure, will not only have 
an impact on supporters of the visiting team, but also on the players and officials 
of the visitors and, perhaps even more so, on the referee. The old Kaladan and 
Gyandu Parks in Ghana were dreaded by visiting teams for the very intimidating 
atmosphere. The same can be said of the Rufaro Stadium in Harare, as Daimon 
observes: 
For example, in Harare’s Rufaro Stadium, which is the home of Dynamos FC, Zimbabwe’s 
most popular team but arguably with the most violent supporters, there is an area popularly 
known as the ‘Vietnam’ stand. The name ‘Vietnam’ is a metaphor for the brutality of the 
Vietnam War of the 1960s. So this section of Rufaro Stadium represents a war zone, solely 
preserved for Dynamos. Paradoxically, the name ‘Rufaro’ denotes happiness or joy. Most 
hooligans who include rouges and criminals are found in this area. Any non-Dynamos fans 
(…) who trespass into this territory, are violently mobbed and ejected.824 
In most cases, home crowds throughout Africa vastly outnumber those of the 
visitors. Intimidation and harassment begins when the visiting team spends the 
night in a hotel and worsens hours before the start of the match. 
The biggest community-based clubs may not escape the sense of topophobia 
but they certainly do not feel it as much as lesser clubs do. The main reason is 
that these clubs normally have a huge following, which means that the ratio of 
home team supporters versus visiting team supporters is likely to be tilted in 
favour of the latter group. In 2009, I watched a match between Kessben FC and 
Asante Kotoko at the stadium in Abrankese. It seemed that only a handful of 
supporters were favouring the home team; the majority of spectators were wear-
ing Kotoko’s red colours and waving the Kotoko flag. The atmosphere was very 
intimidating and the referee was severely pressurised to be biased in favour of the 
Porcupine Warriors. ‘The supporters of the big clubs will chant war songs,’ said 
Mr. X. ‘There are so many of them that you will feel their presence. They make it 
look as if you are the stranger in your own backyard.’ 
As said, topophilia and topophobia are related to home advantage. In review-
ing the literature, Pollard lists three factors that are significant in this respect: 
Crowd effects, familiarity and territoriality. To start with the latter, territoriality 
in football indicates that people ‘respond to a real or perceived invasion of their 
home territory’ which makes it ‘reasonable to suppose this might be a factor in 
home advantage’. Familiarity implies that home teams perform ‘at a familiar 
stadium in familiar conditions amid familiar surroundings, all of which should 
provide an advantage’, especially when the pitch has an unusual size or surface. 
Finally, supporters are an obvious reason for the existence of home advantage 
although, as Pollard argues, ‘the precise way in which crowd support has an ef-
fect has been difficult to pinpoint’.825 
Although intimidation and violence perpetrated against the visiting team also 
contributes to home advantage, it is the referee who is the most likely candidate 
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to be influenced by the home crowd. We already know that referee bias is one of 
the main reasons why home advantage exists. The referee may favour one team 
over the other because he has been bribed. He may, however, also favour one 
team – commonly the home team – because he finds himself severely threaten-
ed.826 ‘The supporters are a big problem,’ said referee Atta Baffour. ‘There’s not 
much security. They can slap you. That’s why some referees are not performing 
well. If there were more policemen you wouldn’t have to fear. You would be 
leaving the field as a hero.’ Is there anything a referee can do about that? ‘If you 
think your life may be in danger,’ Baffour said, ‘you call in sick. The only thing 
you can say to save your life is that you are sick.’ 
We have already come across quite a few cases where referees were physically 
manhandled by the home crowd. Let us consider the following story by Ghanaian 
referee Reginald Lathbridge at a time he was still officiating in the First Division. 
‘This division is a very hot place,’ he said. ‘Those clubs are all eager to join the 
Premier League. They always blame the referee if something bad happens, es-
pecially when you don’t favour the home team.’ He continued: 
A few years back I acted as linesman during a match between a team from Bogoso and one 
from Swedru. One Bogoso player scored a goal from the free kick. But he was in an offside 
position so I raised the flag and the goal was disallowed. There was no inner perimeter 
around the field. The supporters were standing behind me, holding canes and umbrellas, 
because it was raining that day. Most of them had been taking our local drink, Akpeteshi. 
They were whipping me with their canes and umbrellas. The police came in and made sure 
that sanity prevailed. But the home team was leading by 3-0 so I couldn’t understand why 
they were so hostile. 
In the second half there was this Rasta man who was playing on my side of the field. He 
was the left back of the Bogoso team. Then the team from Swedru scored a goal through the 
Rasta player’s side. They scored a second goal the same way. And then the equaliser came. 
The supporters behind me were charging on me but I said that it looked as if the Rasta player 
was bribed. Some of them believed me. But when the match ended in a 3-3 draw, others 
attacked me and we had to run out of the stadium. Finally, we ended up in a woman’s 
kitchen. The police came and took us to safety. 
The strange part of this story is that the supporters of the home team harassed the 
linesman even when their team was in the lead. 
Big Men too sometimes resort to violence. First of all, there are club officials 
who abhor violence and who in no way would contribute to it.827 Having said 
that, some Big Men have a reputation of being hotheads. A former CEO of 
Berekum Arsenals was described by Kotoko Express-journalist David Kyei as a 
‘loose cannon’. He once ‘threatened to bus over fifty supporters of his club side 
to Accra to demand the release of the disciplinary committee ruling on their case 
against Tema Youth,’ Kyei wrote.828 The Arsenals CEO did not escape a ban, 
and neither has Alhaji Grunsah, the owner of King Faisal, who has on occasion 
assaulted referees and security personnel. Antoine Essomba Eyenga and Théo-
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phile Abega, presidents of Tonnerre and Canon Yaoundé respectively, have re-
ceived bans for abusing referees and security personnel.829 
Although violence certainly is not absent in Africa’s newly built modern sta-
diums, there are nevertheless several less appealing football temples that have 
such a bad reputation that they are regarded as no-go areas. Most venues, es-
pecially those in the villages, can hardly be labelled stadiums at all. Players in 
Cameroon complained about having to play on pitches without inner perimeters. 
‘There are always players who ask the coach to be left out of the squad,’ Ashu 
told me. ‘When you’re about to step onto the pitch, supporters will start beating 
you.’ The majority of venues in Cameroon’s and, more generally, Africa’s lower-
level leagues could be regarded as no-go areas. Indeed, Ghana’s First Division 
league is regarded as extremely intimidating and violent. However, even some of 
Africa’s top leagues have such no-go areas. 
Whereas intimidating and violent acts occur at many league centres on a 
somewhat regular basis, no-go areas are characterised by the fact that such 
hooliganism pops up every time a team visits the town for a match. In Cameroon, 
Tiko, Kumba and Bamenda were for long considered no-go areas. Tiko has had a 
terrible reputation when it comes to violence. Former Tiko United secretary Daf 
Obenge told me the following story: 
If you play well and beat us, then fine. But don’t cheat us! There are radicals in Tiko, just 
like the hooligans in England. We don’t want the match delegate and the referees to cheat us. 
The referee may take money but he has to be very careful. The money may cost him his life. 
I remember a match in 1983. I was still a young boy. Tiko United first played a match in 
Kumba against PWD Kumba, a really big team in those days. PWD beat us. Tiko supporters 
destroyed many vehicles, burned tyres. But there are also a lot of hooligans in Kumba. Then 
they played the return match in Tiko. When we beat PWD, their supporters became violent. 
They also destroyed vehicles. They were throwing stones and deflated car tyres. They even 
caused one wall of the stadium to collapse. 
The towns mentioned above all a lack of decent infrastructure. 
In Ghana, towns such as Berekum, Swedru, Kpandu, Tamale, Sekondi and 
Obuasi have for long been synonymous with intimidation and violence. Tamale 
truly has had a terrible reputation. Referee Kwame Nsiah Boafo instead opted for 
matches in the Brong-Ahafo Region which, to him, were ‘the worst’. ‘The under-
standing of the game among the supporters there is minimal. When you do any-
thing that is bad for the home team, they’ll come after you.’ Berekum, a small 
town in the Brong-Ahafo Region, is arguably Ghana’s foremost no-go area. The 
intimidation and violence perpetrated by the population in Berekum certainly has 
had an impact on the performances of visiting teams. ‘You will play there and 
you will lose,’ coach Bashir Hayford bluntly stated. ‘You can call Chelsea (from 
England) to play there but they will also lose.’ 
Home advantage statistics of Berekum Arsenals have been phenomenal. 
Taking data of seven successive Premier League seasons (2001-2008) and inter-
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preting home advantage as not losing at home, then Arsenals has had a home 
success rate between 80 and 100 percent. The team even recorded a 100 percent 
win/draw rate at the Golden City Park between 2005 and 2008. In contrast, 
Arsenals’ away record, in this case meaning a win or draw, was 20 to 33 percent 
between 2001 and 2008. Players, coaches, Big Men and referees all cite the 
intimidating atmosphere as the main reason for Arsenals’ home record. Journalist 
Kamkam Boadu called Berekum a ‘Lion’s Den’: 
The supporters there are very hostile. Sometimes away teams don’t even use their team buses 
to go to the stadium. They feel the supporters will damage the bus, breaking the glass and so 
on. The last time a team won there was Kotoko. That was in 2003. The CEO of Kotoko went 
there with about 100 soldiers. He wrote to the armed forces saying that that place is a no-go 
area. He said it wasn’t safe for his players. So that’s how they managed to get that result. 
The figure of 100 soldiers may be exaggerated but the point is clear enough. 
‘One reason for our success was that the pitch in Berekum is not good,’ admitted 
Arsenals’ former coach Ernest Appau. ‘Another reason is that the stadium is 
entirely filled with home supporters. Visitors would come to play in our stadium, 
knowing that they would lose or maybe, if they were lucky, draw.’ 
No-go areas are not only characterised by the fact that the intimidation and 
violence is a concerted effort by the population at large but also that it is directed 
at everybody who comes to town. Referees certainly do not escape the violent 
behaviour of the home crowd – which is, in fact, in sharp contrast to the 
hospitality rule. Referee Lathbridge told me that even management members of 
Berekum Arsenals would ‘harass’ the referee. ‘One day the CEO of Arsenals 
came to me and said: “I cannot protect you. I don’t know what our supporters 
will do.” That alone is a very big threat. It means your life is in danger.’ He then 
told me the following story: 
I officiated a match between Berekum Arsenals and Hearts of Oak. The trouble already 
started before the match. The CEO and coach of Arsenals started talking on air that the 
Referees Appointment Committee had appointed Ga referees to cheat Arsenals. I live in 
Kumasi but I’m originally from Accra so that’s why they say I’m a Ga.  
When we went to the stadium for the pre-match ceremony, the supporters were shouting: 
“You’ve come to cheat us. We’ll kill you if you don’t let us win!” I laughed. “Oh you are 
laughing huh? You just laugh and go!” At halftime the score was 0-0. We were coming out 
from the inner perimeter to the gate. The supporters insulted us, intimidated us. They wanted 
to put fear in us. Sometimes they’ll even jump over the perimeter to harass you. At the end 
of the second half, in the 89th minute, Berekum Arsenals scored 1-0. When we were coming 
off the field, the supporters cried: “Today you were lucky! If we wouldn’t have won, we 
would have gotten to your mother.” 
His story once again proves that intimidation often starts days before the actual 
match. 
Players, coaches and officials of visiting teams are also heckled and occasion-
ally physically assaulted. Coach Bashir Hayford has the following story to tell in 
relation to Berekum Arsenals: 
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Sometimes they made an attempt to slap me but so far they couldn’t get to me. But one time 
the Arsenals masseur took a bag full of ice cubes and used it to hit one of our players. He 
was running onto the pitch to help one of his players when he saw our player standing there 
and intentionally hit him. This player was my striker. The boy started bleeding. What are you 
going to do? He was our key player. He wasn’t there again for the return match. 
Finally, even journalists, photographers and cameramen are routinely intimidated 
and sometimes beaten up.830 Presenting one’s PLB-approved accreditation at the 
stadium in Berekum does not guarantee a reporter access to the inner perimeter 
or, for that matter, to the stadium at all. ‘If you take a video camera to Berekum 
they will break it,’ explained coach Hayford. ‘Metro TV doesn’t even bring 
cameras along anymore. No! They know their cameras will be smacked.’ 
The situation in these no-go areas is made worse due to the biased security 
forces. Several referees complained that the policemen and security staff in 
Berekum who were supposed to protect them instead overly exhibited support for 
the home team. ‘Sometimes security intimidates you,’ said referee Lathbridge. 
‘They will come to you and say: “You have to help our team because we’re only 
in small numbers and we cannot do anything to protect you.”’ Journalist 
Kamkam Boadu explained that most of the security men are based in Berekum. 
‘It’s a small town,’ he said. ‘Even if security is not from the area, they can only 
try to restrain the supporters. And when they arrest someone you will see him 
walking out of the police station in no time.’ 
The idea that no-go areas influence the outcome of matches became evident 
when the number of such places in Ghana went down due to the 2008 African 
Cup of Nations. Real Tamale United’s (RTU) previous home ground, the Kala-
dan Park, was one of the foremost no-go areas. Ever since RTU started playing in 
the new Tamale Stadium, the team has consistently underperformed in the Pre-
mier League, barely escaping relegation on several occasions. Coach Bashir 
Hayford explained the situation: 
The Kaladan Park was a very bad place. The pitch was a barren ground, there was no grass. 
You weren’t allowed to train there so they would surely beat you. Whatever you do, they 
would win. But now they have a good stadium and that’s a problem to them. Everybody – 
Hearts, Kotoko, Heart of Lion, Kessben FC – beat them in their own stadium. It’s bad luck 
for them. Why? Because they cannot intimidate you any longer. The supporters cannot 
harass you outside, they cannot harass you on the pitch. And the pitch is now a lot better so 
we don’t have to lose there anymore.  
If a referee officiated a match in Tamale in the past, referee Atta Baffour 
claimed, he was ‘going to hell’. ‘But now some teams go there and they win,’ he 
said. 
All of this has led some clubs, including RTU and Hasaacas, to request the 
GFA and PLB to change their home venue. The Accra-based club Tudu Mighty 
Jets requested to change to an inferior venue in Akosombo, an hour’s drive from 
the capital. Bechem Chelsea asked the PLB to change their home ground to 
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Berekum. In an editorial in Hearts News, Hearts sympathisers wondered why 
these clubs would decline making use of modern facilities. Hearts claimed that 
the ‘decision by some clubs to change venues is that they are seeking opportu-
nities to exploit the weaknesses in such venues, intimidate their opponents and 
use other negative means to win their matches at home’.831 Although I do not 
know the exact motives behind these changes of venues, it can indeed be argued 
that these clubs feared a loss of home advantage. 
In sum, Big Men need to win matches in order to successfully convert capital 
through football. They can either leave it to chance or increase the probability of 
victory by cheating, i.e. by breaking the rules of the game. We have focused on 
three deliberate attempts at influencing matches, namely match-fixing, hospital-
lity and gift-giving; juju and other occult forces; and intimidation and violence. 
These factors increase home advantage, meaning that home teams beat the 
visitors more often than chance would dictate. It is generally understood that end-
of-season matches are more influenced by “outside” forces than other types of 
matches. This insight leads us to the next and final chapter. It is here that I 
discuss the impact of Big Men’s attempts at converting capital in entire leagues 
and international tournaments. 
 
 
 9 
Friendships, networks and  
the search for profit 
‘We need three home wins and two away wins,’ says Mr. X. ‘That should put us 
in the safe zone.’ I just made the observation that his club would most likely 
relegate. ‘Maybe,’ he replies. ‘But it’s all about networking. I know a lot of 
people and I’ve planned ahead. We need to collect at least 15 points.’ Mr. X 
sounds confident. So far he has managed to avert catastrophe each and every 
year. 
It is two months before the end of the season. We sit face to face in his 
favourite, air-conditioned room, discussing the remaining eleven matches. Mr. X 
says nothing about the first three matches. The opponent in the fourth match is a 
one-man show. ‘I know the president well,’ he says. ‘I saved him once. We’ll 
arrange something.’ Mr. X is silent about match number five, which takes place 
in a no-go area. Match number six is a home match. ‘This president is unreliable 
so I cannot count on this one,’ he says. 
The opponent in match number seven is a fierce rival. ‘Me and some of the 
older officials have a history together. I will get a result there.’ About match 
number eight, a home match, Mr. X says: ‘We may treat the referee well.’ Match 
number nine is an away match against a top team. ‘We’ll certainly get some 
points,’ he says. The tenth match is a home match against one of Ghana’s biggest 
teams. ‘We’re going to win this one.’ The team has to travel far for the last 
match. ‘I know the man so there’s no problem here.’ 
The first match takes place on the day we have our talk. The vice president 
calls in to say they lost. Mr. X’s predictions of the next ten matches turn out to be 
quite interesting. Luck is on his side in two home matches (numbers two and 
eight) that were not part of his plan. Both matches are won. The same goes for 
the away match against the team in the no-go area (number five) and the home 
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match against the team whose club president was an ‘unreliable person’ (number 
six). Both matches end in a draw. 
Now let us focus on the three home and two away matches which were part of 
Mr. X’s plan. His forecasts were 80% accurate.832 The home match against the 
club president who owed our Big Man a favour (number four) ends in victory; 
the same goes for the fierce rival (number seven). Victories are also recorded in 
the last two matches. Overall, Mr. X collects twenty points in eleven matches. 
When confronted with these results he smiles and says: ‘I told you I knew how to 
avoid relegation.’ 
Friendships and the promotion/relegation struggle 
In most cases (but not all, as we will see further below), playing in the top league 
is the raison d’être for a club. Matches that determine promotion and relegation 
are thus fiercely contested. There is, as we know, so much more at stake than a 
mere ticket for the top league. We have discussed these motivations at length so I 
will refrain from repeating myself. One comment from Mr. X, however, cannot 
be withheld: 
There is sponsorship for all clubs in the Premier League but as soon as you go down you’re 
in trouble. You will find it very hard to come back again because there’s no money from gate 
takings and there’s no sponsorship. You can compare football in the First Division to black 
and white television. There’s only colour television when you’re in the Premier League. We 
call the First Division the Wilderness. I myself used to call it Siberia. It’s a place you don’t 
want to be. So we the clubs do not only try to get into the Premier League, we also want to 
stay there. It’s a matter of life and death. Staying in the league is about life itself! That’s why 
you sometimes have to go to the referee or the other team. I like to call it buying life. 
As Hill states, the ‘cost of relegation and the subsequent loss of sponsors and 
television rights is an important consideration for internal corruptors’.833 
Earning promotion and avoiding relegation are two important goals in a Big 
Man’s career. As Mr. X said earlier, ‘it all depends on the fixtures at the end of 
the season’. ‘It’s a matter of mathematical calculations,’ he added. Journalist 
Kamkam Boadu agreed. ‘If teams can win their home matches and maybe a few 
matches away, they can sustain themselves in the league,’ he told me. We have 
seen how many individual matches are influenced by match-fixing, juju and 
intimidation. Now I would like to take it a step further by examining leagues and 
tournaments as a whole. Seen this way, promotion and relegation are sometimes 
decided by what informants told me are “invisible hands” or “higher powers”. 
Indeed, there are generally speaking three ways in Big Men can earn promotion 
and avoid relegation: Friendships and favours, conflicts of interest, and the power 
of Big Men. 
Remember the statement that the referee is “the most important man on the 
field” (chapter 8). Hill’s research, however, leads to another suggestion. Corrupt 
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referees have in fact the lowest success rate (78.9%) as compared to corrupt 
players (83.1%) and corrupt ‘team administration’ (90.5%).834 In other words, a 
Big Man who fixes a match by approaching officials of the opponent team stands 
the greatest chance of winning the match. Although these statistics were not 
derived from research in Africa, they do correlate with what Mr. X has told me, 
namely that bribing referees or players is unreliable. Instead, he preferred to 
establish relationships with rival club officials. In Mr. X’s words, he liked to deal 
with club officials ‘face to face’. ‘I rely on friendships,’ he said. ‘And it’s not 
always about money. It’s about trust and respect.’ 
It is indeed a matter of trust. Hill argues that ‘corruptors need trust’; ‘the more 
times corruptors can successfully fix matches between themselves, the more they 
trust each other. The more they trust each other, the more matches they can 
fix.’835 Some Big Men, and Mr. X claims he is one of them, are said to have a 
reputation of being trustworthy in this department. According to Mr. X, one can 
never completely rely on referees. For one thing, a referee may already have been 
bribed by the other team with a higher amount of money. One Ghanaian jour-
nalist told me the following story: ‘A while ago Alhaji Grunsah (owner of King 
Faisal) said: “You don’t get a receipt for bribery, so how do you know if you get 
your money’s worth?”’ This is why favours based on friendships are to be pre-
ferred, especially when there is no money involved. 
As said, the first way for a club to gain promotion and avoid relegation is to 
establish friendships. The issue of friendships and favours briefly surfaced in 
relation to club officials trying to fix matches (chapter 8). Friendships between 
clubs may evolve for different reasons. For instance, a friendship exists between 
Sekondi Hasaacas and Liberty Professionals because Sly Tetteh, founder and 
owner of Liberty, is a former Hasaacas player. Hasaacas and Hearts of Oak are 
old friends as well. ‘Hearts is a senior club to Hasaacas,’ said Ben Nab Eyison, 
CEO of Hasaacas. ‘When they were constructing the Takoradi harbour in 1925, 
most workers came from Accra. And the former CEO of Hasaacas, E.A. Nartey, 
used to be a Hearts official. Hearts sees Hasaacas as a woman who was taken 
from the rib of a man.’ Eleven Wise also had a relationship with Hearts before 
experiencing a fall-out in the 1990s.836 
In Ghana, the issue of friendships can best be explained through the country’s 
two biggest clubs. The perception among Ghanaians is that Hearts of Oak 
maintains several friendships while Asante Kotoko does not. Whereas Hearts 
(partly) depends on friends to win the championship, Kotoko (partly) depends on 
its financial strength. The difference was well summarised by Kojo Fianoo, CEO 
of AshantiGold FC: 
Hearts will give a team one point if that’s what it takes for that team to survive. At the time 
where Hearts has accumulated points and they are safe, they’re prepared to help clubs. But 
Kotoko is not like that. There was a club named Dawu Youngstars who were also in the 
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Premier League. The owner of the club was a [former] director of Kotoko. Dawu was going 
into relegation, went to Kumasi and was beaten 4-0 by Kotoko [It was actually worse as 
Dawu was beaten 1-4 at home]. Do you think that if Kotoko can win the league the other 
teams will give the points to Kotoko? No, they won’t give it. They rather give it to Hearts. 
So Hearts has a lot of friends and Kotoko has a lot of enemies. 
In short, as Fianoo argued, Hearts is a club that ‘compromises on certain 
occasions’. ‘They accommodate,’ he said, ‘but Kotoko doesn’t do that. So you 
need to know how to approach these two clubs. Hearts will sometimes bite you 
but at the same time they will be blowing hot and cold. Kotoko blows hot. That’s 
the difference.’ 
Hearts’ tendency to accommodate is said to have its origin in the club’s his-
tory and location. It was stated that the club was founded in Accra’s Ussher 
Town district by members of the Ga, an ethnic group known for its openness to 
strangers (chapter 4). Indeed, the century-old influx of immigrants from other 
parts of Ghana and neighbouring countries led the Ga to become ‘so accustomed 
to the presence of immigrants that they expressed the desire for more to join 
them’.837 ‘Those who control Hearts are very diplomatic,’ said Kojo Fianoo. An 
advantage of Hearts is the club’s location; each Premier League season features 
several clubs from the Greater Accra Region. ‘Hearts has many clubs around 
them so they don’t have to travel far to pick up the points,’ said Fianoo. ‘There 
are more clubs from around Accra than from around Kumasi. That’s also because 
Hearts helps clubs from their area to earn promotion.’ 
Kotoko’s attitude of blowing hot is said to be linked to the Ashanti’s aggres-
sive and warlike past. In contrast to Hearts, Kotoko is especially aggressive 
towards clubs in the Ashanti Region. Officials of Kumasi Cornerstones blame the 
team’s relegation in 1992 and again in 1995 on their city rival’s behaviour. 
‘Kotoko is really powerful and they don’t want to see other teams in the region,’ 
said the club’s CEO. Adansiman, Obuasi’s community-based team, also discov-
ered Kotoko’s nature when they were beaten 0-3 at home in 2002 and were later 
relegated. Kojo Fianoo explained the issue: 
The attitude of the Ashanti man is to dominate and to make noise. The attitude of Kotoko is 
that they should always dominate. We [AshantiGold] always tell them that in terms of 
professionalism we are ahead of them so that brings some level of rivalry. Kotoko fights us 
both for the league title and for regional dominance. They think they are the biggest team in 
the Ashanti Region. They have the same problem with King Faisal. They think that all the 
clubs in the Ashanti Region should be subordinate to them. 
Mr. X stated that Kotoko does not give favours to anyone, except B.A. United (a 
team from the Brong-Ahafo Region, recently renamed Brong Ahafo Stars). ‘It’s 
only with B.A. that Kotoko would give away a match for free,’ said Mr. X. 
Friendships between clubs by and large depend on the Big Men who run them. 
One of the reasons why Hearts has so many friends is that several of its man-
agement members left to form clubs elsewhere. It is claimed that warm con-
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nections still exist between those Big Men and Hearts. In contrast, when former 
Kotoko management members formed private clubs, they immediately became 
the Porcupine Warriors’ fiercest enemies. Since friendships – and the favours 
that come out of it – commonly depend on individual Big Men, relationships 
between clubs are not static and tend to change over time. This is best explained 
through a story as told by Mr. X, whose club maintained historical relationships 
with some Big Men of another club: 
At one point I needed all the points I could get. So I turned to [one particular team]. But they 
were split in two. Some of the management members were new and they wanted to prove a 
point. They said: “No, we cannot do it. We don’t have a relationship with [Mr. X’s team].” 
But the elders in the club knew about our relationship and said: “We don’t want them to go 
on relegation.” So rather than talking to the management team, the elders instead used some 
players with sympathy for [Mr. X’s team]. These were the players who helped us out. They 
secured the win. The management team was furious. They had promised to give the players 
match bonuses but now they didn’t. 
It even happens that the Big Men of sworn enemies help each other out when it 
comes to relegation issues. While the supporters of both teams hurl insults at one 
another, their management members may have struck a deal beforehand. This 
situation is not as outrageous as it sounds. After all, supporter rivalries go back 
decades but management members come and go, and some of them may have 
been friends before they started leading rival clubs. 
There are known friendships between clubs in Cameroon as well. The stories I 
heard are indications of friendships between Bamileke-owned clubs. One rumour 
has it that the Bamileke club presidents who were also Members of Parliament 
(MPs) made bets during meetings at the National Assembly. They would attend 
parliamentary sessions while discussing their teams’ performances. It was here 
that a Bamileke Big Man would throw a match or request a colleague to play 
softly. It is an appealing thought, yet we can leave it by saying that I heard it 
“through the grapevine”. Less vague is the perception among Cameroonians that 
the presidents of Mount Cameroon FC and Racing Bafoussam maintained 
friendships (see further below). 
A second way for club officials to gain promotion and avoid relegation is to 
conspire with FA officials. In 2009, for example, an official of a Nigerian Div-
ision One league club complained about a ‘cartel’ between three clubs aimed at 
obstructing his team from gaining promotion to the top league. The ‘conspiracy’, 
he claimed, was put in place with the help of NFF officials. ‘Bussdor, in their 
desperation to gain promotion,’ he said, ‘have secured the services of the other 
two clubs in the south-eastern region, as well as the consent of some officials of 
the Nigeria Football Federation working in the league department of the body, to 
manipulate fixtures, and the results of matches yet to be played.’838 Allegations 
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like these commonly lack proof, but it should be noted that there are many con-
spiracies involving teams that form “cartels”.839 
More solid are the stories that surround those Big Men who are simultaneously 
club and FA officials. In both Ghana and Cameroon, it is quite common for top 
FA officials to have interests in clubs. We have, in fact, discussed earlier that one 
cannot be elected into a top position within the FA if one does not occupy a 
position within a club. This is what we have referred to as the principle of “foot-
ball being run by football people” (see chapters 3 and 7). Big Men are often 
accused of wearing two hats at the same time, leading to conflicts of interest. 
GFA president Kwesi Nyantakyi, for example, owns a club in the Upper West 
Region, Wa All Stars. The perception is that GFA chairmen or presidents have 
made sure their teams benefited from their position.840  
Big Men who have influences within the FA sometimes make use of the 
league setup itself. The leagues in several if not all African countries occasion-
ally change in terms of structure and size. At the end of the 1997/98 Premier 
League season, Ashanti Goldfields found itself in the relegation zone. Several 
sources claimed that it was the famous CEO Sam Jonah himself who made sure 
the club did not relegate. ‘He cleverly used the system so that Goldfields could 
stay in the league,’ said Mr. X. At that point in time, when the Premier League 
consisted of 14 clubs, Jonah appealed to the GFA to increase the size of the 
league. This is how Kojo Fianoo explained it: 
I was in GHALCA at the time and I spoke on behalf of Goldfields. What happened was that 
he [Sam Jonah] only took advantage of the situation that was prevailing at that time. Back in 
1993, the stakeholders at the Winneba Conference signed a protocol, which was part of the 
Winneba Declaration, which stated that the league should be increased from 12 to 16 clubs. 
So Jonah saw that loophole, he saw that the league was supposed to increase. He went to the 
GFA and said: “Look, this is what the law is saying. We should increase the number of clubs 
in the league from 14 to 16.” It was just his presence and his ability to get that law im-
plemented. Let’s say I have an amnesty and then I commit a crime and have to go to jail. I 
will just refer to that amnesty. It’s my ability to know the law and to refer to the law. It had 
nothing to do with Sam Jonah. He might have sensitised some people to support something 
that was already there. 
The Ghanaian top league has expanded and contracted on several occasions. 
Sometimes the GFA is accused of favouring certain clubs (when the league 
expanded), sometimes the GFA is accused of conspiring against certain clubs 
(when the league contracted).841 
A similar situation occurred prior to the start of the 2010/11 season. Three of 
Ghana’s biggest community-based clubs – Great Olympics, Sekondi Eleven 
Wise and Sekondi Hasaacas – had all been relegated. Then, suddenly, talks were 
underway to expand the Premier League from 16 to 20 clubs. In the months 
leading up to an Extraordinary Congress in which GFA members were expected 
to vote either for or against the expansion, one club official went on air to accuse 
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the chairmen of the ten regional FAs of having been bribed. They allegedly each 
took 1,000 cedi (€500) from a management member of one of the three relegated 
clubs who wanted to buy their votes.842 This accusation was taken seriously 
because rumours had been going around for weeks claiming that some Big Men 
were planning to save the three clubs. In the end, however, members at the 
Congress rejected the proposal. 
A third way for a club to gain promotion and avoid relegation is to have 
powerful Big Men as sympathisers. Sam Jonah certainly was such a person, but I 
am referring to Big Men who neither occupy a position within a club nor within 
the FA. From all indications these things happen all over Africa. ‘One time a 
member of the Central Committee of the Presidency called me and told me that I 
should favour one team,’ a referee in Cameroon told me. We will nevertheless 
again limit the discussion to Ghana and, in this case, to Real Tamale United 
(RTU). It is claimed that Big Men within both the Kufuor and Mills admini-
strations saved the club from relegation. The brothers John Dramani and Alhaji 
Aliu Mahama, who both acted as vice president and who had both been involved 
in the affairs of RTU, were mentioned in particular. 
One story concerned a match in the final round of the 2007/08 season, in 
which RTU beat Zaytuna FC and so managed to stay in the Premier League (see 
chapter 8). Zaytuna officials claimed that the vice president had had a hand in 
their relegation. ‘After the match, a vehicle with a State Protocol Department 
registration number plate picked referee Tagoe up. We believe the car is coming 
from the vice-president’s office,’ said the chairman of Zaytuna. There was, he 
argued, a political motivation in supporting Real Tamale United. ‘If you hear 
comments like people saying that if RTU are relegated, they will not vote for the 
ruling NPP during December’s elections, then it is worrying.’843 Journalist Kam-
kam Boadu was aware of the story: 
It’s a big rumour but all of us believe it. The match between Zaytuna and RTU was a do-or-
die match. If one team would lose the match, they would relegate. So there was a lot of 
drama. It was a very big match and RTU won. Two seasons before this match, RTU was 
playing AshGold in Obuasi. There were only two matches to go and RTU needed a draw in 
Obuasi. AshGold had a change to get into the Top Four [a tournament in between league 
seasons] but they gave RTU the draw. It was a match of convenience. It was decided because 
of a phone call. If the vice president is on the line, what can you do? 
One Premier League referee, whose name I will not reveal, told me about a 
match between RTU and Liberty Professionals in the last stages of one particular 
league season. At this point in time, both RTU and Liberty desperately needed 
the points to avoid relegation. This referee officiated the match because, as he 
stated, ‘some referees like myself are known to be strong enough to handle these 
tough matches’: 
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Photo 9.1 Big teams such as Hearts and Kotoko are thought to receive favour upon favour. 
Kotoko players watch their team win an away match against Bechem Chelsea at the 
stadium in Sunyani 
 
 
 
Before the match I received phone calls from certain men. You know, there are a lot of 
powerful men in Tamale. They’re mostly Muslims there. Some of these men have major 
influence in the GFA. I’m not only talking about (M.N.D.) Jawula but also about a guy 
named (name of person). He’s not officially part of the club but he’s one of those people 
who work on the ground, if you know what I mean. Every club has influence in the GFA but 
RTU just has a little more influence. So these men asked me to be fair and to think about 
RTU’s situation. They needed a referee who could bring them the result that was needed. 
There’s also this political aspect. Tamale is an NPP area so people say: “We don’t want to 
lose twice this year to NDC. You have to save our team.” 
The match ended in a draw which, as the referee said, was ‘enough to keep both 
teams in the league’. 
Apart from politics playing a role in saving RTU from relegation, there had 
been economic considerations as well. ‘RTU almost went down last season,’ Mr. 
X. told me early in 2008. ‘But the club couldn’t go down because of the stadium. 
The GFA didn’t want it and the vice president didn’t want it. So they pulled 
some strings to make some teams play softly.’ As host of the 2008 African Cup 
of Nations, Ghana had built new stadiums in four cities, including Tamale. 
RTU’s relegation was expected to have a disastrous effect on the future of the 
Tamale Stadium. Lower league teams hardly draw supporters to the field of play 
and RTU is, in fact, the only Northern-based team capable of attracting thou-
sands of spectators. Without RTU playing Premier League matches every week, 
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the Tamale Stadium was thought to turn into a white elephant. Economic ratio-
nale thus dictated that RTU’s relegation would have a negative impact on the 
stadium and the league in general.844 RTU nevertheless finally relegated in 2011. 
Fortune, failure and the spiritual factor 
Apart from friendships and favours, the promotion/relegation battle is sometimes 
related to a Big Man’s involvement in spiritual practices. Big Men in Africa are 
commonly suspected of having a link with the spiritual world. In fact, a per-
ceived possession of spiritual powers partly legitimises their positions in the first 
place.845 Three cases are presented below. One case deals with the Seventh-Day 
Adventist Church, the other two with what we have broadly termed as juju. Two 
Big Men (Lupepe, Damase) are wealthy, powerful individuals who formed priv-
ate clubs and who were directly responsible for their teams’ misfortunes. The 
other Big Man (Parma) acted as CEO and therefore was a lot less powerful. His 
case is different in the sense that it was not only the “lesser” Big Man but also the 
supporters who caused the team’s demise. 
The first case deals with the profoundly religious owner of Zimbabwean club 
side AmaZulu,846 Delma Lupepe. A wealthy businessman and a leading member 
of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party, Lupepe took AmaZulu to the Premier 
League in 1997. As Zimbabwe’s richest and most professional club, AmaZulu 
clinched the league title in 2003. Its home ground was Bulawayo, which is also 
home to the country’s oldest club, Highlanders FC. As a typical one-man show, 
AmaZulu completely relied on the generosity of its president. Indeed, the club 
was referred to as “The House that Delma Lupepe Built”,847 which is significant 
because the religious controversy can solely be attributed to the beliefs and 
actions of the Big Man himself. 
Lupepe is a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, a religious move-
ment that regards the seventh day of the week as a day of rest. As a result, 
Lupepe refuses to have his team play on Saturday.848 The Big Man reportedly 
came to an understanding with Wellington Nyatanga, the chairman of the 
Premier Soccer League (PSL), and Wyatt Mpofu, the vice-chairman of the Zim-
babwe Football Association (ZIFA). These two men, incidentally also Seventh-
Day Adventists, gave their word that AmaZulu’s matches would only be played 
on Sundays. This verbal agreement, however, was not shared by other members 
of the PSL.849 AmaZulu was ordered to play a Cup match on a Saturday in 2001, 
which led Lupepe to pull his team out of the competition. AmaZulu was again 
scheduled to play on a Saturday in 2003 but the Bulawayo High Court ruled that 
Lupepe’s religious beliefs had to be respected. 
Things took a wrong turn when AmaZulu had to play Motor Action in August 
2004. A letter to Motor Action to plea for a change of date fell on deaf ears. ‘We 
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find it strange that on the strength of your religion you perhaps believe in juju as 
you failed to enter through the designated point last year and again failed to assist 
when our colours clashed,’ replied the president of Motor Action, referring to a 
match during which AmaZulu allegedly resorted to juju. ‘There are numerous 
reasons that have been factored to play our home matches on Saturdays as you 
are well aware that we are continuously on the road apart from the Harare 
matches. One turn certainly deserves another but in this instance we regret to you 
that your request is rejected.’850 
Lupepe, again, brought the case to the Bulawayo High Court which, again, 
ruled in his favour. If Motor Action wanted to play the match on Saturday, the 
match would have to start after 6 P.M. However, on match day, at 6.30 P.M. 
sharp, the referee called off the match because of poor lighting. The Disciplinary 
Committee ruled that AmaZulu had forfeited the match and fined the club. The 
Appeals Committee overturned this decision and ordered a replay.851 In May 
2005, the saga ended with the intervention of an Arbitration Tribunal. The 
question was whether the club could call upon Section 19 of Zimbabwe’s Con-
stitution which refers, among other things, to freedom of thought. It was ruled 
that AmaZulu, as an independent legal entity, should be separated from the 
club’s officials. Lupepe’s beliefs were therefore not attributable to the club.852 
In October 2005, AmaZulu again failed to show up for a league match against 
Motor Action, causing the team to lose the match by forfeiture. More signifi-
cantly, AmaZulu was expelled from the Premier League. ‘AmaZulu’s conduct 
threatens the survival of the league in many ways,’ the PSL stated. ‘It brings 
chaos. It diminishes the chances of the league attracting meaningful sponsorship. 
One would have been lenient had Amazulu been a first offender. It is not. It is a 
habitual offender.’853 ‘I will never confuse my priorities. God comes first in my 
life and I will not bend to accommodate the voice of men,’ said Lupepe in his 
defence. ‘I abide by the Bible and I can never be part of an organization that 
thinks the ten commandments are not valid. I would rather be expelled from this 
league than be expelled from heaven.’854 
ZIFA, however, overturned the PSL verdict and allowed AmaZulu back into 
the Premier League. ‘I did not see sense in expelling AmaZulu or making them 
forfeit points simply because some clubs insisted on playing their matches on 
Saturdays,’ ZIFA chairman Rafik Khan said.855 When club side Sundowns re-
fused to change a fixture against AmaZulu on a Saturday, Lupepe uttered his 
displeasure. ‘There are some people out to get AmaZulu,’ he said. ‘These people 
want to settle old scores.’ He went on to make a rather odd point: ‘It is un-
fortunate that religion has been sucked into this. The disagreements have nothing 
to do with religion.’856 AmaZulu forfeited their Saturday fixtures and relegated at 
the end of the 2005 season. 
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AmaZulu’s plea not to play on Saturdays contained a few inconsistencies. 
First, the team played several matches on Sabbath Day in its maiden season in 
the Premier League. It was only in their second season that Lupepe ordered the 
team not to play on Saturdays. Second, AmaZulu was accused of practicing juju, 
which led other clubs to wonder to which religion Lupepe adhered to: Witchcraft 
or Protestantism? Third, Lupepe was accused of wanting preferential treatment. 
This was aptly voiced by a pastor of a Pentecostal Church in Harare: ‘We used to 
ask for our games to be played on Saturdays, as Sunday is our day for church and 
for God. But sometimes it didn’t work out and we had to play on Sundays, as, 
although we’re Christians, we had to join the league on their terms, not on 
ours.’857 
The second case involves the Ghanaian Premier League club Tema Youth, 
whose home ground is located east of Accra. In 2005 businessman Emmanuel 
Kyeremeh bought a Division One club in collaboration with two other men – 
Wilfred Osei Kwaku “Parma” and Samuel Williams – and renamed it Tema 
Youth. Although Kyeremeh effectively owns the club, he leaves the day-to-day 
management affairs to his CEO, Wilfred Osei.858 In the same year, Tema Youth 
earned a promotion to the Premier League. The team’s stint in the top league was 
relatively brief as Tema Youth relegated at the end of the 2008/09 season. While 
the official explanation of the relegation was a deduction of points due to the 
fielding of an unqualified player, the main cause must be sought in a combination 
of juju and violence. 
The trouble began when FIFA and the GFA constructed a synthetic pitch at 
the Tema Stadium. In January 2008, FIFA president Sepp Blatter inaugurated the 
synthetic pitch (sometimes called artificial pitch or astro-turf) in front of African 
and European dignitaries. The other Premier League clubs soon realised that 
Tema Youth enjoyed an advantage for being the only team playing on an arti-
ficial pitch. They thus demanded to be able to practice at the Tema Stadium the 
day before a league match. If they filed a written request, the Premier League 
Board (PLB) decided, then they would be allowed entry. This did not augur well 
with Tema Youth officials and supporters, as journalist Kwaitoo writes, ‘sus-
pected their opponents of planting strange objects on the field and therefore 
decided to take the law into their own hands to curb it’.859 Whoever attempted to 
enter the stadium was violently chased away. 
In December 2008, officials of King Faisal lodged a complaint after their 2-1 
defeat in Tema. The affair became a serious matter when Wa All Stars lodged a 
complaint as well after a league match in Tema in January 2009. Before the 
Disciplinary Committee could decide on Tema Youth’s fate, the National Sports 
Council (NSC) stepped in and temporarily closed down the Tema Stadium. The 
ban was lifted a little while later. Violence popped up again in March during a 
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match between Tema Youth and Hearts of Oak. In June, the Graphic Sports 
complained about the ‘veiled threats’ that were directed at the newspaper’s ‘lady 
reporter’ who covered a match between Tema Youth and Berekum Arsenals.860 
The real trouble began days before the final league round on Sunday 19 July 
2009. Although Tema Youth had collected 40 points and were above the rele-
gation zone, there were disciplinary cases pending against the club. First, those 
around the team were accused of molesting a referee during a league match. 
Second, two clubs had filed a complaint against Tema Youth for fielding an 
unqualified player named Emmanuel Clottey, who had signed a contract at Tema 
Youth halfway through the 2008/09 season. The player had been loaned out by 
Great Olympics who claimed that his signing at Tema Youth had been done 
without their consent. The Disciplinary Committee found Tema Youth guilty of 
fielding an unqualified player and handed a six point deduction, which plunged 
the team into the relegation zone. After several hapless attempts to overturn the 
decision, Tema Youth gave up and went to play in the First Division.861 
Wilfred Osei “Parma” alleged that the relegation was predicated on personal 
motives. He argued that Emmanuel Clottey had been wrongfully deemed an 
unqualified player. He said that the authorities misinterpreted the clause which 
was used to disqualify Clottey. The player, not the club, should have been pun-
ished, he said. ‘The GFA system is now being controlled by invisible “hands” 
with the financial clout that is unprecedented in the annals of Ghana football, to 
the extent that the rules and regulations are being twisted with impunity to ensure 
that Tema Youth is relegated at all cost,’ he concluded.862 The CEO also alleged 
that his team was used as a scapegoat in order to save AshantiGold and Sekondi 
Eleven Wise from relegation. ‘There is a miscarriage of justice as Tema Youth is 
being offered on the altar for some clubs that have performed abysmally in the 
course of the year to remain in the Premiership and Tema Youth relegated for 
financial expediency,’ Osei stated.863 
Finally, Wilfred Osei referred to the idea that the club was punished for the 
continuous crowd disturbances at the Tema Stadium. As Tema has been known 
as a no-go area for years, the general idea was that the GFA and the PLB must 
have felt ill at ease with all the violence and mayhem. And everybody knew that 
the violence increased after the construction of the synthetic pitch, which in turn 
was related to beliefs in burying concoctions on the field of play. ‘Tema Youth is 
the bogey club for some people and must go on relegation,’ the CEO of Tema 
Youth said, before asking a rhetorical question: ‘Tema Youth has been gotten rid 
off in such a rude manner, which club would be next?’864 
The third case is probably the most remarkable and the one that relies mostly 
on rumours. Omgba Damase, whose name surfaced in chapter 5, is a contro-
versial figure in Cameroon. He is not only a millionaire who made his money in 
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the arms trade but also a long-time friend of president Biya. Damase kept close 
relations to the government, even though his role was unclear as he never took up 
a formal position. Journalist Kuper went so far as to label him the power behind 
Biya’s presidency.865 The Big Man was involved in the management of Tonnerre 
Yaoundé in the 1980s. After having a disagreement with other management 
members, Damase and a few allies left the club and went on to form Olympic 
Mvolyé (OM) in Mbalmayo, a town south of Yaoundé.866 Although a Big Man 
named Philippe Mbarga Mboa acted as club president, it was an open secret that 
Damase pulled the strings. 
Today, OM is still regarded as the country’s most bizarre club. The club won 
the Cup of Cameroon twice (in 1992 and 1994) but failed to promote to the top 
league for five straight seasons (1990-1995). There were three main reasons why 
Cameroonians found this quite unbelievable. First, OM was the country’s richest 
and most professional club. Some of its players – Stephen Tataw, Victor N’Dip, 
Hans Agbo – were part of the squad that participated in the 1994 World Cup. 
Ashu, a former player of the team, told me that some of his teammates received 
monthly salaries up to 650,000 CFA francs (€1,000).867 Second, OM had a 
reputation of being the country’s most corrupt club. One notorious case con-
cerned the bribing of referee Christophe Tomota during the semi-final of the 
1993 Cup of Cameroon between OM and Léopard Douala (see below). Third, 
OM was managed by powerful individuals and one club official acted as trea-
surer of FECAFOOT, which guaranteed a connection with the authorities. 
OM thus had all the requirements to be very successful, which prompted 
Charles Nguini to compare the club to the proverbial ‘child born with a silver 
spoon in his mouth’.868 Since the team’s failures were considered to be inex-
plicable, it was no surprise that Cameroonians looked to the spiritual world in 
search for answers. Most rumours concentrated on the unorthodox way in which 
the club was linked to Mbalmayo. Damase had no connection to the area yet 
chose his club to be based there. It was said that other teams in the area had 
angrily taken away OM’s luck. One of these teams, Espoir Dzeng, even filed a 
complaint in 1990, accusing OM of illegally entering the divisional league.869 
Others claimed that Damase had failed to perform traditional libation to appease 
the ancestors in Mbalmayo. 
There was yet another spiritual explanation for OM’s woes and here too, 
Mbalmayo was pinpointed as the principle cause. It was footballer Ashu who 
provided me with this account. In 1996, he signed a contract worth 2.8 million 
CFA francs (€4,200) to go and play for OM. Although his account is of a per-
sonal nature, it does confirm the view that Damase was to blame for the team’s 
failures. This is Ashu’s story of the 1996 interpools (in which both finalists 
qualify for the top league): 
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When Damase formed Olympic Mvolyé he went to the elders in Mbalmayo. He told them 
that he wanted his team to be based there. In exchange he promised them a new stadium. In 
1996 the team qualified for the interpools which were held in Ngaoundéré and Bertoua. This 
time the president knew there was something wrong. Since he never constructed the stadium, 
he realised the elders had put a spell on the team. 
Two weeks before the tournament he brought in an old Catholic priest to assist in casting 
out the spell. For three days and three nights we had to stay on a basketball court on a 
compound in Yaoundé. Breakfast consisted of bread and sardines. The priest lit an open fire 
in the compound. We all had to meditate, sing, dance and read scriptures from the Bible. We 
carried bags of salt and performed benediction. The meditation was to see where the tie of 
the team was located. On the second night the priest and one of his followers went to the 
club’s training ground. They dug something up, sprayed it with salt and threw it in the open 
fire. While digging it up, the follower was severely beaten. 
The priest said he now knew what he had to do. To remove the spell he had to go to the 
Nyong river [near Mbalmayo]. While the priest went to the river with his followers on the 
third night, we had to perform long prayers. He knew what had tied the team for so long. It 
was a turtle. A dead turtle with the size of about 40 to 50 centimetres. The priest made 
prayers before he could take the turtle out of the water. This time again one follower was 
beaten by evil spirits. The follower later died from his injuries. 
The priest brought the turtle back to the compound and said that he brought Olympic 
Mvolyé back to the players. We could now see the turtle. Somebody had attached a big 
padlock of about 10 centimetres around the turtle’s tail. A smaller padlock was attached 
around his neck. The locks were rusty because they had been in the water for years. The 
priest used three bags of salt to unlock the padlocks. The priest then called for the president-
general to see the inside of the turtle. He showed many items: Hair belonging to former 
players, names of players written on a piece of paper, coins, earrings, jerseys, flags. Some of 
the players whose names were inside were now playing in Europe but they were always sick 
or injured. The priest destroyed everything and blessed the players. 
The priest announced that he would control the whole show during the interpools. He 
ordered the players to put down any magic that they might have brought from the village. I 
had magic on me but I did not say anything. There was a herbalist in [name of Ashu’s vil-
lage] who gave me some powdered stuff. The priest told us to leave early the next morning. 
He did not join us. He said he would come when things were getting rough.  
We travelled to Bertoua. We played well in the first two matches. During this time I had 
dreams about meeting the priest in mysterious places. I dreamt of fights in the river, fires 
burning and corpses being buried. Before the semi-finals [against Union Abong-Mbang] the 
coach came to see me. He told me that I had to give him 50,000 francs (€75) to secure my 
place in the team. I refused. Meanwhile the priest had joined us at the training camp. With 
him came the body of the follower who had died from the evil spirits’ beatings. At five 
o’clock in the morning of the semi-finals we all had to walk past the dead body. Before the 
match the priest blessed us. The coach did not select me so I followed the priest to the 
popular stand. He had a button in his hand to control the referees. He also had a black stick 
in his hand to deviate balls from the goalpost. 
The match began. Every time the ball threatened to enter between the goal posts, the 
priest deviated it by using his black stick. The other team scored a clean goal but the referee 
disallowed it. It was the priest controlling the referee. Then the referee awarded a penalty to 
us. Serious fights broke out. Gendarmes threw teargas into the public. The match was 
postponed. I ran straight to the hotel. My teammates were protected by the gendarmes and 
then brought to the police station. Before the match the priest had told us that we could not 
win this match so he used confusion to end the match. Three days later the match was 
awarded to us because the supporters of the opponent team had started the riots. 
I went to visit my mother in the village. The herbalist was there as well. He told my 
mother everything that had happened. He said that somebody was sacrificed to get the team 
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into the First Division. He said it was the follower of the priest. He also said that I was 
supposed to be sacrificed. I was saved because I refused to give money to the coach. 
Three issues need clarification. First, a tarred road from Yaoundé to Mbalmayo 
might have been a better investment. Ashu nevertheless maintained that Damase 
had promised the elders a stadium.870 Second, Ashu initially mentioned the name 
of Damase before speaking of the president(-general). It was not clear who was 
present when the priest brought the turtle to the compound, which could have 
been acting president Mbarga Mboa. Third, stories of sacrifices are common. 
Marc-Vivien Foé’s death in 2003 is one example.871 Canon Yaoundé allegedly 
sacrificed albinos in the 1970s. The story surfaced when albinos were said to 
mysteriously disappear from Nkoldongo quartier. 
Networks and Big Man politics 
The influences of Big Men on leagues and tournaments are not always only 
related to friendships, favours and spiritual practices. In fact, it is claimed that it 
goes much further than that. Networks consisting of powerful club and FA offi-
cials are said to be responsible for manipulating leagues and tournaments on 
practically all levels. This is why several informants in both Ghana and Came-
roon have compared football networks to mafia circles.872 Alhaji Karim Grunsah, 
owner and president of King Faisal, is one of them. ‘There’s no honesty in Ghana 
football,’ he shouted one afternoon in 2008. Grunsah was livid when I asked him 
what he thought of those who ran football in his country. This is what he said at 
the GFA headquarters in Accra: 
The FA denies people their rights. They are favouring specific clubs, they are favouring their 
friends. They are respecting their friends more than the Bible of Ghana Football. Football is 
like the mafia. They can push people up and they can push people down. The FA is the heart 
of football in this country. It’s where they make and break clubs. I’ve been in football since 
1967 and I will be around for a long time to come. But these FA people come and go and 
they cheat. 
Although Grunsah is known as an enfant terrible, which often results in his 
words taken with a grain of salt, he is not the only one who criticises the football 
authorities. ‘I always say that when you enter the Premier League you enter 
muddy waters,’ said Alhaji Fawaz Zowk, a Board member of Hearts. ‘You 
cannot mess around with these GFA people. They make things personal. They’ll 
get you one way or the other.’ 
A few days before interviewing Alhaji Grunsah, I came across Mr. X at the 
FA’s headquarters. He had just attended a meeting about a case he brought 
before the Player Status Committee. Mr. X claimed that Kotoko had illegally 
lured one of his players away. Yet although the Committee fined Kotoko, it also 
allowed the club to keep the player. ‘They’re stealing my bread,’ Mr. X said. 
‘I’m referring the case to the Appeals Committee but it’s difficult. The big clubs 
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usually get the benefit of the doubt.’ Mr. X regularly attends GFA meetings. Big 
Men had better show their faces at the GFA, he argued. ‘You never know who 
you meet who might be of use. Here, everybody knows everybody and you need 
friends in all departments.’ Mr. X is also a member of one of Ghana’s national 
teams. ‘You should always try to get a position in the GFA or in a committee. 
That’s the only way to get some level of influence.’ 
It turned out that Mr. X maintained friendships with FA officials. I once at-
tended one of his team’s home matches. He told me to meet up with an FA 
official afterwards. This person had borrowed one of Mr. X’s cars and drove me 
to the latter’s house. ‘(Name of Mr. X) is a very good friend of mine,’ he said. ‘I 
always stay at his place when I’m in town.’ Later that evening Mr. X played the 
generous host – handing out drinks to everyone present – which could be re-
garded as a form of hospitality. I nevertheless saw their friendship as pertaining 
to a conflict of interest. The administrator had occupied positions at the GFA for 
over thirty years and he was bound to come into contact with cases that related to 
Mr. X’s club. It could be regarded as a Big Man maintaining patron-client ties. 
The administrator’s friendship to Mr. X benefited him in some ways while Mr. X 
could call in the administrator’s help once he needed it. 
The existence of networks is the reason why Africa’s biggest and most popular 
(community-based) clubs are thought to receive favour upon favour. Most if not 
all of the top leagues consist of two, three or four clubs around which the entire 
system revolves. Sticking to Ghana’s two top clubs, there are at least two reasons 
for the occurrence of such power structures, namely economic rationale and elite 
networks. The economic rationale is self-evident. As most fans in Ghana either 
support Hearts or Kotoko, these clubs’ successes are intimately linked to the 
popularity of the Premier League. A relegation of Hearts or Kotoko would have a 
negative influence on attendance rates, and sponsors would likely lose interest. 
‘The FA president gets more money in salary from the GFA than he gets from his 
regular job,’ said Kojo Fianoo. ‘He knows that the FA depends on the gate fees 
generated by Hearts and Kotoko.’ 
A relegation of Hearts or Kotoko is purely hypothetical anyway. Both clubs 
have extensive networks and their tentacles reach deep into the political domain 
(see chapter 5). ‘You don’t dare mess with them,’ said Mr. X. ‘They have people 
in very high places.’ Moreover, Hearts and Kotoko enjoy permanent representa-
tion in several GFA committees. ‘They always have representation just because 
they are Hearts and Kotoko,’ said Kojo Fianoo. ‘They think that if these clubs are 
kept out of the FA, they can create problems. If Kotoko would decide to boycott 
the league – well, they have a big support base.’ All of this leads to the view that 
Hearts and Kotoko are “untouchables”. ‘You can see how that affects their per-
formance,’ said Mr. X. ‘They may win the Premier League because of their con-
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nections. But they keep on losing at a continental level. That tells you how much 
they rely on people in high places.’ 
Vice versa, clubs that belong to ethno-political opposition groups commonly 
complain about harassment by the authorities. At least, that is what Anglophone 
supporters of PWD Bamenda told me with regard to FECAFOOT (see chapter 5), 
an FA that has not had an Anglophone chairman/president in its entire exist-
ence.873 I assembled several complaints whereby FECAFOOT allegedly tried to 
influence PWD Bamenda’s matches. Feelings of being structurally cheated were 
caused by (1) occasional bans from playing at home ground, (2) the admonishing 
of seemingly random and unusually harsh sanctions and fines, (3) harassment 
from security personnel and gendarmeries who belong to rival ethnic groups, (4) 
the appointment of referees who favour Francophone teams, (5) the practice of 
taking the gate proceeds back to Yaoundé, and (6) the deliberate relegation due 
to inexplicable point reduction.874 
As said, the view of powerful networks operating as “invisible hands” or the 
“mafia” is related to complaints that some clubs receive help in all departments 
while other clubs are obstructed in everything they do. To be sure, the existence 
of such networks has also been reported in countries in, for example, Southern 
and Eastern Europe and South East Asia.875 From an African perspective, I will 
label such networks as Big Man politics, primarily because of their close rela-
tions to money, politics and power. The practices involved in Big Man politics 
can be summarised by the view that Big Men manipulate the workings of FA 
committees responsible for running the league. ‘We don’t play football on merit,’ 
said Grunsah. ‘We play the league based on names and faces.’ Let us take a 
closer look at two GFA committees, namely the Referees Appointment Commit-
tee and the Player Status Committee. 
The importance of the Referees Appointment Committee should not be under-
estimated. Earlier I stated that friendships between clubs are said to be a more 
reliable method of match-fixing than bribing the referee. But what happens when 
a group of referees favours particular teams throughout the league season? It 
should be noted that this is exactly what Luciano Moggi did so that Juventus 
could pick up league titles in the Italian Serie A.876 Mr. X earlier claimed that 
referees in Ghana admire either Hearts or Kotoko and therefore tend to be sym-
pathetic towards these teams (chapter 8). As referees have a variety of methods 
to influence a match (by giving yellow or red cards, granting penalties and 
raising the offside flag), they are sometimes thought to be responsible for a 
team’s success or failure during a league season. 
One can imagine Big Men wanting to have a say in who officiates their 
matches.877 I will limit myself to the complaints made by Ghanaians in relation to 
teams that are owned and controlled by FA officials. During my research in 
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2009, Wa All Stars, owned by GFA president Kwesi Nyantakyi, was the number 
one suspect. Kojo Fianoo, CEO of AshantiGold, had the following story to tell: 
The last time we went to Wa to play All Stars, there was no match commissioner. That 
means the referee can do whatever he likes. The referee gave them a penalty. They scored 
and mounted pressure on us. Then all of a sudden all the footballs vanished from the sta-
dium. There was only one ball left. When the ball was kicked out, we had to wait and wait 
for it to return. When we complained, they finally picked some balls from the All Stars 
bench. If I had done that, we would be punished! There was no match commissioner to 
report to, there was no independent observer. When All Stars plays away, they will make 
sure to give them a very strong referee who will attempt to cheat you. 
Referee Reginald Lathbridge admitted that the connection between the club and 
the FA president influenced the behaviour of referees: 
When you are chosen to officiate a match involving Wa All Stars, you have already been 
influenced before the match even started because this is the team of the president of the FA. 
Unless you don’t consider the match as such, you will be influenced. The same thing is true 
during the African Cup of Nations. The president of CAF is a Cameroonian so maybe a lot 
of referees will favour Cameroon. Also, to become a FIFA referee you have to be endorsed 
by the Referees Association of Ghana. We’re talking about the Referees Appointment 
Committee. These people send a name to the FA for them to endorse someone as a FIFA 
referee. So it’s a human institution to favour Wa All Stars. 
Wa All Stars is not the only team rumoured to receive favours. All the teams 
whose management members occupy an FA position are thought to enjoy such 
favours. ‘Referees think that if they favour these teams, maybe they will become 
a FIFA referee,’ said Kojo Fianoo. ‘So maybe it’s not direct, but referees favour 
these teams to be recognised and promoted.’ In a similar vein, Kwabena Kesse 
appointed GFA spokesperson Randy Abbey as Director of Communications. 
‘Kessben FC is checked by Abbey,’ journalist Kamkam Boadu told me in 2009. 
‘That signifies a lot of influence. Referees are afraid of those people.’ There is, 
however, a flipside to this story. ‘Some referees may have wanted to become 
FIFA referees but were never selected,’ Fianoo explained. ‘So as soon as you 
leave office, they will show you where power lies.’ So if an FA official is 
relieved of duty, his team is said to fall out of favour and relegate. 
The Player Status Committee is another important body. A player’s official 
status determines which club legally owns him. As was the case with Tema 
Youth, several clubs have suffered point deduction after fielding a player without 
the proper documentation. Here too, it is rumoured that cases are handled by Big 
Men who have a reason for favouring one team over the other. Jones Abu 
Alhassan, the man who was implicated in the Gbadegbe probe (chapter 7), was 
elected chairman of the Player Status Committee in 2006. He has been accused 
of conflicts of interest on several occasions. Journalist Kamkam Boadu described 
the feeling as follows: 
People often complain about the Player Status Committee because it is chaired by Jones Abu 
Alhassan, who is also the Board Chairman of RTU. They feel that he is not the right person. 
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They believe that there is a conflict of interest. A lot of clubs complain that when he deals 
with issues that relate to RTU he is always biased. Alhaji Grunsah also said something like 
that last season. He had players who came from RTU. These players went to the Player 
Status Committee to see whether they were free or whether they still had a contract to fulfil. 
The evidence pointed to the fact that they were free agents. But the Committee decided that 
they should return to RTU. So people are asking why he is allowed to handle these cases 
when he himself is clearly involved? 
It is difficult to determine whether he indeed resorted to favouritism but the point 
is that FA officials should avoid handling cases that involve their own teams. 
Kojo Fianoo told me a story about a famous case in Ghana, namely the Atem 
Valentine saga. Atem Valentine was the captain of Mount Cameroon FC at the 
time I was researching the Buea-based team in 2003. He then earned a transfer to 
AshantiGold and started playing in the Premier League from the 2003/04 season 
onwards. ‘At the end of the season we lost a lot of points,’ said Fianoo. ‘We used 
Atem but it was later decided that he didn’t have a valid work permit. So they 
deducted 12 points from previous matches. We almost relegated.’ He then made 
the following statement: 
The system wasn’t fair to Goldfields. The way they deducted the points wasn’t fair. Let’s say 
you’re coming to Ghana to work. You’re getting your documents. If you can get an officer to 
do that for you, then you’re okay. If there’s a problem with your documentation, who should 
be blamed? You or the officer? If the GFA receives your documentation and endorses your 
registration, and you then use the GFA’s documentation to play, why should you be 
punished for using the GFA registration?  
Fianoo alleged that powerful men in the GFA attempted to obstruct AshantiGold 
by exploiting the confusion surrounding Atem Valentine’s paperwork: 
In the FA it all depends on the personalities who are there. I may be on the GFA Emergency 
Committee which handles the day-to-day running of football. Let’s say I have to play a 
match against another team. Then I realise there’s a problem with the registration of one of 
their players. I then take advantage of my position at the Emergency Committee to get the 
points. That’s what happened. At that time the vice president of the GFA was also the pres-
ident of Great Olympics. Incidentally, the immigration officer who did Atem’s documenta-
tion happened to be an official of Olympics. So after we played and beat Olympics, he went 
to Olympics and told them that he saw a loophole. “Go on and exploit it.” The vice president 
used his position at the FA to say that Atem did not have a work permit. When AshGold 
played against Dawu Youngstars, they also used the Olympics precedent to take the points 
away from us. 
It should be noted that clubs protesting the fielding of unqualified players is 
common throughout the continent. (CAF even went as far as to throw title 
holders TP Mazembe out of the CAF Champions League in 2011 for fielding an 
unqualified player.) 
Let us now focus on the workings of two of the FA’s most important judicial 
bodies, namely the Disciplinary Committee and the Appeals Committee. The Big 
Men who run these bodies deal with cases involving unqualified players, juju, 
violence and bribery. ‘The FA is not reliable,’ said Mr. X. ‘The judicial arm 
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looks at names so you have to be very diplomatic.’ Indeed, it regularly happens 
that these committees are accused of favouritism. This is where we return to the 
problem of conflicts of interest, and former Deputy Sports Minister Joe Aggrey 
explained it as follows: 
That’s the problem today of football people running the FA. Almost all of the people there 
are attached to clubs because that’s the reason why they got there in the first place. So the 
whole system is so messy. The idea is that people don’t trust the FA people who also run 
clubs because there will be a conflict of interest. For instance, if your club and the 
chairman’s club are in dispute over an issue, people have the perception that the chance that 
the committee who has to decide over that particular issue will favour his club is very high. 
Even if he has a very good case against you, there will be suspicion towards him. So that’s 
the danger of having the football people also running the FA. But you know, that’s how 
FIFA wants it. Even if these people do not own clubs, then at least they will support one club 
or the other. That’s the nature of football people. They will always favour one team and 
there’s nothing you can do about it. 
We should not underestimate the importance of decisions made by the Dis-
ciplinary and Appeals Committee because they have the power to deduct points 
and thus make sure teams are relegated. 
Conflicts of interests are said to be especially visible in respect to match-fixing 
allegations. The biggest problem with bribery is finding actual proof of foul play. 
‘It’s very difficult to prove matches of convenience,’ said Kwame Ntow-Fiako, 
chairman of the Division One League Board (DOL). ‘You need witnesses who 
can testify.’ Even when evidence is provided, it can easily be interpreted differ-
ently by different people. There is, in other words, room for the subjective inter-
pretation of testimonies and other pieces of evidence. This is where Big Man 
politics comes into play, which is why so many club officials do not trust the 
football authorities’ judicial arm. Even though one could feel some sort of sym-
pathy for FA officials because of the many cases of match-fixing, juju, violence 
and other illegalities that fall onto their desk, their decisions should also be 
looked upon with a bit of scepticism. 
South Africans are familiar with Big Man politics, especially ever since the 
police investigated match-fixing practices in 2004. More than 30 referees and 
club officials were brought before court.878 Journalist Gleeson concluded that 
‘only three (referees) were eventually fined and handed suspended prison sen-
tences for their part in fixing a lower league match’. The investigation had turned 
into an ‘embarrassment’ and it was speculated that it ‘collapsed because it also 
involved some of the biggest names in South Africa’.879 The same thing had 
happened in the late 1990s when the Motimele Commission investigated match-
fixing practices; and it happened again with the Semenya Commission in 2010.880 
Not only did reports disappear in drawers,881 hardly any club official was ulti 
mately punished.882 This led journalist Thomas Kwenaite to state that these in-
quiries are ‘a total waste of time and resources’.883 
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Photo 9.2 Teams belonging to ethno-political minorities, such as PWD Bamenda, are said to 
be obstructed by the powers that be 
 
 
 
Big Man politics can also be found in Ghana. Two matches in the final round 
of the Middle League in 2007 resulted in ‘cricket score lines’.884 Great Mariners 
beat Tudu Mighty Jets 29-0 while Nania FC beat Okwawu United 31-0. This was 
enough to grant Nania FC, a club owned by football legend Abedi “Pele” Ayew 
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alias the Maestro, a ticket to the Premier League. However, the GFA Disciplinary 
Committee banned Abedi Pele and other officials, and demoted all clubs to the 
Third Division.885 The Maestro then published a letter in which he denied the 
charges,886 after which the Appeals Committee dropped the charges against him. 
I think the main reason why the authorities discarded the evidence is because of 
Abedi Pele’s status in Ghana. At that time, he was involved in two upcoming 
tournaments, the 2008 African Cup of Nations and the 2010 World Cup. His 
conviction would have tainted the image of African football and his role as 
World Cup ambassador would have been compromised.887 
Finally, Cameroonians are familiar with Big Man politics as well. The overall 
perception is one of FECAFOOT subjectively interpreting the rules of the game 
based on friendships, favours and politics. One case concerned the aforemention-
ed Tomota Affair, in which Tomota Christophe stood accused of biased referee-
ing in the semi-final of the 1993 Cup of Cameroon. Tomota himself stated that 
the Olympic Mvolyé coach paid him 200,000 CFA francs (€300) that was said to 
have come from OM’s president, Philippe Mbarga Mboa.888 ‘The referee in 
question has made a written confession and was disbarred,’ said Charles Nguini, 
who wrote a book about FECAFOOT’s judicial cases, to La Nouvelle Expres-
sion. ‘The corruptor, meanwhile, has never been sanctioned (…).’889 Indeed, 
while Tomota was banned for life, OM’s president Mbarga Mboa later became 
Minister of Youth and Sports. 
An examination of two cases – in 2006 and 2007 – will shed more light on the 
issue of perceived bias on the part of the authorities. In September 2006, Racing 
Bafoussam was defeated 0-1 by Mount Cameroon FC in the final league round. 
Racing, a team that by then was already relegated, allegedly gave away the match 
to Mount Cameroon FC, a team that badly needed the point to escape a similar 
fate. A third team that did relegate, Impôts FC, filed a protest. The Disciplinary 
Committee found evidence that Mount Cameroon had offered Racing two 
million CFA francs (€3,000) at Calving Foinding’s hotel in Bandjoun, and de-
moted the club to the Third Division with immediate effect.890 Surprisingly, the 
Appeals Committee discarded the decision barely six days later and Mount 
Cameroon was reinstated in the Elite One league.891 
The Appeals Committee’s ruling raised a few eyebrows because it was 
thought, firstly, that there was evidence of match-fixing and, secondly, that 
Mount Cameroon was a habitual offender. Several Anglophones told me they 
linked the Committee’s U-turn on ethno-politics. This is what Cleopas, supporter 
of PWD Bamenda, said: 
After the [first] verdict the management of Mount Cameroon went on radio to accuse FECA-
FOOT of being biased. They said that the Francophone FECAFOOT deliberately dropped 
Mount Cameroon out of the elite league. The management then said that the Anglophones 
would start their own league, the Southern Cameroons Football League. That’s what scared 
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FECAFOOT but it scared the prime minister even more. [The Anglophone prime minister] 
Inoni gave FECAFOOT a warning and Mount Cameroon returned to the elite league. He 
foresaw that a breakaway would be disastrous for the unity of football in Cameroon so he 
had to intervene personally. 
Nguini, who filed the forms on behalf of Impôts at the time, somewhat cryp-
tically relates to the Mount Cameroon affair by stating that ‘it is an area where 
money, politics and blackmail have forged all sorts of agreements on the back of 
the game. Everybody knows what happened.’892 
An infamous match-fixing case took place in September 2007, which involved 
the Bamileke-owned team Bamboutos Mbouda and an “envelope”. Home team 
Bamboutos had to beat Federal Noun in order to stay in the top league. Deep into 
the second half, when the score was 2-2, the Bamboutos team captain called for 
the Federal captain and handed him an envelope. The Federal captain, in turn, 
made a mistake which led to the third and decisive goal for Bamboutos.893 The 
Disciplinary Committee demoted Bamboutos to the Third Division, which was 
later confirmed by the Appeals Committee.894 ‘For once FECAFOOT applied its 
own texts,’ Nguini argued. ‘The penalty may seem harsh but it was taken by the 
competent legal authorities on the subject, based on facts reported by match 
officials.’895 
Not everybody agreed with Nguini’s assessment. Spiritual adviser Zé, who 
worked for several Bamileke-owned clubs, told me that the decision was politi-
cally motivated: 
Many people saw the bribery – because it happened right there in the field – but nobody 
stepped forward to testify against the team. That’s why I said it was politically motivated 
because FECAFOOT punished the team without any substantial evidence or witnesses. The 
thing is that Bamboutos is known throughout the country as a very rough team. So FECA-
FOOT was looking for a reason to relegate the team and took the opportunity to demote 
Bamboutos. Last year they made it up to the people in Mbouda by renovating the stadium. 
The new stadium was done by MTN and presented to the people this year. So to make up for 
the relegation they made this nice and modern stadium in Mbouda, a town that now no 
longer has First Division football. 
Probably the main point of criticism is that FECAFOOT was perceived to judge 
similar-looking match-fixing cases with different standards. This is what upset 
Bonaventure Djonkep, a former footballer who turned coach: 
We should at some point decide to hit and punish or we’ll go around in circles forever. It is 
unfortunate that those who now watch with great detail the case of Bamboutos looked the 
other way when a president like Essomba Eyenga (of Tonnerre Yaoundé) declared on 
national television that it was he who made Coton Sport Garoua the champion of Cameroon 
because he took money from Coton. When a man like that says something this serious, 
nothing happens. (…) Bamboutos now finds itself in a situation that Tonnerre and Coton 
Sport should have been in yesterday. Why punish Bamboutos today when we did not con-
demn Coton Sport and Tonnerre? Why punish Bamboutos when we did not sanction Mount 
Cameroon and Racing?896 
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The story of Bamboutos Mbouda took a twist when prominent inhabitants of 
Mbouda appealed to high-profile political figures to review their case. In fact, the 
Bamboutos elite resorted to playing the politics card. They directed their griev-
ances at the prime minister’s office, arguing that the demotion of the club would 
have an adverse effect on the support for Biya’s CPDM party. ‘Bamboutos is for 
the region what the Indomitable Lions are for Cameroon,’ one Mbouda inhabit-
ant argued. ‘The confirmation of this decision (to demote the team) would be a 
coup de grâce on CPDM’s political successes in the Bamboutos department since 
2002.’ Prominent inhabitants signed a petition asking politicians to reverse the 
‘injustice’ perpetrated on their team.897 
Prime minister Ephraim Inoni and Minister of Sports Augustin Edjoa both 
responded to the pleas of the Mbouda elite. Minister Edjoa reportedly organised a 
stakeholders meeting in which he urged FECAFOOT to review their decision so 
as to keep the ‘social peace’. He later demanded Bamboutos to be reinstated in 
the Elite One league.898 Prime minister Inoni allegedly went a step further by 
allowing the Mbouda inhabitants to take the matter to a court of law. It was 
rumoured that the general secretary to the prime minister’s office was involved 
because he originates from the Bamboutos department. In November 2007, a 
lawyer representing Bamboutos filed a case at the Mfoundi High Court in Ya-
oundé. Eight months later, the court rehabilitated Bamboutos and ordered FECA-
FOOT to pay a symbolic fine of one CFA franc.899 FECAFOOT did not give in 
and refused Bamboutos permission to re-enter the Elite One league. 
Taking the football authorities to a civil court is unusual, not in the least be-
cause FIFA rules state that filing a case with ‘ordinary courts of law is prohibited 
unless specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations’.900 The fact that this rule 
is occasionally violated in Africa implies that there is limited faith in the ob-
jectivity of the football authorities. With regard to Ghana, Bediako lists several 
football cases that were brought before civil courts between 1967 and 1995.901 
The situation does not seem to have improved in recent years, prompting former 
Deputy Minister of Sports Joe Aggrey to say that ‘football is played in the court 
room’. ‘The problem is that when clubs get banned for match-fixing they go to 
court,’ said former Kotoko management member Kwame Baah-Nuako. Court 
cases have delayed Ghana’s leagues on several occasions which, in turn, caused 
the cancellation of the FA Cup between 2000 and 2010.902 
The overall consequence of seeking the court of law is that FAs may be in-
creasingly intimidated into allowing match-fixing to go unpunished. After all, a 
single person can resort to legal means and disrupt the game for months on end. 
This was the point made by journalist and former football administrator Bediako: 
The fear of fixed matches towards the end of the premier national football league continues 
to haunt the football authorities and since you need top class intelligence work to establish 
guilt in these circumstances everybody seems to have given up. The purists always cite the 
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example in Italy (the Calciopoli scandal in 2006) where the axe fell heavily on certain top 
clubs who were found guilty of match fixing. Some world famous clubs were demoted and 
some fined heavily. Can we do this in Ghana? That is the question. It is almost impossible. 
Even the ordinary man in the street will tell you that in Ghana’s current over exaggerated 
democratic atmosphere it would be unthinkable to take such measures as the clubs would 
quickly rush to the law courts and a whole national football programme could grind to a 
halt.903 
All in all, the game in Africa is influenced by Big Man politics to the extent that 
league systems are occasionally interrupted and, more worryingly, distorted. 
Player selection, age cheats and tournaments 
There is one last issue we need to address before moving on to the conclusion. 
This is where money, politics and power all come together to distort the nature of 
the game. I am referring to the practice whereby international tournaments and 
competitions are used for either political purposes or as a means to sell players. 
This paragraph thus deals with what I wrote in chapters 5 and 6, namely that Big 
Men tend to get involved in football for personal gain, i.e. to convert and increase 
economic and/or social capital. I argue, firstly, that Big Men manipulate the 
selection procedures of players for the various national teams and, secondly, that 
club and FA officials resort to the practice of age cheats. 
As said earlier, earning promotion and avoiding relegation are important 
issues in a Big Man’s life. In fact, the raison d’être of most teams is to compete 
in the top league and to pick up titles. Let us now focus on those teams whose 
goals are no longer congruent with the competitive nature of the game. This does 
not sit well with FIFA’s official policies. ‘Winning is the object of playing any 
game,’ says Fair Play Code rule 2. ‘Never set out to lose. If you do not play to 
win, you are cheating your opponents, deceiving those who are watching, and 
also fooling yourself.’904 Although the Big Men who feature in the story below 
are also interested in winning titles if the opportunity arises, their main objective 
goes beyond the concept of winning on the field of play. These football entre-
preneurs want to win in the football business. 
Recall how Jamil Maraby, the former CEO of Sekondi Eleven Wise, claimed 
(in chapter 6) that the football business is a chance and that Big Men often set up 
clubs in the lower leagues to avoid the risk of losing too much money. Indeed, 
several clubs in Ghana’s First and Second Division and in Cameroon’s Elite Two 
league and Third Division are owned by football entrepreneurs – Big Men who 
merely set up a club to sell players. They are content with the fact that their 
teams operate in a lower league because there they save money while they are 
still able to dream of that “one million dollar ticket”. These clubs are typically 
one-man shows and lack the support which would make it interesting – even 
necessary – to vie for promotion and titles. 
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Some clubs that are owned by football entrepreneurs are nevertheless active in 
the top leagues. Sly Tetteh’s Liberty Professionals and Victor Akpene Ahiak-
por’s Heart of Lions are two prominent examples. Indeed, both clubs at one point 
in time tried to lay claim to the prestigious title of Third Force, meaning the club 
that would break the hegemony of Hearts and Kotoko in the way Ashanti Gold-
fields did in the 1990s. It is alleged that both clubs would have rightfully laid 
claim to this title if Tetteh and Ahiakpor aspired to challenge Ghana’s two top 
clubs. But they did not, and they still do not. ‘Someone like Sly Tetteh is not 
interested in collecting silverware,’ Mr. X told me two years before Tetteh 
passed away. ‘He’s more interested in the business of marketing and selling 
players.’ 
This is why one-man shows owned by football entrepreneurs will always have 
one major problem. Those running such teams simply cannot create a strong and 
unified squad over a longer period of time. ‘Heart of Lions transfers at least four 
to five of its best players each year,’ journalist Emmanuel Prempeh told me. ‘So 
each year the coach has to start all over again. If it wasn’t for all the transfers, 
Lions would have been champion by now.’ Heart of Lions ended up as runner-up 
in the Premier League in 2005 and qualified for the CAF Champions League. 
Ahiakpor then decided to pull his team out of the competition. ‘We had some 
financial difficulties,’ Alex Aboagye, the club’s chief scout, explained. ‘When 
we pulled out, CAF suspended us for three years.’ The loss of key players in 
between seasons played a role as well. ‘We felt we couldn’t compete at a con-
tinental level at that point in time,’ said Aboagye. 
The story does not end here. Recall how several of Sly Tetteh’s pupils featured 
in Ghana’s national team that participated at the 2006 World Cup. A few months 
before the start of the tournament, former GFA president Ade Coker accused 
Tetteh of influencing the Black Stars selection procedure. Naturally, Tetteh de-
nied the allegations and, to his credit, I will refer to the Gbadegbe Commission 
which implicated Coker in the player transfer scam (chapter 7). Coker’s accu-
sation nevertheless forms part of a conspiracy theory, namely that Big Men 
manipulate the selection procedures of the various national teams. Sly Tetteh 
certainly had a motive for doing so. He and other football entrepreneurs want 
their players to receive a call-up for one of the national teams for scouting 
purposes. Moreover, club and FA officials have been found guilty of conspiring 
to sell players abroad. 
As stated earlier, Big Men influence selection procedures at clubs (chapter 7). 
Clearly there are political and ethnic motives to do so. Ivory Coast’s former 
national team coach Vahid Halilhodzic claimed that ‘politicians are interfering in 
absolutely everything, especially football. The reasons are obvious, football is 
very popular, particularly at national level, and some marginal political char-
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acters are using football to collect political points.’905 Peter Schnittger, who 
coached Cameroon in the 1970s, had a similar story to tell. ‘At that time, the 
national team was mainly made up of players from around Yaoundé,’ he said. 
‘That was inevitable as the Yaoundé clubs were the best teams at the time. Once 
we had done very well in the Nations Cup tournament and had reached the semi-
finals, the new Minister came up to me and said “Peter, Cameroon have played 
really well, but remember you also have some Bamileke players you could use.” 
It was indirect pressure on me to change the team (…).’906 
The selection procedure surrounding the Indomitable Lions is indeed partly 
based upon ethno-political considerations. The Anglophones are a case in point. 
‘Anglophone players were selected for the national team in the 1970s and 1980s,’ 
said PWD Bamenda supporter Nji Pius. ‘At the World Cup in 1990 we had an 
Anglophone captain, Stephen Tataw. But now the coaches don’t tour the country 
anymore. They receive a list and the names on it belong to players from Douala 
and Yaoundé.’ Ben Bola, a former PWD Bamenda player, said that Anglophone 
players found it difficult to earn a call-up, even in the old days. ‘You only stood a 
chance if you played for one of the Yaoundé teams,’ he said. ‘Anglophones don’t 
get support from politicians who can lobby for them. It’s rare to see a Lion from 
the Anglophone zone.’ 
I have earlier stated that local coaches in particular are susceptible to Big Man 
influences (chapter 7). ‘It’s an ethnic problem and an authority problem, because 
the local coach can be influenced by the atmosphere around a team,’ said 
Philippe Troussier, who coached several clubs and national teams in Africa.907 In 
Cameroon, it is thought that local coaches favour players from their own 
ancestral area. This is a reason why expatriate coaches are so often preferred. A 
foreign coach, as Troussier rightfully observed, ‘doesn’t know if player x comes 
from north, south, east or west of the country. So, the foreign coach can be pre-
sented as a neutral man, who doesn’t have a favourite tribe or region. He just 
picks the best 11 players, wherever they come from.’908 There are also other rea-
sons for choosing expatriate coaches over local ones, which are related to respect 
and to corruption.909 
The political motivations aside, another reason for manipulating team select-
ion is money. I interviewed a coach of a Ghanaian Premier League club prior to 
the start of the African Nations Championship (CHAN) in 2009. I was sitting 
with him and a Ghanaian journalist in an establishment in Kumasi. When the 
journalist briefly left the table, the coach leaned over to me. ‘I don’t know him so 
I don’t want him to hear this,’ he whispered. ‘There’s one national team coach 
who got paid 5,000 cedi (€2,500) to take three boys along and he took them. 
Some of these players shouldn’t even be there but we all know why they’re 
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there.’ I asked him if he was referring to the CHAN tournament in this case. He 
nodded and then continued the story: 
The chairman of a club here in Ghana gave him 5,000 cedi in cash – just like that … smack! 
– to take these three players into the squad. I sometimes get mixed up. Why is he on that 
team? Why is he there? Oh wake up! It’s because someone is paying. It’s not on merit. What 
is the criterion for that player to be there? He’s been away for three months due to injury, he 
had one game and now he’s into the squad. They think that when he’s in the national team 
they’re going to get noticed by someone from Holland or England and then one man will 
make big money. 
Similar stories have since popped up in the Ghanaian press.910  
There are broadly speaking two types of coaches in this respect. The first type 
uses his position in the sense that he only selects certain players if they are 
willing to pay. The second type is susceptible to bribery and influences by Big 
Men; he selects players based on the power of the Big Men behind them. The 
difference may be quite small – after all, both types of coaches normally earn 
money – but in the second case he is not the initiator. He may even have to share 
his money with others. Mr. X claimed that members of national team committees 
sometimes get involved in deals. ‘In my position as a member of the (name of 
national team) Committee there are temptations,’ he said. ‘I mean, people come 
with envelopes and say: “Take this money and let my player play.” When you 
take money from them, your head is on the chopping board. I’m not saying I’m a 
saint, it’s easy to succumb to these pressures.’ 
A picture emerges of national teams consisting of a group of well-known 
players who were selected based on merit and a group of relatively unknown 
players who were selected because of manipulations. The first group is essential 
for the coach in the sense that they are there to win the match. They play for 
some of the world’s top clubs and their inclusion in the squad goes without 
saying. The second group is important to the coach in another respect, namely as 
a means to complement his salary. They normally still play either at home or at 
clubs in mediocre leagues abroad. In other words, they need someone to push 
them into the squad. Put in economic jargon, this group consists of marketable 
players whose goal in the national team is to earn a lucrative contract. ‘It’s very 
simple,’ the Cameroonian agent Fernand Taninche told me: 
What every player wants is to be called up for the national team. Every player wants to have 
an international cap written on his resume, even if you’ve only played one or two matches. 
International caps enhance a player’s market value. He will probably be able to get a better 
contract from a bigger club or he can negotiate with his employer to improve his contract. So 
it’s very important to get yourself into the national team, even if you’re only on the reserve 
bench. 
‘Our system is corrupt,’ former Ghanaian international Godwin Attram told a 
Dutch journalist. ‘It is the best players who are selected, but if you want to be in 
the first 10 to 20, you have to be interesting in terms of trade.’911 
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It is not only local coaches who are involved in selecting marketable players. 
Dutchman Clemens Westerhof admitted to having traded players when he was 
coach of the Nigerian Super Eagles. Former international Viktor Akpedia told 
Belgian journalists that a link did exist between transfers and national team 
selection. ‘Whoever didn’t trust his transfer in the hands of Westerhof wasn’t 
selected for the national team,’ he said. ‘One time Westerhof invited me to his 
home in Lagos. He suggested we should work together; if I allowed him to trade 
me, he would select me for the national team.’912 Similarly, it is claimed in 
Cameroon that national team players who sit on the bench are there to spice up 
their resume. ‘The regular squad members are the familiar names, Kameni, Song, 
Eto’o,’ agent Taninche said. ‘The others are there because someone paid money. 
The money is well spent because they will earn huge contracts.’ 
The Serbian coach Milovan Rajevac, coach of the Black Stars between August 
2008 and September 2010, was accused of selecting players only if they joined 
Virtus International, a football management agency run by former footballer 
Goran Milovanovic.913 The agency kept several Ghanaian internationals under 
contract in 2010, among whom Samuel Inkoom, Prince Tagoe, Jonathan Quartey 
and Emmanuel Agyemang Badu.914 During my fieldwork in 2009 there were 
rumours about players who were first selected for the CHAN tournament before 
receiving a call-up for the senior national team. One of them, a client of Virtus 
International, was then transferred to a club in Europe. In short, Rajevac, at the 
time a Virtus client,915 was said to have acted as a frontrunner of the agency.916 
These rumours continued when the Serbian Goran Stevanovic succeeded Rajevac 
as Black Stars coach. 
The danger of selecting players based on ethno-political or financial consid-
erations is that teams may lose their strength. It is often claimed of Africa’s 
national teams that their potential is wasted by football administrators who put 
their own interests above that of the competitive nature of the game. We have 
seen how some one-man shows were not founded for competitive purposes, i.e. 
to win titles. Instead, these one-man shows are mainly used as gateways to trans-
fer players. The same story applies to (some of) Africa’s national teams. Indeed, 
various international youth tournaments but also a tournament such as CHAN are 
regarded as platforms through which to sell players. Mr. X made a telling remark 
in this respect. ‘I have always said that at any given time in Ghana, from the 
highest level that is the Black Stars to the lowest level, it is not necessarily the 
best team that is presented to the public,’ he told me. 
But the story does not end here either. A certain economic logic in football 
dictates that young footballers are more valuable than older ones. Young players 
are also eligible to play for Africa’s junior national teams through which, as we 
now know, they tend to find it easier to earn contracts. As a result, it is said that 
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FA officials, club officials, government officials, agents, coaches and players all 
conspire to lower players’ ages. The political reasoning behind these so-called 
age cheats aside,917 I want to focus on the economic rationale. Ashu, for example, 
still wants to play in Europe, even though he passed the age of thirty a while ago. 
He has what is known as a football age as opposed to a real age. Ashu’s football 
age was about five years below his real age in 2003. When we met again in 2010, 
he was ten years younger. 
Let us first consider two cases. In late 2009, Dominic Adiyiah (introduced in 
chapter 6) earned a transfer to Italian giants AC Milan. How did he manage to do 
so? The answer is that he was the star player at the just ended U20 World Cup, in 
which the young Ghanaian and his fellow Black Satellites won the title. More-
over, Adiyiah was crowned both as top scorer and best player of the tournament. 
Born on 29 November 1989, Adiyiah was 19 years old at the time. One Dutch 
reporter, who lived in Ghana for years and who investigated the matter, claimed 
that Adiyiah (then spelled Adiyah) already played for Feyenoord Fetteh in the 
2004 Premier League season. If true, he would have been a 14-year old playing 
in the top league, which is unlikely. When he moved to Norway in 2008, it was 
reported that he was 22 years old. Again, if true, a 23-year-old played at an U20 
World Cup.918 
As captain of the Golden Eaglets in 2009, Fortune Chukwudi led Nigeria to 
second place at the U17 World Cup. Chukwudi was later accused of being eight 
years above the age of 17. Former Nigerian international Adokiye Amiesimaka 
stated that Chukwudi played for Sharks FC in the 2002/03 Premier League 
season. Back then he was 18 years old, said Amiesimaka, who was chairman of 
Sharks at the time.919 Despite the negative publicity, Chukwudi was transferred to 
South African club SuperSport United, evidently as a result of his performances 
at the U17 World Cup. I have to add that instead of being praised for uncovering 
a potential age cheat, Amiesimaka was vilified by the media for being unpat-
riotic. It proves the (understandable) sensitivity surrounding such allegations. 
From all indications age cheats are rampant in African football. Top officials 
have admitted the practice in public. Examples include the late Nigerian Minister 
of Sports Steven Ibn Akiga and the Ghanaian Deputy Minister of Sport Joe 
Aggrey. ‘We have for a while now been fielding players far above the ages for 
some international age group competitions,’ Akiga said. ‘This has not helped our 
football and as such we must now fight against these age cheats.’920 A ZIFA offi-
cial called age cheats a ‘cancer that’s been rife for some time’.921 ‘By all accounts 
the size and facial maturity of the supposed under-20s makes a mockery of a 
supposed age group event,’ writes journalist Gleeson. ‘I hope it is an exagge-
ration but for too long now, age cheating has been the scourge of the African 
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game, creating false realities and expectations and leaving an air of suspicion 
over every African footballer who goes to play overseas.’922 
There are anecdotes about U20 players who first drop their wives and three 
kids at a hotel before driving on to the training grounds, or about U17 players 
who are forbidden to take off their shirts out of fear for exposing an abundance of 
chest hair. One story concerns the career of Tobie Mimboe Bayard, a Cameroon-
ian player who according to Hawkey had ‘Peter Pan paperwork’ and according to 
Ricci ‘never has a birthday’.923 ‘Mimboe Bayard belongs to the creative school, 
one of those who change their passports according to season and opportunity,’ 
Ricci continues. ‘At the 1996 African Cup of Nations, he turned up with a 
document which, under Date of Birth, read June 30, 1964. After the disappoint-
ing performance of the Indomitable Lions and consequent difficulties in finding a 
contract abroad, he decided to tweak his passport – Date of Birth June 30, 
1970.’924 He later changed the date again, this time to 1974. 
In Africa, birth certificates are far from reliable and not seldom absent. It 
proves that we should not always cry “foul play” whenever a player looks older 
than his age suggests. On the other hand, it is often quite easy to get a hold of a 
fake ID. As the Nigerian journalist Onmonya writes, one only needs to ‘walk into 
any immigration office in Nigeria today, forge documents at the nearby business 
centre, change your name, place of birth, date of birth, pay seven to ten thousand 
naira (…) and within hours you have completed the whole process of getting an 
international passport’.925 Several age fraud methods were uncovered when 
Cameroon banned players for this reason.926 However, Ashu claimed that FECA-
FOOT officials helped him in acquiring IDs with his “football age”. His real ID, 
he said, was ‘burned’ by the officials in Yaoundé. 
As of 2003, FIFA uses MRI bone technology to determine age fraud. It was 
thereafter estimated that 35 percent of all players at the 2003, 2005 and 2007 
editions of the U17 World Cup were overage. ‘In the past, over-age players have 
been wrongly entered into various youth competitions, often benefiting from an 
unfair advantage due to their greater physical maturity compared to players of the 
proper age,’ a FIFA statement read.927 It should be noted that countries in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia also have a reputation for 
this kind of foul play. In any case, the MRI scans are nowadays said to be 99 
percent accurate. ‘MRI of the wrist is a simple, reliable, valid and non-invasive 
method of age determination in young male football players,’ said the Head of 
FIFA’s medical research team. ‘We can identify overage players at under-17 
competitions at no risk to the individual.’928 
The use of MRI bone technology turned into an embarrassment for Nigeria’s 
FA officials in the run-up to the U17 World Cup in 2009. Prior to the tourna-
ment, NFF president Sani Lulu ordered the U17 squad to undergo an age test 
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which resulted in 15 out of 38 players being dropped for failing to pass the test. 
‘The decision was taken because the NFF was concerned with the preservation of 
Nigeria’s good image,’ said a spokesperson.929 When FIFA determined that all 
teams had to undergo a FIFA-supervised age test, Sani Lulu refused to comply. It 
was understood that Lulu feared that many more players would be deemed 
ineligible. Instead, Lulu planned to invite the players’ parents who would ‘put the 
nation’s interest first by letting us know how old their sons are’.930 His statements 
irked the Nigerian Minister of Sports.931 
What are the consequences of age cheats? First, the combination of selecting 
marketable players and age cheats gives rise to the idea that economic squads 
dominate such tournaments. Second, this short-term practice is said to obstruct 
the long-term development of youth football in Africa because actual young 
players are denied the chance of gaining international experience. When the 
majority of Zimbabwe’s youth players disappeared after having received a call-
up for an MRI scan prior to the African Youth Championship in 2009, an ano-
nymous ZIFA official called it ‘a sad day for Zimbabwean football’. ‘What this 
means is that we’ve been investing in the wrong people for years,’ he said. ‘By 
faking age you deprive the genuinely young players of their deserved opportu-
nities.’932 
Third, youth squads are conduits through which players gain access to the 
senior squads. But, as Gleeson observes, ‘Ghana and Nigeria have a bevy of 
world titles at under-20 and under-17 level but have never kicked onto a World 
Cup triumph’.933 Indeed, the successes of Africa’s youth teams do not appear to 
be followed by successes at a senior level. Fourth, players who cheat tend to 
reach their peak at the “football age” of 25 to 30. When 31-year-old Samuel 
Kuffour signed a contract at Ajax, journalists congratulated Ajax officials with 
their purchase of a 40-year-old.934 Kuffour played only 33 minutes in Amster-
dam. One Nigerian journalist compared the players of Portugal and Nigeria who 
played at the 1989 World Youth Championship. ‘While Luis Figo is still playing 
active football,’ he wrote in 2007, ‘most of our players who played in that tour-
nament in 1989 have retired and become grandpas.’935 
I doubt whether age cheats will soon be a practice of the past. To be sure, 
African teams have been banned for fielding overage players. Already in 1989, 
FIFA banned Nigeria for two years; CAF disqualified Niger from participating in 
the African Youth Championship in 2009. The question is whether banning is a 
structural solution. We have seen how FIFA conducts MRI scans prior to youth 
tournaments, and CAF is following suit.936 But although MRI is helpful at the 
U17 level, it is said to be mostly useless at the U20 level. Journalist Gleeson 
states that ‘bone development stops within a year or two (after the age of 17) and 
by the time players are aged 20 it is impossible to make an accurate determina-
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tion with the same test. So it is used by FIFA and CAF for under-17 events, and 
has uncovered much cheating as well and serves as a top class deterrent, but the 
under-20 championships are still a cheating free-for-all.’937 
The difficulty of combating age cheats is that everybody seems to have a 
motive for maintaining the status quo. ‘CAF have never investigated any of the 
frequent age cheating claims that cross their desk,’ Gleeson argues. ‘Instead they 
have wrung their hands in indifference claiming they cannot be seen to be 
questioning the validity of a document (passport) issued by a sovereign country. 
Football officials (…) still have a lily-livered approach to cheats and a tolerance 
that serves only to encourage them.’938 There have been exceptions, for instance 
the Kenyan Minister of Sports Najib Balala who withdrew the national U17 team 
from the African Youth Championships in 2003, stating that two players were 
overage. He was backed by his Tanzanian colleague who subsequently showed 
his displeasure when FIFA threatened to ban Kenya for government interfer-
ence.939 
I want to address one last issue before we go to the conclusion of this dis-
sertation. Gambling syndicates appear to manipulate international tournaments 
and competitions involving African teams. As both Reefe and Alegi argue, 
gambling in sports has a long history in Africa.940 In South Africa and Uganda, 
gambling in sports is now quite a lucrative business.941 Several matches involving 
African teams have come under scrutiny. In 2008, Namibia and Benin were 
alleged to have been approached to fix their matches at the African Cup of 
Nations.942 Nigerian players allegedly confessed to having been susceptible to 
corruption at the 2010 World Cup.943 Hill recorded testimonies with regard to the 
allegations that Ghana’s national team was contacted by Asian fixers.944 Also, a 
large number of gamblers correctly predicted the occurrence of a fifth goal dur-
ing a friendly match between Nigeria and Argentina in 2011.945 
Zimbabwe’s Asia tour in December 2009 is linked to gambling syndicates. An 
investigation revealed that Zimbabwean players had been offered money to lose 
matches against Syria (in Kuala Lumpur) and Thailand. ‘Raja (the agent) had 
come to our dressing room before kick-off and told us to lose to Thailand by  
1-0,’ captain Method Mwanjali told the investigators. ‘We were handsomely paid 
$1,000 (…) for losing.’946 In February 2012, 80 players were excluded from 
national team selection after being accused of fixing matches for gambling pur-
poses. Around the same time, a court ruled that the then CEO of the Zimbabwean 
FA, Henrietta Rushwaya, should stand trial on charges of match-fixing.947 Over-
all, it appears that football administrators deliberately send their national teams 
on tours to earn money from syndicates. 
In sum, this chapter dealt with the impact of Big Men’s attempts at converting 
capital on leagues and international tournaments as a whole. First, Big Men in-
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fluence promotion/relegation struggles through friendships and favours, with 
spiritual factors also playing a role. It is said that powerful networks comprising 
top club and FA officials distort leagues to the benefits of some clubs and the 
detriment of others. I have also argued that there are influences on the activities 
of various FA committees, particularly with regard to the judicial aspects of 
running leagues. Some people have called such influences “invisible hands” or 
“higher powers”; I have labelled them Big Man politics. Second, Big Men also 
manipulate international tournaments in order to convert capital. Interfering in 
selection procedures and age cheat practices are prominent examples of this. 
 
 10 
Conclusion 
At the outset I stated that the performances of Africa’s national teams at inter-
national senior tournaments leave a lot to be desired. The main cause lies in the 
way the African game is organised, financed and managed. I have focused on the 
actions and motivations of club officials and to a lesser extent those who run FAs 
and FA Committees. Club and FA officials, however, are more often than not 
interchangeable as club officials tend to occupy positions within the wider foot-
ball bureaucracy. In running the game, these club and FA officials – whom I 
have labelled Big Men – tend to put their own interests above that of the game. 
This, in turn, has had an adverse effect on the development of football in Africa. 
I have approached these Big Men’s personal interests from the angle of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s forms of capital, i.e. symbolic, social and economic capital. Football 
offers opportunities for individuals as well as groups to convert and accumulate 
capital. At one end of the spectrum there are the community-based clubs. 
Generally speaking, these clubs are widely supported and very popular, which 
means that they own all forms of capital. On the other end of the spectrum are 
one-man shows. These clubs are often relatively rich in economic capital but less 
so in terms of symbolic and social capital. Big Men wishing to convert capital 
thus typically (want to) become attached to community-based clubs. From a Big 
Man’s point of view, Africa’s national teams offer opportunities to convert all 
three forms of capital. 
Football is a means by which Big Men are able to enhance their status, pres-
tige and popularity. In other words, their involvement in the game can lead to an 
accumulation of symbolic capital for themselves and the wider community. This 
is mainly due to the game’s massive appeal, whether based on ethnic, national-
istic or other sentiments. Football is also a vehicle through which Big Men can 
acquire social capital and, by implication, political capital. Big Men use the game 
as a stepping stone to a political career and, vice versa, politicians are involved in 
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clubs and national teams. In many cases, clubs maintain connections with poli-
tical parties. Finally, Big Men are able to increase their economic capital through 
football either by setting up clubs as businesses or by getting involved in the 
international player transfer market. 
These Big Men’s attempts at converting and accumulating capital has affected 
the game in Africa in no small way. First of all, football in Africa is organised, 
financed and managed by Big Men who resort to patronage politics to gain and 
maintain power. As widespread poverty is a reality in the majority of countries 
on the continent, clubs by and large depend on the economic capital brought in 
by businessmen and other wealthy benefactors. In turn, these Big Men regard 
clubs as their personal property in the sense that they act as the organisation’s 
sole power broker. In hiring staff, they tend to overlook relevant qualifications 
and experience in favour of kinship, friendships and political affiliations. These 
Big Men also resist attempts at professionalising the game for fear of losing 
power.  
As a result, clubs and leagues in Africa are stuck in a vicious circle. Clubs are 
run by Big Men in an ad-hoc, semi-amateur fashion which makes it difficult to 
attract sponsorships. Most top league teams do not own proper training facilities 
and cannot afford to pay players decent wages. Practically every footballer 
therefore tries to earn a contract at a club outside the continent. The exodus of 
players to Europe and elsewhere causes Africa’s top leagues to be bereft of the 
most talented players. Fans increasingly turn their backs on their countries’ lea-
gues and instead watch European football on television. Empty stadiums lead to 
dwindling gate proceeds and also scare away sponsors. Most clubs therefore 
cannot sustain themselves and depend on Big Men for survival, at which point 
the circle starts all over again.  
The situation is made worse by incompetent and corrupt FA officials. Several 
leagues in Africa are sponsored by companies in various fields. League money 
nevertheless does not appear to adequately trickle down to the clubs. From all 
indications it seems that a lot of money disappears into the pockets of the Big 
Men who run FAs and League Boards. This is most visible with regard to the 
deplorable state of Africa’s football infrastructures. Also, many top FA officials 
owe their positions to personal and political connections. As a result, leagues are 
more often than not run in an amateur fashion. One notable example includes the 
continuous cancellations of league matches due to failure on the part of FA offi-
cials to create decent fixtures. This is why companies often think twice before 
taking up sponsorship. 
Another obstacle to the development of football in Africa is the fact that 
matches are often played dishonestly. Big Men influence matches in order to be 
able to convert forms of capital. Football is about winning titles and trophies. In 
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Africa, winning a match, league or tournament often literally means a victory in 
the political domain. As a consequence, Big Men often fix matches, employ 
spiritualists for juju rituals, and encourage home crowds to harass and/or beat up 
referees and opponents. In fact, match-fixing and juju practices even increase 
violence. Again, one notices a vicious circle as such illegal practices decrease the 
popularity of the game among ordinary fans and sponsors alike. Less money 
comes in, which negatively affects the development of infrastructures and the 
level of security. 
Leagues as a whole are also influenced by the phenomenon of Big Man 
politics, which is predicated on a combination of prestige, politics and power. It 
means that certain clubs receive favours while other clubs are harassed and 
obstructed by the football authorities. This is evident when it comes to the 
application of rules and regulations regarding promotion and relegation. Some 
teams fix matches and resort to violence and get away with it. Moreover, these 
teams hardly ever find themselves in the relegation zone because they maintain 
connections with (politically) powerful people. Other teams complain about be-
ing consistently heckled throughout the league season. Here too, Big Man poli-
tics negatively influences the overall popularity and credibility of domestic lea-
gues. 
I have painted a picture of powerful elites who use football to enrich them-
selves in various ways. They are businessmen, company directors, politicians, 
civil servants, traditional rulers and former footballers, among others. Granted, 
many of these Big Men (and a few Big Women) love the game and get involved 
partly because they feel obliged to their communities, partly because they feel 
honoured to do so. Many of them really want to win titles and trophies in an 
honest way. In Kenya, several top clubs even broke away from an FA they 
perceived to be corrupt and biased. In Ghana and Cameroon, I have met several 
club officials who wanted nothing but the “powers that be” to disappear. One 
Ghanaian sports presenter and former club official told me that he and others 
were ‘waiting for some powerful people to die’.  
The powerful Big Men in football nevertheless find themselves protected from 
different sides. First, they tend to form networks of like-minded Big Men in 
football. Anyone who crosses their path finds himself in some sort of trouble. 
‘You do not mess with these people,’ one club official in Ghana told me. 
Whistleblowers are normally threatened or, less commonly, molested or killed. 
Second, these Big Men commonly rely on support from powerful politicians 
who, in turn, often do not hesitate to intervene in football affairs. Third, those 
who occupy top positions in the football bureaucracy commonly receive protect-
ion from FIFA. This is because FIFA forbids outside, i.e. political meddling in 
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football affairs in terms of hiring/firing officials and investigating the football 
authorities. 
FIFA still adheres to the belief that football is played in a parallel world where 
politics and commerce do not influence the game. In this world, FA officials 
always act “for the good of the game”. FAs, including the ones in Africa, are 
only accountable to FIFA. In practice, FA officials seem to be accountable to no 
one but themselves. In Africa, transparency and accountability have little mean-
ing as FA officials tend not to disclose their actions to the public. Governments 
in Africa nevertheless still make large financial contributions to their national 
teams. Any attempt at finding out how that money is spent, however, is followed 
by threats from FIFA to ban the country from international football. In a way, 
FIFA helps incompetent and corrupt FA officials to remain in positions of power. 
On the one hand, FIFA’s attempts to keep politics out of football should be 
applauded. On the other hand, FIFA itself does not seem overly inclined to check 
what FAs are up to. It is also worrying to see that the idea that football should be 
run by “football people” leads to conflicts of interests. Positions within FAs, FA 
Committees and League Boards are often taken by club officials who have vested 
interests in their own clubs. An investigation in Ghana in the late 1990s uncov-
ered a network of club and FA officials who conspired to sell players abroad and 
keep percentages of the transfer fees. They were able to do this because the 
CEOs of the clubs simultaneously took up positions within the relevant FA 
Committees, which made it easy to forge transfer certificates.  
Football in Africa is heavily mixed up with money, politics and power. These 
influences have had a negative impact on leagues and national teams. Most im-
portantly, Big Men tend to give preference to short-term personal gain rather than 
long-term benefits for the game itself. This is evident in the numerous fights 
within the management teams of clubs as well as the top levels of FAs and 
Ministries of Sports. Big Men all want to be the top official of the organisation in 
order to control the forms of capital. Boardroom struggles within clubs and FAs 
tend to obstruct the smooth running of the game in Africa. This is especially 
visible in national teams. FA officials and government representatives always 
seem to disagree about the question who really owns these national teams. 
As symbolic capital par excellence, national teams are a playground for busi-
nessmen, politicians, military leaders and even presidents aspiring to become 
popular. Typical drawbacks in this respect are that everyone tends to intervene in 
the selection of national team players and the hiring/firing of national team 
coaches. In selecting players, ethno-politics occasionally plays a more important 
role than performance. The hiring of national team coaches is commonly pre-
dicated on short-term (political) gain. Relatively well-known foreign coaches are 
hired months before the start of a major international tournament, thereby leaving 
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them with little preparation time. Big Men fire these coaches for not living up to 
unrealistic expectations. In several cases, even reaching the semi-finals of the 
African Cup of Nations results in a lay-off. 
The manner in which Big Men prepare national teams for major international 
tournaments is characterised by incompetence, mismanagement and short-term 
thinking. Friendly matches and pre-tournament training camps often do not go as 
planned due to lack of organisational skills or corruption. For one thing, arrange-
ments are commonly made at the last possible minute. Also, Big Men generally 
put their own interests above that of the team. Accommodating FA officials, gov-
ernment representatives, business associates as well as their families and friends 
takes up a large portion of the overall budget. It regularly happens that match 
bonuses vanish into thin air, resulting in strikes and non-performance on the part 
of national team players. 
Apart from symbolic and social capital, the quest for economic capital also has 
an impact on leagues and tournaments. This is particularly true in relation to the 
international player transfer market. Africa’s talented players are regarded as 
commodities that can be sold for a handsome profit. As a consequence, Big Men 
want to be part of the managements of community-based clubs with the aim of 
getting close to the players. They influence team selection and undermine the 
authority of the coach. There are many one-man shows in Africa whose owners 
generally do not vie for titles and trophies. Instead, their main goal is to sell 
players. Their desire to make money often supersedes the welfare and well-being 
of the players. 
National teams commonly include marketable players who were selected to 
increase their chances of earning lucrative contracts. Their inclusion is influenced 
by the power of certain Big Men who either pay or pressurise the coach. Big 
Men, coaches, agents and players alike also resort to age cheats, meaning that a 
player’s official age is lowered so as to increase his market value. These things 
happen especially in relation to international youth tournaments. As a result of 
these attempts to accumulate economic capital, national teams do not necessarily 
consist of a country’s very best players. Moreover, youth squads tend to be 
comprised of overage players, thereby decreasing the progression of players from 
the youth level to the senior level. Finally, reports indicate that FA officials in 
Africa work under the influence of (Asian) gambling syndicates. 
Big Men generally do not appear to work to the benefit and development of 
football in Africa. On the contrary, football serves to satisfy the (short-term) 
needs of those who run it. It is evident that the game offers Big Men many oppor-
tunities to convert symbolic, social and economic capital. There are thus plenty 
of incentives for Big Men not to play according to the rules. There are also plenty 
of motives for Big Men not to disclose their activities. This lack of transparency 
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prevents outsiders from finding out what actually transpires at the boardroom 
level of clubs and FAs. As long as these Big Men are not held accountable by 
anyone but themselves, it is difficult to see football in Africa progressing in the 
near future. 
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